

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

Volume V, Issue 5
October 2017

A JOURNAL OF THE

TRI **TERRORISM RESEARCH INITIATIVE**
Enhancing Security through Collaborative Research

Table of Contents

Welcome from the Editors.....	1
-------------------------------	---

Articles

Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps.....	2
--	---

by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis

The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric.....	12
---	----

by Ariel Koch

Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists' Targeting Preferences in Europe.....	24
--	----

by Cato Hemmingby

Research Notes

On and Off the Radar: Tactical and Strategic Responses to Screening Known Potential Terrorist Attackers.....	41
--	----

by Thomas Quiggin

Resources

Terrorism Bookshelf.....	50
--------------------------	----

Capsule Reviews by Joshua Sinai

Bibliography: Terrorist Organizations: Cells, Networks, Affiliations, Splits.....	67
---	----

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Bibliography: Life Cycles of Terrorism.....	107
---	-----

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

Academic Theses (Ph.D. and MA) on Terrorism and Counterterrorism-Related Issues, written in English between 2013 and 2017	140
---	-----

Compiled and selected by Ryan Scrivens

Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects.....	152
---	-----

Compiled and selected by Berto Jongman

About Perspectives on Terrorism.....	179
--------------------------------------	-----

Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XI, Issue 5 (October 2017) of Perspectives on Terrorism at <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com>. Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University's Campus The Hague. Now in its eleventh year, Perspectives on Terrorism has nearly 7,600 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

Here is a brief look at the contents of the current issue:

The first article by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis explore the phenomenon of violent extremism in prisons, highlighting the most important research findings in recent years. Then Ariel Koch describes the symbolism and rhetoric of contemporary right-wing extremists in Europe and North America, noting their description of those who disagree with them as “treacherous” or “disloyal” in their calls for violence against Muslims, immigrants and left-wing or moderate elements of society. And Cato Hemmingby examines the targeting preferences of militant Islamists in Western Europe, where he finds conservative tendencies and no significant differences between al-Qaida and Islamic State-linked perpetrators.

This issue of Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) also features a Research Note by Thomas Quiggin, who calls for a strategic (i.e., more than tactical) European response to Islamist ideology.

In the Resources section the reader will find a column of 30 short book reviews by Joshua Sinai, followed by two extensive bibliographies compiled by the journal's Information Resources Editor, Judith Tinnes. Then Ryan Scrivens provides a list of academic theses on terrorism and counterterrorism completed over the past five years. And the issue concludes with a detailed list of recent online, open-source publications on terrorism and counterterrorism, compiled by web analyst Berto Jongman.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism was jointly prepared by editor James J.F. Forest and associate editor Aaron Zelin, with assistance from Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, the editor-in-chief of the journal.

Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps

by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis

Abstract

Over the past decade, government policy has repeatedly identified prisons as particularly important environments in terms of both the risks of radicalisation and of opportunities for de-radicalisation. This paper provides an overview of some of the most important research findings that have emerged on prison and violent extremism in recent years. Drawing on this research, the article synthesises and assesses the dominating themes and views in the literature. The paper also identifies a number of significant knowledge gaps that deserve further scholarly attention.

Keywords: prison, prisoners, detention, radicalisation, de-radicalisation

Introduction

In recent years, the role of prisons in countering violent extremism has received increasing scholarly and political priority. [1] With prisons often being portrayed and widely viewed as ‘hotbeds’ of radicalisation, researchers have devoted growing attention to examining the challenges and opportunities that arise with the presence of violent extremist offenders within prison systems. The literature in this area now covers a broad range of issues. Whereas the first publications focused mainly on understanding the risks and dynamics behind prisoner radicalisation[2], more recently authors have started focusing on more technical challenges, such as risk assessment and classification, management strategies, and rehabilitation and reintegration approaches. [3]

This paper aims to provide an overview of some of the most important findings that have emerged in the field in recent years. Given the vast amount of publications and the breadth of relevant issues, we highlight and synthesise some of the dominating themes and views in the literature. Finally, the paper also seeks to identify a number of important remaining knowledge gaps that deserve further scholarly attention.

Religion and Ideology in Prison

Traditionally, religion and ideology have played an important role in prison, and criminologists have long recognised that religious or ideological commitment can have substantial benefits for inmates.[4] Especially for first-offenders, imprisonment can be a disheartening experience. Adopting a belief system can help inmates adopt a new, more positive identity, give purpose and meaning to their prison experience, cope with feelings of guilt and shame, and gain a sense of control and self-significance while in prison.[5]

Scholars on prisoner radicalisation have likewise noted the positive effects of religious or ideological conversion for prisoners, and tend to agree that conversion among inmates is common but that radicalisation towards violent extremism, although potentially dangerous, is very rare. For instance, based on extensive research in the U.S., Mark Hamm concludes that prison conversions mostly “did more good than harm and sometimes even served a de-radicalisation agenda.”[6] Similarly, in an in-depth study among inmates in a UK-based high-security prison, Liebling and colleagues note that religion can offer moral and social guidelines for inmates and help them make sense of their imprisonment.[7]

As such, although it is undisputed that violent extremism can create real and serious security concerns within the correctional system, most authors seem to agree that religion generally has a positive effect on inmates and that, in most prisons, radicalisation is a rare phenomenon.

Causes and dynamics of prisoner radicalisation

Arguably, the majority of publications in the field set out to identify the key contextual factors that appear to make inmates vulnerable to violent extremism. It is generally accepted that radicalisation primarily stems from a combination of institutional, social, and individual factors, such as overcrowding and deprivation, violence and group dynamics, and a desire for protection and belonging.[8] In particular, two factors appear to stand out in the discussion on what drives inmates towards violent extremist ideologies and groups: overcrowding and charismatic leadership.

Overcrowding is a common problem in many prisons around the world, and is often seen as one of the central causes behind inmate misconduct and recidivism.[9] Overcrowding creates stress and induces inmates to flock together in subgroups, which compete over scarce resources and social status. Especially in prisons with high levels of disorder and violence, inmates may be inclined or even forced to join a group for protection or access to otherwise unattainable goods. Under such conditions, inmates may become susceptible to the influence of violent extremist groups or ideologies, which may offer social and moral support to deal with the ordeals of imprisonment.

Overcrowded, chaotic, and under-resourced prisons in turn pave the way for charismatic extremist leaders to organise social groups and impose extremist belief systems upon their followers. The role of charismatic leaders is emphasised in the majority of recent publications on prisoner radicalisation. Hamm, in particular, stresses how charismatic leaders select vulnerable inmates and use one-on-one proselytization to recruit groups of followers.[10] Liebling and colleagues describe a similar dynamic in the UK, where charismatic Muslim “key-players” target search for ‘lost’ inmates and offer themselves as trustworthy guides, propagating Islam as a means to find an identity and meaning in life.[11]

One problem, however, with the discussion around the causes of radicalisation within prison is that the evidence base has tended to be anecdotal. Current theories on prison radicalisation are almost entirely based on an analysis of a small number of case studies of radicalisation within prison, combined with a theoretical assessment of likely drivers which draws primarily on the wider literature on radicalisation and also frequently on the literature around prison gangs.[12]

Some much older research has explored how prison can act as an environment for increasing the politicisation of terrorist prisoners. For example, Colin Crawford’s interview survey of 70 paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland found that imprisonment increased their level of political awareness (e.g. “we hadn’t a clue about republicanism”). What is particularly interesting is that Crawford also found that this increasing political awareness led most of the prisoners (70%) to eventually believe that a political settlement to the conflict was the only logical solution (rather than continued violence).[13] In this respect then, the prison experience was associated with elements of de-radicalisation rather than increased radicalisation.

More recent research has illustrated that prison can also be associated with increased radicalisation among terrorist prisoners. In a study focused on detained terrorist suspects in the Philippines, Arie Kruglanski and his collaborators were able to survey 29 prisoners suspected of membership of the Abu Sayyaf group, and carried out a follow-up survey two years later with the same prisoners.[14] The study found that radicalisation increased among the prisoners over the two year period, with the prisoners on average scoring higher across three different measures of radicalisation (‘Islamic Extremism’, ‘Support for Violence’ and ‘Negative Attitudes to the West’). Significantly, the effects were strongest for younger prisoners, unmarried prisoners, and prisoners without children. Perhaps unexpectedly, their attitudes to their prison experience or to prison guards showed no link with increased radicalisation. Prisoners with more negative attitudes were not more likely to become increasingly radicalised. The research also found that prisoners with a high need for cognitive closure were less likely to radicalise than those with a low need. The research team drew attention to the context in which the prisoners were held: the prisoners were all held together in the same compound where they and many other suspected Abu Sayyaf members (including senior figures) had unlimited social interaction.

Management and Allocation of Violent Extremist Offenders Within the Prison System

When it comes to appropriate management and allocation strategies for violent extremist prisoners, a question that frequently arises is whether radicalised inmates can best be integrated into the mainstream inmate population, or whether they should be segregated in separate high-security facilities. Several countries, like the USA, Australia, and the Netherlands have opted for concentration policies, whereas others generally disperse violent extremist offenders across a small number of high-security facilities.[15] Others such as Spain operate a mixed policy, dispersing prisoners belonging to the Basque group ETA, but concentrating Jihadi terrorists.[16]

The UK is increasingly moving to a mixed approach. In Northern Ireland, paramilitary prisoners have always been concentrated. Before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement such prisoners were held in HMP The Maze. Following the closure of that prison as part of the peace process, paramilitary prisoners are now concentrated instead at HMP Maghaberry. In England and Wales, Jihadi prisoners have traditionally been spread among the small number of high security prisons. The Acheson review in 2016 concluded that “Islamist Extremism (IE) was a growing problem within prisons.”[17] This view was not shared by the National Offender Management Service, at the time, which could highlight the low re-offending rate for former terrorist prisoners and the rarity of cases of individuals radicalised in prison in England and Wales who are subsequently convicted of terrorist offences. Nevertheless, the Acheson conclusions chimed with public perceptions and ultimately the government introduced one of the key recommendations: the creation of specialist “separation centres” to isolate terrorist prisoners from the rest of the prison population.[18] Three centres are being established, each located in a high security prison, and with a combined capacity for up to 28 prisoners. There are over 130 Jihadi-related prisoners in England and Wales, so most will still remain outside of the new segregation system.

The first of the centres was opened in July 2017, but researchers have already raised concerns. Drawing on interviews with former British Jihadi prisoners, Tam Hussein highlighted that the ability of terrorist prisoners to radicalise other prisoners in British jails was widely overestimated, and what was significantly underestimated was how exposure to other prisoners actually moderated the views of most extremist prisoners. As one interviewee reported:

I really think that in my time in prison most of the Mojo's [Muhajiroon] realised they had made errors from being in prison and actually being forced to mix for once. They couldn't isolate like they do on the outside... no one took Mojo Dawah [proselytisation] seriously, and they ended up all...becoming much more mainstream.[19]

John Horgan, arguably the leading international expert on terrorist disengagement and de-radicalisation, has been scathing in his assessment of the separation centres:

The idea of segregating radical prisoners from the rest of the prison population is a terrible idea. In an attempt to solve one problem it will create another, focusing and amplifying radicalization rather than curbing it...It reeks of a knee-jerk political response and just isn't very smart. Smart monitoring, supervision, program development, resourcing and staff training represent far better solutions.[20]

However, as yet, limited concrete evidence exists on the downsides and benefits of both strategies. Clearly, context is very important, but it is unclear which strategy may work best and under which circumstances.

On the one hand, housing violent extremist offenders together may be cost-efficient and minimise the risk of proselytization. However, Veldhuis evaluated the Dutch terrorism detention policy to concentrate terrorism offenders in specialised ‘terrorism wings’ and found that there was no substantial evidence that concentration was a necessary and helpful response to violent extremism.[21] Similarly, speaking in relation to the Australian policy for also separating terrorist prisoners Sofia Patel has warned that “the assumption that creating an exclusive wing for terrorist offenders will curb the spread of their ideology is inaccurate at best, and counter-productive at worst.” Moreover, concentration policies can produce undesired side-effects, such as intensifica-

tion of extremist ideologies and networks. They can also enhance the prisoners' ability to plan and orchestrate activities both within the prison and with elements beyond the prison walls. Northern Ireland, for example, provides many such examples including mass escapes, riots, weapon smuggling, co-ordinated hunger strikes, the intimidation and assassination of prison staff, and sophisticated campaigns of political protest. [22].

On the other hand, in their study in the Philippines, Jones and Morales found that integrating terrorists into a gang-dominated prison culture may (temporarily) promote disengagement and encourage de-radicalisation.[23] Jones and Morales argue that, provided that inmate groups are constructively managed, integrating extremists into the general inmate population may create opportunities for positive reform. At the same time, however, integration may also increase the risk of recruitment and dispersion of violent extremist ideologies.

It is clear that what works in one country may not work in the next, and the preferred strategy is likely to depend on a range of contextual factors, such as background and size of the inmate population, available resources and staff, levels of violence and gang activity, and inmate culture. Individual characteristics can also be a factor. For example, charismatic, high profile prisoners, such as the Islamist ideologue Anjem Choudary who was jailed in the UK in 2016, could pose a special challenge for the prison authorities, likely presenting a greater potential risk of 'contagion' of ideology compared to someone less charismatic. It is perhaps no surprise then that Choudary was one of the first prisoners transferred to the newly opened segregation centres. [24]

Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programs in Prison

One of the most serious questions in this area relates to the effectiveness of prison-based programs which are designed to intervene with terrorist prisoners and to either de-radicalise and/or disengage them from violent extremism. This issue has attracted considerable (and growing) attention but good evidence about what works in this area remains scarce.[25] Most of the published studies to date have either been descriptive or theoretical.[26] These can provide useful insight into different approaches but are of very limited use in terms of determining, empirically, what impact the programs have.

Two recent studies, however, have shed important light on this area, and both are distinctive in that the research involved direct access to terrorist prisoners and ex-prisoners.

Zora Sukabdi's (2015) study was carried out in Indonesia and involved interviews and focus groups with 43 male prisoners and ex-prisoners most of whom had belonged to Jama'a Islamiya (JI) or an affiliate organisation.[27] The sample included a spread of membership ranging from low ranking individuals to senior leadership. At the time of the interviews and focus groups all of the men were identified as having disengaged from supporting violence and illegal activity. A key focus from Sukabdi's research was to shed light on the disengagement and de-radicalisation experiences of the prisoners, and to also assess their views on what factors made prison-based de-radicalisation programs effective or not. While Indonesian authorities have tried a variety of approaches to de-radicalise terrorist prisoners, overall, the effectiveness of Indonesian efforts in this regard have been considered poor by most reviews.[28] De-radicalisation approaches in Indonesia have tended to focus on four elements: (1) isolating prisoners who are engaging in de-radicalisation programs from other terrorist prisoners; (2) providing practical incentives for prisoners to engage, including holding them in better conditions and by providing economic assistance for them and their families; (3) using former militants to debate with current prisoners the ideology, rationales and justifications for violence; and (4) running workshops to tackle issues such as anger management but also to develop practical skills for future employment and provide new social relationships outside the terrorist network.[29] Thus, Sukabdi's study offered some potentially useful insight in terms of what lessons might be taken away to inform future efforts both in Indonesia and elsewhere.

The study found that shock experiences in the prisoners' lives (e.g. the experience of being arrested; seeing family members and friends pursued and arrested by the authorities) was cited by a majority of prisoners as a trigger for behavioural transformation away from violence. Though Sukabdi did not highlight it, this finding very much echoes some of the key findings from Cusson and Pinsonneault's (1986) highly influential research

on desistance from general crime.[30] Cusson and Pinsonneault identified a series of stages through which the offender progressed before deciding to abandon criminal activity, with the first factor being a shock stage resulting from aversive experiences as a result of the criminal activity.

Also significant was the prisoners' awareness of an ideological change based on their understanding the contexts of *daar al harb* (state of war) and *daar as salam* (state of peace) and coming to see Indonesia as a country where war was inappropriate. 23% of the prisoners also highlighted meeting the victims of terrorist bombings as a transformative experience.

There was also some fascinating insight in terms of the prisoners' views of what was needed to make an effective rehabilitation programme. In terms of development needs at the start of the interventions, personal self-empowerment was flagged by almost all as a key issue. No doubt partly linked to this, the prisoners also had an overwhelming emphasis on developing vocational skills which would allow them to gain employment, develop their own businesses and be economically self-sufficient after release. Characteristics which were important with the staff running the programme were, first and foremost, a strong knowledge of Islam, followed then by an ability to work in a positive, genuine and respectful manner with the prisoners.

While Sukabdi's study gives a fascinating insight into the views of prisoners who have been the focus of de-radicalisation programs, a far larger study in Sri Lanka provides us with valuable data on the effectiveness of such programs. Kruglanski and colleagues focused on the experience of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) detainees.[31] After decades of conflict, the LTTE was comprehensively defeated in 2009 and approximately 12,000 LTTE members were captured. The Sri Lankan government introduced large-scale programs to rehabilitate these prisoners.[32] Key elements included:

Hard core members of the LTTE who remained highly committed to the cause were separated from the rest of the prisoner population, so that they were not able to actively try to undermine the rehabilitation programme.

The authorities did not refer to the LTTE members as "prisoners" or "detainees". Instead, they were referred to as "beneficiaries." [33] It was believed that this language had more positive connotations and would help foster better relations with staff, and creates a different and more positive self-image for the "beneficiaries" themselves.

Prisoners were encouraged to take part in a variety of activities designed to encourage individual development. This included taking part in yoga to develop spiritual insight, and artistic activities to facilitate individual expression. The emphasis on individual development in these programs, was designed to counteract the heavy collectivistic and group focus which dominated the prisoners' time in the LTTE.

Prisoners also took part in vocational programs, which were designed to develop skills that would help the prisoners to successfully reintegrate into society after their release. These programs included courses on construction, electronics and carpentry, as well as courses on cosmetics and the clothes industry specifically for female prisoners.

Kruglanski and colleagues carried out evaluations of the impact of the rehabilitation programme, and indeed, this evaluation is probably the most rigorous currently available.[34] The evaluation involved 1906 prisoners based across six different centres. Crucially, the researchers were able to compare this sample with a control sample of 152 LTTE prisoners at another institution who for logistical reasons were not able to be part of the rehabilitation programme.

The evaluation showed a significant drop in support for continued political violence among prisoners who experienced the rehabilitation programme compared to those who did not. Similarly, prisoners in the programme showed a significant increase in positive attitudes towards the staff running the centres. Overall, the evaluation showed a positive impact of the rehabilitation programme even among more hardcore individuals among the LTTE prisoners.

The rehabilitation programme overall was seen as very successful, and there were periodic mass releases of prisoners who had taken part in the programme. By the end of 2011, only about 1000 LTTE prisoners remained in detention, and by 2015 only about 100 of the original 12,000 still remained in prison.

Overall, the study provides clear evidence that rehabilitation programs can have a positive impact, and do result in significant differences compared to not running such programs for terrorist prisoners. The study does not allow us to pick apart the impact of different elements of the programme, but it provides an important milestone in evidence in this area. The extent to which the conclusion can be applied with confidence in other contexts while promising is unclear. For a start, one factor is that the LTTE had a nationalist/separatist motivation and wanted to establish a new country for Sri Lanka's Tamil minority in the north and east of the island. After decades of conflict, the LTTE was comprehensively defeated in 2009. Following this, the government maintained a very strong military presence in areas previously under LTTE control with a focus on preventing the re-emergence of pro-LTTE group. Thus, the prison programs took place in a context where the wider conflict had effectively ended, a context which almost certainly assisted rather than hindered the impact of the programs. There is also a question as to what extent ethno-nationalist motivations (versus for example religious motivations) affects the susceptibility of prisoners to interventions?

The Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders

In recent years, concerns over recidivism among violent extremist ex-prisoners and returned foreign fighters have spurred attention for rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders. Research on post-release and probation programs for ex-prisoners has been limited to date, though there has been a recent upsurge in interest.[35] Most of the recent papers however have been review studies which have highlighted some of the significant issues, but evaluative or impact assessments have been rare.

An exception is the study by Schuurman and Bakker, which provided an evaluation of a Dutch reintegration programme for detainees on probation or parole who were involved in jihadist extremism or terrorism, or individuals who were suspected of involvement in such activities and who were about to be released from detention.[36] All of the individuals targeted by the "project adhered to an extremist interpretation of Islam commonly designated as Salafi-Jihadism." Schuurman and Bakker evaluated the programme over a one-year period between 2013 and 2014, drawing primarily on a series of interviews with staff involved in running the programme.

The number of offenders on the programme was small at just five individuals, and overall, the study assessed the programme as having a mixed impact. While the general framework of the programme was judged to be theoretically sound, the most serious setback occurred when two of the five offenders managed to leave the Netherlands and travel to Syria to join Islamist militant groups (both were believed to later have been killed in combat). Of the remaining three offenders, staff judged that one had de-radicalised, one had disengaged but still held radical beliefs, and the third was assessed as probably not having been radicalised to begin with.

The evaluation also highlighted a variety of obstacles the programme faced in its operation, in particular, problematic relationships with key stakeholder partners such as the Public Prosecution Service and civil authorities; staff in support agencies lacked appropriate understanding or knowledge around extremist offenders; and, staff running the programme frequently reported a lack of line management support which added significantly to stress and workload levels.

Overall, while the evaluation was hardly a ringing endorsement for the work, Schuurman and Bakker nevertheless felt that many of the setbacks were the result of teething problems as the programme was being established, and they flagged a variety of areas where improvements were being noticed by the end of the evaluation period. The evaluation also flagged potential issues that should be considered when other reintegration and resettlement programs were being developed elsewhere. First, was the crucial importance of clear communication around the programme and of ensuring strong buy-in from key stakeholders. A second major issue was how to define and measure the success of such programs. Much attention in terms of judging success is focused on rates of recidivism, but Schuurman and Bakker argued that a 100% success rate was not

reasonable and that “with a process as complicated as the reintegration (violent) extremists, upsets are almost inevitable.”

The Major Research Gaps

In general, authors tend to agree that although a vast amount of scholarly and policy attention has been paid to violent extremism in the correctional system, the amount and quality of empirical research into the matter is still insufficient.

In part, the lack of evidence may be caused by conceptual and methodological difficulties. Social phenomena such as radicalisation, recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration are not only hard to conceptualise, they are equally hard to measure. In part, the problem is also that prisoners in general and violent extremist offenders, in particular, comprise a difficult research population. They are by definition isolated from society and not easily accessible for researchers, they may be reluctant to talk openly or may not be allowed or willing to be interviewed at all.[37] Consequently, there are still a number of issues that are underexplored and require further research:

There is little empirical scrutiny of the underlying social and psychological dynamics behind prisoner radicalisation. Several studies have set out to identify the factors that may be conducive to radicalisation, such as overcrowding, gang dynamics, and the presence of charismatic extremist leaders. Although useful, such accounts fail to explain why, when confronted with the same prison conditions, some people radicalise while others do not. In order to accurately identify those individuals at risk, empirical research is needed that aims to disentangle the social and psychological *mechanisms* by which contextual conditions may lead to radicalisation in some, but not in others.

Further work is also needed to understand disengagement from violence within prison. Though it is often overlooked a growing body of work illustrates that disengagement frequently occurs among imprisoned terrorists. Indeed, this may be norm for most terrorist prisoners even when prisoners are not exposed to or involved with de-radicalisation programs or other interventions.[38] The dynamics behind this need greater examination.

More research is required into the dynamics behind violent extremist inmate groups or gangs. It is often suggested that inmate groups play an important role in spreading violent extremist ideologies through prison; and more information is needed about the conditions under which extremist groups arise, how they recruit new members, and what their status position is within the broader inmate population. Moreover, as Jones and Morales suggested, inmate groups can play a positive role in maintaining order and structure within the inmate population.[39] As such, it is important to examine how prison staff can positively intervene in group dynamics.

There is a serious lack of good evaluative studies on prison and probation programs aimed at terrorist offenders. Most programs which have been developed appear not to be evaluated. Others receive partial evaluations which often tend to focus on process key performance indicators rather than impact. Often when evaluations have been carried out, the findings are not published or made available, making independent scrutiny and assessment of the evaluation or its conclusions exceptionally difficult. Inevitably this means that there is a serious lack of ‘what works’ evidence in this area. More impact assessments are badly needed.

There is little research into juvenile violent extremist offenders, and how (if at all) they should be treated differently from adult violent extremist offenders. Juveniles and teenagers make up a substantial proportion of the violent extremist offender population, yet many countries do not differentiate in their approaches toward adults and juvenile violent extremist offenders.

There is little knowledge about the challenges that violent extremists face when they are released from prison, and about the dynamics behind violent extremist recidivism. It is well known that ex-prisoners face a range of challenges upon their release, and it is likely that violent extremists face similar and maybe unique additional reintegration problems, such as stigmatisation and difficulties finding employment. Moreover, it

is imperative to examine in detail how conditions of confinement (e.g., concentration or integration, regime, security levels) impact post-release radicalisation and recidivism dynamics.

About the Authors: Professor Andrew Silke is based at the University of East London. He has a background in criminology and forensic psychology and has published extensively on issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism. His recent books include the edited collection *Prisons, terrorism and extremism: Critical issues in management, radicalisation and reform* (Routledge 2014).

Dr. Tinka Veldhuis is an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). Her research interests are radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. In particular, she focuses on detention and reintegration of terrorist offenders and on radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes in prison. Her book *Prisoner radicalization and terrorism detention policy* was published by Routledge in 2016.

Notes

[1] For example, see: Mark Hamm. *The spectacular few: Prisoner radicalization and terrorism in the post-9/11 era*. New York: New York University Press, 2013; Clarke Jones. 'Are prisons really schools for terrorism? Challenging rhetoric on prisoner radicalization.' *Punishment & Society*, 16, (2014): 74-103; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons*. Vienna: United Nations, 2016; Ryan Williams, RAN P&P Practitioners' working paper *Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation*. Amsterdam: Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016.

[2] For example: James Brandon. *Unlocking al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons*. London: Quilliam Foundation, 2009; Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck & Jennifer Rubin. *Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners*. Santa Barbara: RAND Corporation, 2008; Bert Useem & Obie Clayton. 'Radicalization of US prisoners.' *Criminology & Public Policy* 8, no. 3 (2009): 561-592.

[3] Hamed El-Said. *New Approaches to Fight Violent Extremism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalisation and Deradicalisation Programs in Muslim Majority States & Western Democracies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Peter Neumann. *Prisons and terrorism. Radicalisation and de-radicalisation in 15 countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010; Andrew Silke. *Prisons, terrorism and extremism: Critical issues in management, radicalisation and reform*. Oxon: Routledge, 2014.

[4] For example: John Lofland & Rodney Stark. 'Becoming a world-saver: A theory of religious conversion.' *American Sociological Review*, 30, (1965): 862-874. See also Jim Thomas & Barbara Zaitzow. 'Conning or Conversion? The Role of Religion in Prison Coping.' *The Prison Journal*, 86, (2004): 242-259.

[5] Shadd Maruna, Louise Wilson & Kathryn Curran. 'Why God is often found behind bars: prison conversion and the crisis of self-narrative.' *Research in Human Development*, 3, (2006): 161-184.

[6] Mark Hamm. *Locking up terrorists: Three models for controlling prisoner radicalization*, (2011) p 4. Retrieved from: www.ind-state.edu/ccj/crinst/Locking%20Up%20Terrorists.docx.

[7] Alison Liebling, Helen Arnold and Christina Straub. *Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on*. London: National Offender Management Service, 2012. P.60.

[8] For example, James Brandon. *Unlocking al-Qaeda*; Mark Hamm. *Locking up terrorists*; Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington and Peter James Bell. 'The radicalisation of prison inmates: a review of the literature on recruitment, religion and prisoner vulnerability.' *Journal of Human Security* 9, no. 1 (2013): 4-14.

[9] For example, David Farrington and Christopher P. Nuttall. 'Prison size, overcrowding, prison violence, and recidivism.' *Journal of Criminal Justice* 8, no. 4 (1980): 221-231; see also James Beckford, Daniele Joly, and Farhad Khosrokhavar. *Muslims in prison: Challenge and change in Britain and France*. Basingstoke, Hampshire (UK): Palgrave Macmillan; Clarke Jones. 'Are prisons really schools for terrorism?'; Farhad Khosrokhavar. 'Radicalization in prison: The French case.' *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 14, no. 2 (2013): 284-306; Humberto Trujillo, Javier Jordán, Jose Antonio Gutierrez and Joaquin Gonzalez-Cabrera. 'Radicalization in pris-

ons? Field research in 25 Spanish prisons.' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 4 (2009): 558-579.

[10] Mark Hamm. 'Prisoner radicalization: Assessing the threat in US correctional institutions.' *NIJ Journal* 261 (2008): 14-19; Mark Hamm. 'Prison Islam in the age of sacred terror.' *The British Journal of Criminology* 49, no. 5 (2009): 667-685; Mark Hamm. *Locking up terrorists*; Mark Hamm. *The spectacular few*.

[11] Alison Liebling, Helen Arnold and Christina Straub. *Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor*.

[12] Nathan Thompson. 'Root Cause Approach to Prisoner Radicalisation.' *Salus Journal* 4, no. 3 (2016): 18.

[13] Colin Crawford. *Defenders or Criminals: Loyalist Prisoners and Criminalisation*. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999.

[14] Arie Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Anna Sheveland, Maxim Babush, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, Michele Ng Bonto, and Rohan Gunaratna. 'What a difference two years make: Patterns of radicalization in a Philippine jail.' *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 9, no. 1-3 (2016): 13-36.

[15] For example, Peter Neumann, *Prisons and terrorism*.

[16] Manuel R. Torres Soriano. 'Prison Policy as an Anti-Terrorist Tool: Lessons from Spain.' In A. Silke (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism & Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*. Oxon: Routledge, 2014.

[17] Ian Acheson. *Summary of the main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice*. London: Ministry of Justice, 2016.

[18] Ministry of Justice. *Press release: Dangerous extremists to be separated from mainstream prison population*. 21 April 2017. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dangerous-extremists-to-be-separated-from-mainstream-prison-population>

[19] Tam Hussein. *Prison Radicalisation: Dealing with Muslim Inmates with Terror Convictions*. 13 February 2017. <http://www.tamhussein.co.uk/2017/02/prison-radicalisation-dealing-muslim-inmates-terror-convictions/>

[20] Alicia Buller. 'Segregation plan defended after UK prison system dubbed 'Harvard for radicals'.' *Arab News*. 17 September 2017. <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1162501/world>

[21] Tinka Veldhuis. *Captivated by fear. An evaluation of terrorism detention policy*. PhD dissertation. Groningen: The University of Groningen, 2015. See also: Tinka Veldhuis. *Prisoner radicalization and terrorism detention policy. Institutionalized fear or evidence-based policy making?* London: Routledge, 2016.

[22] See for example Jacqueline Bates-Gaston. 'Prisons and detention: Reflections on the Northern Ireland Experience.' In A. Silke (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. Oxon: Routledge, in press.

[23] Ben Farmer. 'Anjem Choudary moved to specialist new 'jihadi jail' unit for extremists.' *The Telegraph*. 23 July 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/23/anjem-choudary-moved-specialist-new-jihadi-jail-unit-extremists/>

[24] Clarke Jones and Resurrecion S. Morales. 'Integration versus segregation: A preliminary examination of Philippine correctional facilities for de-radicalization.' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35, no. 3 (2012): 211-228.

[25] For example, see: Gunaratna, Rohan, and Mohamed Bin Ali (eds.). *Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-terrorism*. London: Imperial College Press, 2015; Angel Rabasa, Stacie Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez and Christopher Boucek. *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. Santa Monica: Rand, 2011; Hamed El-Said. *New Approaches to Fight Violent Extremism*; Andrew Silke. *Prisons, Terrorism & Extremism*; and, Omar Ashour. *The Deradicalisation of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamic Movements*. Oxon: Routledge, 2009.

[26] For example, see Atta Barkindo and Shane Bryans. 'De-Radicalising Prisoners in Nigeria: developing a basic prison based de-radicalisation programme.' *Journal for Deradicalization* 7 (2016): 1-25.

[27] Zora Sukabdi. 'Terrorism in Indonesia: A review on rehabilitation and deradicalization.' *Journal of Terrorism Research* 6, no. 2 (2015), 36-56.

[28] Irfan Idris and Muh Taufiqurrohman. 'Current State of Indonesia's Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation Programme.' In R. Gunaratna and M. Bin Ali (eds.) *Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-terrorism*. London: Imperial College Press, 2015; and, Angel Rabasa, Stacie Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez and Christopher Boucek. *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*.

[29] Sulastri Osman. 'Radicalisation, Recidivism and Rehabilitation: Convicted terrorists and Indonesian prisons.' In A. Silke (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism & Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*. Oxon: Routledge.

[30] Maurice Cusson and Pierre Pinsonneault. 'The decision to give up crime.' In D.K. Cornish and R.V. Clarke (eds.), *The Reasoning Criminal*. New York: Springer Verlag, 1986: 72-86.

- [31] Arie Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Rohan Gunaratna, and Malkanthi Hettiarachchi. 'De-radicalising the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).' In A. Silke (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism & Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*. Oxon: Routledge, 2014; and, Michelle Dugas and Arie W. Kruglanski. 'The quest for significance model of radicalization: Implications for the management of terrorist detainees.' *Behavioral sciences & the law* 32, no. 3 (2014): 423-439.
- [32] Malkanthi Hettiarachchi. 'Sri Lanka's rehabilitation programme: The Humanitarian Mission Two.' In R. Gunaratna and M. Bin Ali (eds.) *Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-terrorism*. London: Imperial College Press, 2014.
- [33] Arie Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Rohan Gunaratna, and Malkanthi Hettiarachchi. 'De-radicalising the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'
- [34] Ibid.
- [35] See, for example: Kate Barrelle. 'Pro-integration: disengagement from and life after extremism.' *Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015): 129-142; Sarah Marsden. 'Conceptualising 'success' with those convicted of terrorism offences: Aims, methods, and barriers to reintegration.' *Behavioral sciences of terrorism and political aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015): 143-165; Ben Wilkinson. 'Do Leopards Change Their Spots? Probation, Risk Assessment and Management of Terrorism-Related Offenders on Licence in the UK.' In A Silke (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism & Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*. Oxon: Routledge, 2014.
- [36] Bart Schuurman & Edwin Bakker. 'Reintegrating jihadist extremists: evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014.' *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 66-85.
- [37] For example, Alison Liebling. 'Doing research in prison: Breaking the silence?' *Theoretical Criminology* 3, no. 2 (1999): 147-173.
- [38] See for example Colin Crawford. *Defenders or Criminals*; John Morrison. 'A Time to Think, A Time to Talk.'
- [39] Clarke Jones and Resurrecion S. Morales. 'Integration versus segregation.'

The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric

by Ariel Koch

Abstract

A new right-wing extremism is on the rise in contemporary Europe and North America. Those who embrace this ideology articulate extreme hatred towards the left, which they consider “treacherous” or “disloyal”, and towards Muslims and immigrants, and eventually are prone to violence against them. In Europe, a new movement known as the Counter Jihad Movement has emerged. It is exploiting jihadi terrorism and immigration in order to gain more support, mobilize people and justify their struggle on the Internet, on the streets and even in war zones like Syria and Iraq. This article will examine one of this new movement’s main characteristics: the use of crusader symbolism as a source of inspiration, activism and even justification of violence as a religious duty in Europe and in the Middle East.

Keywords: Right-Wing Extremism, Crusaders, Counter Jihad Movement, Jihadism, Political Violence

Introduction

In recent years Europe and North America have been experiencing an increase in extreme right wing violence, and as it seems, this wave is not about to fade away any time soon. Although Jihadi terrorism is attracting most of public and media attention, right wing terrorism and violence has become an acute problem. According to Daniel Koehler, the founder and director of the Berlin based Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies, “right-wing terrorism or racist political violence remains one of the most dangerous threats to Western democracies.”[1] As Koehler notes:

Although all available national and international statistics in Europe and North America show increasing trends in extreme right-wing violence/terrorism, the basic phenomenon is by no means new: both Europe and the United States have experienced significant extreme right-wing attacks and waves of violence during the past several decades.[2]

Nonetheless, according to Jacob Aasland Ravndal, a researcher at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) and the Center for Extremism Research at the University of Oslo, since the 1990s, extreme right terrorism and violence “has declined,” and nowadays it is carried out mostly by “unorganized gangs and lone actors.”[3] However, in the last two years Europe and North America have been suffering from right wing violence that targets immigrants, Muslims, and leftists.[4] Moreover, it seems like right wing vigilantes are flourishing across Europe,[5] and they are involved in hostile and violent activity against immigrants and Muslims at home and abroad.[6]

This article aims to analyze modes of mobilization within the new extreme right,[7] while focusing on Christian crusader symbols and rhetoric, and its use as a tool to direct anti-Muslim sentiment for a fight against those who persecute Christians, mainly the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS). What role does the Christian identity play in crystallizing the new extreme right? What symbols do right-wingers make use of and how do they see themselves? What characterizes the activity of these factors and what are the possible implications of this activity? In order to answer these questions, I will use textual, audio and video analysis of primary sources and I will rely on a variety of relevant studies, as well as on media reports.

One of the familiar and troubling phenomena of the war in Syria is that of foreign fighters leaving their countries and joining Islamist elements in the ranks of the rebels against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This phenomenon is troubling because in Syria these volunteer fighters absorb political-religious indoctrination, acquire practical knowledge in the use of weapons and gain combat experience. While most of the threat comes from Jihadists, in reality, it is not the only threat. Other extremist movements also motivate and mobilize volunteers for their struggle. Every movement has its specific reasons to fight against its enemies. And if foreign fighters from one extremist movement are capable of producing terror, as we saw in the Paris attacks in November 2015, surely militants from other movements can do the same.[8]

In regard to Jihadi terrorism and activity in the United States and Western Europe,[9] anti-Muslim sentiments (Islamophobia)—which embody a mixture of contemporary politics and medieval history[10]—have increased. In recent years, these sentiments were fueled by ISIS, whose persecution and murder of Christians in Syria and Iraq led to a phenomenon in which right wing elements use Christian symbolism and rhetoric to recruit and mobilize volunteers to fight against the “ancient enemy” of Christendom: The Muslims, and especially their Salafi-Jihadi representatives,[11] either in their homelands or abroad, in Syria and Iraq.

According to a research conducted by Tuck, Silverman and Smalley, some several hundreds of Anti-ISIS are fighting in Syria. The majority of them “did not self-identify a religious affiliation,” but “among those that did express religious sentiments there were a surprisingly large number of Christians [...] and a comparatively small number of Muslims.”[12] In other words, there is a movement of Christian volunteers to the battle-fronts of Syria and Iraq, and it is not baseless to assume that some of them are holding right wing stances. [13] Although Syria attracts the most attention, it is clear that the Ukrainian arena has long become a magnet for right wing extremists who can train, fight and acquire weapons for future assaults against their various enemies.[14] Both arenas require a separate in-depth studies.

The Extreme Right Use of the Internet

According to Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai, “the Internet is seen as allowing for the creation of a virtual community for groups and movements that can support existing physical networks while disseminating different ideologies.”[15] In addition, the extreme right makes an extensive use of the Internet, which enables the formation of a transnational community. Many websites contain multimedia content (i.e. videos, pictures, etc.) and include the availability to purchase products such as military clothing online.[16] Furthermore, these sites include a fundraising appeal and the possibility to do so online. Thus, these sites serve as a tool to raise financial support and volunteers—doctors, media personnel, fighters and weapons experts. Other studies also indicate the extensive use of the Internet by religious fundamentalists.[17]

Gabriel Weimann explains Jihadist extremists use of online platforms – and we can project it on other (non-Muslim) extremists as well – “used for operational purposes such as instruction and training, data mining, coordination, and psychological warfare.”[18] Moreover, a study by J. M. Berger shows that neo-Nazis and white supremacists are more active on Twitter than the supporters and activists of ISIS.[19] In accordance, it is important to note “White supremacist groups are part of a rising specter of far-right extremism mobilization across the United States and Europe.”[20]

The extreme right, as well as other political violent extremists learned how to mobilize and motivate the masses through social networks, and how to spread hatred via these tools.[21] Examples of this can be found in the “Defense Leagues”, which have appeared in recent years throughout Europe. The first “Defense League” was the English Defence League (EDL), a single-issue street movement, which began operating in 2009.[22] Through their Facebook page, that gained tens of thousands “Likes”, the EDL succeeded in mobilizing thousands for what they see as a struggle to prevent the “Islamization” of the United Kingdom (and Europe in general), particularly against “radical Islam”, when it is clear that they spread hatred against all Muslims.

The EDL is linked to various European and non-European Islamophobic-hate groups and movements which

have been supported and reinforced by right-wing elements in Europe and the United States. After the EDL gained public attention, the group inspired smaller but identical groups—the “Defense Leagues”—that formed throughout Europe and which, like the English branch, tried to mobilize people through Facebook pages and to demonstrate and march against Islam, Muslims and immigration.

All these groups form a transnational network that researchers such as Matthew Goodwin, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Hans Brun, and others, have described as the Counter Jihad Movement (CJM),[23] that is, in many aspects, echoing the “emerging pan-European extreme-right identity.”[24] The CJM was developed as a response to Jihadist terrorism and propaganda in the West,[25] where it continues to pose a significant threat, and which has led to the formation of a European Salafi-Jihadi groups that openly called to the Islamization of the West.[26] According to Roger Eatwell, this reflects the “cumulative extremism”, a process in which one type of extremism ignites other types of extremism.[27]

As Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun noted, there are three “serious problems” with the CJM narrative. First, although “it does not specifically call for violence,” it “includes a paranoid tendency towards conspiracy-theory”—for example, the idea of “Islamization”—which can be used “as inspiration for violent terrorist attacks.” Second, the CJM “can serve to incubate, protect and add a veneer of plausibility and acceptability to traditional forms of far-right xenophobia and extremism.” Besides that, “its amorphous nature and ability to tap into popular concerns about immigration, religion, terrorism and the economy increases the likelihood of violent confrontation and jeopardises Europe’s social fabric.”[28] This article argues that in fact, the CJM does call for violence, but indirectly, with its crusader discourse.

A New Christian Militancy in Europe?

Jonathan Sacks, the former chief rabbi of the UK, claimed that secularity is facing the growth of radical and extremist forms of religion, which became an important factor in the world and even within modern (and secular) Europe. He argues, “The twenty-first century will be the start of an age of de-secularization.”[29] One reason for this process is the demographic changes that occurred in Europe in recent years. Another reason is “the use of new electronic media” by “religious radicals.” A third reason is that religion, according to Sacks, offers a strong identity and sense of community: religion “offers meaning, direction, code of conduct and a set of rules for the moral and spiritual life,” which liberal democracies failed to supply.[30]

Contemporary extreme right in North America and Europe includes a variety of groups and movements. Some of them are religiously motivated, mainly by Christianity or paganism,[31] and all of them, nowadays, are sharing hatred to the “Muslim invaders.” Because of the religious nature of Salafi-Jihadism, we can assume that the answer to one’s religious extremism will be another’s religious extremism. This is the case of the CJM, that uses crusader symbols and rhetoric as an anti-thesis and reaction to Jihadism rhetoric and symbolism. Yet, it does not indicate that religion is the most prominent factor within the extreme right. Furthermore, as it seems, the real functions and purposes of the crusader symbolism are as a combination of motivation, religious awakening, and moral justification of violence, and, besides that, for propaganda, recruitment and mobilization.

According to Western right-wing extremists, Muslims nowadays try to conquer Europe as their ancestors did; for example, when they invaded the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and France, or when the Ottoman Turks occupied large parts of Eastern Europe and reached the “gates of Vienna.” In the end, it was always an alliance of Christians who fought the invaders and expelled them from Christian lands. Although in the past Muslims lived in Christian areas, or maintained trade relations with the Christians,[32] they never tried to reconquer those lands and did not challenge the authorities, until they could do so due to the freedom of expression given to the citizens of European liberal democracies.

These countries tried, in various ways, to integrate the Muslim communities among the (Christian) societies (for example, emphasizing what we know as “multiculturalism”).[33] According to research by the Migration

Policy Institute, “multiculturalism characterized as a feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music, and cuisine that exist in a multiethnic society.”[34] This multicultural approach, has “utterly failed,” as admitted by Angela Merkel, the German chancellor. Accordingly, senior politicians in France, England, the Netherlands and elsewhere have also expressed strong criticism against this approach.[35]

These politicians argued that multiculturalism allows separatism and lack of integration, which may eventually lead to religious extremism and hence to the rejection of the state, its institutions, symbols and laws; and even the willingness to use violence against its citizens. The failure to integrate Muslims into society led to unrest among many young Muslims, especially the second, third, and even fourth generation of immigrants. Many of these young Muslims, dubbed by Robert Leiken as Europe’s Angry Muslims, became the vanguards of Jihad within liberal European countries.[36]

These radical Muslim youths have united in various religious-political inter-connected groups and have begun to call publicly for an Islamic holy struggle (“Jihad”), using their right to demonstrate without fear of the authorities. Although this call was accepted by some European Muslims, it resonated also among their rivals. In this context, it should be noted that the idea of a Christian holy war (“crusade”), in response to the Jihad, is reverberating in the public discourse and is not alien to right wing circles in the West. “The idea that a war against infidels could be something sacred,” wrote one researcher, “in Christian history is clearly a Western development.”[37] One can discern such “holy” and militant currents in the Christian world that intensify whenever the real and imaginary conflict between the West and Islam continues; and so is the persecution of Christians in the Islamic world.

Extreme Right use of Crusader Symbolism and Rhetoric

Among the extreme right, the use of crusaders (and mainly the Templar Knights) motifs is not new. For example, the American white supremacist organization Ku Klux Klan (KKK) publishes a newspaper called The Crusader. In October 2016, three men were arrested in Kansas, USA, for planning attacks against Muslims. They called their group “The Crusaders.”[38] White supremacists are not the only ones in the extreme right who use Christian motifs as a source of justification for their struggle against Muslims. Similarly, individuals, groups and organizations identified with the CJM, which does not necessarily operate out of a racist view, also make use of crusader symbols and derive inspiration from those Christian knights.

Examples for this can be found with the “Defense Leagues,” whose symbol is the cross of Saint George, with the inscription “In Hoc Signo Vincens” (Under this sign we conquer), which used to be a Crusader slogan. In addition, in CJM circles, there is an extensive use of memes and photos of knights, many of whom are accompanied by a caption that threatens to execute a Crusade as a counter-response to Jihad, such as “Jihad Works Both Ways” or “I’ll See Your Jihad and I’ll Raise You One Crusade,” and others who call for a fight against the “Muslim invaders” as was done by their Christian ancestors.[39]

For example, on the Norwegian Defense League Facebook page there are many images of the crusaders. In a picture that was uploaded on July 18, 2015, a cross appears, and on its lower part a shield with crossed swords, and behind it, the inscription “Templar Knights D.K.”[40] Another example is in the Spanish Defense League (Liga de Defensa Española) Facebook page, in which many memes propagate militant Christian identity. One meme, uploaded on May 10, 2015, shows a Christian knight kneeling, with a sword in his hand, and supposedly saying: “I am not a racist, I am anti-Islam; There are Islamists from all races.”[41] The anti-Islamic crusade is necessary not only as a response to terrorism, but also in order to “preserve European Christian values, white Europeans need to gather forces to fight Islam and Muslims, instead of being fragmented across Europe.”[42]



Figure 1: “I am not racist, I am Anti-Islam,” from the Spanish Defence League Facebook page [screenshot]

In this context, it should be noted that Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian Pan-European nationalist who murdered seventy-seven people on July, 2011, defined himself as a “Justiciar Knight Commander for Knights Templar Europe and one of several leaders of the National and pan-European Patriotic Resistance Movement.”[43] Breivik, who for years absorbed anti-Islamic blogs and websites,[44] published a 1,500 page manifesto written in London, in which he expressed support and sympathy for the EDL and Western nationalists. Furthermore, he expounded his theory of Islam’s takeover of Europe, clarifying who are the “allies” of Islam (such as the European left, the elites), whom he accuses of treason, and therefore he condemns them to death. This is why among his victims were sixty-nine members of the Labor Party’s youth wing on the Utoya Island.

To what extent is militant Christianity, embodied in the glorification of the Knights Templar, expressed in Breivik’s manifesto? Beside the fact that the Manifesto binding is the Templar Cross on a white background, the word “Christian” was mentioned on 2,247 different occasions, the word “Crusade” appears 263 times, “Knights Templar” appears 195 times, and “Christendom” appears 119 times. Breivik hoped that this religious rhetoric, followed by his attacks, would lead to a civil war “which he thought was inevitable.”[45] Nevertheless, Breivik’s crusader discourse does not indicate that he was a religious fanatic nor that he was motivated by religion, but instead he should be viewed as a nationalist who thought he could inspire other Western nationalists with the use of crusaders slogans and symbols.

Contemporary extreme right violence, motivated nowadays mostly by Islamophobic hatred, either against the Left or against Muslims, continued after the Breivik’s attack.[46] In October 2015, a neo-Nazi stabbed and injured a German politician in Cologne for her support of allowing refugees to enter Germany,[47] and a few days later, in the city of Trollhattan, Sweden, a neo-Nazi and right wing sympathizer, which expressed hostility to immigrants, stabbed a teacher to death and injured several students in a city school.[48] On June 16, 2016, a British right wing extremist shot and killed Jo Cox, a Labor MP who was known for her support of allowing refugees to enter England.

According to media reports, Joe Cox’s murderer shouted “Britain First” before stabbing and shooting the Cox.[49] Britain First (BF) is the name of an anti-Islamic movement, founded in 2011, that clearly illustrates the term “counter-Jihad”, and defines itself as a “Christian crusader.”[50] This movement was established by well-known right wing activists in England, led by Paul Golding, who had previously been active in the British National Party (BNP), a party supported by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, fascists, and the like.[51] Golding understood that in order to obtain broader public legitimacy he should abandon the neo-Nazi scene and turn into what is known as the Counter-Jihad “new extreme right.”

Indeed, in response to the “Muslim patrol” that appeared in recent years in several Western European countries, including Britain, which enforces Sharia law (i.e. prevent gambling, prostitution, alcohol, immodest clothing or the presence of homosexuals on the streets),[52] BF launched the “Christian Patrol”, in which its members march on the streets with white crosses and even entering mosques, where they distributed copies of the New Testament.[53] White crosses, next to the Templar flags, are also seen at BF marches. Like the EDL, BF are using extensively the internet and especially the social networks.[54] For instance, its Facebook page has almost two million Likes.[55]

Manifestations of Crusader Symbolism and Rhetoric in the Syrian Context

From the BF Facebook page, we learn about its worldview: its hostile attitude towards Muslims and immigrants, its call to join the struggle against ISIS, as well as the presence of right wing elements in Syria. For example, on June, 2016, BF Facebook page was uploaded a picture allegedly taken in Syria, where eight armed men are seen, one of them is flying the Templar Knights flag. According to the caption accompanying the picture, the eight are volunteers who came to Syria in order to fight ISIS. This picture has received about a hundred enthusiastic and supportive responses, more than 2,000 Likes and over 500 shares.[56]

Although we don't know what really motivated these armed men, the fact that they are waving this flag in Syria gave to extreme right-wing groups in Britain the opportunity to show how active and determined they are. Even though the photo has been used without the permission and approval of the men, we do know that at least one of them, the British veteran Timothy Scott, was the leader of the right-wing movement PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident”[57]) in the UK.[58] Although we don't know if these men were motivated by religion, we can notice how religious (and militant) symbolism is being used by Anti-Islamists who are willing to take arms and fight for their cause.




Figure 2: “Brave anti-ISIS volunteers flying the Templar flag in Syria”, From BF Facebook page [screenshot]

The Templar flag is also the flagship of the Knights Templar International (KTI), a British religious organization founded in 2015 in order to strengthen the Christian identity of the UK, and have links to BF and other extreme right-wing groups in Europe.[59] To promote its goals this organization uses a website and a Facebook page that has accumulated over half a million “Likes”.[60] The struggle of these self-proclaimed “modern Templars” is not limited to the Middle East. It is in Europe, too, which they claim to be under a double threat from Muslims in general and from radical Islam in particular: on one hand, a demographic threat that is intensified in light of the “immigration crisis,” and on the other, the threat of terrorism that continues to claim victims in Europe and exploits immigration in order to infiltrate the continent.

Therefore, these so called “modern Templars” help their European counterparts to stop the immigrants before they can cross the border between Turkey and Bulgaria. The KTI assistance, according to their website, is expressed in the dispatch of equipment such as tactical vests, winter clothes and communication equipment,

which are supposed to help a nationalist paramilitary group in Bulgaria to prevent Syrian immigrants from crossing into the country from Turkey.[61] In other words, “modern Templars” are involved in supplying equipment and volunteers to groups fighting against their Muslim enemy, both in Europe and in the Middle East.

Another example of Christian willingness to fight in Syria and Iraq is found on the “Apoyo Voluntarios Españoles Contra DAESH” (Spanish Volunteers Support Against ISIS) Facebook page, which calls on Christians in Spain (and Europe in general) to embark on a “crusade”, reach Syria-Iraq and protect the persecuted Christians from ISIS. This Facebook page began operating in January 2016 and by April 2017 had more than 25,000 “Likes”. The profile picture of the page shows a military beret, a hand grenade and a chain with a cross; the background picture shows the Spanish flag with the inscription “Long live King Jesus” (Viva Cristo Rey). On the flag, there are a Kalashnikov rifle, ammunition and a military helmet.[62]

On this page propaganda videos can be found calling for Christians to join the campaign against ISIS and Muslims in general; Media reports about European and Spanish fighters in Iraq and Syria (some of them veterans),[63] memes, photos and illustrations that show Jesus riding on a white horse, fighting against Muslims; crucifixes with guns attached to them, and alike. It should be added that not only Spaniards join the forces defending Christians in Syria and Iraq. Thus, for example, we can learn about the activities of a “Christian Falange” composed of French citizens.[64]



Figure 3: “Spanish Volunteers Support Against ISIS” Facebook page [screenshot]

There are other examples of the willingness to fight for the persecuted Christians in the Middle East and against ISIS, such as “The Veterans for the Protection of Christians Against ISIS International” Facebook page, which opened in early April 2015 and has accumulated over 1,700 Likes by April 2017.[65] This page is of a closed group, and most of its members are Americans and Canadians “with right-wing stances.”[66] The page, which has not been updated since June 2016, is intended to recruit volunteers, especially veterans, who will to defend the Christians in Iraq and the “Jews” (the State of Israel), both perceived as being persecuted and terrorized by Jihadists.

The page is accompanied by memes and illustrations of horrific Crusaders, and has links to the online purchase of clothing with various Crusader symbols and rhetoric. In this context, it should be noted that Christians who fled out of fear of the Jihadists in the Middle East, when arriving in Europe, found that also there, they were still threatened by jihadi sympathizers.[67] This strengthens not only the call for the protection of Christians in Muslim countries, but also within Europe. This understanding might lead to religious radical-

ization and the perception of violence as being capable of defending Christianity and Christians.

Conclusion

For the extreme right wing (either the CJM or neo-Nazis and fascists) circles, Christianity is under a religious and demographic threat, posed by Muslims in general and by Jihadis in particular. In this context, we see how Christianity, and mainly the Templar flag, has become an inspirational and motivational source of empowerment for the extreme right in the Twenty-First Century. Right wing individuals, groups, movements, parties and organizations in Europe and North America use the same militant-religious symbols and rhetoric, whether they really mean it or not, in addition to provide an appropriate response to what they see as a threat posed by Muslims. Furthermore, it is being used not only as a motivational source (to protect Christianity and Western culture), but also for recruitment, mobilization and propaganda.

As we saw, contemporary right-wing extremists in Europe and the United States portray themselves as descendants of the crusaders and as those who are obligated to not only protect European and American Christians and Christendom from terrorism and invasion (by immigrants), but also to prevent the spread of Islam in Europe and elsewhere that according to them, will undermine the Christian identity of their nations and the core values and norms of the Western (-Christian) civilization. Furthermore, it seems that European extreme right, which used to be more pagan than its counterparts in North America, due to the “Jewish nature” of Christianity – nowadays share the same vision of Europe as a Christian space that is under threat posed by Muslims.

Crusader symbols and anti-Islamic rhetoric help to consolidate individuals, groups, organizations, parties and movements in Europe and in the United States (and elsewhere) under a transnational framework, by reviving the crusader heritage and presenting it as an appropriate response to Jihad, even though just for propaganda purposes. Thus, Christian symbols and rhetoric provide a religious justification and inspiration for a physical struggle against a religious enemy. This struggle has an internal aspect—reflected in protest activity on the streets, as well as online—as well as an external aspect, which is expressed by helping groups with a similar worldview who are fighting a common enemy, such as the assistance given by the Knights Templar International to nationalists in Bulgaria, and mobilizing volunteers to fight in the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.

The revitalization of the crusader heritage takes place primarily in the Internet, mainly through social networks. This enables the creation of a virtual community and connections with similar elements from different parts of the world that share the same world-view. This has been true since the EDL began to march in England, followed by a whole network of “Defense Leagues” that drew supporters and fans from Facebook to the streets, where they clashed with their various rivals: the left and Muslims. The same is true for Britain First and other extreme right groups in Europe and beyond, which use the new media for propaganda and as a recruitment tool of people and money; and exploit the immigration crisis and terrorism in addition to spreading lethal hatred.

An example of this was found in Breivik’s attack, in Jo Cox’s murder and in other cases, which demonstrated that those who portray themselves as the “new crusaders” would not hesitate to act violently against their own people, who allegedly collaborates with the “Muslim enemy,” and helped the “invaders” directly and indirectly. Indeed, more and more attacks against Muslims and against the Left occurred in Europe and North America in recent years, sparking fears of civic unrest and lack of security, which is intensified in light of right wing extremists’ involvement in the war in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, it is questionable whether these volunteers will exploit their combat experience and continue their struggle against “Islamization” even after they return, or will they lay down their weapons? We will discover answers to these questions in the coming years.

About the Author: Ariel Koch is a member of the Middle East Network Analysis Desk at the Moshe Dayan

Center (MDC) for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Beyond his work at the MDC, Ariel is a doctoral candidate in Middle Eastern Studies at Bar Ilan University, under the supervision of Professor Michael M. Laskier. Ariel's specialization is in the study of extremist movements in contemporary Europe. His research focuses on the nexus between Salafi-Jihadis, the new extremist right and the new extremist left, while exploring the causes for the emergence of these groups, their characters and their activities both on the street and in the online space.

Notes

[1] Daniel Koehler, "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future," *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, July 2016: 84-104, p. 99. http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-2/Koehler.pdf?ver=2016-07-05-104619-213

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[3] Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 10, Issue 3, 2016: 2-15, p. 12. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/508>

[4] See, for example: "Te-Sat: European Union Terrorism Situation & Trend Report 2017," Europol, The Hague: 2017, p. 10. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017>

[5] Extreme right vigilantes in Western Europe include groups such as the French "Generation Identity" (Generation Identitaire), the Finnish "Soldiers of Odin" or "Britain First" in the United Kingdom.

[6] In the United States, where according to the Southern Poverty Law Center right wing extremists are on the rise, there are more than 900 hate-groups. See: Marc Potok, "The Number of Hate and Antigovernment 'Patriot' Groups Grew Last Year, and Terrorist Attacks and Radical Plots Proliferated," The Southern Poverty Law Center, February 17, 2016. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2016/year-hate-and-extremism>

[7] Anton Pelinka, "Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology," in: Ruth Wodak, Brigitte Mral and Majid Khosravini (eds.), *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (UK, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013): 3-22, p. 10.

[8] See: Øyvind Strømme, "Assad's Far-Right Europe Corps?," *Hate Speech International*, November 25, 2013. <https://www.hate-speech.org/other-volunteers/>; and Lewis Barton, "Is Europe Overlooking the Far-Right 'Foreign Fighter' Issue in Ukraine?," *The Huffington Post*, January 23, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lewis-barton/ukraine-far-right_b_6531154.html

[9] See: Rik Coolsaet (ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe* (UK, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008); Peter R. Neumann and Brooke Rogers, "Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe," *International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation*, December 2007. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1234516791ICSREURsearchReport_Proof1.pdf

[10] See: S.N., "Medieval Memes: The Far Right's New Fascination with the Middle Ages," *The Economist*, January 2, 2017. Online at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/01/medieval-memes>; and Paul B. Sturtevant, "Race, Racism, and the Middle Ages: Tearing Down the 'Whites Only' Medieval World," *The Public Medievalist*, February 7, 2017. <http://www.public-medievalist.com/race-racism-middle-ages-tearing-whites-medieval-world/>

[11] For further information on Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism, see: Roel Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (UK, London: C. Hurst & Co. publishers Ltd., 2009)

[12] Henry Tuck, Tanya Silverman and Candace Smalley, "Shooting in the Right Direction": Anti-ISIS Foreign Fighters in Syria & Iraq," *The Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, Horizons Series No. 1, 2016, pp. 9-10. <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ISD-Report-Shooting-in-the-right-direction-Anti-ISIS-Fighters.pdf>

[13] See, for example: James Dunn, "UKIP Supporter Who Left London to Fight Islamic State in Iraq Speaks Out About Lee Rigby's Killers," *The Independent*, February 22, 2015. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ukip-supporter-who-left-london-to-fight-islamic-state-in-iraq-speaks-out-about-lee-rigbys-killers-10062550.html>

[14] See, for example: Paul Andre Narvestad, "The Internationalization of Far-Right Terrorism in Europe and NATO's Future Role," *Atlantic Community*, June 20, 2016. <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/the-internationalization-of-far-right-terrorism-in-europe-and-nato-s-future-role>

[5] Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Kaderbhai, "Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review 2006-2016," *International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation*, 2016, pp. 40-42. <http://icsr.info/2017/05/icsr-vox-pol-paper-research-perspectives-online-radicalisation-literature-review-2006-2016/>

[16] Manuela Caiani and Patricia Kröll, "A Transnational Extreme-Right? New Right-Wing Tactics and the Use of the Internet,"

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2014: 1-21.

[17] Karine Barzilai-Nahon and Gad Barzilai, "Cultured Technology: Internet and Religious Fundamentalism," *The Information Society* 21, No. 1, 2005: 25-40.

[18] Gabriel Weimann, "New Terrorism and New Media," *The Wilson Center Commons Lab, Research Series*, Vol. 2, 2014, p. 4. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.pdf

19] [19] J. M. Berger, "Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: A Comparative Study of White Nationalist and ISIS Online Social Media Networks," *Program on Extremism*, Georgetown University, September 2016. https://cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Nazis%2520v.%2520ISIS%2520Final_0.pdf

[20] See: Pete Simi, Stevan Windisch and Karyn Sporer, "Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists," *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism*, College Park, MD: START, 2016, p. 113. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_RecruitmentRadicalizationAmongUSFarRightTerrorists_Nov2016.pdf

[21] Koehler, 2016, p. 98; "Te-Sat: European Union Terrorism Situation & Trend Report 2017," Europol, The Hague: 2017, p. 47.

[22] For more details about the EDL, See: Paul Jackson (ed.), "The EDL: Britain's 'New Far Right' Social Movement," *Radicalisation and New Media Publications*, University of Northampton, 2011. <http://nectar.northampton.ac.uk/6015/7/Jackson20116015.pdf>

[23] For examples, see: Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Hans Brun, "A Neo-Nationalist Network: The English Defence League and Europe's Counter-Jihad Movement," *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, 2013. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ICSR-ECJM-Report_Online.pdf; Matthew J. Goodwin, "The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and The Counter-Jihad Challenge," *Chatham House*, March 2013. Online at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf; James Treadwell, "The English Defence League and the Counter Jihad: James Treadwell Asks Whether Precariousness is a Factor in Extremist Violence," *Criminal Justice Matters*, Vol. 93, Issue 1, 2013: 8-9.

[24] Michael Whine, "Trans-European Trends in Right Wing Extremism," in: Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins (eds.), *Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe* (London & New York: Routledge, 2012): 317-333, p. 318.

[25] In this context we should notice that right wing terrorism was a reaction to other movements' activities, and was not driven uniquely by fascist world-view. See: Peter R. Neumann, *Radicalized* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 28-31.

[26] Contemporary European Salafi-Jihadism was inspired by Al-Muhajiroun, a British organization with links to Al-Qaeda. The successors of al-Muhajiroun will be dubbed as the "Sharia4 Movement". For further reading about this movement, see: Lorenzo Vidino, "Sharia4: From Confrontational Activism to Militancy," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 9, Issue 2, April 2015: 2-16. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/415>; Raffaello Pantucci, "Al-Muhajiroun's European Recruiting Pipeline," *CTC Sentinel*, August 2015. Volume 8, Issue 8: 21-24. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-muhajirouns-european-recruiting-pipeline>; Peter Neumann dubbed them "the megaphone jihadists". See Neumann, 2016, pp. 115-118.

[27] Roger Eatwell and Matthew J. Goodwin, "The 'New ' Extreme Right in Twenty-First-Century Britain," in: Roger Eatwell and Matthew J. Goodwin (eds.), *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain* (USA, NY: Routledge, 2010): 1-20, p. 7.

[28] Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013, p. 2.

[29] Jonathan Sacks, *Not in God's Name: Confronting Religious Violence* (USA, NY: Schocken Books, 2015), p. 17.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[31] See: Simi, Windisch and Sporer, 2016, p. 6.

[32] John Tolan, "Saracens and Ifranji: Rivalries, Emulation and Convergences," in: John Tolan, Gillies Veinstein and Henry Laurens (eds.), *Europe and the Islamic World* (USA, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 31-32.

[33] For the definition of "integration," see: Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Hekmann, "Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities," *European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions*, 2006, p. 4. http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_1483_698594144.pdf

[34] Will Kymlicka, "Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future," *Transatlantic Council on Migration*, February 2012, p. 4. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/TCM-multiculturalism-success-failure>

[35] "Nicolas Sarkozy Joins David Cameron and Angela Merkel View that Multiculturalism Has Failed," *The Daily Mail*, February 11, 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-Sarkozy-joins-David-Cameron-Angela-Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html>

[36] Robert S. Leiken, *Europe's Angry Muslims* (USA, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012)

[37] Harry W. Hazzard, "Preface," in: Marshall W. Baldwin (ed.), *A History of the Crusades* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), p. xix

[38] Mark Berman, Sarah Larimer and Cleve R. Wootson Jr., "Three Kansas Men Calling Themselves 'Crusaders' Charged in Terror Plot Targeting Muslim Immigrants," *The Washington Post*, October 15, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/10/14/three-kansas-men-calling-themselves-crusaders-charged-in-terror-plot-targeting-muslim-immigrants>

[39] For example, in France, members of Generation Identity have stormed a mosque in the city of Poitiers and filmed themselves on the mosque's roof holding a big flag with the inscription "Generation of Identity 732". In 732 King Charles Martel succeeded to halt the Muslim army that invaded southern France. See: "French Far-Right Group Storms Site of New Mosque," *France 24*, October 21, 2012. <http://www.france24.com/en/20121020-france-french-far-right-group-hold-sit-protest-against-new-mosque-islam-generation-identity>

[40] From the Norwegian Defence League Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/456979061050635/photos/pb.456979061050635.-2207520000.1439388036./869366499811887/>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[41] From the Spanish Defence League Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/LigadeDefensa/photos/a.193934667287716.53961.189960594351790/1061503757197465/>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017). (Figure 1)

[42] Narvestad, "The Internationalization of Far-Right Terrorism in Europe," June 20, 2016

[43] Anders Behring Breivik, "2083 – A European Declaration of Independence" (UK, London, 2011). The full manifesto was re-published by *The Washington Post*: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/07/24/National-Politics/Graphics/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017).

[44] Neumann, 2016, pp. 30-31.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[46] January 29, 2017, Alexander Bissonnette shoot and killed six Muslims inside a mosque in Quebec, Canada. Five months later, during one week of June, there were two attacks that targeted Muslims, the first in Sweden and the second in England. In both cases the attackers used cars as weapon. These attacks occurred in light of several attacks in Europe, in which Jihadis used cars and trucks to mow down their victims.

[47] Ben Brumfield and Catherine E. Shoichet, "German Pro-Refugee Candidate Stabbed, Wins Election," *CNN*, October 19, 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/18/europe/germany-candidate-stabbing-migration/>

[48] Sara Malm and Anthony Joseph, "Swedish School Killer Posed for This Photo MIDWAY Through Murder Spree: 'Right-Wing' Fanatic Put Arm Round Pupil Who Thought Bloody Sword Was a Prank...Then Carried on His Rampage," *Daily Mail*, October 22, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3284339/Five-injured-sword-attack-Swedish-school-suspect-shot.html>

[49] Ian Cobain and Matthew Taylor, "Far-Right Terrorist Thomas Mair Jailed for Life for Jo Cox Murder," *The Guardian*, November 23, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-found-guilty-of-jo-cox-murder>

[50] James Glenday, "Britain First: A Day with The UK's Anti-Islam Alt-Right Group," *ABC News* March 4, 2017. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-05/a-day-with-alt-right-britain-first/8324680>

[51] For more information about the BNP, see: Matthew J. Goodwin, "In Search of the Winning Formula: Nick Griffin and the 'Modernization' of the British National Party," in Eatwell and Goodwin (eds.), 2010: 169-190; Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013, p. 28.

[52] Lorenzo Vidino, "Hisbah in Europe? Assessing a Murky Phenomenon," *European Foundation for Democracy*, June 2013. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Hisba_in_Europe.pdf

[53] See: "Britain First Launches 'Christian Patrols' in East London," *Britain First*, February 1, 2014. <http://www.britainfirst.org/britain-first-launches-christian-patrols-in-east-london/>

[54] Online platforms of Britain First (Accessed: 20.05.2017):

- Website: <https://www.britainfirst.org/>

- Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/>

- Twitter: <https://twitter.com/BritainFirstHQ>

- You Tube: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtEsYNHwF37lrd9IH7Tv-uA-->

[55] Paul Golding himself have two Facebook pages: one private (<https://www.facebook.com/people/Paul-Gold->

ing/100014186493099) and one public (<https://www.facebook.com/BFAktivists>), both together have more than 150,000 Likes and Followers. (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[56] Eight anti-ISIS volunteers, from Britain First Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/photos/a.346633882148546.1073741826.300455573433044/1049392898539304/>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017) (Figure 2).

[57] PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) is an Anti-Islamic street movement, launched in 2015 in Dresden, in East Germany, that reflects the CJM, including the use of Christian and crusader symbolism and rhetoric.

[58] For further information, see: "Knights Templar International: Christian Knights or Fascist Front?" International Report Bigotry and Fascism, May 26, 2017. <http://irbf.org.uk/knights-templar-international-analysis/> (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[59] Ibid.

[60] Online platforms of Knights Templar International (Accessed: 20.05.2017):

- Website: <https://knightstemplarinternational.com>

- Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/knightstemplarint/>

[61] See: "Guarding OUR Borders Too – KTI-Backed Volunteers in Action on the Frontier of Christendom [video]," Knights Templar International, March 17, 2017. <https://knightstemplarinternational.com/2017/05/guarding-borders-kti-backed-volunteers-action-frontier-christendom-video/>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[62] Facebook page of "Spanish Volunteers Support Against ISIS": <https://www.facebook.com/Apoyo-Voluntarios-Espanoles-contra-DAESH-811409822301358>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[63] "Ex Militares Españoles Anti-ISIS se Preparan Para Participar en la Toma de Mosul," El Confidencial Digital, July 31, 2016. http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/defensa/Ex-militares-espanoles-anti-ISIS-Mosul_0_2755524432.html; Gonzalo Araluce, "Así Lucha Contra el Daesh la Milicia Cristiana en la que Están Integrados Varios Españoles," El Español, July 28, 2016. http://www.lespanol.com/espana/20160727/143236590_0.html

[64] Par Quentin Muller, "Avec la Phalange Chrétienne Française Partie Combattre Daesh," Vice News, August 30, 2016. <http://www.vice.com/fr/read/avec-la-phalange-chretienne-francaise-partie-combattre-daesh>

[65] "The Veterans For the Protection of Christians Against ISIS International" Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/VetsProtect/>. (Accessed: 20.05.2017)

[66] Tuck, Silverman and Smalley, 2016, p. 36.

[67] "Syrians in Gothenburg Scared by Isis Graffiti," The Local, October 16, 2015. <http://www.thelocal.se/20151016/isis-graffiti-scares-syrians-in-göteborg>

Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists' Targeting Preferences in Europe

by Cato Hemmingby

Abstract

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe. In addition to target types, this study has a particular focus on the degree of target discrimination, casualty focus, and soft versus hard target preferences. These features of intent constitute a warning triangle with regard to the lethality potential of terrorist acts. There is also a lone actor vs. group perspective included, as well as a comparative glance between the targeting preference of militant Islamists and actors from other ideological directions in Europe. The main findings are that a soft target focus is dominant and increasing, while particularly well-protected targets are almost totally avoided. There is a substantial mass casualty focus, but only few attacks lead to such results. Indiscriminate vs. discriminate targeting comes out evenly. The jihadists are more ambitious regarding targets in early planning stages, compared to later in the process. Furthermore, there are higher ambitions in launched attacks physically carried out by more than one perpetrator. Both lone actors and groups prefer soft targets, but individuals acting alone are more likely to act discriminately and with a limited casualty focus. Attacks directed against name-specific individuals are mostly a one-perpetrator phenomenon. Jihadists are generally conservative with regard to target preferences, attack approach and weaponry. There is no evidence supporting suggestions that there are modus operandi-related differences between AQ and ISIS-linked perpetrators. Shifts in trends seem rather to be influenced by practical and contextual factors.

Keywords: Militant Islamists, targets, modus operandi, tactics, response to terrorism

Introduction

As soon as the dust settles after a terrorist attack a basic question for security authorities is why the target in question was chosen. Even more pressing is the question: will other attacks follow, and if so, who or what are the most likely next targets? In addition, security professionals will analyse details of every attack, in order to enhance the protection of other potential targets. Finally, knowledge on modus operandi-related issues provide the best foundation for selecting scenarios to consider - for example, as part of threat assessments related to protective efforts, as well as for education and training programmes.

Modus operandi (MO) has traditionally not been given too much attention within terrorism research. Three decades ago Max Taylor noted how the focus of terrorism research had been on *involvement* issues, and not *event* issues.[1] Other senior researchers have since repeated the call for more research on operational issues.[2] Indeed, the focus on MO has increased in recent years, including works relevant for targeting.[3][4] Still, more research on MO issues is needed - not least because there are quite different activities involved.

Targeting research, like other operational issues, is challenging due to the need for detailed information. The amount and quality of the information available determine the output. Large datasets with basic information are useful for quantitative research on a meta or macro level, but may offer limited insight into operational issues per se. More detailed datasets, where the situational contexts can be derived, allow closer examination of operational issues and targeting preferences, which this article aims to do.

More specifically, this article examines the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016. Furthermore, this article focuses on three features commonly attributed to militant Islamists - that they target indiscriminately, have a mass casualty focus and prefer soft targets. Obviously they commit such acts, but to what degree? This is important to clarify since these three features of intent constitute a warning triangle regarding the lethality potential of terrorist acts, which is meaningful from the perspective of security within a society. These features are also very much illustrative of why militant Islamists represent a threat for European authorities that is more complex than the threat posed by terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s.[5] This seems to be somewhat overlooked when comparing different periods of time.[6] It will also be argued here that a focus on casualty levels, and on soft versus hard targets, are issues that are rarely thoroughly defined and/or measured - even in works focusing on operational aspects.[7] Also, claims that terrorists are more ambitious in early stages of planning than later are rarely documented. In addition to the issues mentioned above, this article offers perspectives on the issue of lone actor vs. group actors, a comparison to actors from other ideological directions within Europe, and some brief recommendations based on the findings from this study.

Approach and Dataset

Research on targeting-related issues is complex. Ideological, moral, strategic and tactical factors are all influencing terrorist decision-making, in addition to external factors beyond the control of the perpetrators.[8] Moreover, interactions between intervening variables make targeting processes profoundly dynamic and rarely straightforward.[9] Analysing the situational context is also essential. Here a customized variation of the triangle introduced by Cohen & Felson has been adopted; it distinguishes between offender, target and situational circumstances.[10] A structured approach, however, cannot necessarily *explain* target preferences and interlinked features. Therefore, process tracing has also been applied.[11]

The dataset utilised here consists of 246 registered plots and initiated attacks in Europe from 1994 to the end of 2016.[12] By confining the focus to one region with similar societal conditions, the relevance of the research for policymakers and practitioners is enhanced. As for other inclusion criteria, actors must adhere to the Sunni-based jihad ideology, for example as promoted by GIA, GSCP, al-Qaida and ISIS. There must be strong indications of a planned attack, or an attack must have been initiated. A plot is defined as a planned attack that has not yet been initiated. In order to be registered as an initiated attack, the act must have been set in motion against a selected target.

Information available on individual plots and attacks are rated as *strong* or *vague*. Strong documentation means there are several, well-documented indications that an attack has been planned or initiated. Vague documentation means that there are concrete indications that an attack is planned, but the indications are fewer and not as precise as in the strong cases. When measuring specific parameters or making comparisons in this article, only plots with strong documentation and attacks have been included. Each attack is assessed individually, which for example means that Muhammed Merah is coded in the data as being responsible for three incidents.[13] This is a prerequisite for a functional dataset on targeting, since every attack is unique. Each item has a case ID and, in addition to basic details, numerous MO and targeting related features have been registered. Nine target-type categories are established in accordance with observed practices of militant Islamists operating in Europe: *authorities, diplomatic missions, military, law enforcement, public area, transport, public debate, religious institutions* and *others*. [14] Regarding incidents involving transport, subcategories were established due to the different nature of the targets within this category. It also makes the analysis more useful for the different branches within the transport sector.

This research is built on open sources; the majority of information comes from mass media sources, legal documents and official inquiry reports.[15] Furthermore, a number of articles, reports and books on jihadists in Europe have provided detailed information in some cases.[16] Studies on militant Islamist ideological, strategic and operational texts have provided important insights about the jihadists' rationale.[17] Finally, online publications from militant Islamists - like al-Qaida's *Inspire* and ISIS' *Dabiq* - have been examined, although propaganda often differs from actions taken.[18]

One must be realistic with regard to what can be retrieved from open sources. MO research requires detailed information, and the security services have richer data materials than academic researchers in this particular area. This is a main reason for focusing on targeting *preferences*, rather than detailed decision-making processes in this project. The strength of this research lies in the structured theoretical and methodological approach applied. By casting the net wide from the start, it has been possible to locate more incidents than a narrow approach would have achieved. This has led to a more complete picture with regard to the extent of militant Islamists' actions in Western Europe for the 23 years under consideration in this study, as well as strengthened the potential for valid inferences. It is an advantage that the author has developed the dataset himself, since close familiarity with the research material ensures consistency with definitions and data inclusion. It is possible, however, that some cases have escaped his attention. Media reports can be overlooked and the security services may thwart attacks without publicly acknowledging them.[19] New information also sometimes sheds new light on old incidents.[20] It is, however, unlikely that additional information on a few missed cases will alter the main conclusions of this research significantly. Geographical boundaries and customized coding will make direct comparison with other projects challenging, but the same factors increase the relevance of this research for practitioners and policy-makers within the area covered.

Expressed Intention of Producing Mass Casualties not Reflected in the Results Achieved


The first topic addressed in this study involves the three issues of intent - the casualty focus, the hard or soft target preferences and the degree of discrimination. To begin with, it should be acknowledged that the number of casualties does matter. For authorities and the public, the number of fatalities says something about the severity of an attack, and for the terrorists it is a parameter for success. It also has considerable impact on the relationships between media coverage, public fear and political pressure on authorities to act more decisively. [21] However, mass casualty attacks may also backfire against terrorists in different ways.[22] A common definition of a mass casualty incident is that it involves a number of casualties, calling for an extraordinary effort from the emergency services.[23] Most analysts avoid setting a fixed number of fatalities in order to define a mass casualty incident, since local emergency capacities vary, but contextual information will most often clarify whether the casualty potential is low (e.g. five or fewer victims), or higher. In the latter case emergency capacities are likely to be activated regardless of location.

In 194 cases it has been possible to assess the casualty focus. 47 plots have vague documentation and are excluded from further analysis. According to the 77 plots with strong documentation, there is a mass casualty focus in 87.0% of the plots (see Figure 1.1), and a limited casualty focus in 22.1% (in seven plots both alternatives are present). In contrast, for the 70 launched attacks the mass casualty focus is down to 54.3%, while a limited casualty focus exists in 45.7% of the attacks (see Figure 1.2).


A mass casualty focus dominated in plots for almost the entire period. As for launched attacks, the mass casualty focus dominated significantly in the 1990s due to the consistent MO applied by GIA-linked groups. Meanwhile, a limited casualty focus increased from 2010 onwards. The mass casualty focus among militant Islamists is substantial, and it is rarely controversial within their own ranks. Some perpetrators conduct both limited and mass casualty attacks, like Muhammed Merah in 2012 and Amedy Coulibaly in 2015 - illustrating that tactical and practical factors (and not just moral reflections) influence target decision-making.[24] Regarding the divergence of casualty focus between plots and attacks, the explanation can be found in a few intertwined factors. Groups and larger networks, which dominated the scene until around 2010, seem more ambitious than lone actors. Intragroup dynamics and a perception of high capacity can initially trigger ambitious plans, which are reduced during the planning process. The increased limited casualty focus from 2010 corresponds with more attacks conducted by one perpetrator for the same period of time. The four relevant attacks in 2010 were Mohammed Guele's attack on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in Denmark, Roshonara Choudry's attack on Member of Parliament Stephen Timms in East London, Loris Doukaiev's attempt to send a parcel bomb to the newspaper Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen, and the Stockholm suicide bomb attack by Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly.[25] Also important to remember in this context is that groups run a higher

risk of being detected than lone actors.[26]

**Fig. 1.1 Mass Casualty vs. Limited Casualty Focus
1994-2016 Plots**



**Fig. 1.2 Mass Casualty vs. Limited Casualty Focus
1994-2016 Attacks**



This analysis found that 26 of the 70 launched attacks conducted in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016 caused fatalities. In total 555 people were killed, leading to an average of 7.9 fatalities per attack. Eight attacks caused 523 deaths (94.2%), and seven of these were connected to established networks.[27] The eighteen remaining attacks that claimed lives caused four or fewer fatalities. Accordingly, most of these terrorist attacks do not lead to casualties, few attacks cause mass casualties, and those that do are normally the work of established networks. Less connected, 'inspired' jihadists rarely achieved grave results. It has been a negative development for the last few years with more attacks, however, and five of eight mass casualty attacks in the


dataset used here took place between January 2015 and December 2016. Several serious attacks have followed in 2017.


Weapon type is highly relevant for determining the casualty factor. Bladed weapons (e.g., knife, axe, etc.) and vehicles have increasingly supplemented explosives and firearms in attacks for the last several years. In the eight attacks causing mass casualties, explosives played an essential part in five of them: the 1995 St. Michel bombing, the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 7/7 bombings, the 2015 November attacks in Paris (combined with assault rifles), and the 2016 Brussels bombings. The highly lethal potential of military assault rifles in particular has been demonstrated on several occasions. Examples include the 2014 Jewish Museum attack in Brussels, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo incident in Paris and the 2015 November attacks, also in Paris. The 2015 Sousse massacre in Tunisia, where one man killed 38 people, fully illustrates the devastating effect that assault rifles can produce.[28] As illustrated in Nice and Berlin in 2016, as well as in Stockholm and Barcelona in 2017, the lethal potential of large vehicles overrunning pedestrians has proven significant.

Increasing Focus on Soft Targets: Hardened Targets are Avoided

Terrorists often consider the basic factor of how well a potential target is protected, and the level of protection they observe may range from unprotected to very well-protected targets. The latter are considered *hardened targets*, and typically include state leaders, government buildings, military bases and commercial airlines. Targets with no or inadequate protection are referred to as *soft targets*, and can include unarmed civilians (as well as police and military personnel patrolling a street, in contrast to clear-cut distinctions in some reports). [29] Importantly, the toolbox for preventive measures is extensive, but *target hardening* does not automatically lead to a hard target status.[30] A target can switch between being a hard or a soft target, for example, when additional protection officers are provided on special occasions.[31]

In 205 of the 246 cases it is possible to say something about hard or soft target focus. 53 plots have vague documentation and are excluded from further analysis. For the 82 plots with strong documentation, there is a hard target focus in 42.7% of them (see Figure 1.3), and a soft target focus in 75.6% (in 15 plots both alternatives were present). For the 70 attacks the hard target focus is down to 14.3% (see Figure 1.4), while there is a soft target focus in 88.6% (in two cases both alternatives are present).





The soft target dominance in plots is evident, but it is even stronger for actual attacks – in other words, the frequency of attacks against hard targets has decreased. The likely explanation is the combination of robust security at hard targets, and that militant Islamists find it legitimate to attack random civilians. By avoiding hard targets the odds for operational success and escape increases for the perpetrators.

As for the few hard target incidents in our database, it is interesting to note that no attacks involved the hardest targets, like state leaders or highly symbolic state buildings.[32] These are far better protected today than they were just two decades ago.[33] As such, hard targets have become harder, but soft targets are just as soft as they have always been. Accordingly, extensive protection does have a deterrent effect, given the fact that operational success is crucial for terrorists.[34] Commercial airliners are the most consistent hard target with only four recorded attacks.[35] Interestingly, it is possible to observe a shift of focus from hard to soft targets within the law enforcement and military target type categories. From 2000 to 2010 most plots and attacks within these categories were focusing on the headquarters of security and intelligence services or military bases respectively, which normally will have a hard target status. Since Arid Uka's attack on U.S. servicemen in 2011, a clear majority of plots and attacks have targeted military personnel in a public area, or near the entrance of military premises – that is, in situations where they are momentarily most vulnerable. Likewise, after Bertrand N's knife attack against police officers near Tours in 2014, plots and attacks against the law enforcement sector have (with one possible exception) been directed against police on the streets, near or in the entrance of police stations, and in one case at their home.[36] In general, it can be said that police personnel in public areas represent soft targets for attackers, who have the element of surprise on their side and are acting at close range.

Degree of Discrimination

The discriminate factor is strongly linked to the terrorists' rationality and ethical framework.[37] If they find it legitimate to stage random attacks, the range of targets is almost unlimited. *Indiscriminate targeting* refers to attacking random civilians, while if there is some type of constraint in the selection of target, it is *discriminate targeting*. There are 207 cases where degree of target discrimination is specified. 55 plots have vague documentation and are here excluded from further analysis. For the 82 plots where strong documentation is available, there is an indiscriminate focus in 64.6% of them (see Figure 1.5), and a discriminate focus in 54.9% (in 16 cases both alternatives are present). For attacks, the indiscriminate focus is down to 48.6% (see Figure 1.6), while there is a discriminate focus in 54.3% (in two cases both alternatives are present).

Fig. 1.5 Indiscriminate vs. Discriminate Targeting
1994-2016 Plots





Fig. 1.6 Indiscriminate vs. Discriminate Targeting
1994-2016 Attacks



Again, the mid-1990s was marked by the Algerian GIA network's indiscriminate attacks in France, but apart from that the frequency of indiscriminate attacks is fairly low and even throughout the 2000s. The difference between plots and attacks seen in more recent years is mainly due to the fact that a number of lone actors have slipped under the radar and launched discriminate attacks against military and police personnel. On the whole, there is nevertheless a considerable indiscriminate focus noticeable among militant Islamists. Occasionally, the discrimination issue has become a topic for internal discussions among perpetrators.[38]

Turning to the discriminate attacks, several types of target groups in European societies have received attention from the jihadists. As previously mentioned, police and military personnel has often been a focus. Jews, Christians and media institutions are also among the frequent targets. Militant Islamists have also launched eight attacks against name-specific individuals. Usually these victims have a trophy target status, as they are in the public eye and the perpetrator(s) will receive a high level of recognition for murdering such persons. Individuals alleged to have insulted the prophet as well as participants in the public debate have been particularly targeted.[39] So, although freedom of speech is guaranteed in all liberal democracies, those individuals who draw public attention to themselves by their words or actions may run a higher personal risk.[40]

Target Type Categories

Turning to specific target type categories, the starting point for analysis is the 80 plots with strong documentation where targets have been identified and the 70 attacks that were actually conducted during the period from 1994 to 2016. A number of plots and a few attacks have involved several target type categories.

Target type categories 1994-2016	Plots (n=80)	Attacks (n=70)
Authorities	13	2
Law enforcement	11	9
Military	17	8
Diplomatic missions	9	2
Public area	30	21
Transport	34	21
Public debate	9	7
Religious institutions	12	5
Others	6	2

As this table illustrates, civilians in a public area and on public transport are the most common target types when it comes to plots, and these two categories are also targeted in more than 50% of the launched attacks - equally divided between them. Regarding transport, the attacks have primarily been directed against the aviation sector and railway trains, except for the bus attacks in the 2005 7/7 and 21/7 cases in London. Looking closer to the threats against aviation, there are four cases involving in-flight incidents and two involving airports. There are 13 incidents involving rail transport, with attacks against underground services and commuter trains dominating. It should be noted that initial plans of targeting the aviation sector are not often followed up on in practice, in comparison to plots involving rail transport.

Terrorist interest for targeting top politicians and highly symbolic buildings is evident in several plots, but not reflected in actually conducted attacks. This must be due to the high level of protection dedicated to VIPs and buildings of this type. However, as has been made clear by the stabbing of MP Timms in 2010 and other cases, politicians a step below the top level are more vulnerable for attacks – especially when out of office. Diplomatic missions from countries like the U.S. and Israel are well protected, therefore initial interest in targeting them may often be discarded in favour of softer targets. Citizens, servicemen and companies from the U.S. and Israel seem to serve as substitution targets to a certain degree, and are addressed later in this article.

Law enforcement and military personnel are attractive targets, as they are symbolic and representatives of the state, and also are often direct parties of the conflict. As described above when discussing hard and soft targeting, we have observed a shift of focus away from the HQs of security services and military bases, to police and military personnel on the streets or near police station and military base entrances. Although somewhat hypothetical, it is possible that Arid Uka's killing of two U.S. servicemen in 2011, as well as the 2013 Lee Rigby murder, inspired others to use the same attack approach against police and military personnel.

Attacks in the public debate category have primarily been directed against individuals and institutions that have, according to the Islamists, offended the Prophet or promoted blasphemy. Most of the cases have been related to the 2005 Muhammed cartoons and Lars Vilks' drawings.[41] It is interesting to note that militant Islamists have plotted or carried out more attacks against public debate participants and media individuals than politicians. In fact, this is why former Danish police intelligence and security director general Scharf at one time called for a critical review regarding the use of close protection capacities.[42]

As in the case of public debate participants, the targeting of religious leaders and institutions has mainly been discriminate, like the plots against the San Petronio Basilica in Italy, which has a controversial fresco inside. [43] The churches of interest to Sid Ahmed Ghlam in Villejuif in Paris in 2015, as well as the church attacked

by two men in Normandy (France) in 2016, may have been chosen more at random, and here the perpetrators' local affiliation may have been a factor.[44] Interest in attacking critical infrastructure targets has been low. This includes nuclear facilities, although an interest displayed in a few cases worldwide should be noted.[45]

Particularly Exposed: American, Israeli and Jewish Targets



A target issue of interest not covered above is that the United States, Israel and Jews have been given substantial attention in the jihadists' discourse and rhetoric, since the early days of the jihad movement.[46] Has this, however, been reflected in the actions taken? The total dataset shows that there have been U.S.-linked targets in 34 of 209 cases where targets could be identified—more specifically, in 9 conducted attacks and 25 plots. The fact that 12.9% of the 70 launched attacks have targeted U.S. interests or citizens, combined with the number of plots where such interest has been identified, shows that statements reflecting anti-American verbal aggression have been followed by action. Launched attacks against trans-Atlantic flights are on top of the list with three attacks, followed by two attacks against U.S. embassies carried out by low-capacity actors. Casualties in attacks where U.S. citizens have been deliberately targeted are found in the 2011 Arid Uka attack against military personnel in transit at Frankfurt airport, and the massacre at the Bataclan concert venue in the 2015 November Paris attacks, where the American band *Eagles of Death Metal* was performing on stage.[47]

Regarding Israel and Jews, militant Islamists and Hezbollah represent a current global threat to them - as seen in attacks that occurred in South America, Europe and Asia.[48] The total dataset shows that there have been Israeli or Jewish targets in 26 cases, more specifically in 19 plots and 7 attacks. Additionally, it has been documented that the 2004 Madrid bombers and members of the Cannes-Torcy network planned follow-up attacks against Jewish targets.[49] 10% of the 70 conducted attacks were directed against a variety of Jewish targets: two schools, two kosher shops, a museum, a synagogue, and a rabbi in a public area. Three attacks caused four victims each: the 2012 Merah attack against a Jewish school, the 2014 Jewish museum attack in Brussels and the 2015 Kosher shop siege in Paris. No attacks have been launched against Israeli diplomatic missions, which have been extensively protected following a Palestinian terrorist attack against the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1972.[50]


Militant Islamists' Targeting Preferences in Comparative Perspective

How do the targeting practices of militant Islamists in Western Europe compare to other ideological types of terrorists? Although coding issues do not allow strict comparisons, indications can be found by making a comparison with all ideological types of terrorists in Europe, using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. The GTD has registered 4,409 terrorist incidents (excluding ambiguous cases) in Western Europe from 1994 to 2016.[51]

Figures 1.7 and 1.8 (below) illustrate that the general public is very much exposed to terrorist activity in general, since the categories "public area" and "transport" most often involve civilians who have no part in the conflict. However, it is important to note that the GTD includes a number of incidents against private property, which is not typical for militant Islamists in Europe. It is therefore reasonable to argue that compared to terrorists in other ideological categories, jihadists target people in public areas more actively. Islamist terrorists also have a greater focus on the transport sector. As with attacks in public areas, this may be related to the mass casualty focus, the intention of spreading fear among the public as well as the societal disruptive effect. The jihadists' interest for targeting law enforcement is similar to that of terrorists in other ideological categories, but they give comparatively more attention to military targets. Furthermore, terrorists from other ideological directions have initiated more attacks against authorities. However, while the militant Islamists' interest is largely directed against well-protected top-level targets, cases in the GTD also include incidents directed against low-level and local authorities.

Figure 2.1**GTD Target Overview Western Europe 1994-2016 (n=4409)****Figure 2.2****Target Overview Militant Islamists in Western Europe 1994-2016 (n=70)*****Single Perpetrator Versus Duos and Groups***

The issues addressed above are also of relevance for the lone actor vs. group actors debate, although it is often quite challenging to distinguish between these two actor categories. In general, most lone actors have some sort of contact with other extremists.[52] Some of the individuals conducting lone actor attacks have in fact been known to have a clear extremist milieu background, yet they have seemingly acted on their own initiative without involving others. One example is the Dutch-Moroccan Mohammad Bouyeri, who killed filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. He had ties with the Hofstad network, but apparently planned and launched the attack without involving others.[53] Hence, there is always a substantial uncertainty regarding group and network participation when determining who actually may be involved in an attack. For this reason plots are left out of the discussion here, and a simple distinction is made between attacks physically carried out by one perpetrator and attacks executed by several perpetrators. In total 45 of 70 launched attacks have been carried out by a single individual (see Figure 1.9).



The table below illustrates findings related to hard or soft target preference, casualty focus, and indiscriminate or discriminate targeting attacks only – again, for the period 1994-2016.[54]

Attacks 1994-2016 (n=70)	Hard target*	Soft target	Mass casualty	Limited casualty	Indiscriminate targeting*	Discriminate targeting
One perp. (n=45)	17.8%	86.7%	37.8%	62.2%	35.6%	68.9%
Several perp. (n=25)	8.0%	92.0%	84.0%	16.0%	80.0%	20.0%

* Two attacks conducted by one perpetrator included both alternatives.

Both categories are overwhelmingly focusing on soft targets for reasons explained earlier. However, there are differences when it comes to casualty focus and discrimination. Individuals conducting attacks alone have a mass casualty focus in about one third of the cases, while several perpetrators acting together have a mass casualty focus in more than four out of five cases. Regarding discrimination, duos and groups have targeted indiscriminately in four of five cases. This supports the assumption that groups are more ambitious than lone actors regarding a high damage result - both in planning processes and in launched attacks. Those conducting attacks alone are more often than not prioritising discriminate attacks. Interestingly, seven of the eight attacks targeting a name-specific individual were executed by one perpetrator only. As for the two most sophisticated attacks launched by one perpetrator - the in-flight attacks by the shoe bomber Reid in 2001 and by the Nigerian millionaire's son Abdulmutallab in 2009 - these were centrally led. Regarding type of weapons utilised, the overview for the period 1994-2016 is as follows:

Attacks 1994-2016 (n=70)	Explosives	Firearms	Blades	Vehicle	Others
One perpetrator (n=45)	10	13	18	5	3*
Several perpetrators (n=25)	20	4	2	2	3**

* Three cases involved arson, toxic letters and hand grenades respectively.

** Two cases involved hand grenades

The single perpetrator category dominates the firearms category, while groups are more often behind attacks with explosives. As for bladed weapons use, the single perpetrator category is dominant. The same applies for vehicles, where the exceptions are the duos attacking Glasgow airport in 2007 and Lee Rigby in 2013. The attacks involving advanced or high-effective (military-grade) explosives, or assault rifles, were all conducted by individuals with links to criminal or Islamist networks.[55] For lone actors without such connections the 'simple means' approach prevailed, as it is not easy to acquire weapons illegally in most West European coun-

tries without risking detection through leakage or entrapment.[56]

Jihadists Appear Conventional in their Targeting and Attack Approaches

In general, militant Islamists in Western Europe are conventional and imitative when it comes to their targeting preferences – in contrast to suggestions implying that ISIS has shown innovation in this area.[57] The vast majority of targets can be categorized into a limited number of typical target types, and as such the main challenge facing counter-terrorism planners is more the broad range of potential targets the militant Islamists can choose from. Having established that the odd targets are few and far between, elaborating on what is not often struck becomes an issue. One example is that attacks directed against random private homes have been more or less absent, in contrast to what is seen in some other regions of the world.[58] The jihadists are also conservative with regard to attack approaches and weaponry. They can occasionally be creative, but are more adaptive than innovative, although a high level of sophistication and skills have been shown in a few cases – like the 2006 Liquid plot and the 2010 Cargo planes plot. The most advanced plots and attacks have unsurprisingly been linked to established, central terrorist networks.

This study did not have at its disposal information that would enable detailed tracking of the decision-making processes in each case. Nevertheless it appears that those executing the attacks will normally make the final target selection, for the simple reason that most attacks are not centrally organized.[59] Furthermore, it has in some cases been noted how central figures or the core leadership have suggested targeting alternatives, but have still given the perpetrators a say in the final decision regarding target selection.[60] In some cases, target proposals from the core leadership have also been rejected by the perpetrators.[61] From an operational point of view, leaving the target selection to those on the front line has advantages. They will often have local knowledge, be able to blend into the surrounding, and are in a better position to map potential targets that carry a limited risk of detection during the preparatory stage.

MO and targeting-related differences between AQ and ISIS operatives in Europe are hard to identify. Shifts in modus operandi trends appear to be influenced more by contextual and operational factors than by network affiliation. It is true that ISIS has a proven ability to launch complex mass casualty attacks, but so had AQ in the past. The one attack that arguably has had ISIS characteristics – since beheadings became an ISIS signature from 2014 onwards – was the previously mentioned 2015 Lyon Air Products factory incident, where the perpetrator beheaded his boss. That said, intentional beheadings were also observed in several jihadists cases in Europe before then, e.g., in the 2004 attack against Theo van Gogh, the 2007 Parviz Khan plot and the 2013 Lee Rigby murder.[62]

What are the Lessons Learned?

Based on the findings of this research into targeting, some brief recommendations can be made. First of all, it has been noted that politicians a step below the top level may be the ones most vulnerable for assassination attacks. Since close protection services are a limited resource, behavioural advice from security authorities and less resource demanding protective efforts based on individual threat assessments offer more cost-effective approaches. When it comes to highly symbolic buildings and premises, like parliaments and government institutions, the general absence of attacks indicates that physical protective measures work. This fact should inform considerations about creating security perimeters around other key institutions.[63] When it comes to diplomatic missions from exposed countries like the US and Israel, the substantial security efforts appear to have a deterrent effect, taking into account that there were only two incidents in our dataset.[64] It is also possible that previous failed attempts to enter U.S. and Israeli embassies may have contributed to the deterrent effect. One example is the incident at the Israeli consulate in Berlin in 1999, when three Kurds were killed by Israeli security guards during an attempt by more than 50 Kurds to storm the consulate.[65] When it comes to police and military personnel in public areas, vulnerabilities have been disclosed with regard to attacks from close quarters. Accordingly, proper tactics must be applied when they do patrols or guard duty.

Attacks against crowds in public areas and in transport represent the most challenging issue, since it is not

possible to protect everyone everywhere all the time. Despite this fact, a structured combination of physical security efforts, police response capabilities and rational behaviour from those attacked can make a positive difference in this area. Certain crowded areas will benefit from the use of physical protection in the form of bollards, balustrades and vehicle barriers, in order to counter vehicle attacks and vehicle-borne IED attacks. Moving to police, a rapid response is vital when attacks take place, as acknowledged by French authorities after the 2016 Nice attack.[66] The density of ordinary police coverage of an area is key, since local policemen are most often first on the scene – if they have capacity to counter armed threats. Dedicated mobile response units can be established in major cities, like the armed response vehicles in London.[67] This is a cost-effective alternative, compared to maintaining a permanent police presence in a large number of locations.

On top of this, national counterterrorism units, bomb disposal teams and negotiators possess crucial expertise for some of the most difficult situations. During periods with a high or critical threat level, there will be a lack of sufficient police resources to secure key assets, buildings and premises. Special police units can be established for this, like in Berlin, where a dedicated local unit is securing non-federal assets.[68] It is also important to further develop police-military cooperation, as proven with *Operation Sentinelle* in France.[69] As for the general public, information campaigns from security authorities regarding how to behave when observing suspicious activity or experiencing attacks are potential lifesavers.[70] Such campaigns can also be of value in order to detect lone actors, who have proven difficult to detect in time with an intelligence-driven approach alone.[71] When it comes to lone actors, research has made clear that information about an impending attack is often being disclosed among those closely surrounding the perpetrator (e.g., family and friends).[72]

Recommendations for public areas are also relevant for public transport. As for the aviation sector, airliners are generally well protected. As demonstrated with the Rajib Karim case from 2010, however, the insider threat needs more attention.[73] Some countries have taken intensified efforts to counter this threat, as seen in France.[74] As for airport and railway terminal buildings, they are hotspots that need special attention. Crowds in check-in zones and counters related to some specific airlines linked to certain countries must be given enhanced attention. Finally, the cyber threat, which has worried counter-terrorism officials for years, should not be neglected.[75]

About the Author: Cato Hemmingby is Research Fellow at the Norwegian Police University College. He is also a senior security advisor in a government institution. He is the author, with Tore Bjørgo, of *'The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process: Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway'* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). He has also contributed to *'Terrorists on Trial: A Performative Perspective,'* edited by B. de Graaf & A.P. Schmid (Leiden University Press, 2016). He can be reached at < cathem@phs.no >.

Notes

[1] Taylor, Maxwell (1988). *The Terrorist*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, p. 183.

[2] Clarke, Ronald V. & Newman, Graeme R. (2006). *Outsmarting the Terrorist*. Westport: Praeger, p. 233; Schmid, Alex. P. & Jongman, Albert J. (2007). Research Desiderata in the Field of Terrorism, in Ranstorp, M. (Ed.) *Mapping terrorism research*. London: Routledge, p. 268; Schmid, A. (Ed.) (2011). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London: Routledge, p. 468

[3] Books focusing on targeting include Bell, J.B. (1990). *IRA Tactics and Targets*. Dublin: Poolbeg Press; Drake, C.J.M. (1998). *Terrorist Target Selection*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; Clarke & Newman 2006; Hemmingby, C. & Bjørgo, T. (2016). *The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process: Anders Behring Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Articles and other publications include Hoffman, Bruce (1993). Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, trends and potentialities, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5:2, 12-29; Drake, C.J.M. (1996). *The factors which influence the selection of physical targets by terrorist groups*. PhD thesis. University of St Andrews; Nemeth, Stephen C. (2010). *A rationalist explanation of terrorist targeting*. PhD thesis. University of Iowa; Libicki, M.C., Chalk, P. & Sisson, M. (2007). *Exploring terrorist targeting preferences*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation; Silke, A. (2011). Understanding Terrorist Target Selection, in *Terrorism and the Olympics*, Richards, Fussey & Silke (Eds.). London: Routledge; Wright, A.I. (2013). *Terrorism, Ideology and Target Selection*. Princeton University.

- [4] For terrorist innovation see Dolnik, A. (2007). *Understanding Terrorist Innovation*. London: Routledge; Oppenheimer, Andy (2009). *IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press; Ranstorp, M. & Normark, M. (Eds.) (2015). *Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning*. London: Routledge. For symbolism see Matusitz, J. (2015). *Symbolism in Terrorism*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- [5] See Alexander, Y. & Pluchinsky, D. (1992). *Europe's Ted Terrorists*. London: Frank Cass; Aust, S. (2009). *Baader-Meinhof*. New York: Oxford University Press; Calle, S.C. (2006); Clark, Robert. P. (1984). *The Basque Insurgents – ETA, 1952-1980*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; Dartnell, M.Y. (1995). *Action Directe*. London: Frank Cass & co; English, R. (2003). *Armed Struggle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kraushaar, W. (Ed.) (2006). *Die RAF under der linke Terrorismus*. Band I & II. Hamburg: Hamburger edition; McGladdery, Gary (2006). *The Provisional IRA in England*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press; McKittrick, D. Kelters, S., Feeney, B. Thornton, C. & McVea, D. (1999). *Lost Lives*. London: Mainstream publishing; Peters, Butz (2008). *Tödlicher Irrtum*. Frankfurt am Main: Argon Verlag.
- [6] See, for example, Bergen, Peter (2015). The Golden Age of Terrorism. CNN. URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/28/opinions/bergen-1970s-terrorism/>; Stanley, Tim (2016). West Europe is safer now than in the 1970s. *The Telegraph*. URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/25/west-europe-is-safer-now-than-in-the-1970s-and-safer-than-almost/>
- [7] See for example Hesterman, Jennifer (2015). *Soft Target Hardening*. Boca Raton: CRC press; Sommer, D. (2010). *Terrorist Modus Operandi*.
- [8] See for example Drake, 1996, 1998; Hemmingby & Bjørge, 2016.
- [9] Schuurman, B. & Eijkman, Q. (2015). Indicators of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for threat assessment. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1040426>
- [10] Cohen, L.E. & Felson, M. (1979). Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review*, 1979, Vol. 44 (August), p. 589.
- [11] George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew (2005): *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Andersen, Svein S. (2010): *Case-studier og generalisering*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- [12] This dataset is part of a PhD dissertation project on terrorist target selection issues, conducted at the Norwegian Police University College and University of Stavanger. It will be made fully available at the website of first-mentioned at the time of conclusion. URL: www.phs.no
- [13] Muhammed Merah conducted three separate attacks in the Toulouse and Montauban region in March 2012. See *BBC News* (2012). Shootings in Toulouse and Montauban: What we know. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17428860>
- [14] Category *Public debate* includes media institutions. Category *Others* covers target types rarely selected by militant Islamists in Western Europe, like critical infrastructure and financial targets.
- [15] Examples include House of Commons (2006): *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*; Intelligence and Security Committee (2009). *Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005*; London Assembly (2006). *Report of the 7 July Review Committee*; Intelligence and security committee of Parliament (2014). *Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby*; Assemblée nationale (2016). *Au nom de la commission d'enquête (1) relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l'État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015*.
- [16] For example Kohlmann, E.F. (2004). *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe*. Oxford: Berg; Lia, B. & Kjøk, Å. (2001). *Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and their Host States - The case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000*. Oslo: FFI-report 2001/03789; Nesser, P. & Stenersen, A. (2014). The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 8, issue 6; Nesser, P. (2015): *Islamist Terrorism in Europe*. London: Hurst; Pantucci, Raffaello (2015). 'We Love Death as you Love Life': Britain's suburban terrorists. London: Hurst; Rabasa, Angel & Benard, Cheryl (2015). *Eurojihad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Skjoldager, Morten (2009). *Truslen indefra – de danske terrorister*. Lindhardt og Ringhof; Skjoldager, Morten (2016). *Syv år for PET*. København: People's press; Steinberg, Guido W. (2013). *German Jihad*. New York: Columbia University Press; Storm, M., Cruickshank, P. & Lister, T. (2014). *Agent Storm*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
- [17] For terrorist rhetoric and statements see Holbrook, D. (2014). *The Al-Qaeda Doctrine*. London: Bloomsbury; Kepel, G. & Milelli, J.P. (2008). *Al Qaeda in its Own Words*. London: Belknap Harvard; Lawrence, B. (2005). *Messages to the World - The statements of Osama Bin Laden*. Verso. For analysis of ideological, strategic and operational texts, see Cigar, N. (2009). *Al-Qaida's Doctrine for Insurgency*. Dulles: Potomac Books; Lacey, J. (Ed.) (2008). *The Canons of Jihad*. Annapolis: Naval institute press; Lia, B. (2007). *Architect of the Global Jihad*. London: Hurst; Stout, Huckabey, Schindler & Lacey (2008): *The Terrorist Perspectives Project*. Annapolis: Naval institute press.
- [18] See for example Holbrook, D. (2014). *The al-Qaeda Doctrine*. London: Bloomsbury.

- [19] See for example comments by former PET director general Jakob Scharf in Skjoldager 2016: 222.
- [20] For example the 2005 7/7 bombings in London. CNN (2012). Documents give new details on al Qaeda's London bombings. URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/>
- [21] Consult Nacos, B.L. (2007). *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- [22] English, R. (2016). *Does Terrorism Work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 89.
- [23] WHO (2007). *Mass casualty management systems: strategies and guidelines for building health sector capacity*. URL: www.who.int/hac/techguidance/MCM_guidelines_inside_final.pdf
- [24] Both Merah's and Coulibaly's committed two limited casualty attacks first, while the third had mass casualty potential. See IBT (2015). French Authorities Connect Amedy Coulibaly, Kosher Grocery Store Gunman, to Separate Shooting of Jogger. URL: <http://www.ibtimes.com/french-authorities-connect-amedy-coulibaly-kosher-grocery-store-gunman-separate-1779834>; BBC News (2015). Charlie Hebdo Attacks: Three days of terror. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237>.
- [25] For the Mohammed Geele case see: Astrup, S. (2011). Øksemand atter kendt skyldig i angreb på Kurt Westergaard. Politiken. URL: <http://politiken.dk/indland/ECE1313529/oeksemand-atter-kendt-skyldig-i-angreb-paa-kurt-westergaard/>; For the Roshonara Choudry case see: Rayner, G. & Bingham, J. (2010). Stephen Timms stabbing: How Internet sermons turned quiet student into fanatic. *The Telegraph*. URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8105516/Stephen-Timms-stabbing-how-internet-sermons-turned-quiet-student-into-fanatic.html>; For the Lørs Doukaiev case see: Pedersen, T. & Søgaard, J. (2011). Lørs Doukaev skyldig i terror. Extrabladet. URL: <http://ekstrabladet.dk/112/article4097277.ece> For the Stockholm bomb attack see: *The Guardian* (2010). Sweden suicide bomber: police search Bedfordshire house. URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/13/sweden-suicide-bomber-bedfordshire-house>
- [26] Read more on terrorists and detection with Scandinavia as an example, in C. Hemmingby & T. Bjørge 2016, p.101-105.
- [27] The eight incidents are the 1995 St Michel bombing, the 2004 M11 attacks, the 2005 7/7 bombings, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, the 2015 13 November attacks, the 2016 Brussels bombings, the 2016 Nice truck attack, and the 2016 Berlin truck attack. At the time of writing there is no clear direct link between the 2016 Nice perpetrator and central jihadi networks.
- [28] BBC News (2015). Tunisia attack: What happened. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33304897>
- [29] One report where police and military forces are uncritically are defined as hard targets is *Europol – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017*. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017>
- [30] For example politicians can receive basic security advice, and be equipped with modest protective measures at home and at their workplace, but they will still be soft targets.
- [31] Cartoonist Kurt Westergaard and artist Lars Vilks are two examples. The protective steps at their homes do not necessarily make them hard targets, but close protection officers assigned to them for public appearances do. See Jyllands-posten (2015). FAKTA: Det ved vi nu om skyderierne i København. URL: <http://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/politiretsvaesen/ECE7489720/FAKTA-Det-ved-vi-nu-om-skyderierne-i-Koebenhavn/>
- [32] An interest for such targets can be seen in some plots, but they are rarely developed into actual serious attacks.
- [33] There are several sources illustrating the security know-how of today. See, for example, the Internet resources of the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) in the UK and the US Department of Homeland Security. URL: <https://www.cpni.gov.uk> and <https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security>. For manuals, see, for example, Federal Emergency Management Agency (2007). *Site and urban design for security*; FEMA 430 /December 2007; Department of Homeland Security (2011). *Reference manual to mitigate potential terrorist attacks against buildings*. FEMA-426/Bips-06/October 2011 ed.2. Homeland security.
- [34] See Nagin 2013: 199. Criminals can be deterred by apprehension and punishment. However, this is less applicable for militant Islamists; they tend to be more concerned about operational failure.
- [35] These are the 1994 hijacking, the 2001 Richard Reid case, the 2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab case and the 2010 cargo planes plot.
- [36] The possible exception is the ISIS-linked Strasbourg and Marseilles cell which was arrested in 2016. Its members displayed an interest in targeting the DGSi HQ (French security service), a police HQ and the High Court building. It is, however, more likely that they prioritized other targets over these. See Osborne, S. (2016). Isis terror cell 'planned to attack Disneyland Paris and Champs Elysees Christmas market on 1 December'. *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-terror-plot-paris-france-disneyland-champs-elysees-christmas-market-a7436441.html>
- [37] Moghaddam 2008: 13

- [38] See for example the case of Adlene Hicheur, who in October 2009 was arrested for planning terrorist attacks in France after online dialogue with AQIM. He preferred discriminate targeting, and did not wish to conduct a suicide operation. Hanlon, C. (2012). Former nuclear scientist at Large Hadron Collider goes on trial accused of 'being Al Qaeda agent'. *Daily Mail*. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2122309/Adlene-Hicheur-trial-Former-nuclear-scientist-Large-Hadron-Collider-accused-Al-Qaeda-agent.html>; Chrisafis, A. (2012). Former Cern scientist faces terror trial in France. *The Guardian*. URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/29/cern-scientist-terror-trial-france>
- [39] For example the killing of Theo van Gogh in 2004, several plots and attacks against Kurt Westergaard and Lars Vilks, the 2013 attack on Lars Hedegaard, and the 2015 killing of Stéphane "Charb" Charbonnier.
- [40] Militant Islamist publications contribute to the creation of a trophy target status and to keep such a focus alive over a long period of time. In Inspire magazine issue 10 (2013), the Islamists presented a dead or alive list, naming 11 people. Most of them were linked to media, namely Carsten Juste (mentioned as Luste, editor-in-chief in Jyllandsposten from 2003 to 2008), Kurt Westergaard, Lars Vilks, Stéphane "Charb" Charbonnier, Flemming Rose (culture editor in Jyllands-Posten in from 2004 to 2010) and Molly Norris (US based cartoonist).
- [41] *Jyllands-Posten* (2005) Muhammeds ansigt. URL: <http://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE4769352/Muhammeds-ansigt/>; Fröden, M. (2015). NA inte ensam om att publicera Muhammed-bild. URL: <http://na.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2844566-na-inte-ensam-om-att-publicera-muhammed-bild>
- [42] Skjoldager 2016: 153-155
- [43] *BBC News* (2002a). Italy arrests men over church plot. URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2205263.stm>; Jordán, J. (2014). *The foiled attacks in Italy*. In *The evolution of the global terrorist threat* (B. Hoffman & F. Reinares, Eds.), New York: Columbia University Press.
- [44] *Le Parisien* (2015). Sid Ahmed Ghlam avait fait des repérages autour des églises. URL: <http://www.leparisien.fr/espace-premium/actu/sid-ahmed-ghlam-avait-fait-des-reperages-autour-des-eglises-25-04-2015-4722733.php>; Willsher, K. (2016). *France in shock again after Isis murder of priest in Normandy*. *The Guardian*. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/france-shock-second-isis-attack-12-days>
- [45] A targeting interest has for example been noted around facilities in the United States, Lucas Heights in Australia, the Dimona facilities in Israel, Sizewell in the UK, as well as facilities in the Netherlands, France and Belgium.
- [46] See for example Lawrence, 2005; Holbrook, 2014: 73-74.
- [47] One could also argue that the 2015 Lyon gas factory attack was directed against US interests since the factory was U.S. owned, but the one person killed before the attack on the factory was the perpetrator's boss. See *The Guardian* (2015). French terrorism attack: suspect took selfie with severed head. URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/french-terrorism-suspect-took-selfie-with-slain-victim>
- [48] Stermann, A. (2014). Israel has killed perpetrators of 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, says ex-envoy. *Times of Israel*. URL: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-bombers-in-amia-attack-were-taken-out-by-israel/>; Davies, W. (2013). Hezbollah linked to the Burgas bombing. *BBC News*. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21342192>; *Jerusalem Post* (2014). Report: Peru arrested Hezbollah operative planning attacks on Israelis, Jews. URL: <http://www.jpost.com/International/Report-Peru-arrests-Hezbollah-operative-planning-attacks-on-Israelis-Jews-380369>; Ravid, B. (2014). Hezbollah Members Arrested in Thailand Admit to Planning Attack on Israeli Tourists. *Haaretz*. URL: <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.586220>
- [49] *BBC News* (2004b). Madrid bombers 'had more targets'. URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3855085.stm>; Le Figaro (2012). *Cellule djihadiste : 7 suspects déferés, 5 relâchés*. URL: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/10/10/01016-20121010ARTFIG00632-cellule-djihadiste-d-inquietantes-decouvertes.php>; *Le Figaro* (2013). L'inquiétante cellule islamiste «Cannes-Torcy» passée au crible. URL: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/07/05/01016-20130705ARTFIG00750-l-inquietante-cellule-islamiste-cannes-torcy-passee-au-crible.php>
- [50] Pedahzur, A. (2009). *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, p.44
- [51] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Global Terrorism Database. Information retrieved from GTD June 2017. URL: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>
- [52] Nasser, P. 2015: 253-255; Mullins, S. (2017). *Lone-actor vs. Remote-Controlled Jihadi Terrorism: Rethinking the Threat to the West*. War on the Rocks. URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/lone-actor-vs-remote-controlled-jihadi-terrorism-rethinking-the-threat-to-the-west/>
- [53] Schuurman, B., Q. Eijkman, and E. Bakker: A History of the Hofstadgroup. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume 8, issue 4.
- [54] Two attacks involved both hard and soft targets, based on the definitions utilised in this project; the 2003 toxic letters case in

Belgium, and the 2015 Copenhagen attack on Lars Vilks. Furthermore, two attacks involved both discriminate and indiscriminate targeting; the 2015 Copenhagen attack against Lars Vilks, and the 2015 Lyon gas factory incident.

[55] Mehdi Nemmouche and Amedy Coulibaly are two examples.

[56] Not only seen in plots, but also confirmed by former terrorists in interviews by the author conducted from 2013 to 2017.

[57] Europol review (2016). *Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Terrorist Attacks*. URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/changes_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_attacks.pdf

[58] Regarding the attack against a police couple at their private home in Magnanville in June 2016, there are strong indications that the perpetrator knew the police officer from before. *BBC News* (2016b). France police killing: Jihadist Abballa 'knew his victim'. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36547663>

[59] Mullins, S. (2017).

[60] One example is the 7/7 2005 bombings. Notes from central AQ planner Rashi Rauf revealed that the perpetrators were given the choice between the Bank of England, the G8 summit in Scotland and the London underground. *CNN* (2012). Documents give new details on al Qaeda's London bombings. URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/>

[61] The Sauerland-cell was encouraged to attack Uzbek targets, Steinberg 2013: 71, 74. Furthermore, there are claims that Merah was encouraged to target the Indian embassy, Naravane, Vaiju (2012). Slain terrorist Merah planned to attack Indian embassy in Paris. *The Hindu*. URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/slain-terrorist-merah-planned-to-attack-indian-embassy-in-paris/article3430764.ece>

[62] Carter, H. (2008). Fanatic planned to kidnap British Muslim serviceman and behead him 'like a pig'. *The Guardian*. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/30/terrorism.world>

[63] An example: Westminster City Council made major efforts in the Whitehall area with the Whitehall Streetscape Improvements project 2007-2010. See *BBC News* (2007): £25m Whitehall street work begins. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/6900760.stm

[64] For the toxic letters case from Belgium in 2003 see *Associated Press* (2003). Iraqi arrested after letters in Belgium. URL: www.apnewsarchive.com/2003/Iraqi-Arrested-After-Letters-in-Belgium/id-00fb046623dcb2bf11c25e8f7e0fd35b. For the US embassy attack in Vienna in 2007 see *BBC News* (2007): Vienna 'embassy bombing' foiled. URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7022522.stm>

[65] Cohen, R. (1999). Three Kurds shot dead by Israeli guards at Berlin protest. *New York Times*. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/18/world/3-kurds-shot-dead-by-israeli-guards-at-berlin-protest.html>

[66] *BBC News* (2016). Nice attack: France calls up 12,000 reservists. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36817435>

[67] More information: Metropolitan police archive. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20120503150929/http://www.met.police.uk/co19/armed_response.htm

[68] Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin. *Objektschutz*. URL: <https://www.berlin.de/polizei/beruf/objektschutz/>

[69] See *Operation Sentinelle*: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/france/operation-sentinelle>

[70] See for example The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2017). *Run – Hide – Tell*. URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-counter-terrorism-security-office>

[71] Hemmingby & Bjørge 2016: 88-95

[72] Ellis, C. & R, Pantucci (2016). *Lone-Actor Terrorism Policy Paper 4: 'Leakage' and Interaction with Authorities*. RUSI, ISD, Chatham House, Universiteit Leiden. URL: <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CLAT-Series-8-Policy-Paper-4-RUSI.pdf>

[73] For details on the 2010 Karim case see Crown Prosecution Service. *The Counter-Terrorism Division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) - Cases concluded in 2011*. URL: https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd_2011.html#a03

[74] Dearden, L. (2015). Paris attacks: 70 staff have security clearance revoked for suspected 'radicalisation' at French airports. *The Independent*. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-attacks-70-staff-have-security-clearance-revoked-for-suspected-radicalisation-at-french-a6773691.html>

[75] Wilkinson, P. (Ed.) (2007). *Homeland Security in the UK*. London: Routledge, p. 262.

Research Notes

On and Off the Radar: Tactical and Strategic Responses to Screening Known Potential Terrorist Attackers

by Thomas Quiggin

Abstract

Islamist inspired terrorists have carried out attacks in Europe even when they had been “on the radar” of officials. But they dropped “off the radar” and then struck. This phenomenon was noted by Dr. Bob de Graaff in a January 2017 article in the Groene Amsterdammer. More attacks followed by individuals who had dropped “off the radar.” De Graaff’s article questioned whether authorities were doing something wrong and whether they miss opportunities during moments of contact. The Dutch National Police (Taskforce Vreemdelingen en Migratiecriminaliteit) responded and organized a two-day event on this subject. Based on the presentations and discussions at the conference, the author of this paper suggests that tactical front-line officials can exploit opportunities to improve assessments that disrupt attacks. In the future, however, the attack levels in Europe will likely increase if no strategic level response is forthcoming. Reciprocal radicalization will also increase. Terrorism is a tactic. Therefore counter-terrorism activities are - by definition - at the tactical level. To be effective at the tactical level, authorities need an understanding of the principal problem at the strategic and operational levels. By analogy, it is as if NATO had been trying to defend Europe while refusing to admit that the Soviet Union existed. The European nations need to understand their invasive strategic level Islamist ideology problem. Without change, the prudent policy now would be to condition the public to accept the deaths and injuries caused by future terrorist attacks.

Keywords: Islamist extremism, Terrorism, Tactical counterterrorism, Strategic response

Terrorist attacks are often carried out by individuals who were “on the radar” and were known to police and intelligence services.[1] How do we assess such individuals more effectively to prevent future attacks? Current approaches appear fragmentary and lack the validation necessary to know if they work.[2]

Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals or groups who believe that violence, or the threat of violence, will help them achieve *their political aims*. This tactic of violence is part of an overall strategy of the group as it seeks to obtain its goals or objectives. By definition, counter-terrorism is a tactical level activity as it is aimed at preventing an activity at the tactical level (i.e. a terrorist attack). Terrorism itself is a symptom of the larger strategic problem.

The root problem at the strategic level is the rapid spread of Islamist extremism which is driven by the global struggle for the soul of Islam. The battleground is in almost 100 countries, many of which are in Europe and The West. On one side of the struggle is the Islamists – those who believe in a political, Salafist, and supremacist form of Islam. On the other side are the modernists – who want to see Islam as a modern religion accepting of democracy, science and women. The Islamists have the dominant voice in the West and increasingly have the upper hand in many Muslim majority countries. Historical analogies are dangerous, but the struggle for the soul of Islam can be loosely compared to the Protestant Reformation of 1517 to 1648. It should be remembered that 130 years of conflict caused Germany to lose about 40% of its population. The “Islamic Reformation” will last longer and may be deadlier.

Governments regularly tell their employees to “think outside the box” and then usually ignore them or punish them when they think differently. This is a problem at the operational and strategic levels. Strategic thinking has become nearly a lost art in government and even in the military. As Dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn of Leiden University wrote: “We can at present not but come to the conclusion that we are quite good at tactical disruption of our enemy, instead of generating strategic effect.”[3] This statement captures the nature of the problem of the

invasion of the Islamist ideology into Europe and the West in general. We have tactical responses which are sometimes effective, but no strategy to defeat the problem.

Part of the “off the radar” problem is the increasingly large numbers involved. According to a variety of official sources as many as 85,000 Islamist extremists exist in the UK,[4] the Netherlands, France,[5] Germany,[6] Belgium, Spain and Switzerland.[7] This number could go past 100,000 if Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Greece are included. Effectively tracking them all is a physical impossibility for the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A typical full-time surveillance operation against one individual can take as many as 10 to 20 officers.

The number of extremists will continue to increase due to: (a) migration;[8] (b) the output of Islamist runs schools K-12;[9] and (c) populations that are growing under isolated and ghettoized conditions.[10]

The rapid rise and spread of Islamist extremism in the West is not random. It is organized by a variety of well-funded groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood,[11] Hizb ut Tahrir and the Iranian Khomeneists. Although these groups represent varying theologies, especially the Iranians, they share a common Islamist supremacist ideology. Their ideas on strategy and tactics also diverge on occasion. A variety of Gulf States also fund salafist groups which have strong Islamist leanings.

The United Arab Emirates, for instance, lists 83 groups as being terrorist groups, front groups, proxy groups or fundraisers for terrorist groups,[12] many of which are in Europe. Among the leading European organizations noted by the UAE are the Cordoba Foundation (UK), the Muslim Association of Britain, the Muslim Association of Sweden, the Islamic Society of Germany, the League of Muslims in Belgium, Association of Italian Muslims, Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Union of Islamic Organisations of France, and the Finnish Islamic Association. Also noted is the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) which has members in a variety of countries, including Europe.

The largest and most effective of the Islamist groups is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It has a permanent, structured presence in at least 81 countries and it continues to spread. The second largest global group is likely Jammat e Islami, founded as a sister group to the Muslim Brotherhood by Ala al Maududi in Pakistan in 1941. More importantly is the fact that many of the most dangerous Islamist groups have been founded by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of them are front groups (Hamas) while others are spinoffs created by former Muslim Brotherhood members who had different or emerging ideas on tactics. Among them are ISIS (Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi), Al Qaeda (Abdullah Az-zam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden), Hizb ut Tahrir (Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani), the Abu Sayaf Group (Salamat Hashim), and Boko Haram (Mohammed Yusuf). As noted, also included in this list is Hamas (Ahmed Yasin, Abdel Aziz Rantisi) which openly identifies itself in Article Two of the Hamas Covenant as “one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine.”

There is no such thing as a “moderate Islamist” as their most fundamental belief calls for the domination of their form of political Islam over all others. The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna stated that “*It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet.*”[13] The founder of Jamaat e Islami, Ala al-Maududi, stated that “*Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam.*”[14] The motto of the Muslim Brotherhood is *Allah is our objective, The Qur'an is the Constitution, The Prophet is our leader, Jihad is our way and Death for the sake of Allah is our wish.* Hassan al-Banna's own slogan was “*Islam is the solution.*”[15]

Islamist groups should be seen as either “violent” or “not yet violent.”[16] Some Islamist groups have an overtly violent approach to almost every question or problem. This would include ISIS, al Qaeda, Boko Haram, the Abu Sayaf Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (and its front groups) take a more calculated approach. When operating in the West, for instance, their front groups continue to follow their “bottom up” approach to organizing at the community level. They reject violence and claim victim status at every opportunity. As with many of the Islamist groups, when they gain in strength they start

to become aggressive through campaigns of “Islamophobia” accompanied by lawsuits (lawfare)[17] in order to silence critics. Once in positions of some limited power, Islamist groups will become abusive of others. Once in real power, they become violent and oppressive towards all others (cf. Egypt 2012, ISIS 2014 etc.).

The Muslim Brotherhood as it existed in its home country of Egypt did try from the 1970s to the mid-1990s to separate itself from the worst of its own violence. However, those behind that effort are now mostly dead or have been forced to the sidelines. The official line now of the Muslim Brotherhood to its own followers is one of violence and martyrdom.[18]

The recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is but one small part of the overall problem. The demise of ISIS will not end the Islamist problem. The collapse of ISIS will simply be converted into “martyrdom” in the Islamist narrative and the struggle will continue. Of greater concern is that ISIS proved that Islamists built a caliphate which withstood the attacks of the West and its allies for four years from its inception and three years after it captured Mosul. There is now ISIS controlled territory in the Philippines (Marawi City) [19] as well as ISIS having a significant visible presence in Bosnia,[20] Gaza,[21] Afghanistan,[22] and Egypt. [23]

In the face of this global Islamist insurgency,[24] the EU and Western states collectively lack any shared understanding of the problem. No strategy has been formulated, nor does even a reasonable discussion occur on how to resist the invasion of this Islamist ideology. Much of what are called “strategic plans” or “strategic assessments” are little more than ill defined plans on how to deal with tactical issues such as terrorist attacks or deradicalization programs which are largely failing.[25]

To formulate a strategic approach to the invasion of the Islamist ideology, a variety of key factors need to be understood at the national and EU level. It must be understood that:

- A global Islamist problem exists.
- The Islamist problem is widespread in the Netherlands[26] and Europe generally, and it is growing quickly. Increased levels of migration increase this problem and promote reciprocal radicalization.
- The Islamist extremist movement is organized and well funded domestically and from foreign countries.
- The wide range of Islamist groups are driven by a common objective, even if they have different strategies and tactics.

Current approaches such as Confronting Violent Extremism,[27] Preventing Violent Extremism and deradicalization are having limited effects.

A national level/EU strategy to tackle the invasion of this foreign ideology would require, at a minimum, the following points:

- Identify the Islamist ideology as the problem specifically, not the general presence of Muslims. This must include a statement that *political Islam* has no place in Europe.[28] This could include listing foreign groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Libya as a terrorist entity, much as some Middle Eastern countries have done.[29] As noted, the United Arab Emirates list of terrorism entities includes multiple European and American groups.[30]
- European nations and the EU need to identify and map the extent of the Islamist networks in their midst. This includes networks, extremist mosques, charities, schools and cultural centres. It must also include supra-national organizations such as the International Union of Muslim Scholars[31] run by Yusef Qaradawi, now living in Qatar. The UK report on the Muslim Brotherhood[32] can be seen as a good starting point, as is the Swedish report commissioned by the Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency.[33]
- The nations and the EU need to defund and then undermine the platform of Islamist groups. Defunding should focus on removing the charitable status of Islamist groups as well as stopping the inflow of

foreign money that funds mosques, schools and cultural centres.

- At the tactical level, the above process will simplify and decrease the number and capabilities of the Islamist extremist networks. This will also give the operational and tactical levels the tools and knowledge needed to identify those individuals who go “on and off the radar.”

It should not be forgotten that part of the price of ignoring the invasion of the Islamist ideology is “reciprocal radicalization.” Countries as diverse as Canada[34] and Germany[35] are seeing deadly attacks against Islamists and (mostly innocent) Muslim migrants in general. The greater the spread of Islamist extremism and violence, the more likely that reciprocal radicalization will increase as a problem. Though outside the scope of the conference, it should be noted that another major economic downturn in Europe is likely. Quantitative Easing (money printing), long term low interest rates, high public and private debt along with an uncontrolled derivatives market will ensure that the next downturn is significant.[36] Historically, in times of economic downturn the general population tends to turn on the government and “the other.” In this case, “the other” will most likely be migrants, especially those who are identified as Islamists or Muslims.

The most significant obstacles to a more effective strategy on Islamist extremism in Europe might be political correctness and cultural relativism. The press and the police are literally afraid to discuss or act upon any issue that might identify them as racist or Islamophobic. While not specifically an Islamist group issue, consider that in Rotherham UK, 1,400 girls between the ages of 11 and 14 were raped, drugged and then forced into sexual slavery between 1997 and 2013. The victims were primarily white girls and the attackers were primarily Pakistani Kashmiri Muslims. The violence against these girls was known to police, the social workers and the city council since at least 2002. Collectively, however, they were unwilling to act for fear of being called racist or Islamophobic. When the Home Secretary commented on the official government “Jay Report”[37] on this long-term mass rape, she noted that the problem was one of “institutionalized political correctness.”[38] Denis McShane, the former Rotherham Labour MP was questioned by the media the day after the Jay Report was released. He made a stunning statement concerning the role of multiculturalism in the UK. Speaking to the BBC, he stated he was a “*Guardian reading liberal leftie*” and that “*I think there was a culture of not wanting to rock the multicultural community boat if I may put it like that.*”[39] Notwithstanding this official government report and the media reports around it, the problem has occurred in several other cities[40] and may be continuing now. If a variety of politicians at the municipal and national level cannot even act when such violence is occurring, how willing are they to tackle extremists Imams who preach the Islamist ideology?

The general knowledge of politicians, bureaucrats, academics and the press needs to be improved. Among the more thoughtless and ill-informed statements being made are:

- *The current wave of terrorist attacks has “nothing to do with Islam.”* This statement results from politicians who are completely submerged by political correctness or by apologists who have sympathy for the Islamist ideology. Muslims on both sides of the conflict are painfully aware that Islam has a problem as more Muslims die in this conflict than non-Muslims.
- *“To try to understand their motives (ISIS) is futile because their motives are pure and unmitigated evil.” “These criminals are not motivated by any recognizable religion, but by a perverse view of the world.* These statements were made by Mayor Bonnie Crombie of Mississauga Canada, but they are common in much of the West.[41] The statement is defeatist in that it says it is futile to identify the motives, when in reality the motives of the attacks she was referring to were rather clear. Additionally, it states that the “criminals” were not from any recognized religion. In reality, large numbers of Muslims, such as the Muslim Reform Movement[42], have clearly identified that a virulent form of Islam is responsible for these kinds of terrorist attacks.
- *More people die in their bathtubs every year than die from terrorism.* This is perhaps the most disturbing statement when it comes from politicians or journalists. The weapon of the terrorist is not a knife, a gun or a bomb. The weapon of the terrorist is the fear that is injected into a society. Many terrorist groups call in their attacks before the bomb goes off. They want publicity for their cause, not death. Other ter-

rorist groups have made the assessment that the greater the number of deaths, the more press coverage (and effect) they will have. Whatever the situation, the measure of terrorism is not death, it is the level of fear and (over)reaction their attacks receive from the society they are attacking. By this measure, the Islamist are successful. Those who insist on using this sort of statement are either fundamentally ignorant of the nature of terrorism or are apologists for the Islamist cause.

- *Lone wolves are responsible for Islamist attacks.* The term lone wolf has come into popular usage, most likely because journalists and academics (to some degree) feel it is a “cool term.” The concept of a lone wolf in Islamist attacks is almost non-existent.[43] Many are sole attackers, but they are regularly a part of a larger network. “Lone wolf” attacks do occur, but the most recent tangible examples are Anders Breivik, Timothy McVeigh and Theodore Kaczynski (Unabomber). None of them were Islamists. Again, the use of this term either reveals general ignorance on the part of the person using it or they are attempting to downplay the networked nature of the larger Islamist problem.
- *The Internet causes radicalization.* The Internet does not “cause” extremism and radicalization. Terrorism existed before the Internet and Islamist extremism was operationalized before email and blogsites were available. CD Rom technology was used effectively to recruit for the Chechen jihad and in radicalizing others into being members of terrorist plots.[44] While greater awareness of the Internet and social media may be an effective tool at the tactical level, it will have little to no effect at the strategic level. The government’s interest in terrorism and the Internet seems to be part of a larger effort at the long-held wish to exert greater government control over the Internet.
- *Women emerging as terrorists is a new phenomenon.* Women have not, in general, played a leading role in terrorist attacks in Europe or North America with only limited exceptions. However, the view that this is somehow new is incorrect. In 1991, British journalist Eileen MacDonald wrote a book with the title “Shoot the Women First.”[45] It was based on research into female terrorists among the radical left and the Palestinians. She identified women as not only a threat, but they would be more likely to shoot first or attack when under pressure and therefore more dangerous than men.
- *The emerging threat from social media is the most dangerous aspect of terrorism.* Statements on the state of social media are frequently alarmist and focus on the “newness” of the threat. However, the governments of the day in 1848 were concerned about the social media of their day – the man portable printing presses that could put out pamphlets immediately after an event. Again, monitoring and attacking social media sites may be quite useful at a tactical level, but it will do nothing to change the strategic problem of the expanding Islamist ideology.

On and Off the Radar

It is possible, in the short term, to create a workable assessment model to more effectively measure the likelihood of whether one individual may be at higher risk of becoming an active terrorist than another. Such a tactical assessment model would include group association, ideological thought leader association, money trails, personal belief systems (identity vs ideology), place and nature of education, technical skills background, converts and their situation, quotations and references to extremist ideology in social media and leadership figures.

This model, however, would only function at the tactical level and could not be expected to stop all terrorist attacks. The increasing numbers of Islamist extremists in Europe now are simply overwhelming and are increasing rapidly.[46]

Future Outlook

An economic downturn in the West will seriously aggravate both the Islamist extremist problem and the reciprocal radicalization. It is unlikely that any government is ready for this problem. While this is not the place to discuss details, the next economic downturn could be worse than 1980/81, 1990/91, 1999/2000 or 2007/09

Great Recession.

Conclusion

The military has an expression that says: “You cannot kill your way out of this problem.” The same can be said for law enforcement and the intelligence services in this case: You cannot arrest or disrupt your way out of this problem. The long-term solution to this problem is at the strategic level. This means the nation state and the EU.

If the nations and the EU do not devise a strategic response to the invasion of Islamist ideology onto their territory, then they must accept the idea that the ongoing fight at the tactical level will continue. The best policy without a strategic response is to condition the population to accept the costs of failure which are more terrorist attacks and more reciprocal radicalization.

About the Author: Thomas Quiggin has 30 years of practical experience in security and intelligence matters. He is a court expert in the reliability of intelligence as evidence and on terrorism (Criminal and Federal Court). His experience includes intelligence positions for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Armed Forces, the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia, Citizen and Immigration Canada (War Crimes), the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Privy Council Office of Canada and the Bank of Canada. He was also a Senior Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Notes

- [1] Bob de Graaff, *Losers op en onder de radar*, 04 January 2017, De Groene Amsterdammer. This article is available online at <https://www.groene.nl/over>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A2**. (Sources in this paper are rated according the Admiralty System A1F6 or the NATO System. The A to F rating stands for the source of the material which is listed as highly dependable (A) down to not dependable (E) or Unknown (F). the 1 to 6 rating stands for the credibility of the information itself, separate from the source. It is rated as 1 (high credibility) down to 5 (low credibility) or 6 (unable to assess).)
- [2] Alex P. Schmid, *Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?*, May 2014, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague. The paper is available online at <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A2**.
- [3] Prof. Dr. I.G.B.M. Duyvesteyn, *Strategic Illiteracy: The Art of Strategic Thinking in Modern Military Operations*, Special Chair in Strategic Studies at Leiden University on behalf of the Foundation for Strategic Studies on Monday, 10 June 2013. The paper can be seen online at <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/20944/Oratie%20Duyvesteyn%20Eng.pdf>. Page 11 of 19 in the PDF format. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A2**.
- [4] See, among others, *Britain is 'home to 35,000 Islamist fanatics', more than any other country in Europe, top official warns*, 31 August 2017, The Telegraph. The article is available online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/31/britain-home-35000-is-lamist-fanatics-country-europe-top-official/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2**.
- [5] For more on the figures for France, Spain and Belgium see the article by Noor Nanji, *'50,000 militant Islamists in Europe', warns top security chief*. This article is available online at <https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/50-000-militant-islamists-in-europe-warns-top-security-chief-1.624849>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated**.
- [6] *Germany must brace for more attacks by radicalized Muslims: officials*, 04 July 2017, Reuters News Service. The article can be seen online at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security/germany-must-brace-for-more-attacks-by-radicalized-muslims-officials-idUSKBN19P1MY>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A2**. For more on this see also Allan Hall, *WE'VE LOST CONTROL' Germany cannot cope with ISIS terror cells because the country's Muslim population has grown so rapidly, top intelligence official admits*, 09 January 2017, The Sun. This article can be seen online at <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2573862/germany-can-not-cope-isis-terror-cells-muslim-population-grown-intelligence-official-admits/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated C3**. There may be as many as 400 extremist individuals being tracked in just Berlin by itself. For more on this see *Mehr als 400 gewaltbereite Salafisten leben in Berlin*. The article can be seen online at <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/28387288>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated**.

[7] The Swiss authorities are believed to be monitoring some 500 Islamist extremists. For more on this see *Swiss monitor 500 people for online jihadist propaganda*, 14 March 2017, Swissinfo.ch. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B3.**

[8] For more on migration trends in Europe see the overview paper *Anticipating Future Migration into Europe (2018-2050): Beyond the irresponsibility of current political and humanitarian short-termism*. This paper is available online at <https://www.laetusinpraesens.org/docs10s/futmigrat.php>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[9] Among many others, see Richard Adams, *Ofsted chief: pupils at east London faith schools at risk of radicalisation*, 21 November 2017, The Guardian. This article can be seen online at <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/nov/21/ofsted-chief-pupils-east-london-faith-schools-risk-radicalisation>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**

[10] For an overview of this issue see Kim Sengupta, *London attack: Why has Birmingham become such a breeding ground for British-born terror?*, 23 March 2017, The Independent. This article is available online at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-attacker-khalid-masood-birmingham-uk-terrorists-breeding-ground-a7646536.html>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated C3.**

[11] Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, Columbia University Press, August 2010. **Not rated.**

[12] *List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE*, 16 November 2014. The article can be seen online at <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A1.**

[13] See, among many others, the CNN iReport at <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1023139>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[14] For more on al-Maududi, see the Ikhwan Info website report on him at <http://www.ikhwan.whoswho/en/archives/257>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[15] See, among many others, the CNN report by Bryony Jones and Susannah Cullinane, *What is the Muslim Brotherhood?*, 03 July 2013. The article can be seen online at <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-explainer/index.html>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**

[16] Alex P. Schmid, *Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?*, May 2014, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague. The paper is available online at <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A2.**

[17] For more on Lawfare see the book by Brooke Goldstein on this subject: *Lawfare: The War Against Free Speech: A First Amendment Guide for Reporting in an Age of Islamist Lawfare*. More information on the book can be seen at <https://www.amazon.com/Lawfare-Against-Amendment-Reporting-Islamist/dp/0982294794>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[18] MEMRI Institute, *Muslim Brotherhood Turn to Terrorism Against Al-Sisi Regime: Threats Of Attacks Against Foreign Diplomats, Workers In Egypt On Turkey-Based MB TV, Calls For Jihad And For Assassination Of Al-Sisi, Regime Heads*, 20 February 2017. The article can be seen online at <https://www.memri.org/reports/muslim-brotherhood-turn-terrorism-against-al-sisi-regime-threats-attacks-against-foreign>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B3.**

[19] Ana Santo, *How Two Brothers Took Over a Filipino City for ISIS*, 12 August 2017, The Atlantic. This article can be seen online at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/philippines-isis/536253/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B3.**

[20] For more on the problems of Islamist extremism in Bosnia see *Bosnia & Herzegovina: Extremism & Counter-Extremism*, date not given, the Counter Extremism Project. The article can be seen online at <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/bosnia-herzegovina>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[21] Sara Helm, *ISIS in Gaza*, 14 January 2016, the New York Review of Book. This article can be seen at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/01/14/isis-in-gaza/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[22] Hamid Shalizi, *Embassy, mosque attacks fuel fears ISIS bringing Iraq war to Afghanistan*, 02 August 2017, Reuters News Service. The article can be seen online at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state/embassy-mosque-attacks-fuel-fears-isis-bringing-iraq-war-to-afghanistan-idUSKBN1A10V1>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B3.**

[23] Declan Walsh, *Attacks Show ISIS' New Plan: Divide Egypt by Killing Christians*, 10 August 2017, The New York Times. The article can be seen online <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/middleeast/egypt-christians-isis-palm-sunday-attacks-sisi.html?mcubz=0>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B3.**

[24] The Quilliam Foundation in the UK argues that the problem is a global Islamist insurgency. As Managing Director Haras Rafiq says, "It is frustrating that we are still having the same conversations I was having in Downing Street a decade ago. We know what the problem is. A global jihadist insurgency. We know the solution required. Full spectrum counter-extremism led by civil society." For more on this see the Quilliam article at <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/jihadist-insurgency-reaches-nice/>. Viewed 28

September 2017. **Not rated.**

[25] Most deradicalization programs are failing while some of them have been found to be run by individuals of clearly doubtful backgrounds. For more references to these failures see the following online articles: <https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/indre-et-loire-le-seul-centre-de-radicalisation-en-france-ferme-officiellement-1501228065>, <https://www.jihadwatch.org/2009/02/11-ex-gitmo-prisoners-flee-the-saudi-rehabilitation-program-and-join-up-with-terrorist-groups>, <https://www.jihad-watch.org/2010/06/indonesian-government-admits-that-its-jihadist-rehab-program-is-a-failure> and <https://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-convicts-pose-dilemma-after-release-from-prison-1455560250>.

[26] Among the Muslim Brotherhood fronts in the Netherlands are the Es-Salaam mosque in Rotterdam, the

Al-Aqsa Foundation (branch of German head office) and the Liga van de Islamitische Gemeenschap in Nederland (League of the Islamic Community in the Netherlands) or LIGN was founded in The Hague. The UAE list of terrorist front groups included the International Union of Muslim Scholars, which has Imams in the Netherlands. The UAE list also listed Islamic Relief UK, which has a branch office in Amsterdam. Another UAE listing was the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe which has a headquarters in Belgium but a presence throughout most of Europe. For source material on these issues see <http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The-Influence-of-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-in-the-Netherlands.pdf>. See also AIVD, *The radical dawa in transition. The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* (2007) pp. 49- 52., <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/theradicaldawaitransition.pdf>. See also the UAE list at <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037>.

[27] See, among many others, Clarke Jones, *Why countering violent extremism programs are failing*, 30 June 2017, Asia and the Pacific Policy Society. This paper can be seen online at <https://www.policyforum.net/countering-violent-extremism-programs-failing/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[28] Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, believes that *political Islam* has a role to play in Europe. For more on this see Federica Mogherini's remarks at *Call to Europe V: Islam in Europe*, FEPS conference, Brussels, 25/06/2015. The full text is at <http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/150624islamfepsdeliv.pdf>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

[29] *List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE*, 16 November 2014. The article can be seen online at <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A1.**

[30] The UAE list includes CAIR USA (Council on American Islamic Relations USA) and the Muslim American Society. *List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE*, 16 November 2014. The article can be seen online at <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae-1.270037>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A1.**

[31] For a brief overview of some of the activities of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, see *How Qaradawi used the International Union of Muslim Scholars as a political tool*. The article can be seen online at <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/06/17/How-Qaradawi-used-the-International-Union-of-Muslim-Scholars-as-a-political-tool.html>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated C3.**

[32] The UK report on the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/muslim-brotherhood-review-main-findings>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated A1.**

[33] A copy of the Swedish report on the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen at https://www.msb.se/Upload/Kunskapsbank/Studier/Muslimska_Brodraskapet_i_Sverige_DNR_2107-1287.pdf. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**

[34] *Head of Quebec City mosque latest target in apparent string of hate crimes*, 30 August 2017, the Montreal Gazette. The article can be seen online at <http://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/torched-car-belongs-to-president-of-islamic-cultural-centre-of-quebec>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated C3.**

[35] *Germany hate crime: Nearly 10 attacks a day on migrants in 2016*, 26 February 2017, BBC News. The article can be seen online at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39096833>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**

[36] A variety of economic observers believe that a combination of high speed trading, Quantitative Easing and long term low interest rates have essentially destroyed the price discovery aspect of most financial markets. Most of this economic activity has been driven by Central Banks who are attempting to re-inflate their respective economies following the 2007/2008 economic downturn. One side effect is that the process of creative destruction, that is to say the collapse of non-productive enterprises, has been avoided, meaning that the next economic downturn may be even more destructive. Increasingly high debt which is both private and public, means that governments may not have the resources for bail out and high social welfare costs.

[37] A PDF version of the Jay Report can be seen at [file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Independent_inquiry_CSE_in_Rotherham%20\(13\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Independent_inquiry_CSE_in_Rotherham%20(13).pdf).

- [38] Mark Tran, *May blames 'institutionalised political correctness' for Rotherham scandal*, 02 September 2014, The Guardian. This story can be seen online at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/sep/02/theresa-may-political-correctness-rotherham-abuse>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**
- [39] Gordon Rayner, *Denis MacShane: I was too much of a 'liberal leftie' and should have done more to investigate child abuse*, The Telegraph, 27 Aug 2014. The article can be seen online at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11059643/Denis-MacShane-I-was-too-much-of-a-liberal-leftie-and-should-have-done-more-to-investigate-child-abuse.html>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**
- [40] In 2014, the list of other towns that had large scale rape cases of the same nature as Rotherham included Derby, Rochdale, Telford, Peterborough, and Oxford. See the BBC report *Rotherham child abuse: Cases in other towns*, 27 August 2014, BBC News. This story can be seen online at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28953549>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.** The City of Rochdale also had a significant mass rape case of the same nature. For more on this see The Guardian story at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/09/members-of-rochdale-grooming-gang-face-deportation-to-pakistan>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**
- [41] For the complete statement by Mayor Crombie, see the Mayor's website at <http://www.mayorcrombie.ca/mayor-crombie-re-marks-during-vigil-service/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**
- [42] For more on the Muslim Reform Movement and its beliefs see their website at <https://muslimreformmovement.org/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**
- [43] Rukmini Callimachi, *Not 'Lone Wolves' After All: How ISIS Guides World's Terror Plots From Afar*, 04 February 2017, the New York Times. The article can be seen online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html?mcubz=0>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Rated B2.**
- [44] Momin Khawaja was arrested in 2004 in Ottawa Canada for his role in a terrorism plot in the United Kingdom. During the investigation, it was revealed that he had used the "Russian Hell" set of videos about the Chechen conflict as recruiting tools. For more on this, see the report on his radicalization at https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_2.5_MominKhawajaMechanismsOfRadicalization_Aug2016.pdf. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**
- [45] Eileen MacDonald, *Shoot the Women First*, Random House; 1st edition (September 22, 1992).
- [46] Germany had estimated that it had a potential problem with some 3,800 fundamentalist Sunni Muslims in 2011. That number is now over 24,000 as of 2017. For more on this see <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2573862/germany-cannot-cope-isis-terror-cells-muslim-population-grown-intelligence-official-admits/>. Viewed 21 September 2017. **Not rated.**

Resources

Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 30 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

by Joshua Sinai

This column consists of capsule reviews of books from various publishers. The reviews are arranged in alphabetical order, per authors' last names.

Neil Krishan Aggarwal, *Mental Health in the War on Terror: Culture, Science, and Statecraft*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2015), 232 pages, US \$50.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-2311-6664-5.

As explained by the author, "The goal of this book is to analyze the cultural meanings of mental health knowledge and practice produced throughout the War on Terror. My framework for studying the interrelationships of mental health, culture, and power come primarily from cultural psychiatry and medical anthropology." (p. ix) Viewing the application of medical systems in the War on Terror as "cultural systems," the book's chapters cover topics such as bioethics and the conduct of mental health professionals in counter-terrorism; the meanings of symptoms by Guantanamo detainees, such as their underlying motives and their "psychological deterioration," including an assessment of hermeneutical adjudications in specific detainee cases; how psychodynamic scholarship depicts Arabs and Muslims; how suicide bombers are depicted in mental health scholarship, such as in the works of Donatella Marazziti, Anne Speckhard, Arie Kruglanski, Jeff Victoroff, Fathali Moghaddam, Jerrold Post, and Talal Asad; and assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs, with an assessment of the approaches of specialists such as John Horgan, Rohan Gunaratna, as well as selected programs in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Yemen. In assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs, the author offers practical insights, such as "Which components of de-radicalization programs embody local knowledge and practice and which components can be applied across cultures? How do such programs reflect implicit, unspoken norms about politics, religion, and society, as with state allegiance programs for Yemen and Saudi Arabia enveloped within religious instruction? How do these programs create new ways of being, feeling, and experiencing in the world for militants, their families, and supervising government officials? How do these programs produce new cultural materials such as pedagogical texts and policy documents, as well as novel institutions that reconfigure kinship, community, and social relations?" (p. 156) Although one might criticize the author's uncritical view of Islamist terrorists, there is significant methodological and analytical insight in this study to recommend it as a major contribution to the literature on the psychology of terrorism and the application of psychology and psychiatry to address the phenomenon of terrorism. The author is an assistant professor of clinical psychology at Columbia University and a research psychiatrist at the New York State Psychiatric Institute.

Sadik Al-Azm, *1967: Self-Criticism After the Defeat* (London, England, UK: Saqi, 1968/2011), 191 pages, US \$21.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8635-6488-8.

In 1968, Syrian philosopher Sadik al-Azm—who had obtained his doctorate in modern European philosophy at Yale University, and was teaching at the American University of Beirut—wrote *Al-Nakd al-Dhati Ba'da al-Hazima* (*Self-Criticism After the Defeat*), which was a stinging critique of Arab society for its failure to adopt to the modern world, exemplified by the decisive defeat of its militaries in the June 1967 war with Israel. This book was highly influential at the time among progressive Arab intellectuals, and was reissued in an English translation by the publisher in 2011, with a foreword by the late Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese American academic who was also a critic of Muslim Arab society. What is especially pertinent about this book is that the author's critique of Arab society now especially applies, not necessarily to Arab state political leaders, but to the extremist Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi groups such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State (ISIS) who are waging their various insurgencies throughout the Muslim world. What is al-Azm's critique? As explained by Ajami, in his foreword, "A 'traditional people' who spoke of war in

obsolete terms of chivalry and the ‘clinking of swords,’ the Arabs were not ready for a modern war, they had thought of the war as a triumphant ‘excursion.’” (p. 11) In what also applies to jihadi-type insurgents (but not current Arab societies), al-Azm had observed that such preoccupation conceals “reactionary resistance to the scientific progress, scientific socialist practice, and cultural revolution that societies walking these paths seek. All this in the name of defending the people’s traditions, values, art, and heritage, when it actually shields popular supernaturalism, superstitions, ignorance, and backward worn-out values, regurgitating the old in its obsolescence and leaving social conditions and human relations as they are, that is, in a condition of severe backwardness.” (p. 118) By shifting the book’s lens to focus on current Islamist extremism, it is such insights that make this book so pertinent in understanding the reactionary nature of these movements and the measures that are required to counter them. The author died in December 2016, while living in Berlin, Germany.

Mel Ayton, *The Forgotten Terrorist: Sirhan Sirhan and the Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), pages, US \$29.95 [Hardcover], US \$19.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5979-7079-2.

This is an important and extensively documented account of the motivations and steps that led Palestinian American extremist Sirhan Sirhan to assassinate of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 5, 1968, which in retrospect (according to the author) can be considered as “the first act of the tragedy that culminated in 9/11.” (p. 11) Sirhan’s pathway into violent extremism fits the profile of homegrown Islamist terrorists. As the author explains, “Sirhan might have been mentally unstable and angry at a society that had relegated him to the bottom of the heap.... [but he] clearly saw himself, like today’s suicide bombers, as an Arab hero.” (p. 10) The book also discusses the assassination’s aftermath, the trial—including controversies over physical evidence and witnesses used at the trial—and Sirhan’s political attitudes and obsessions. Even though it was written some 10 years ago, the chapter on “The Unaffiliated Terrorist” is especially pertinent to understanding current lone wolf terrorists, as it discusses leading forensic psychology theories to explain Sirhan’s possible mental state and motivations. This includes the discussion of psychologist Eric D. Shaw’s personal pathway model, “which includes a socialization process, narcissistic injuries, escalatory events, and those terrorists ‘who have suffered from early damage to their self-esteem.... Family political philosophies may also serve to sensitize those persons to the economic and political tensions inherent throughout modern society.... As a group, they appear to have been unsuccessful in obtaining a desired place in society, which has contributed to their frustration.” (p. 244) Targeting Senator Kennedy, the author concludes, was due to Sirhan’s political motivations; he writes that “without Sirhan’s Arabness and without the bitterness and hatred toward Jews that had their roots in the conflict in the Middle East, it is unlikely he would have assassinated Robert Kennedy. All the hatred that spewed forth from Sirhan’s gun can ultimately be traced back to one source – Palestinian nationalism.” (p. 263) The author is a veteran British journalist and author of numerous books on national security subjects.

Ram Dev Bharadwaj and **Joseph Benjamin**, *Conflict, Terror & Violence in Indian Society & Polity* (New Delhi, India: Ess Ess Publications/Portland, OR: ISBS, Inc., 2015), 354 pages, US \$72.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-8-1700-0747-0.

The contributors to this edited volume examine the internal and external factors shaping terrorist-type conflicts in India. These include the Dalit movements and violence in Maharashtra, anti-caste violence, ethnic conflict by the Bodos in Assam, the Naxalite threat in Bihar, inter-group conflicts in India, violence against women in Jammu and Kashmir, and challenges to India’s security presented by narco-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. One of this volume’s contributions is its presentation of the perspectives and insights by leading Indian academic experts on these threats and how to solve them. An example is Deepika Chakraborty’s chapter on “Naxalism: Threat to Internal Security, in which he writes that “Until the [Indian] government implements employment, poverty alleviation and land reform programmes, counterinsurgency measures cannot achieve much. Social justice and inclusive growth are the planks on which the government must build

its programme. Only with consolidated efforts on the part of the legal and political framework socio-economic reforms can be implemented, and the problem of Naxalism tackled.” (p. 260)

Nicholas Burns and **Jonathan Price**, editors, *Blind Spot: America's Response to Radicalism in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2015), 215 pages, US \$21.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0898436297.

This book is a collection of papers commissioned for the 2015 Aspen Strategy Group Summer Workshop, in Aspen, Colorado. The workshop was convened to assess America's response to radical extremism in the Middle East. The book is divided into four parts: Part 1, “The Roots and Appeal of Extremism” (e.g., the history and ideology of the Islamic State, strategies to win the ideological war, and lessons on radicalization pathways from Egypt and Tunisia); Part 2, “The Rise of the Islamic State” (e.g. the spread of ISIS in the Middle East and how to fight it); Part 3, “A Toolbox to Counter ISIS” (e.g., military, political and cyber strategies to counter ISIS); and Part 4, “The American Strategy to Combat ISIS and Violent Extremism” (e.g., the principles of a successful strategy for America and its allies to defeat ISIS, and the challenge of countering violent extremism). The numerous insights by the volume's contributors include Princeton University's Professor of Near East Studies Bernard Heykal, who observes that groups such as ISIS flourish because of “an ideology of religious power and domination as well as political, social, and economic realities that provide a wellspring of recruits and supporters who feel deeply disenfranchised and increasingly marginal to the flow of history. Only by addressing seriously these underlying causes and grievances will the phenomenon of jihadism be effectively dealt with.” (pp. 27-28) The volume's authors are prominent experts with high-level government and think tank experience.

Mark Calderbank, *‘For Only Those Deserve the Name’: T.E. Lawrence and Seven Pillars of Wisdom – A Literary Biography & Study* (Brighton, England, UK/Chicago, IL: Sussex Academic Press, 2017), 360 pages, US \$64.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-8451-9804-4.

Thomas Edward Lawrence (known as T.E. Lawrence and “Lawrence of Arabia”), lived from 1888 to 1935. He became famous worldwide as a British archaeologist, military officer, diplomat, and author of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, which recounted his involvement as a British military officer seconded to assist the successful guerrilla warfare-based Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, which helped to lay the basis for the modern Middle East. This book focuses on the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* as “part biography, part essay in interpretation.” (p. 1) The book is divided into two parts. The first part is an account of the more than seven-year period that Lawrence spent writing his book, which was published in 1926. The second part examines *Seven Pillars* from different angles, including accounts by other participants in the Arab Revolt, and the author's interpretation of major themes in the book, such as Lawrence's attitudes towards the Arabs, “his presentation of history, and the meaning of his autobiography.” (p. 3) The book's Epilogue presents a chronology of four versions of the book's text, as well as other resources for the book's and its chapter's editions. The author recommends that the book's readers first read *Seven Pillars* since the text provides page references for additional information. This book will especially appeal to T.E. Lawrence bibliophiles and others interested in delving deeper into literally everything associated with *Seven Pillars*. The author is a Cambridge University-educated British writer with extensive experience in the Middle East, who has written extensively about Lawrence.

Aaron Edwards, *UVF: Behind the Mask* (Dublin, Ireland: Merrion Press/Portland, OR: Distributed by ISBS, 2017), 448 pages, US \$23.98 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-7853-7087-8.

This is a highly informative, authoritative and well-written account of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) within the wider landscape revolt by Irish Republican militant groups from the 1960s to the current era in Northern Ireland. As explained by the author, the UVF in its new form was reconstituted in 1965 “as a preemptive

defence mechanism against a perceived Irish Republican Army (IRA) threat, though its main purpose was as an instrument to put pressure on the ruling Unionist Party that was seen as weak on Irish republicanism and far too liberal in its views on northern Catholics and the Republic of Ireland.” (p. xviii) The author describes how, during the period of what became known as the “Troubles,” the UVF “killed 564 people, mostly Catholic civilians, and injured thousands more Protestants and Catholics between its first killing in 1966 and its most recent in 2010.” (p. xviii) It is within this context that the author seeks “to uncover the real causes of the ‘mental or emotional’ reactions that lead people to engage in violence” (p. xxi) and “the generic features of the UVF as a militant group – how it recruited, trained and organized, the disciplinary system of control exerted over its volunteers, its command structures, how it operated when carrying out its ‘counter-terrorist campaign against violent nationalism’ and everyone else, and, perhaps, most controversially of all, the forensic details of violence. It is my intention to look behind the mask of UVF terror to paint as accurate and comprehensive a picture as it is possible to give of a ruthless, organized and determined armed group.” (p. xxiv) This is excellently accomplished through the author’s extensive research and inside access to the UVF’s leading members, such as Billy Mitchell, David Ervine, Billy Wright, Billy Hutchinson and Gary Haggarty. Their loyalist rivals are also interviewed for a balanced perspective on the UVF’s activities. The UVF’s high profile bombing and shooting operations are also examined. The author concludes on a promising note that “The chances of needing to reactivate the UVF as a military-based organization are now slim.” (p. 334) This will depend, however, on “completing its process of transition. It will require legislation from the British and Irish governments to ensure that those who have moved away from their paramilitary pasts can be fully reintegrated and rehabilitated into society. And it will require victims and survivors of the troubles to work through the past to address the toxic legacy of political inspired violence and to ensure that the mantra ‘never again’ becomes the watchword on everyone’s lips.” (p. 334) The author is a Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, England.

Richard English, Eds., *Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press/The British Academy, 2015), 200 pages, US \$70.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-1972-6590-1.

This edited volume’s chapters are based on a symposium on “9/11: Ten Years On,” held at a joint British Academy/University of St Andrews meeting in September 2011. As noted by the volume’s editor in the introductory overview, the contributors’ bring a multidisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between the challenges presented by terrorism and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism response measures. To address these issues, the volume’s contributors discuss a range of topics, such as Alia Brahimi’s chapter on al-Qaida and the 9/11 decade (in which he argues on p. 38 that “the illusion of counter-terrorism was the possibility of a military solution”); Rashmi Singh’s chapter on assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism in the post 9/11 era (three lessons are highlighted: a shift in the overall strategic character of war, the law of unintended consequences, and over-securitization of counterterrorism has fueled al-Qaida’s brand of ideology); David Omand’s chapter on recommended limits for Western counter-terrorism policy (with government ensuring that ethical principles are used in security and intelligence operations for public protection against major dangers); Conor Gearty’s chapter on the origins and utility of Western counter-terrorism policy (in which he argues that the 9/11 attacks ushered in new frameworks of laws not only to control al-Qaida-type militancy but to control dissent by other groups deemed subversive); Adrian Guelke’s chapter on misinformation in counter-terrorism (in which he proposes the intriguing observation that Western states, in their eagerness to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria had inadvertently become de facto allies of the insurgent jihadi groups); Audrey Kurth Cronin’s chapter on how and why terrorist campaigns end (with five patterns proposed: decapitation of terrorist group leaders, negotiations with terrorist groups, terrorist groups achieving their objectives, failure by terrorist groups, military defeat by government forces, and shifting terrorist campaigns to other areas, such as criminal activities); Richard English’s chapter on using the case of dissident Irish Republicanism to explain how terrorist campaigns do not end (but will “become enduringly marginal”); and David A. Lake’s chapter on the role of the global insurgency in contemporary world politics (in which he argues that with “no total or permanent solution to the global insurgency” the United States, which overextended

itself in countering terrorist insurgencies around the world, “should favour a strategy of retrenchment.”). The interesting arguments offered by the volume’s contributors are worth addressing in examining the challenges presented by contemporary terrorism and how to counter them effectively.

Richard English, *Does Terrorism Work? A History* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 512 pages, US \$39.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-1996-0785-3.

In this conceptually innovative, well analyzed, and important book, the author examines the question of whether terrorism works. This is an important question, the author writes, because answering it explains “some of the central dynamics of terrorist activity: its causation (why does it occur where and when it does?); its varying levels across place and time (why does it endure for periods and at the specific, differing levels that it does?); the processes by which terrorist campaigns come to an end (why does it dry up in some settings at some moments, but not in and at others?); and the patterns of support involved in terrorism (why are some people more likely to endorse and practice it than others?).” (p. 2) To answer these questions, the author insightfully formulates a conceptual framework, based on four outcomes for a terrorist campaign: 1) strategic victory (in terms of achieving a group’s central, primary goal or goals); 2) partial strategic victory (such as a protracted stalemate); 3) tactical success (operational success or acquisition of publicity); and 4) the inherent rewards of struggle (such as attaining prestige and status for the group). (p. 30) This framework is applied to examining the effectiveness of terrorist insurgencies in the cases of al-Qaida, the Northern Ireland Provisional IRA, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Basque ETA, with numerous other terrorist groups also examined, although in lesser detail, such as the Lebanese Hizballah, the Sri Lankan LTTE, the African National Congress (ANC), the German Baader-Meinhof Group (or Red Army Faction), the Pakistani LeT, and others. Among the author’s numerous findings is that all these case studies involved considerable human suffering, and yet none of the groups achieved their central goals. Further, “contrary to the confidence so often evinced by terrorist activists about violently achieved progress, very many of the political futures that they have helped to create have been far less worthy of celebration than they had anticipated. Indeed, in tune with historians’ frequent skepticism about historical watersheds, very much in political life (in our al-Qaida, PIRA, Hamas, and ETA case studies, for example) has actually proved continuous before, during, and after those groups’ violent campaigns in pursuit of dramatic change.” (p. 265) As demonstrated by such insights, this book is an important contribution to advancing the discipline of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The author was, until recently Wardlaw Professor of Politics in the School of International Relations, and Director of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Baya Gacemi, [Translated by Paul Cote and Constanina Michell], *I, Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 160 pages, US \$50.00 [Hardcover], US \$24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8032-7124-1.

This is an interesting “autobiography” by an Algerian journalist of “Nadia” (a pseudonym) – a young Algerian woman who (against her parents’ wishes) had been married at a young age to “Ahmed,” a petty criminal who became a local leader of the Islamic Action Group (GIA) in the 1990s. As recounted to the journalist, “Nadia” describes her difficult marriage to “Ahmed,” who was constantly disappearing to carry out operations for GIA, while she had to constantly seek GIA safe houses to avoid the government’s security services. Of particular interest is her description of what her husband told her was expected of a terrorist’s wife: “he told me about his brothers and what they expected of me: ‘Now that we’re married, you’re part of the clan. You’ve become a sister. It’s your obligation to cook for them and do their laundry. It will be your way of contributing to the creation of an Islamic state in Algeria. Somebody has to do those chores. The brothers are fighting against the taghout [false idols]. God has ordered them to do it. Besides, anyone who supports them is also indirectly taking part in the fight. I want you to be the one to help. That way, when I become an emir, you’ll have the title of ‘mother of the faithful’ and God will count you among the chosen of the earth.’” (pp. 37-38) With her husband eventually murdered, “Nadia” was able to pull away from the GIA and regain her own life. In the

conclusion, “Nadia” writes that “I hope my story can serve as an example for other young women. It got into this mess because I was in love with a man who, all things considered, I hardly knew. We lived together for only three months. I’ll tell my son everything as soon as he’s old enough to understand. He has to know the truth some day.” (p. 150) With so many women, whether in the Middle East or the West, marrying jihadi fighters in Syria and Iraq, this book is instructive in showing the actual life they end up living with their husbands, which often is the opposite of the rosy expectations they are promised when they marry them.

George Hawley, *Making Sense of the Alt-Right* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), 232 pages, US \$28.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-2311-8512-7.

The Alternative Right, commonly known as the Alt-Right, is a set of far-right wing ideologies, groups and individuals in the United States whose core beliefs is that “white identity” is under attack by multicultural forces (i.e., non-white and liberal elements) who seek to undermine the prominence of white people and their civilization. The Alt-Right is considered a destabilizing force in American politics, especially the intentionally provocative protest demonstrations by their adherents around the country. In an example of what may be a precedent to future Alt-Right terrorism, on August 12, 2017, an Alt-Right adherent deliberately rammed his car against a counter-demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing one person and injuring more than 30 others. To understand this threat, *Making Sense of the Alt-Right* is an excellent account of its goals, predecessors, and activities. What does the Alt-Right want? As the author explains, “The new-Nazi element of the Alt-Right desires the creation of something akin to the Third Reich, with everything this entails. Their best known website is the *Daily Stormer*, run by a new-Nazi named Andrew Anglin.” (p. 14) Another leader, Richard Spencer, the originator of the Alt-Right term, “supports the idea of creating one or more white ethnostates in North America.” (p. 15) The most prominent Alt-Right leader is Steve Bannon, a “right-wing nationalist and a populist,” (p. 129), who was fired as President Donald Trump’s strategic adviser in mid-August 2017 and then returned to run *Breitbart*, the movement’s influential media publication. In the concluding chapter, the author observes that “In a postconservative America, zero-sum identity politics may become the norm, and the Alt-Right will be on the periphery, pushing racial polarization at every available opportunity.” (p. 175) The author is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

Thomas Hegghammer, editor, *Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 284 pages, US \$99.99 [Hardcover], US \$28.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1076-1456-7.

With much of the literature on jihadi terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State (ISIS), focusing on their warfare activities in ‘physical’ and ‘cyber’ space, this is one of the few books to examine the cultural dimension of jihadism as it applies to its militant adherents. This is an important topic for study, the volume’s editor explains in his introductory overview, because “militancy is about more than bombs and doctrines. It is also about rituals, customs, and dress codes. It is about music, films, and story-rituals, customs, and dress codes. It is about music, films, and story-telling. It is about sports, jokes, and food.” (p. 1) This “rich aesthetic culture,” the editor adds, “is essential for understanding their mindset and worldview.” (p. 1) Research on this topic, the editor notes, is “also highly policy-relevant” about terrorism in general “because it can shed new light on why people join extremist groups and why some groups and movements survive longer than others.” (p. 17)

To analyze these topics, the contributors to the volume, who are leading experts in their respective fields, discuss topics in jihadi culture such as poetry, a cappella songs, a musicological perspective on jihadi *anashid* (Islamic chants), cinematography, and the relationship between the tradition of Islamic dreams and jihadi militancy, including martyrdom (as Muslim operatives are promised by their terrorist groups to continue living in an afterlife paradise following their death in suicide bombing attacks).

In the concluding chapter, the editor presents an inventory of non-military devotional practices in jihadi groups, such as prayer, invocations, ablution, Qur'an recitation, and exorcism; recreational practices such as video watching, storytelling, and dream interpretation; as well as identity-markers such as dress and grooming, adopting noms de guerre (*kunyas*), and slogans.

While this volume does accomplish, as the editor notes, an important survey of "the jihadi cultural universe and provide[s] a starting point for more research into the cultures of rebel groups," (p. 201) one of its weaknesses is that much of the discussion concerns jihadi propaganda which paints an overly glorified portrait of jihadi life. Nevertheless, for counterterrorism services to counter these jihadi narratives, this volume provides the rich material that needs to be considered in counter-messaging campaigns. The editor is senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and adjunct professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo.

James J. Hentz and Hussein Solomon, editors, *Understanding Boko Haram: Terrorism and Insurgency in Africa* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 304 pages, US \$155.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-1386-9622-8.

The contributors to this conceptually interesting and informative edited volume apply a multi-disciplinary approach to analyze the nature of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. As explained by the volume's editors, Boko Haram's objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the Borno State in the North East that would ultimately cover the areas of the former "Kanem-Borno Empire," thereby replacing the modern state system imposed on Nigeria by Western colonialism. The book's coverage begins with Hussein Solomon's interesting introductory overview that discusses the contending approaches of traditional counter-terrorism studies and what is known as "Critical Terrorism Studies" (CTS) to analyzing terrorism and counterterrorism in the African context, in which he argues that both approaches are required, although he criticizes the "traditional" approach for "privileging the African state, an artificial and alien entity and often the source of its citizens' insecurity." (p. 10) The CTS approach, on the other hand, highlights the importance of "objective conditions" such as economic factors that generate terrorist movements, although he admits that "it remains short on policy options." (p. 11)

To analyze these issues, the book is divided into three parts. The first part contextualizes the phenomenon of Boko Haram, with chapters on Boko Haram as a jihadist group, its ethnic and religious characteristics, and the influence on it of ideological and operational antecedents with previous revolts in Nigeria. The second part, "The Nigerian State and Boko Haram," covers Boko Haram's exploitation of cleavages in Nigeria, the roles of identity and deprivation in driving its insurgency, and problems in the Nigerian government's response, for instance, focusing on countering terrorism while overlooking the role of radicalization in driving the group's adherents into violent extremism. The fourth part, "Responses," assesses the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism campaigns by the government, the West, and regional bodies.

The chapter by John A. Stevenson, Amy Pate and Elvis Asiamah, on "Effective Counter-Terrorism Against Boko Haram," is especially interesting as it applies an empirical approach, based on field research and quantitative incident data, to assess the effectiveness of various government counter-measures during the period of 2009 to 2014. Although their recommendation may be more ideal than practical, given Nigeria's deep seated problems, it is still worth noting, as they write that "the United States should encourage the use of local knowledge in counter-terrorist operations against Boko Haram, by simply providing technical assistance for combinations of the military and vigilantes to engage in sweeps to clear the extremist group, as well as ensuring sustained resources for local law enforcement agents to have and employ in their territory. Therefore, the best policies to most effective counter Boko Haram will emerge not from a Nigerian military-led solution but from a more balanced and coordinated effort through CVE programs, hardened target preference, negotiations and police-vigilante combat operations." (p. 208)

In the concluding chapter, "Nigeria and a War Across States in Northwest Africa," co-editor James J. Hentz discusses the Boko Haram insurgency within the context of three types of African wars: interstate, civil war,

and what he terms “new wars.” He concludes that “The catholic approach taken by this volume – that of sociology, history, political science, economics and policy studies – is a step toward a critical examination of Boko Haram and conflict in Africa.” (p. 266) Hentz is Professor and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute, in Lexington, Virginia. Hussein Solomon is Senior Professor in the Department of Political Studies and Government at the University of the Free State, South Africa.

Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* [Third Edition] (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), 528 pages, US \$85.00 [Hardcover], US \$26.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-2311-7477-0.

This is the third edition of the author’s masterful and best-selling comprehensive account of the history and manifestation of global terrorism, which was first published in 1998, with the expanded second edition (456 pages) issued in 2006. This edition is some 70 pages longer than the previous edition, with much of its material remaining intact, and it brings the author’s analysis of terrorism to the current era, especially with an update on al-Qaeda and new sections on the Islamic State (ISIS), as well as discussions of new developments in terrorists’ exploitation of the Internet. While the previous edition’s concluding chapter was entitled “Terrorism Today and Tomorrow,” this edition provides two concluding chapters: “Terrorism Today and Tomorrow I: Force Multipliers” and “Terrorism Today and Tomorrow II: New and Continuing Challenges.”

Like the book’s previous editions, this book covers topics such as defining terrorism, the origins and evolution of terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, the internationalization of terrorism, religion and terrorism, suicide terrorism, terrorism’s exploitation of the media of communications, the psychology of terrorism, terrorism’s modus operandi (e.g., tactics and weaponry), and new trends and challenges.

There is much to commend in this important book, such as the author’s insightful observation that “While some terrorist movements have been successful in achieving the first three objectives [attention, acknowledgment, and recognition], rarely in modern times has any group attained the last two [authority and governance]. Nevertheless, all terrorists exist and function in hopes of reaching this ultimate end. For them, the future rather than the present defines their reality.” (p. 268) Another pertinent observation is the author’s conclusion that “both ISIS and al-Qaeda and their respective branches and affiliates have locked the U.S. and its allies into an enervating war of attrition – the preferred strategy of terrorists and guerrillas from time immemorial.” (p. 331) He then adds, “Decisively breaking this stasis and emerging from this war of attrition must therefore be among the highest priorities in our ongoing struggle against terrorism.” (p. 331)

The author is a professor in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and the director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program, in Washington, DC.

William Hopkinson and **Julian Lindley-French**, *The New Geopolitics of Terror: Demons and Dragons* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 114 pages, US \$70.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-1382-1184-1.

This is an interesting and concise survey of the current conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and the war between groups such as al-Qaida and ISIS and the geopolitical interventions by Western military and security forces in those countries. This complicated interaction needs to be better understood, the authors write, because “terrorism, misery, state tensions across the Middle East – all interact with wider current geopolitics to create a highly dangerous strategic environment. The West needs a counter-terrorism strategy, a counter-insurgency strategy and a ‘classic’ geopolitical strategy. Weaving such very different elements into one unified whole will be a major challenge.” (p. 2) To analyze these issues, the authors present an innovative framework based on four levels of analysis: “sub-state ethnic and sectarian divisions from which terror groups have emerged; the impact of such groups on state structures and regional state relations; the implications of regional tensions for regional strategic and extra-regional actors, most notably European

states, Russia, and the United States, together with implications for the security and defence of those states; and finally the impact of such threats on geopolitics and state competition between Great Powers the world over.” (p. 6)

The book also examines how such power interactions impact on the international system, international institutions and regimes (such as the Arab League, United Nations, European Union, and NATO), including how a strategy can be formulated and implemented to manage “such a fractious and contentious geopolitical environment.” (p. 6) The authors conclude that with Syria and the Levant forming “the epicenter of a struggle that is ideological, regional and fast becoming geopolitical,” (p. 93) if the West does not act to solve these conflicts “then a whole spectrum of separate evils could merge into a grand strategic one – the worst of all worlds: a world that is ever more prone to shock, but ever less capable of coping with shock. The world is indeed complex, but managing complexity is what government is mean to be for.” (p. 95) Such geostrategic insights make this book an important guide for understanding the challenges facing Western governments who are involved in this Middle Eastern cauldron and the solutions that need to be implemented to stabilize the region. William Hopkinson is a former Director of Studies and Deputy Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Assistant Secretary of State (Policy) in the Ministry of Defence, London, England. Julian Lindley-French is a strategic analyst and Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Brussels, Belgium.

Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide* [2nd edition] (Pluto Press, 2010), 224 pages, US \$95.00 [Hardcover], US \$26.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7453-2972-7.

First published in 2006, this revised edition updates the coverage of Hamas to 2009. As a guide, the book's chapters are structured chronologically and thematically, with sub-headings taking an interesting—and, at times, even provocative—format of questions and answers (e.g., “Who are the Muslim Brothers?”, “In Hamas's view, what would be the future of the Jews in Palestine?”, “How much influence does Hamas have on Palestinians inside Israel proper?”, and “Are we witnessing the rise of an ‘Islamic and radical arc’, starting from Iran, spanning Syria, Hizballah and then Hamas?”) The book's 13 chapters start with the origins of Hamas, its ideology, strategy and objectives, its leadership and structure, Hamas and Israel, its resistance and military strategy, its political and social strategy, Hamas and ‘international Islamism,’ and ending with what the author terms the ‘new’ post-2006 Hamas, in which it gained control over the Gaza Strip. Although the guide requires an updated edition to account for latest developments, it is recommended as an informative and multi-dimensional account of Hamas. The author, a Palestinian who was born in a refugee camp in Bethlehem, is a senior research fellow at the Centre of Islamic Studies and the co-ordinator of the Cambridge Arab Media Project at the University of Cambridge, England.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2017* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 504 pages, US \$618.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-85743-835-2.

The annual *The Military Balance*, which is published by the London-based The International Institute for Strategic Studies, is considered the most authoritative, comprehensive and detailed assessment of latest developments in the military capabilities and defense economics of 171 countries. It is widely used as an open-source based reference resource by governments' military and intelligence agencies, as well as public policy research institutes and academic researchers, around the world.

The volume is divided into two parts. The first part, “Capabilities, Trends and Economics,” is the volume's primary section. Following two chapters that provide analyses of defense and military trends (including interesting sections on topics such as the changing defense-industrial landscape, trends in challenges to deterrence, and a four page overview on the roles of special operations forces in projecting military capability), seven chapters provide detailed information about the military capabilities of the 171 countries, with the countries listed according to their geographic regions. For each country, a short section provides a general overview, followed by their organizational formations (e.g., army, air force, navy, cyber, special operations, etc.). The

last chapter consists of tables that provide data on country comparisons and defense expenditures. The volume's second part, "Reference," provides explanatory notes about using the volume's data and definitions of concepts and terms, such as defense economics and army, air force, and navy forces and equipment.

The volume is also useful for the terrorism and counterterrorism research community as it provides extensive details about selected non-state groups that constitute militarily significant armed actors. In a two-page section on "Selected non-state armed groups: observed forces and military equipment holdings," (pp. 563-564) three terrorist groups are profiled: Hizballah, the Islamic State (ISIS), and Boko Haram. We learn, for example, that Hizballah has an estimated 4,000 to 8,000 active forces, with an additional 20,000 reserves, and that among these forces between 4,000 and 8,000 are estimated to be committed to operations in Syria. Hizballah's military equipment includes MBT T-72 armored fighting vehicles, surface-to-surfaces missiles launchers, and SAM air defense systems. At its height, ISIS's total combat strength (at least prior to its current military setbacks and killed fighters) had totaled an estimated 20,000-35,000 personnel, of whom 12,000-15,000 had operated in Syria. A fourth non-state actor, the Kurdish Peshmerga, although not considered a terrorist group, is also profiled.

Of particular interest to the counterterrorism community is the volume's detailing of countries' combating terrorism forces. Thus, for example, it details that the United States' Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consists of 63,150 active forces and 6,550 civilians (p. 56); France has 3 Special Forces groups (p. 114); Norway's Army has 2 Special Forces groups and one Naval Special Forces group (p. 143); the United Kingdom has a large contingent of Royal Navy, Army and RAF Special Forces regiments and squadrons (p. 174); Russia has a total of 659,000 paramilitary forces, which consist of 10,000-30,000 Federal Protection Service forces, and 160,000 Federal Border Guard Service forces (p. 223); India has 1,403,700 paramilitary forces, which consist of 63,900 Ministry of Home Affairs' Assam Rifles forces and 230,000 Border Security Force personnel, an anti-terrorism contingent of 7,350 National Security Guards, 10,000 mainly ethnic Tibetan Special Frontier forces, a Special Protection Group with 3,000 personnel, and 450,000 State Armed Police forces; and Israel has 3 Army Special Forces battalions and 1 Special Operations brigade, 300 Naval Commandos, and 8,000 Border Police forces (pp. 382- 384).

Sarah Irving, *Leila Khaled: Icon of Palestinian Liberation* (London, England, UK: Pluto Press/Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 168 pp., US \$80.00 [Hardcover], US \$22.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7453-2951-2.

This is a revealing and important account of the life and activities of Leila Khaled, dubbed 'the poster girl of Palestinian militancy' in the late 1960s and 1970s, but who has continued to be active in the Palestinian resistance movement to this day. This biography details Khaled's terrorist activities, beginning with her involvement on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the August 29, 1969 hijacking of flight TWA 840. This incident, led by her partner Salim Issawi, involved diverting the flight from Rome to Athens, and then its eventual landing in Damascus. In a second hijacking, on September 6, 1970, she partnered with Patrick Arguello (a Nicaraguan-American member of the Sandanista movement) in an unsuccessful plot to hijack an El Al Boeing 707 at Amsterdam Airport. After Arguello was killed on board the plane, Khaled was arrested and spent the next month in London's Ealing police station. She was later released as part of a prisoner exchange. This account, which is based on a series of interviews conducted by the author with Khaled in Amman, where she lived (at least by 2008 when the interviews were conducted), then details Khaled's later life as wife, mother, a member of the Palestinian National Council, a leader of the General Union of Palestinian Women, and a spokesperson for the Palestinian cause.

This book is highly relevant to the current era because of the important questions that it posed to Khaled: "how do militants whose careers start with violent action end them in the arena of political negotiation and discussion? Why, and how, do people – especially women – decide to follow the path of armed struggle, and what do they gain and lose? How does the left-wing revolution of Khaled's day link to the Islamist parties which dominate the armed Palestinian resistance of today? And how does the romanticized, sexualized figure

of the “Aubrey Hepburn terrorist” fit into the wider Palestinian struggle?” (p. 5) Many of Khaled’s answers are especially noteworthy, including her criticism of the culture of suicide bombings, which she refers to as “about death, not about life,” that it “dehumanizes the idea of struggle: ‘We don’t want this generation to think they can just fight by pushing the button,’ and “we don’t see this as the best way to mobilize the people.” (p. 124) Khaled also criticizes “the impact that the rise of the Islamist parties has had on the position of women in the West Bank and Gaza.” (p. 126) Finally, Khaled supports Palestinian – Israeli peace once “the core issues, the land and the refugees, are dealt with in a just way...” (p. 138) The author is a British journalist who has published books on Palestinian affairs.

Gilles Kepel, *Terror In France: The Rise of Jihad in the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 240 pages, US \$29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-6911-7484-6.

This is an interesting account of the nature of what the author refers to as the third wave of jihadism in Europe, including France, the primary subject of this book. The first wave, as explained by the author, lasted from 1979 to 1997, and was centered in Afghanistan, with episodes in Bosnia, Egypt, and Algeria. The second wave was focused on al-Qaida’s jihad against America, with its “high” point reached in its 9/11 attacks, and followed by the jihadists’ failure in Iraq. The third wave, the subject of this book, began in 2005, with its focus on jihadi radicalization of Western Muslims and terrorist activities in Europe. The peak of the third wave, the author points out, was reached with the shooting rampage at *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015 and the attack at the Bataclan concert in November of that year.

The author focuses on the case of jihadism in France because it “is exemplary and premonitory, and a deeper knowledge of it can help us decipher situations in which we see jihadism spreading in the West, whether in the rest of Europe or in North America.” (p. xii) In the epilogue, the author criticizes what he terms the French “establishment’s incompetence” in misunderstanding how to deal with its jihadist problem, which was caused by a number of factors, such as neglecting the academic field of Islamic studies, with no “innovative thinking to be found at the top of the highly hierarchical French security apparatus, which would need to be retooled in order to grasp the shift in jihadist organization from pyramidal structures to an unprecedented model in which the actors operate in swarms.” (p. 189) Some of the author’s language is highly philosophical and is difficult to comprehend, such as the following sentence: “In such a context, the places of religion or obedience to which the secularism of the Republic grants a legitimate place within human society – the church, the mosque, the synagogue, and the temple (whether Protestant or Masonic) – cannot be erected into the primordial relays of state intervention.” (p. 198) Despite such complications in the text, the book is still worth reading for the insight it presents on the problem of jihadism in France. The author is professor of political science at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, France, who has published numerous books on these issues.

Hein G. Kiessling, *Faith Unity Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan* (London, England, UK: Hurst & Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 320 pages, US \$70.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-8490-4517-9.

This book is a comprehensive and detailed account of the history, current operations, and effectiveness of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s primary domestic and external intelligence and agency. The ISI, the author notes, plays a crucial role in Pakistan due to its involvement in Kashmir and in Afghanistan and its role as “a state within a state – as an intelligence agency that was influencing and controlling Pakistan’s domestic and international politics.” (p. 10) The book’s chapters cover topics such as the ISI’s first decade (it was established in 1948) and its operations through the early 1990s, especially its involvement in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Also discussed is the ISI’s involvement in anti-Indian operations in the disputed Kashmir province, as well as its involvement with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT – “Army of the Pure”) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (“Army of the Prophet Mohammad”) terrorist groups, which the author characterizes as “the preferred partners of the ISI.” (p. 193) With regard to issues such as greater civilian government control over the ISI, the author writes

that “They still see the military and the ISI as guarantors of the existence of the state of Pakistan, which will only be weakened by excessive reforms.” (p. 236) The author is a German political scientist and historian who had lived in Pakistan from 1989 to 2002, where he formed relationships with Pakistan’s political, military and intelligence elites.

Robert Manne, *The Mind of the Islamic State: ISIS and the Ideology of the Caliphate* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2017), 175 pages, US \$18.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-6338-8371-0.

This interesting and well-argued book traces the evolution of the jihadi ideology that drives groups such as al-Qaida and ISIS. It is important to study this ideology’s origins and evolution because, as the author correctly points out, “Political ideologies take decades to form. The mind of the Islamic state represents the most recent iteration of an ideology that has been developing over the past fifty years.” (p. 12) The book’s discussion, therefore, begins with an examination of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian author of *Milestones*, which was published in 1964, and which the author (citing Gilles Kepel) regards it as “the Islamist version of Lenin’s *What Is to be Done?*” (p. 13) Other noteworthy jihadi tracts include the Egyptian militant Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj’s *The Neglected Duty*, which called upon Muslims to carry out jihad; the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam’s *The Defense of the Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan*, which were published in the 1980s; and the Egyptian Muhammad Khalil al-Hakim’s *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through which the Umma Will Pass*, which was published in 2004. The current Salafi jihadist movement, the author points out, “which originated in Egypt during the late 1960s and the 1970s, and expanded during the 1980s in the war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, represents the fusion of Salafi-inflected Egyptian revolutionary jihadism and politically awakened Saudi Wahhabism.” (p. 21) Now, these extremist ideologies, the author writes, find expression in *Dabiq*, ISIS’s online magazine. The author concludes that “Fifty years after Sayyid Qutb’s execution, this is what the tradition of Salafi jihadism, the mind of the Islamic State, has become. There are no more milestones to pass. We have finally reached the gates of hell.” The author is Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow, Emeritus Professor and Convenor of the Ideas & Society Program at La Trobe University, in Melbourne, Australia.

Gordon Martel, Editor, *Twentieth-Century War and Conflict: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 440 pages, US \$30.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1188-8463-8.

The articles in this concise encyclopedia were drawn from the editor’s five-volume *The Encyclopedia of War* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). This version is devoted to the subject of war since 1900. While most of the entries cover regular warfare, some also discuss terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The coverage of terrorism and counterterrorism is highlighted by the excellent 11-page entry by Seumas Miller on “War Against Terrorism,” which consists of interesting sections on “Terrorism as Crime and Terrorism as War,” “Terrorist Attacks, Disasters, and States of Emergency,” and “Terrorism, Internal Armed Struggles, and Theaters of War.” Of particular interest is the author’s taxonomy of the three contexts of terrorist activity: “(1) well-ordered (non-totalitarian) nation-states in peacetime: specifically, well-ordered, liberal democratic states at peace; (2) theaters of war in the context of wars between nation-states; and (3) theaters of war in the context of wars involving non-state actors (e.g., a civil war or an armed insurgency between a government’s security forces and some other armed and organized military force).” (p. 201) Other entries on wars, whether inter-state or internal, include coverage of the activities of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and others. This encyclopedia is recommended for placing terrorism and counterterrorism within the larger context of war studies. The editor is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Northern British Columbia, in Canada.

Susanne Martin and **Leonard Weinberg**, *The Role of Terrorism in Twenty-First-Century Warfare* (Manchester, England, UK: Manchester University Press; New York, NY: Distributed by Oxford University Press, 2017), 288 pages, US \$100.00 [Hardcover], US \$26.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-7849-9409-9.

This is a conceptually innovative approach, based on extensive empirical data, to examine the use of the tactic of terrorism by insurgent groups in major armed conflicts that have erupted during the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, in locations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. As the authors write, the book “concerns the role of terrorism in twenty-first century warfare. This is a study of the ways in which militants use terrorism to trigger and sustain insurgency. It is also a study of the ways in which the resort to terrorism may signal an end to insurgency, or its failure.” (p. 2) The insights generated by the “patterns in the incidence of terrorism as a tactic” in such conflicts and wars, the authors note, are intended to provide findings for efforts to counter these continuing threats.

There is much to commend in this theoretically groundbreaking book, such as the authors’ findings about the uses and timing of terrorism within wider-scale warfare. As they write: “Terrorism may be used prior to or early in a violent confrontation to incite further violence, gain attention, or for some other purpose. Terrorism used in these early stages is likely a sign of military weakness. Terrorism used later in the context of wider-scale warfare may indicate something different. It may indicate a weakening of an armed group. Terrorism may serve as a weapon of last resort, used when alternative forms of armed action are no longer available or seen as viable.” (p. 6)

With the first chapter defining terrorism (including the phenomenon of “new terrorism”), guerrilla warfare, and insurgency, the discussion concludes with an analysis of the point in an armed conflict when insurgents are likely to use the tactic of terrorism, and whether this timing impacts on the success or failure of the insurgents’ campaign. The successive chapters then examine past and current insurgencies in order to test the validity of these hypotheses in “the role of terrorism as a leading, concurrent, or trailing indicator of armed conflict.” (p. 55) The case studies include Turkey’s Armenian and Kurdish insurgents, the Sikh Punjabi insurgency in India, the insurgencies in the former Yugoslavia, Colombia’s leftist guerrillas, the Shining Path in Peru, the LTTE’s insurgency in Sri Lanka, Hizballah’s insurgency in Lebanon, the Naxalites in India, and the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Information for the data gathering was primarily derived from START’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD), as well as other sources.

In the concluding chapter, the authors’ find, based on their data, that “Terrorism was more commonly a trailing indicator than a leading one. It is more frequent for terrorism to appear or peak toward the latter stages of an armed conflict than during its initial phases. The cases, or at least their central tendencies, suggest explanations. First, terrorism appears to be a tactic employed by those whose challenges are losing ground. Second, endgame terrorism also may be carried out in retaliation against segments of a population who are perceived to have betrayed the cause for which the insurgents have been fighting. And, third, there may be a certain amount of desperation involved. The late surge in terrorism may reflect the fact that authorities (or rival groups) are closer to victory. The use of terrorism may reflect desperation and frustration.” (pp. 234-235)

It is such empirically-derived insights about the utility of the uses of terrorism by various types of insurgent groups that make this book an important contribution to the literature on these issues.

Susanne Martin is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada. Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada.

T. David Mason and **Sara McLaughlin Mitchell**, Editors, *What Do We Know About Civil Wars?* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 364 pages, US \$101.00 [Hardcover], US \$39.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-4422-4225-8.

The contributors to this conceptually important volume, as explained by the editors, seek to explain ob-

servable patterns in armed conflicts, such as “what do we know about civil wars? How do we explain these shifting patterns in armed conflict? More specifically, how do we account for where and when civil wars are likely to occur, when and how they are likely to end, and whether or not they will recur?” (p. 1) Following the editors’ introductory overview, the book is divided into three parts. Part I, “Factors That Bring About Civil War,” covers topics such as patterns of armed conflict since 1945, the roles of “greed, grievance, and state repression” as antecedents of civil war onset, the roles of ethnic and religious divisions as identity issues in driving civil wars, the influence of state capacity and regime type in shaping civil wars, and transnational dimensions of civil wars. The second part, “Factors That End Civil Wars and Promote Peace,” covers issues such as the impact of third party interventions in the durations and outcomes of civil wars, including their positive influence in facilitating mediation and negotiating peace agreements; the components of negotiated peace agreements, such as power sharing; the impact of peacekeeping on perpetuating violence or democratization in the post-conflict context; and the legacies of health, education, and economic development on the societies that experience civil wars. The third part, “Emerging Trends in Civil War Research,” discusses the role of transitional justice in contributing to post-war peace and human rights, gender and civil wars, and the nexus between conflicts over issues such as resources and environmental conditions and the emergence of civil wars. The third part’s last chapter by David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, on “Trends in Civil War Data: Geography, Organizations, and Events,” discusses new trends in researching civil wars, including new methodologies and technologies “to examine the geographic and temporal patterns of conflict *within* a given civil war.” (p. 2)

With regard to the overlap between terrorism and civil wars, the chapter’s authors discuss how a 2012 study had found that “about 56 percent of all terrorist attacks take place within geographical areas with ongoing civil war.” (p. 257) In terms of new directions in the collection of event data they note the use of “fully automated or computer-assisted techniques to extract information from news sources,” which would overcome the problem of sorting through massive amounts of text on conflict events. (p. 257) They caution, however, that “for certain more complex tasks – for example, arbitrating between conflicting accounts of the number of fatalities or event attribution to the correct group – the currently available software is limited in its ability to interpret events.” (p. 257) In a concluding observation they write about the need for progress in data collection “in identifying factors that lead to the outbreak of violence,” and in filling “a significant gap in our understanding of why violent civil conflict begins in some places at some times and not in others,” which they attribute to “lack of data.” (p. 259) T. David Mason is the Johnnie Christian Family Professor of Peace Studies and Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, in Denton, Texas. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell is Professor of Political Science and Collegiate Scholar at the University of Iowa, in Iowa City, Iowa.

Michele R. McPhee, *Maximum Harm: The Tsarnaev Brothers, the FBI, and the Road to the Marathon Bombing* (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge/An Imprint of University Press of New England, 2017), 340 pages, US \$29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-6116-8849-8.

This is a highly detailed and authoritative investigative account, which reads like a suspense movie, of how Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his younger brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, had plotted to carry out the horrific bombing of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, their family backgrounds, and a description and assessment of how the United States government’s counter-terrorism measures functioned in attempting to surveil them prior to the attack and in its immediate aftermath. The author, a Boston-based investigative journalist, had spent three years researching this book, which led her to uncover numerous pieces of new evidence that are recounted throughout this account. These include evidence that “in 2011 Tamerlan secretly worked on an investigation that dismantled a ring of crack cocaine dealers who moved the drug from Boston to Portland, Maine,” that he “drove a Mercedes without holding a job,” and that his lucrative pay as a government informant enabled him to get “away with so much villainy that only a hands-off policy formulated at the local level by one or more agencies responsible for national intelligence could have engineered it.” (p. x) While this reviewer is not in a position to verify such new evidence, it is still worth considering. This account also in-

cludes numerous insights into how the U.S. government's counterterrorism agencies track individuals with a suspected nexus to terrorism, such as the National Counterterrorism Center's and FBI's watchlisting databases, including the 'No Fly' listings, and how they cooperate with their Russian counterparts (who had warned them about Tamerlan's suspicious activities). Also noteworthy is the author's discussion of the dysfunctional nature of the Tsarnaev family, Tamerlan's radicalization into extremism, his association with other Chechen extremists, his visit to Dagestan, Russia in 2012, and the step-by-step preparation that Tamerlan took to prepare the bombs that were used in the attack.

Suzi Mirgani, *Target Markets: International Terrorism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall*. (New York, NY: Transcript/Georgetown University Qatar/Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2017), 200 pages, US \$37.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-3-8376-3352-8.

This book is an interesting examination of what the author considers the points of convergence between corporate capitalist and terrorist practice in commercial entities in urban areas, with an emphasis on the shopping mall in general and Nairobi's Westgate Mall in particular. It assesses the proliferation of terrorist attacks against such commercial entities in order to understand the "spaces" in contemporary culture where terrorism, the most "extreme" force, confronts shopping malls, the most "mainstream" force, in this type of "common ground." As the author explains, Al-Shabaab's September 21, 2013 attack against the Westgate Mall "is used as a contextual case study that allows for an interactive reading of the relationship between capitalism, globalization, and terrorism, and how these grand narratives relate to people's lives within everyday space." (p. 10) To discuss these issues, the book's chapters cover topics such as developing and designing the shopping mall as "architectronics of entrapment," "atmospherics of enchantment," and "spectacle of consumption;" the architecture of securing the shopping mall, including surveillance for terrorism; "spectacles of the shopping mall," including "commodification of terror and media productions"; and "spectors of the shopping mall," including the "chimeras of consumption."

One of the problems with the book (aside from its obfuscatory language) is the author's underplaying of the serious threat posed by terrorism to shopping malls, as demonstrated by the following argument: "In order for the military-industrial complex to continue being profitable, terrorism is a constant threat and is perpetuated as such. In this regard, terrorism is good for business and keeps the security industry buoyed as it continues to construct ever more impregnable structures that require constant improvement by both security agents and security technologies." (p. 116)

The author is Manager and Editor for Publications at the Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

James E. Mitchell, with **Bill Harlow**, *Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America* (New York, NY: Crown Forum, 2016), 320 pages, US \$28.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-1019-0684-2.

This important book is primarily an insider's account of the author's extensive involvement, as a civilian clinical psychologist contractor, with the CIA's interrogation program which was established in the aftermath of 9/11 to elicit intelligence information from just-captured al-Qaida leaders and operatives. It is also an important primer on the mindsets of terrorists, how they operate in their underground worlds, how counterterrorism is conducted by government agencies, the types of interrogation techniques (including enhanced interrogation techniques) that are used to elicit urgently required intelligence information from 'high value' captured terrorists, and how such terrorists spend their time in their detention cells. Working as a civilian contractor, the author and his associate, Dr. John Bruce Jessen, his former air force colleague (they had been involved in working with the military's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training), were involved in the interrogations of high level al-Qaida operatives, such as Abu Zubaydah (who was familiar with

logistical operations), Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (the commander of the attack against the USS Cole), Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (the mastermind of 9/11, also known as KSM), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (a key facilitator of 9/11), and Abu Yasir al-Zaza'iri (part of KSM's entourage). The interrogations of these suspects, the author writes, yielded important intelligence information that led to the capture of other al-Qaida operatives, including thwarting a number of significant potential plots. In the concluding chapter, the author offers numerous insights about the components of effective counterterrorism, including the observation about the difference between a law enforcement approach (i.e., "taking a perpetrator off the streets and convicting that person in a court of law" once "a crime has already been committed") and, in his opinion, a preferred "war-focused, intelligence-gathering approach" that seeks "to obtain actionable intelligence to prevent upcoming attacks before building a case for prosecution – that comes later." (p. 294)

Emma Sky, *The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2016), 496 pages, US \$19.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-6103-9714-8.

This is a highly detailed and well-written memoir of the author's experiences in Iraq over more than a decade, beginning in mid-2003. The author, a British expert on the Middle East, who had studied Arabic (and Hebrew) as an undergraduate at the University of Oxford, had worked for the British Council in the field of development and conflict resolution for some 10 years, when she was presented with an opportunity to help rebuild Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. Eventually, she became political adviser to General Ray Odierno, the commander of the U.S. military campaign in Iraq, from 2007 to 2010. This book, the author notes, "describes the challenges of nation building and how the overthrow of an authoritarian regime can lead to state collapse and conflict. It reminds us of the limitations of external actors in foreign lands, but also where we can have influence." (p. xi) What makes this book important in the literature on the U.S. military involvement in Iraq are the author's insightful descriptions and observations, which read like scenes in a documentary, of her close working relationship and familiarity with the top military and political leaders on the various sides of the rebuilding efforts in the country. Among the author's many findings is the observation that "After all the initial mistakes, the US military felt they had turned the war around during the Surge. They had done everything asked of them to the best of their ability. But all the gains had since evaporated. There was nothing to be seen from all the blood and treasure we had invested. Iran was resurgent, a proxy war was raging in the region and the US appeared to be in global retreat." (p. 361) In a prescient observation the author writes that concerning the Islamic State (also known as Da'ash), "if the very conditions that gave rise to Da'ash are not addressed, then its ideology will continue to attract adherents, and it will likely be succeeded some time in the future by son-of-Da'ash. And the cycle will continue." (p. xiii) The author is director of Yale University's Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program and a Senior Fellow at the Jackson Institute, where she teaches Middle East politics.

Amulya K. Tripathy, D. Santishree Pandit, and Roshni Kujur, *Understanding Post 9/11 Cross-Border Terrorism in South Asia: U.S. and Other Nations' Perceptions* (New Delhi, India: Ess Ess Publications, 2016), 330 pages, US \$70.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-8-1700-0800-2.

The contributors to this edited volume, who are leading Indian academic experts on terrorism, examine significant aspects of the threat of terrorism in South Asia and how to counter them. These threats range from cross border terrorism in the cases of Pakistan and India, Indian-Sri Lanka relations in a post-LTTE era, new safe havens for terrorists and smugglers along the Indo-Nepal border, the rise of radical Islamism in Bangladesh, the implications for India of geopolitical rivalries in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism cooperation between India and the United States, including their cooperation in combating terrorism in South Asia. The concluding chapter by Sudhansubala Das and Narottam Gaan, "Combating Terrorism in South Asia: Role of US and India," presents a valuable overview of the region's terrorist threats in the cases of the al-Qaida-Taliban nexus within the context of Pakistan and Afghanistan, indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation, Pakistan's military operations against

terrorist groups operating in the country, the problem of youth bulge and violent conflict, separatist terrorism in Kashmir, and terrorism in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In the chapter's conclusion, the authors insightfully observe that "Regional counter-terrorism efforts will only be as good as the national capacities of individual states to tackle militant efforts," (p. 300) and that "The international community at large should recognize that deviations from the rule of law will make sustainable counter-terrorism successes less likely." (p. 301) Amulya K. Tripathy, is teacher at the Science College (Autonomous) Hinjilicut, Odisha, India. D. Santishree Pandit is a Professor at the Department of Politics & Public Administration, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Maharashtra, India. Roshni Kujur is a faculty member in the P.G. Department of Political Science, Berhampur University, Odisha, India.

Wang Yizhou, et al., ([Translated by Zhang Yidan, Polisher: Jonathon Richard Gartner], *The Global Threat of Terrorism: Perspectives From China* (Paths International Ltd./Social Sciences Academic Press (China)/Distributed by ISBS, Portland, OR, 2016), 286 pp., US \$130.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-8446-4465-3.

This is a substantially expanded edition of the author's 86-page book *On Terrorism: Chinese Perspectives* (2014) [which was reviewed in this column in PoT's August 2017 issue]. The book's chapters cover topics on terrorism such as definitions of terrorism (with an important point made on p. 1 that "a theoretical definition of terrorism is ultimately an abstract manifestation of a very physical entity"); types of contemporary terrorism (e.g., nationalist and religious extremism, cult-based, far right and far left, and criminal); the North-South income gap and terrorism (e.g., the impact of the economic gap between the North and the South in driving terrorism); great power relations and terrorism (e.g., the dominance of a "single power" such as United States imperialism in strengthening Islamic terrorism); national strategies for eliminating terrorism (e.g., hegemonic powers such as the United States not dealing with "ethnic relations in a healthy way"); racial conflicts and terrorism (e.g., the role of ethnic revenge in driving terrorist groups); religions and terrorism (e.g., terrorism in ethnic and religious conflicts such as in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya, Indian Sikh and Islamic terrorism, and cult terrorism); and the three major wars and terrorism in cases such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.

It is valuable for a book on terrorism to be produced in China, but it's unfortunate that the only "Chinese perspective" on the terrorist threat in this volume is a criticism of the United States that "people are wondering why the United States, the most powerful country in the world, was so easily attacked by terrorists and if the military and national defense strategy of the U.S. is rational." (p. 123) Moreover, it would have been valuable for a chapter to be included on the Chinese approach to analyzing the Islamist Uyghur terrorist insurgency in Xinjiang and the Chinese government's counter-terrorism campaign against it – but this topic is not discussed in the volume.

As an edited volume, the identity of the chapters' authors is confusing, with a researcher listed at the end of each chapter, so should one assume that Wang Yizhou is their primary author and that these researchers had assisted in writing each of them? The researchers are affiliated with the Institute of World Economics & Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. Wang Yizhou is Professor of international Politics and Chinese Foreign Affairs and Associate Dean in the School of International Studies (SIS), Peking University.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comast.net.

Resources

Bibliography: Terrorist Organizations: Cells, Networks, Affiliations, Splits

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2017-5]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on terrorist organizations – particularly cells, networks, affiliations, and splits. Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to September 2017. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, terrorist organizations, cells, networks, affiliations, mergers, franchising, cooperation, differences, rivalries, competition, splits, splinter groups

N.B.: All websites were last visited on 23.09.2017. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Bibliographies and other Resources

Ackerman, Gary et al. (2011-): *I-VEO Knowledge Matrix*. (START / SMA Project). URL: <http://start.foxtrot-dev.com>

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2012, November-): *Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog*. URL: <http://www.aymenn-jawad.org/blog>

Elden, Stuart (2014, June): *Boko Haram – An Annotated Bibliography*. *Progressive Geographies*. URL: <https://progressivegeographies.com/resources/boko-haram-an-annotated-bibliography>

Fairchild, Halford H. (2015, Fall): *An Annotated Bibliography on Domestic Terrorism*. URL: <http://bernard.pitzer.edu/~hfairchi/courses/Fall%202015/Sem%20Social/Domestic%20Terrorism%20Bib%20090115.pdf>

IntelCenter (n.d.-): *Islamic State Wilayats: Interactive World Map*. URL: <http://www.intelcenter.com/maps/is-wilayats-map.html>

IntelCenter (2015, December 15): *Islamic State's 43 Global Affiliates Interactive World Map*. URL: <http://www.intelcenter.com/maps/is-affiliates-map.html>

King's College London (2016-2017): *Homegrown Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Western Europe and North America*. (7SSWM053 Reading List). URL: <https://kcl.rl.talis.com/lists/94191FB0-895E-8FFE-FD00-C31B8CE821CB.html>

NATO Multimedia Library (2009, March): *The Taliban*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 4/09). URL: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_library_bibref/20100511_them0409.pdf

NATO Multimedia Library (2011, May): *Bin Laden and Al Qaeda*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 5/11). URL: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_library_them/20110503_them0511.pdf

NATO Multimedia Library (2016, February): *From Al Qaida to ISIS: The Evolution of Terrorism*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 1/16). URL: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=19411574

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI); University of Oslo (2016-): *Jihadi Document Repository*.

URL: <http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/jihadi-document-repository/index.html>

Price, Eric (2012, October): Bibliography: Inside Terrorist Organisations. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(4-5), 160-168. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/222>

Price, Eric (2013, February): Literature on Al-Qaeda since 2001. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 7(1), 114-144. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/246>

Tinnes, Judith (2014, April): Bibliography: Muslim Brotherhood (Part 1). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 8(2), 66-91. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/338>

Tinnes, Judith (2015, February): Bibliography: Terrorism in, or Originating from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia (Part 1). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(1), 122-156. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/408>

Tinnes, Judith (2015, August): Bibliography: Islamic State (Part 1). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 165-212. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/452>

Tinnes, Judith (2015, December): Bibliography: Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalisation. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6), 119-153. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/476>

Tinnes, Judith (2016, June): Bibliography: Islamic State (Part 2). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(3), 59-98. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/516>

Tinnes, Judith (2016, December): Bibliography: Islamist Terrorism in Europe. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 171-206. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/567>

Tinnes, Judith (2017, June): Bibliography: Islamic State (Part 3). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(3), 96-149. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/613>

U.S. Department of State (2004-): *Country Reports on Terrorism*. URL: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/>

Van Vlieden, Guy (2013, May-): *emmejihad: ExcuseMeMyEnglish – A Research Blog about Jihad in and out of Belgium*. URL: <https://emmejihad.wordpress.com>

Zelin, Aaron Y. (2010, June-): *Jihadology*. URL: <http://jihadology.net>

Zelin, Aaron Y. (2014, June): Bibliography on the History and Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. *Jihadology*. URL: <http://jihadology.net/2014/06/14/bibliography-on-the-history-and-evolution-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham>

Books and Edited Volumes

Alexander, Yonah; Swetnam, Michael S. (2012): *Al-Qa'ida: Ten Years after 9/11 and beyond*. Arlington: Potomac Institute Press.

Alterman, John B. (Ed.): *Religious Radicalism after the Arab Uprisings*. [e-Book]. Lanham: CSIS / Rowman & Littlefield. URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/religious-radicalism-after-arab-uprisings>

Arquilla, John; Ronfeldt (2001): *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. (RAND Monograph Reports, MR-1382-OSD). [e-Book]. Santa Monica: RAND. URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html

Atwan, Abdel Bari (2012): *After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation*. London: Saqi Books.

Aydınlı Ersel (2016): *Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists*. (Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics). Abingdon: Routledge.

- Barzilai, Yaniv (2013): *102 Days of War: How Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda & the Taliban Survived 2001*. Dull-es: Potomac Books.
- Bergen, Peter (2017): *United States of Jihad: Who Are America's Homegrown Terrorists, and How do we Stop Them?* New York: Broadway Books.
- Berti, Benedetta (2013): *Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bosi, Lorenzo; Demetriou, Chares; Malthaner, Stefan (Eds.) (2014): *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Botha, Anneli (2008): *Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Bouchard, Martin (Ed.) (2015): *Social Networks, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Radical and Connected*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Brown, Vahid; Ressler, Don (2013): *Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bunker, Robert J. (Ed.) (2005): *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Byman, Daniel (2015): *Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement*. (What Everyone Needs to Know). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carroll, Jacinta (Ed.) (2017, February): *Counterterrorism Yearbook 2017*. [e-Book]. Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). URL: <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017>
- Celso, Anthony (2014): *Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle against the Near and Far Enemy*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) (Ed.) (2008): *Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 43). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Coolsaet, Rik (Ed.) (2011): *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*. (2nd ed.). Farnham: Ashgate.
- Cruickshank, Paul (Ed.) (2013): *Al Qaeda*. (5 Vols.). (Critical Concepts in Political Science). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Davis, Richard (2016): *Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East: Insurgency in the Holy Land*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- della Porta, Donatella (2013): *Clandestine Political Violence*. (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Emerson, Steven; Investigative Project on Terrorism, The (2006): *Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US*. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Forest, James J. F. (Ed.) (2015): *Essentials of Counterterrorism*. (Praeger Security International Textbooks). Santa Barbara: Praeger.
- Ganor, Boaz (2015): *Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.

- Gerges, Fawaz A. (2009): *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. (New Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gunaratna, Rohan (2002): *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gunaratna, Rohan; Oreg, Aviv (2015): *The Global Jihad Movement*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Haer, Roos (2015): *Armed Group Structure and Violence in Civil Wars: The Organizational Dynamics of Civilian Killing*. (Routledge Studies in Civil War and Intrastate Conflict). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hamid, Mustafa; Farrall, Leah (2015): *The Arabs at War in Afghanistan*. London: Hurst.
- Hamid, Sadek (2016): *Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Hegghammer, Thomas (Ed.) (2017): *Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139086141>
- Hellmich, Christina (2011): *Al-Qaeda: From Global Network to Local Franchise*. London: Zed Books.
- Hillebrand, Claudia (2012): *Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union: Maintaining Democratic Legitimacy after 9/11*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffman, Bruce; Reinares, Fernando (Eds.) (2014): *The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hopkinson, William; Lindley-French, Julian (2017): *The New Geopolitics of Terror: Demons and Dragons*. (Routledge Focus). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Husain, Ed (2007): *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, what I Saw Inside and why I Left*. London: Penguin Books.
- Jackson, Brian A. et al. (2005): *Aptitude for Destruction*. [e-Book]. (Vol. 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and its Implications for Combating Terrorism). (RAND Monographs, MG-331-NIJ). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG331.html>
- Jackson, Brian A. et al. (2005): *Aptitude for Destruction*. [e-Book]. (Vol. 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups). (RAND Monographs, MG-332-NIJ). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332.html>
- Jones, David Martin; Lane, Ann; Schulte, Paul (Eds.) (2010): *Terrorism, Security and the Power of Informal Networks*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Kamolnick, Paul (2017, February): *The Al-Qaeda Organization and the Islamic State Organization: History, Doctrine, Modus Operandi, and U.S. Policy to Degrade and Defeat Terrorism Conducted in the Name of Sunni Islam*. [e-Book]. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute; U.S. Army War College Press. URL: <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1339>
- Kepel, Gilles; with Antoine Jardin (2017): *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West*. (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics). Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 2015)
- Kindt, Michael T.; Post, Jerrold M.; Schneider, Barry R. (Eds.) (2009): *The World's most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal Gangs*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kohlmann, Evan F. (2004): *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network*. Oxford: Berg.
- LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura; Miller, Erin (2015): *Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.

- Leiken, Robert S. (2012): *Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lentini, Pete (2013): *Neojihadism: Towards a New Understanding of Terrorism and Extremism?* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Licklider, Roy (Ed.) (2014): *New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Lister, Charles R. (2015): *The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency*. London: Hurst.
- Mackinlay, John (2009): *The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden*. London: Hurst.
- Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian (2011): *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Mannes, Aaron (2004): *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations*. (JINSA Book). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Masys, Anthony J. (Ed.) (2014): *Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security*. (Lecture Notes in Social Networks). Cham: Springer. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04147-6>
- Medina, Richard M.; Hepner, George F. (2013): *The Geography of International Terrorism: An Introduction to Spaces and Places of Violent Non-State Groups*. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Mendelsohn, Barak (2016): *The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and its Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moghadam, Assaf; Fishman, Brian (Eds.) (2010, December): *Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa'ida and its Periphery*. (CTC Report). Westpoint: Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/self-inflicted-wounds>
- Moghadam, Assaf (2017): *Nexus of Global Jihad: Understanding Cooperation among Terrorist Actors*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Moghadam, Assaf; Fishman, Brian (Eds.) (2011): *Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Morrison, John F. (2013): *The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits*. (New Directions in Terrorism Studies). New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Mullins, Sam (2016): *"Home-Grown" Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the US and UK*. London: Imperial College Press.
- Musharbash, Yassin (2006): *Die neue al-Qaida: Innenansichten eines lernenden Terrornetzwerks*. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- Nance, Malcolm W. (2015): *The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014*. (2nd ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Nesser, Petter (2015): *Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History*. London: Hurst.
- Neumann, Peter R. (2008): *Joining al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe*. (The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 48, Iss. 399). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Neumann, Peter R. (2009): *Old and New Terrorism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Neumann, Peter R. (2016): *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West*. (Alexander Starritt, Trans.). London: I.B. Tauris.

- Pantucci, Raffaello (2015): *"We Love Death as You Love Life": Britain's Suburban Terrorists*. London: Hurst.
- Pargeter, Alison (2008): *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Phillips, David L. (2009): *From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Pokalova, Elena (2015): *Chechnya's Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia's North Caucasus*. (PSI Guides to Terrorists, Insurgents, and Armed Groups). Santa Barbara: Praeger.
- Posłuszna, Elżbieta (2015): *Environmental and Animal Rights Extremism, Terrorism, and National Security*. Waltham: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Rabasa, Angel et al. (2006): *Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-429-AF). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG429.html>
- Rabasa, Angel et al. (2006): *Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-430-AF). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG430.html>
- Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl (2015): *Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rajan, V. G. Julie (2015): *Al Qaeda's Global Crisis: The Islamic State, takfir, and the Genocide of Muslims*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Ranstorp, Magnus (Ed.) (2010): *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Rapoport, David C. (Ed.) (2001): *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. (2nd ed.). (Cass Series on Political Violence). London: Frank Cass.
- Rapoport, David C. (Ed.) (2006): *Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*. (4 Vols.). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Rich, Paul B.; Burchill, Richard (Eds.) (2018): *Jihadist Insurgent Movements*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Romaniuk, Scott Nicholas; Webb, Stewart Tristan (2016): *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War*. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Roth, Christopher F. (2015): *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar*. Sacramento: Litwin Books.
- Sageman, Marc (2004): *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sageman, Marc (2008): *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Saikia, Jaideep; Stepanova, Ekaterina (2009): *Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalization*. New Delhi: SAGE.
- Serena, Chad C. (2014): *It Takes more than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation*. (Stanford Security Studies). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Shahzad, Syed Saleem (2011): *Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond 9/11*. London: Pluto Press.
- Shapiro, Jacob N. (2013): *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Simcox, Robin et al. (2011): *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. (Rev. ed.). London: Henry Jackson

Society; Centre for Social Cohesion.

Smith, Paul J. (Ed.) (2015): *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*. Abingdon: Routledge. (Original work published 2005)

Soufan, Ali (2017): *Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Southers, Erroll (2013): *Homegrown Violent Extremism*. Amsterdam: Anderson Publishing.

Speckhard, Anne; Shaikh, Mubin (2014): *Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18: Al Qaeda Inspired, Home-grown Terrorism in the West*. McLean: Advances Press.

Staffell, Simon; Awan, Akil N. (Eds.) (2016): *Jihadism Transformed: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Global Battle of Ideas*. London: Hurst.

Staniland, Paul (2014): *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*. (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Steinberg, Guido W. (2013): *German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.

Steinberg, Guido W.; Weber, Annette (Eds.) (2015, June): *Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances*. (SWP Research Paper 2015/RP 05). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. URL: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/jihadism-in-africa>

Stenersen, Anne (2017): *Al-Qaida in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139871501>

Stepanova, Ekaterina (2008): *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects*. (SIPRI Research Report No. 23). [e-Book]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2008/terrorism-asymmetrical-conflict-ideological-and-structural-aspects>

Stern, Sarah N. (Ed.) (2011): *Saudi Arabia and the Global Islamic Terrorist Network: America and the West's Fatal Embrace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230370715>

Strick van Linschoten, Alex; Kuehn, Felix (2012): *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Szekely, Ora (2017): *The Politics of Militant Group Survival in the Middle East: Resources, Relationships, and Resistance*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40141-6>

Tan, Andrew T. H. (2007): *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*. (Elgar Original Reference). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Temple-Raston, Dina (2007): *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Thomson, David (2014): *Les Français jihadistes*. Paris: Les Arènes.

Tibi, Bassam (2014): *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism*. (2nd ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.

Tomolya, János; White, Larry D. (Eds.) (2015): *Terrorist Threats in North Africa from a NATO Perspective*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 124). Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Weinberg, Leonard; Pedahzur, Ami; Perliger, Arie (2009): *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*. (2nd ed.). (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Vol. 10). Abingdon: Routledge.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2005): *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wright, Robin (Ed.) (2012): *The Islamists are Coming: Who they Really Are*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; United States Institute of Peace Press.

Zelin, Aaron Y. (Ed.) (2017, June): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>

Theses

Bacon, Tricia L. (2013, November): *Strange Bedfellows or Brothers-In-Arms: Why Terrorist Groups Ally*. (Doctoral Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10822/707433>

Blavicki, Slaven (2009, September): *Islamist Terrorist Networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4643>

Cirino, Christopher (2014, December): *Symbiotic Relationships in the Terrorist Decision Making Process: The Organizational Perspective of Tactics and Strategies*. (Master's Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, United States). URL: <http://jhir.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37226>

Danzell, Orlandrew E. (2011, May): *Transition to Violence: An Evaluation of Political Parties and their Move to Terror*. (Doctoral Thesis, Kansas State University, Manhattan, United States). URL: <https://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/8618>

Davis, Danny Wayne (2003, December): *Al-Qaeda and the Phinehas Priesthood Terrorist Groups with a Common Enemy and Similar Justifications for Terror Tactics*. (Doctoral Thesis, Texas A&M University, College Station, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/574>

de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine H. (2014, January): *Fearing the Western Muslim Foreign Fighter: The Connection between Fighting the Defensive Jihad and Terrorist Activity in the West*. (Master's Thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: <http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/290146>

Dietz, Rebekah K. (2010, December): *Illicit Networks: Targeting the Nexus between Terrorists, Proliferators, and Narcotraffickers*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5008>

Erlacher, Matthew D. (2013, March): *Fighting Dark Networks: Using Social Network Analysis to Implement the Special Operations Targeting Process for Direct and Indirect Approaches*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32815>

Evertse, Sophia Joanne (2016, May): *The Evolution of a Militant Group: How ISIS Structured its Organization to Facilitate Rapid Growth from 2012 to the Establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014*. (Master's Thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: <http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/335092>

Freeman, Joshua Adam (2015, May): *Fixing the Failed: An Investigation of Terrorist Organizations and State Building Capabilities*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, United States). URL: http://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/93

Gemeah, Ibrahim M. (2016, May): *Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: A Comparative Study of the Jihadi Narratives*. (Master's Thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1773/36787>

Giebel, Kathleen A. (2007, June): *Counterterrorism Tactics: A Model of Cell Dynamics*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3437>

Graham, Suzanne (2004, November): *Terrorist Waves and Corresponding Terrorist Groups: A Comparative Analysis of the IRA, FARC and Al Qaeda*. (Master's Thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, South Africa). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10210/1371>

Hayne, Spencer O. (2010, November): *Borderless World, Boundless Threat: Online Jihadists and Modern Terrorism*. (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: <http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/818725727.html?FMT=ABS&pubnum=1483143>

Heller, David E. (2010, September): *Designating Domestic Terrorist Individuals or Groups*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5213/10Sep_Heller.pdf

Herrington, Lewis (2015, March): *Incubating Extremist Terrorism: The UK Islamic Fundamentalist Movement 1989-2014*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom). URL: <http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2846010~S1>

Jean-Baptiste, Ari (2010, July): *Terrorist Safe Havens: Towards an Understanding of what they Accomplish for Terrorist Organizations*. (Master's Thesis, University of Kansas, Lawrence, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1808/6997>

Jerard, Jolene (2015): *Terrorism in Indonesia: An Examination of Ten Radical Groups*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9324>

Karaca, Anil (2010, December): *Disrupting Terrorist Networks: An Analysis of the PKK Terrorist Organization*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5070>

Koçak, Murat (2010, December): *The Application of Q Methodology to Generate a Functional Typology of Terrorist Organizations in Turkey*. (Doctoral Thesis, Kent State University, Kent, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1286681075

Koschade, Stuart (2007): *The Internal Dynamics of Terrorist Cells: A Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Cells in an Australian Context*. (Doctoral Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia). URL: <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/16591>

Law, Nicholas Benjamin (2016, August): *The Franchising Effect on the Al-Qaeda Enterprise and Related Transnational Terror Groups: Patterns of Evolution of Al-Qaeda Affiliates in the 21st Century*. (Doctoral Thesis, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, United States). URL: http://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/10

McAllister, Bradley J. (2011): *Revolutionary Networks? An Analysis of Organizational Design in Terrorist Groups*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Georgia, Athens, United States). URL: https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/mcallister_bradley_j_201105_phd.pdf

Mechling, Andrew David, Jr. (2014, December): *Failed States: An Examination of their Effects on Transnational Terrorist Organization Movements and Operational Capabilities*. (Master's Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, United States). URL: <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/38118>

Mele, Christine (2013, June): *Terrorism, Provocation, and Mobilization*. (Doctoral Thesis, The Florida State University College of Arts and Science, Tallahassee, United States). URL: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-7507

Miller, Warwick S. (2012, February): *Homegrown Terrorism inside of Democratic States*. (Master's Thesis, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia). URL: <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA569742>

- Mitchell, Kathryn E. (2013, May): *Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Correlation between Group Identity and Becoming Transnational*. (Master's Thesis, College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, Columbus, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1366131538
- Myers, Matthew Kendall (2010, March): *A Tale of Two Countries: Why some British Muslims Turned to Terrorism and French Muslims Did not*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5428>
- Nesser, Petter (2011): *Jihad in Europe: Patterns in Islamist Terrorist Cell Formation and Behaviour, 1995-2010*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway).
- Novozhilova, Olesya (2016, Spring): *Looking at Differences in the Amount of Violence Caused by Lone Wolves versus Terrorist Organizations*. (Master's Thesis, California State University, Sacramento, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10211.3/171139>
- Osborne, David T. H. (2003): *The Terrorist Cell: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis of Interconnectedness between the PIRA, ETA and Hamas Cellular Systems*. (Master's Thesis, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10179/7615>
- Osborne, David T. H. (2013): *The Terrorist Cell: An Historical and Evolutionary Study of Irish Terrorist Cells, c.1881-1896*. (Doctoral Thesis, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10179/5761>
- Ouellet, Marie (2016, Summer): *Terrorist Networks and the Collective Criminal Career: The Relationship between Group Structure and Trajectories*. (Doctoral Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada). URL: <http://summit.sfu.ca/item/16726>
- Palma, Oscar (2013, March): *Transnational Networks of Insurgency and Crime: Explaining the Spread of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia beyond National Borders*. (Doctoral Thesis, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom). URL: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/744>
- Peladeau, Hillary (2016, August): "Support for Sisters Please": *Comparing the Online Roles of al-Qaeda Women and their Islamic State Counterparts*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada). URL: <http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3894>
- Penaflor, Edison H. (2012, Spring): *Spies Like us: A Comparison of Infiltrating Networked Terrorist Organizations versus Foreign Intelligence Services*. (Master's Thesis, San Diego State University, San Diego, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10211.10/1861>
- Perkoski, Evan James (2015, January): *Organizational Fragmentation and the Trajectory of Militant Splinter Groups*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, United States). URL: <http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1943>
- Pitts, Damien Evan (2015, August): *New Destinations of Islamic Fundamental Terrorism: The Rise of Al Shabaab*. (Master's Thesis, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, United States). URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/3499
- Prucha, Nico (2015): *Online Territories of Terror – How Jihadist Movements Project Influence on the Internet and Why it Matters Off-line*. (Doctoral Thesis, Universität Wien, Vienna, Austria). URL: <http://othes.univie.ac.at/36565>
- Ryan, James D. (2013, June): *An Alliance Built upon Necessity: AQIM, Boko Haram, and the African "Arch of Instability"*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34732>
- Schuurman, Bart (2017, January): *Becoming a European Homegrown Jihadist: A Multilevel Analysis of Involvement in the Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005*. (Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands).

URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/45328>

Sevinc, Bilal (2008): *Participation in Terrorist Organizations: An Analysis of Left Wing DHKP/C and Religiously Motivated Turkish Hezbollah Terrorist Organizations*. (Doctoral Thesis, Michigan State University, East Lansing, United States). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3348215)

Stinson, Robert T., III (2009, June): *Detection and Monitoring of Improvised Explosive Device Education Networks through the World Wide Web*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/7289>

Swami-Persaud, Arjun (2016, August): *Frame Wars: The Effects of Frame Alignment Processes on al-Qaeda's and Islamic State's Contest for Resonance: A Comparative Frame Analysis*. (Master's Thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: <http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/338217>

Verdoes, Thomas (2013, January): *Us versus them: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of a Terrorist's Constituency Comparing Evolutionary Terrorism and Single-Issue Terrorism*. (Bachelor's Thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: <https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/268203>

Vittori, Jodi (2008, June): *Idealism Is not enough: The Role of Resources in the Autonomy and Capability of Terrorist Groups*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Denver, Denver, United States). URL: <http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/304636687.html?FMT=ABS&pubnum=3303538>

Walls, Erin (2017, April): *Waves of Modern Terrorism: Examining the Past and Predicting the Future*. (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10822/1043900>

Worrell, Blake (2007, December): *Determinants of International Terrorist Group Formation, 1968-1999*. (Master's Thesis, University of North Texas, Denton, United States). URL: <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5107>

Yilmaz, Bülent (2013, August): *The Effect of Belief in Becoming a Member of a Terrorist Organization and the Impact of that Belief on the Level of Violence Exerted by the Terrorist Organization Members in Turkey*. (Master's Thesis, Kent State University, Kent, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1377000529

Articles and Book Chapters

Aasgaard, Andrea Sjøberg (2017, Winter): Migrants, Housewives, Warriors or Sex Slaves: AQ's and the Islamic State's Perspectives on Women. *Connections*, 16(1), 99-111. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.08>

Abbas, Yasir (2016, April): Another "State" of Hate: Al-Nusra's Quest to Establish an Islamic Emirate in the Levant. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 20, 45-64. URL: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/20160506CurrentTrends20.pdf>

Abboud, Samer (2017, Spring): Social Change, Network Formation and Syria's War Economies. *Middle East Policy*, 24(1), 92-107. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12254>

Abrahms, Max; Conrad, Justin (2017): The Strategic Logic of Credit Claiming: A New Theory for Anonymous Terrorist Attacks. *Security Studies*, 26(2), 279-304. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280304>

Ackerman, Gary A.; Pinson, Lauren E. (2014): An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 226-245. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849945>

Agbibo, Daniel E. (2014, February): Terrorism without Borders: Somalia's Al-Shabaab and the Global Jihad

Network. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 5(1), 27-34. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.826>

Aggarwal, Neil Krishan (2017): Exploiting the Islamic State-Taliban Rivalry for Counterterrorism Messaging. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 12(1), 1-15. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2016.1223868>

Aghedo, Iro (2014): Old Wine in a New Bottle: Ideological and Operational Linkages between Maitatsine and Boko Haram Revolts in Nigeria. *African Security*, 7(4), 229-250. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2014.977169>

Ahmad, Aisha (2016): Going Global: Islamist Competition in Contemporary Civil Wars. *Security Studies*, 25(2), 353-384. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171971>

Ahram, Ariel I. (2016): Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(3), 207-226. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1104025>

Alakoc, Burcu Pinar (2017): Competing to Kill: Terrorist Organizations versus Lone Wolf Terrorists. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(3), 509-532. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1050489>

Aleroud, Ahmed; Gangopadhyay, Aryya (2016): Multimode Co-Clustering for Analyzing Terrorist Networks. *Information Systems Frontiers*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-016-9712-4>

Alkhouri, Laith; Kassirer, Alex (2015, August): Governing the Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(8), 17-20. URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue816.pdf>

Almqvist, Zack W.; Bagozzi, Benjamin E. (2016, November): The Spatial Properties of Radical Environmental Organizations in the UK: Do or Die! *PLoS ONE*, 11(11), Article e0166609. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0166609>

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2015, August): The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 117-129. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/447>

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2016, Winter): How the Islamic State Governs. *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, 30. URL: <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-30/how-islamic-state-governs>

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2017, February): The Formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Wider Tensions in the Syrian Insurgency. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(2), 16-20. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss229.pdf

Andersen, Lars Erslev (2017, Winter): The Mole and the Mallet: Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the "Thirty Years' War" in the Middle East. *Connections*, 16(1), 7-24. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.01>

Anderson, Jessica (2016, June): ISIS: State or Terror Group? *Small Wars Journal*, 6/2016. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-state-or-terror-group>

Anzalone, Christopher (2017, June): Al-Shabab in Somalia: The Resilience of Al-Qaeda's East African Affiliate. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 67-76. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>

Ardemagni, Eleonora (2016): Framing AQAP's Intra-Jihadi Hegemony in Yemen: Shifting Patterns of Governance and the Importance of being Local. *Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società*, 4/2016, 21-33. URL: <http://www.sicurezzaeterrorismosocieta.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Framing-AQAP%E2%80%99s-intra-jihadi-hegemony-ARDEMAGNI.pdf>

- Armbrorst, Andreas (2014, October): Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation of Social Movements: The Come-back of Political Islam? *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 62(3), 235-255. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9464-8>
- Armbrorst, Andreas (2015): Division of the Global Jihadi Movement: Chance or Threat? In: Janusz Biene; Martin Schmetz (Eds.): *Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat*. (Sicherheitspolitik-Blog Fokus). Frankfurt: Sicherheitspolitik-Blog, 37-42. URL: <http://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/files/2015/07/Kalifat-des-Terrors.pdf>
- Arquilla, John (2014): To Build a Network. *PRISM*, 5(1), 23-33. URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-1/To_Build_A_Network.pdf
- Arquilla, John; Ronfeldt, David (1999): The Advent of Netwar: Analytic Background. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 22(3), 193-206. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761099265720>
- Arquilla, John; Ronfeldt, David F. (2005): Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future Continues. In: Robert J. Bunker (Ed.): *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency*. Abingdon: Routledge, 8-19.
- Asal, Victor; Hastings, Justin V. (2015): When Terrorism Goes to Sea: Terrorist Organizations and the Move to Maritime Targets. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(4), 722-740. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.855636> URL: <https://jvhastings.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/tpv-maritime-terrorism-release.pdf>
- Asal, Victor; Rethemeyer, R. Karl (2008, April): The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(2), 437-449. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608080419>
- Asal, Victor; Rethemeyer, R. Karl; Young, Joseph (2016, November): An Analysis of Violent Nonstate Actor Organizational Lethality and Network Co-Evolution in the Middle East and North Africa. In: Allison As-torino-Courtois; Hriar Cabayan (Eds.): *Options to Facilitate Socio-Political Stability in Syria and Iraq*. (SMA White Paper). Boston: NSI, 23-27. URL: <http://nsiteam.com/socio-political-stability-in-syria-and-iraq>
- Asal, Victor et al. (2015, April): Killing Range: Explaining Lethality Variance within a Terrorist Organization. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(3), 401-427. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713508927>
- Asal, Victor et al. (2016): With Friends like these ... Why Terrorist Organizations Ally. *International Public Management Journal*, 19(1), 1-30. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2015.1027431>
- Atef, Abuelenin (2016): Toward Understanding the Linguistics of Terrorist and Radical Groups. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 11(1), 101-110. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2016.1104283>
- Atwan, Abdel Bari (2009): Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban: Dangerous Alliances in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In: Alex P. Schmid; Garry F. Hindle (Eds.): *After the War on Terror: Regional and Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. [e-Book]. London: RUSI Books, 125-148. URL: <https://rusi.org/rusi-news/after-war-terror>
- Atwan, Abdel Bari (2015): The Origins – Part Two: The Taliban, al-Qa'ida and IS. In: *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*. (Updated ed.). London: Saqi Books, 53-72.
- Azamy, Hekmatullah (2016, October): Challenges and Prospects for Daesh in Afghanistan and its Relations with the Taliban. In: Beatrice Gorawantschy et al. (Eds.): *Countering Daesh Extremism: European and Asian Responses*. (KAS Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs, 02/2016). Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS); International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), 43-60. URL: <http://www.kas.de/politikdialog-asien/en/publications/46739>
- Azani, Eitan (2013): The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(11), 899-916. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.832113>
- Bhattacharya, Srobana (2017): Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 10(2),

1-32. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.2.1562>

Bacon, Tricia (2014, August): Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 8(4), 4-26. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/357>

Bacon, Tricia (2017): Hurdles to International Terrorist Alliances: Lessons from Al Qaeda's Experience. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(1), 79-101. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.993466>

Ball, Leslie (2016, April): Automating Social Network Analysis: A Power Tool for Counter-Terrorism. *Security Journal*, 29(2), 147-168. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2013.3>

Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2016, Fourth Quarter): Abu Sayyaf Group's Persistence: A Chronological Analysis of Crime-Terror Nexus in the Philippines and the ISIS Connection in Southeast Asia. *Peace and Security Review*, 7(15), 50-72. URL: <http://bipss.org.bd/pdf/7number15.pdf>

Bapat, Navin A. (2014): The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict. *International Interactions*, 40(4), 568-578. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.902818>

Barber, Victoria (2015, December): The Evolution of Al Qaeda's Global Network and Al Qaeda Core's Position within it: A Network Analysis. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6), 2-35. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/469>

Barkindo, Fr. Atta (2016, June): Boko Haram-IS Connection: Local & Regional Implications. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 8(6), 3-8. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CT-TA-June-2016.pdf>

Barr, Nathaniel (2015, November): If at First you don't Succeed, Try Deception: The Islamic State's Expansion Efforts in Algeria. *Terrorism Monitor*, 13(22), 8-11. URL: http://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue22_03.pdf

Basit, Abdul (2017, June): IS Penetration in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and Implications. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(3), 19-39. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/606>

Becker, Michael (2015, February): When Terrorists and Target Governments Cooperate: The Case of Syria. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(1), 95-103. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/404>

Becker, Michael (2017): Why Violence Abates: Imposed and Elective Declines in Terrorist Attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(2), 215-235. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1011799>

Beevor, Eleanor (2017): Coercive Radicalization: Charismatic Authority and the Internal Strategies of ISIS and the Lord's Resistance Army. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(6), 496-521. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1221256>

Bell, J. Bowyer (2015): Revolutionary Organisations: Special Cases and Imperfect Models. In: David Carlton; Carlo Schaerf (Eds.): *International Terrorism and World Security*. (Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism and Insurgency, Vol. 3). Abingdon: Routledge, 78-92. (Originally published in 1975)

Bell, Kevin (2016, February): The First Islamic State: A Look Back at the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(2), 9-14. URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss28.pdf>

Bergen, Peter; Footer, Laurence (2008, July): Defeating the Attempted Global Jihadist Insurgency: Forty Steps for the Next President to Pursue against al Qaeda, Like-Minded Groups, Unhelpful State Actors, and Radicalized Sympathizers. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618(1), 232-247. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317785>

- Bergen, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Tiedermann, Katherine (2011): Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(2), 65-101. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538830>
- Berger, J. M. (2014, February 5): War on Error: We're Fighting al Qaeda like a Terrorist Group. They're Fighting us as an Army. *Foreign Policy*. URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/05/war-on-error>
- Blakemore, Brian (2016): Extremist Groups and Organisations. In: Imran Awan; Brian Blakemore (Eds.): *Extremism, Counter-Terrorism and Policing*. Abingdon: Routledge, 87-102. (Original work published 2013)
- Boeke, Sergei (2016): Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime? *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27(5), 914-936. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280>
- Bonino, Stefano (2016): Violent and Non-Violent Political Islam in a Global Context. *Political Studies Review*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929916675123>
- Boyd, Katharine A. (2017): Group-Level Predictors of Political and Religiously Motivated Violence. In: Gary LaFree; Joshua D. Freilich (Eds.): *The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism*. (Wiley Handbooks in Criminology and Criminal Justice). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 77-92.
- Brams, Steven J.; Mutlu, Hande; Ramirez, Shawn Ling (2006): Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(7), 703-718. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600701982> URL: http://slramirez.github.io/lionsden/slr_terror_networks.pdf
- Braniff, William [Bill]; Moghadam, Assaf (2011, May): Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda's Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5(2), 36-49. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-jihadism>
- Brisard, Jean-Charles; Jackson, Kévin (2016, November-December): The Islamic State's External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(11), 8-15. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol9Iss1113.pdf
- Bruscella, Jacqueline S. (2015): "It's more than just a Name": A Theoretical Approach to Eradicating Terrorism through Propositions of Organizational Naming. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(9), 759-775. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1038107>
- Burcher, Morgan; Whelan, Chad (2015): Social Network Analysis and Small Group "Dark" Networks: An Analysis of the London Bombers and the Problem of "Fuzzy" Boundaries. *Global Crime*, 16(2), 104-122. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2015.1005363>
- Burke, Jason (2013): Al-Qaida and its Affiliates. In: John L. Esposito; Emad El-Din Shahin (Eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*. (Oxford Handbooks). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 630-642.
- Byers, Andrew; Mooney, Tara (2017, July): Al-Qaeda in the Age of ISIS. *Small Wars Journal*, 7/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/al-qaeda-in-the-age-of-isis>
- Byman, Daniel (2014): Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with its Affiliate Organizations. *Security Studies*, 23(3), 431-470. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2014.935228>
- Byman, Daniel; McCants, Will (2017): Fight or Flight: How to Avoid a Forever War against Jihadists. *The Washington Quarterly*, 40(2), 67-77. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1328923> URL: https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Summer2017_Byman-McCants.pdf
- Carey, Sabine C.; Colaresi, Michael P.; Mitchell, Neil J. (2015, August): Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(5), 850-876. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576747>
- Caschetta, A. J. (2016, Fall): The Terrorist "Wing" Scam. *Middle East Quarterly*, 23(4). URL: <http://www.me->

forum.org/meq/pdfs/6261.pdf

Casey, Abigail (2016, June): Analyzing the Threats from Nonstate Actors and Internal Conflict to Algerian Stability: A Risk Assessment. *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, 4(2), 20-31. URL: <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GSSR-Vol.-4-Iss.-2.pdf>

Celso, Anthony N. (2014): Al Qaeda's Post-Bin Laden Resurgence: The Paradox of Resilience and Failure. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 25(2), 33-47. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-2685749>

Celso, Anthony N. (2015): The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups. *Orbis*, 59(2), 249-268. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2015.02.010>

Clarke, Colin P. (2015): Al-Qaida: 9/11, Franchise Groups, and the Future after Bin Laden. In: *Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*. (Praeger Security International). Santa Barbara: Praeger, 133-152.

Clausen, Maria-Louise (2017, Winter): Islamic State in Yemen – A Rival to al-Qaeda? *Connections*, 16(1), 50-62. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.04>

Colas, Brandon (2017): What does Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within Dabiq Magazine. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(3), 173-190. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184062>

Comas, Jordi; Shrivastava, Paul; Martin, Eric C. (2015): Terrorism as Formal Organization, Network, and Social Movement. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 24(1), 47-60. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492614538486>

Cozine, Keith (2016, Winter): Social Media and the Globalization of the Sicarii. *Global Security Studies*, 7(1), 1-12. URL: <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Cozine%20Sacarii.pdf>

Cozzens, Jeffrey B.; Ranstorp, Magnus (2012): Does al-Qaeda Continue to Pose a Serious International Threat? YES: The Enduring al-Qaeda Threat: A Network Perspective. In: Richard Jackson; Samuel Justin Sinclair (Eds.): *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*. Abingdon: Routledge, 90-96.

Cragin, R. Kim (2015): Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(5), 311-327. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024>

Cragin, Kim R. (2017): The Global ISIS Threat in Historical Context. *Pathways to Peace and Security*, 1/52, 77-90. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2017-1-77-90>

Crenshaw, Martha; LaFree, Gary (2017): Pinning Down an Elusive Adversary: What Is a Terrorist Organization? In: *Countering Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 99-130.

Cristiani, Dario (2016, May): Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(9), 8-11. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/TM_May-5-2017.pdf

Cristiani, Dario (2017, April): Saharan Jihadist Leaders Establish New Alliance. *Militant Leadership Monitor*, 8(3). URL: <https://jamestown.org/brief/saharan-jihadist-leaders-establish-new-alliance>

Crone, Manni (2017, Winter): Islamic State's Incursion into North Africa and Sahel: A Threat to al-Qaeda? *Connections*, 16(1), 63-76. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.05>

Crone, Manni; Splidsboel Hansen, Flemming (Guest Eds.) (2017, Winter): Disunity in Global Jihad. [Special Issue]. *Connections*, 16(1). DOI: <http://connections-qj.org/connections-vol16-no1-winter-2017>

Crone, Manni; Splidsboel Hansen, Flemming (2017, Winter): Disunity in Global Jihad: A Preface. *Connections*, 16(1), 5-6. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.00>

Cross, Remy; Snow, David A. (2011, Winter): Radicalism within the Context of Social Movements: Processes

and Types. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 115-130. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.5>

D'Alessio, Stewart J.; Stolzenberg, Lisa; Dariano, Dustin (2014): Does Targeted Capture Reduce Terrorism? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(10), 881-894. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.941437>

Davis, Carmel (2017): Limits to the Islamic State. *Orbis*, 16(2), 187-194. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.02.003>

Davis, Jessica (2017): Organizational Decision Making. In: *Women in Modern Terrorism: From Liberation Wars to Global Jihad and the Islamic State*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 19-28.

Dearing, Matthew P. (2017): A Double-Edged Sword: The People's Uprising in Ghazni, Afghanistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(3), 576-608. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1307611>

de Bie, Jasper L. et al. (2017, January): Changing Organizational Structures of Jihadist Networks in the Netherlands. *Social Networks*, 48, 270-283. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2016.09.004>

Decker, Scott; Pyrooz, David C. (2011, Winter): Gangs, Terrorism, and Radicalization. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 151-166. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.7>

Decker, Scott H.; Pyrooz, David C. (2015, February): "I'm down for a Jihad": How 100 Years of Gang Research Can Inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(1), 104-112. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/405>

de la Calle, Luis; Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2012, August): Rebels without a Territory: An Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(4), 580-603. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711431800>

Del Vecchio, Giorgio (2016): Political Violence as Shared Terrain of Militancy: Red Brigades, Social Movements and the Discourse on Arms in the Early Seventies. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 8(3), 212-226. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1099114>

Doherty, Thomas (2016, September): Treating Islamic Violent Extremism as a Pandemic Super-Infection. *Small Wars Journal*, 9/2016. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/treating-islamic-violent-extremism-as-a-pandemic-super-infection>

Egerton, Frazer (2011): Movement: From Actual to Ideological. In: *Jihad in the West: The Rise of Militant Salafism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 100-131.

Eiselt, H. A.; Bhadury, J. (2015, January): The Use of Structures in Communication Networks to Track Membership in Terrorist Groups. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 6(1), 1-18. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1073>

Ellis, Clare (2016, December): With a Little Help from my Friends: An Exploration of the Tactical Use of Single-Actor Terrorism by the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 41-47. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/555>

Ellis, Patrick D. (2014): Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 211-225. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849935>

Englund, Scott; Stohl, Michael (2016, August): Violent Political Movements: Comparing the Shining Path to the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(4), 21-31. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/524>

Esberg, Jane (2015): Democracy's Effect on Terrorist Organizations: Regime Type and Armed Group Behavior in Chile. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(2), 243-267. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.800049>

- Everton, Sean F. (2016, June): Social Networks and Religious Violence. *Review of Religious Research*, 58(2), 191-217. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-015-0240-3>
- Faria, João Ricardo; Arce, Daniel (2012, August): A Vintage Model of Terrorist Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(4), 629-650. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712438349>
- Ferguson, Michael P. (2017, September-October): The Mission Command of Islamic State: Deconstructing the Myth of Lone Wolves in the Deep Fight. *Military Review*, 9-10/2017, 68-77. URL: http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/FERGUSON_Mission_Command_Islamic_State.pdf
- Ferguson, Neil T. N. (2017): Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts, Pro-State Militants, and the Violence Premium. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(2), 296-322. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1035368>
- Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014, March): The Fractured Jihadi Movement in the Sahara. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 16, 86-98. URL: https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1393/ct_16_posting.pdf
- Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2016, December): The French “Iraqi Networks” of the 2000s: Matrix of the 2015 Terrorist Attacks? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 97-101. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/560>
- Fishman, Brian (2008, July): Using the Mistakes of al Qaeda’s Franchises to Undermine its Strategies. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618(1), 46-54. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208316650>
- Fitzpatrick, Kevin M. (2017): A Community-Level Comparison of Terrorism Movements in the United States. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(5), 399-418. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212548>
- Fjelde, Hanne; Nilsson, Desirée (2012, August): Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(4), 604-628. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712439496>
- Forster, Peter; Hader, Thomas (2017, March): Al-Shabaab: Domestic Terrorist Recruitment and Finance Networks. *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base*, 6(1). URL: <https://www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org/terrorism-journal-1/volume-vi-number-1>
- Franco, Joseph (2017, August): Assessing the Feasibility of a “Wilayah Mindanao”. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(4), 29-38. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/620>
- Friedman, Brett A. (2015, October): Mujahideen: The Strategic Tradition of Sunni Jihadism. *Small Wars Journal*, 10/2015. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mujahideen-the-strategic-tradition-of-sunni-jihadism>
- Fu, Julei et al. (2015, November): The “Six-Element” Analysis Method for the Research on the Characteristics of Terrorist Activities. *Annals of Operations Research*, 234(1), 17-35. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1444-y>
- Fussell, Christopher; Lee, D. W. (2016, October): Networks at War: Organizational Innovation and Adaptation in the 21st Century. In: Hilary Matfess; Michael Miklaucic (Eds.): *Beyond Convergence: World without Order*. [e-Book]. Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations [CCO], 369-389. URL: <http://cco.ndu.edu/BCWWO>
- Ganor, Boaz (2009): Terrorism Networks: It Takes a Network to Beat a Network. In: Paul R. Kleindorfer; Yoram (Jerry) R. Wind; Robert E. Gunther (Eds.): *The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit, and Risk in an Interlinked World*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 453-470.
- García-Calvo, Carola; Reinares, Fernando (2016, December): Patterns of Involvement among Individuals Arrested for Islamic State-Related Terrorist Activities in Spain, 2013-2016. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 109-120. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/562>

Garraway, Charles (2013): Armed Conflict and Terrorist Organizations. In: Larissa van den Herik; Nico Schrijver (Eds.): *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 425-453.

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2017, February): Violent Non-State Actors in the Age of Social Media: A Twenty-First Century Problem Requires a Twenty-First Century Solution. *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, Special Issue: What the New Administration Needs to Know about Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 43-49. URL: <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GSSR-What-the-New-Administration-Needs-to-Know-About-Terrorism-and-Counterterrorism.pdf>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2017, June): A Strategic History of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's Formation. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 32-39. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Barr, Nathaniel (2016, Winter): An Opening for Al-Qaeda. *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, 30. URL: <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-30/opening-al-qaeda>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Barr, Nathaniel (2017, March): How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 21, 50-68. URL: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/20170331CurrentTrends21.pdf>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Moreng, Bridget (2015, October): Tunisian Jihadism after the Sousse Massacre. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(10), 13-18. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CTCSentinel-Vol8Iss1028.pdf>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Moreng, Bridget; Barr, Nathaniel (2015, September): The Strategic Dimensions of the Competition between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-Qaeda. In: Allison Astorino-Courtois et al. (Eds.): *White Paper on SMA Support to SOCCENT: ISIL Influence and Resolve*. (SMA Periodic Publication). Boston: NSI, 51-53. URL: <http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ISIL-Influence-and-Resolve.pdf>

Gates, Scott; Podder, Sukanya (2015, August): Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 107-116. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/446>

Gaub, Florence (2016): The Cult of ISIS. *Survival*, 58(1), 113-130. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1142142>

Gentili, Giorgia (2016): The Debate around the Evolution of Boko Haram's Connections to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. *Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società*, 3, 7-40. URL: <http://www.sicurezzaeterrorismosocieta.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-debate-around-the-evolution-Gentili.pdf>

Gentry, John A. (2016): Toward a Theory of Non-State Actors' Intelligence. *Intelligence and National Security*, 31(4), 465-489. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1062320>

Gill, Paul et al. (2014). Lethal Connections: The Determinants of Network Connections in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1970-1998. *International Interactions*, 40(1), 52-78. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.863190>

Guillou, Nat (2017, July): The Future of Sunni Jihadist Violence in Iran. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(15), 3-5. URL: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Terrorism-Monitor-July-28-2017.pdf>

Gray, Phillip W. (2013): Leaderless Resistance, Networked Organization, and Ideological Hegemony. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 25(5), 655-671. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.674077>

- Greenwood, Maja Touzari (2017, Winter): Islamic State and al-Qaeda's Foreign Fighters. *Connections*, 16(1), 87-97. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.07>
- Groppi, Michele (2017, May): The Terror Threat to Italy: How Italian Exceptionalism is Rapidly Diminishing. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(5), 20-28. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss517.pdf
- Guelke, Adrian (2017): Irish Republican Terrorism: Learning from and Teaching other Countries. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(7), 557-572. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237222>
- Gunaratna, Rohan; Hornell-Scott, Natasha (2016, August): The Islamic State Wilayats & Global Expansion. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 8(8), 3-7. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CTTA-August-2016.pdf>
- Gunaratna, Rohan; Oreg, Aviv (2010): Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(12), 1043-1078. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860>
- Gunning, Jeroen (2013): Terrorist Movements. In: David A. Snow et al. (Eds.): *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. [e-Book]. Malden: Wiley. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm407>
- Hamming, Tore; Roy, Olivier (2016, May): Al-Zawahiri's Bay'a to Mullah Mansoor: A Bitter Pill but a Bountiful Harvest. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(5), 16-20. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss510.pdf
- Harris, Halistair et al. (2017): The Resurgence of al-Qaeda? Consequences of the Syrian Conflict's Denouement. In: Alessandro Niglia; Amer Al Sabaileh; Amani (Amneh) Hammad (Eds.): *Countering Terrorism, Preventing Radicalization and Protecting Cultural Heritage*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 133). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 84-102. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-755-9-84>
- Harris-Hogan, Shandon (2012): Australian Neo-Jihadist Terrorism: Mapping the Network and Cell Analysis Using Wiretap Evidence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35(4), 298-314. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.656344>
- Harris-Hogan, Shandon; Zammit, Andrew (2014): Mantiqi IV: Al-Qaeda's Failed Co-Optation of a Jemaah Islamiyah Support Network. *Democracy and Security*, 10(4), 315-334. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2014.964860>
- Harris-Hogan, Shandon; Zammit, Andrew (2014): The Unseen Terrorist Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links between Lebanon and Australia. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(3), 449-469. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.729541>
- Harrison, J. Richard; Carroll, Glenn R. (2006): Terrorist Networks. In: *Culture and Demography in Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 169-184.
- Hartung, Jan-Peter (2016): Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Ṭālibān, Afghan Self-Determination, and the Challenges of Transnational Jihadism. *Die Welt des Islams*, 56(2), 125-152. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607-00562p01>
- Hashim, Ahmed S. (2014, Winter): The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate. *Middle East Policy*, 21(4), 69-83. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12096>
- Hassan, Muhammad Haniff (2017, July): A Rebuttal of Al-Qaeda and IS' Theological Justification of Suicide Bombing. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(7). URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-July-2017.pdf>
- Hauer, Neil (2017, February): The "Khasavyurt Group": A New Watershed of Islamic State Activity in Dages-

tan. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(3), 5-7. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TM_February_10_2017-2.pdf

Heger, Lindsay; Jung, Danielle; Wong, Wendy H. (2012): Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(5), 743-768. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.642908> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lindsay_Heger/publication/237507010_Organizing_for_Resistance_How_Group_Structure_Impacts_the_Character_of_Violence/links/53dfa1920cf27a7b830691ed.pdf

Hegghammer, Thomas (2016, December): The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 156-170. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/566>

Heil, Georg (2017, February): The Berlin Attack and the “Abu Walaa” Islamic State Recruitment Network. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(2), 1-11. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss229.pdf

Heller, Samuel (2017, June): The Governance Strategy of Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 40-43. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>

Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie (2016, December): Plebeian Jihadism in Denmark: An Individualisation and Popularization Predating the Growth of the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 102-108. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/561>

Hewitt, Christopher (2014): Law Enforcement Tactics and their Effectiveness in Dealing with American Terrorism: Organizations, Autonomous Cells, and Lone Wolves. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 58-68. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849913>

Hoffman, Bruce (2016, November-December): The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next Administration. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(11), 1-7. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol9Iss1113.pdf

Hoffman, Bruce (2017, February): The Evolving Terrorist Threat and Counterterrorism Options for the Trump Administration. *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, Special Issue: What the New Administration Needs to Know about Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 6-14. URL: <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GSSR-What-the-New-Administration-Needs-to-Know-About-Terrorism-and-Counterterrorism.pdf>

Horowitz, Michael C.; Potter, Philip B. K. (2014, March): Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(2), 199-225. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468726> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Philip_Potter2/publication/228192307_Allying_to_Kill/links/00b7d539897b3ed33b000000/Allying-to-Kill.pdf

Horton, Michael (2017, April): Why Egypt's Nationalist Hasam Movement could Gain Greater Traction. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(8), 3-5. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/TM_April-21-2017.pdf

Hughes, Seamus; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander (2017, March): The Threat to the United States from the Islamic State's Virtual Entrepreneurs. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(3), 1-8. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss330.pdf

Hunter, Samuel T. et al. (2017, April): Recruitment and Selection in Violent Extremist Organizations: Exploring what Industrial and Organizational Psychology might Contribute. *American Psychologist*, 72(3), 242-254. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000089>

- Idler, Annette (2012, October): Exploring Agreements of Convenience Made among Violent Non-State Actors. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(4-5), 63-84. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/217>
- Idler, Annette; Forest, James J. F. (2015): Behavioral Patterns among (Violent) Non-State Actors: A Study of Complementary Governance. *Stability*, 4(1), Article 2. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.er>
- Ilardi, Gaetano Joe (2008): Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence—A Key Prerequisite to Action. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31(12), 1072-1102. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802508086>
- Imady, Omar (2016): Organisationally Secular: Damascene Islamist Movements and the Syrian Uprising. *Syria Studies*, 8(1), 66-90. URL: <https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/1313>
- Iqbal, Khuram (2015): Driving Forces of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan: The Organisational Level. In: *The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 67-94.
- Iyekekpola, Wisdom Oghosa (2016): Boko Haram: Understanding the Context. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(12), 2211-2228. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1177453>
- Jaboori, Rafid (2017, June): Haiat Tahrir al-Sham Ascendant in Northwest Syria. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(13), n.p. URL: <https://jamestown.org/program/haiat-tahrir-al-sham-ascendant-northwest-syria>
- Jarvis, Lee (2012): Does al-Qaeda Continue to Pose a Serious International Threat? NO: Al-Qaeda: A Diminishing Threat. In: Richard Jackson; Samuel Justin Sinclair (Eds.): *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*. Abingdon: Routledge, 97-102.
- Jarvis, Lee; Legrand, Tim (2017): "I Am Somewhat Puzzled": Questions, Audiences and Securitization in the Proscription of Terrorist Organizations. *Security Dialogue*, 48(2), 149-167. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010616686020>
- Joffé, George (2016): The Fateful Phoenix: The Revival of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27(1), 1-21. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1122899>
- Johnsen, Gregory (2016, January): Al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State Benefit as Yemen War Drags On. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(1), 14-17. URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss1.pdf>
- Jones, David Martin; Smith, Michael L. R.; Weeding, Mark (2003): Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia - The Genealogy of a Terror Network. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26(6), 443-457. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100390248284>
- Jones, Seth G. (2017): Organizational Structures. In: *Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 83-113.
- Joose, Paul (2017): Leaderless Resistance and the Loneliness of Lone Wolves: Exploring the Rhetorical Dynamics of Lone Actor Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(1), 52-78. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.987866>
- Jordan, Javier (2014): The Evolution of the Structure of Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe: The Case of Spain. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(8), 654-673. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.921770> URL: <http://www.ugr.es/~jjordan/Jihadist-Terrorism-Spain.pdf>
- Kalout, Hussein (2017, January): The Struggle for the Islamic Supremacy. *Global Discourse*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2016.1265207>
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2015, August): Is ISIS a Revolutionary Group and if Yes, What Are the Implications? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 42-47. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/442>

- Kamolnick, Paul (2017): How Muslim Defenders Became “Blood Spilling” Crusaders: Adam Gadahn’s Critique of the “Jihadist” Subversion of Al Qaeda’s Media Warfare Strategy. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(3), 444-463. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1043996>
- Kaplan, Jeffrey (2016): A Strained Criticism of Wave Theory. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 228-235. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112279>
- Kaplan, Jeffrey; Costa, Christopher P. (2014): On Tribalism: Auxiliaries, Affiliates, and Lone Wolf Political Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 13-44. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849907>
- Kaplan, Jeffrey; Löw, Heléne; Malkki, Leena (2014): Introduction to the Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 1-12. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.854032>
- Karmon, Ely (2015, April): Islamic State and al-Qaeda Competing for Hearts & Minds. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(2), 71-79. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/420>
- Kennedy, Jonathan; Weimann, Gabriel (2011): The Strength of Weak Terrorist Ties. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23(2), 201-212. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.521087>
- Kenney, Michael et al. (2015): Competitive Adaptation in Militant Networks: Preliminary Findings from an Islamist Case Study. In: Alex Stedmon; Glyn Lawson (Eds.): *Hostile Intent and Counter-Terrorism: Human Factors Theory and Application*. (Human Factors in Defence). Farnham: Ashgate, 177-194.
- Khan, Vryan; Mitzcavitch, Andrew (2013, May): How Terrorists Cooperate: Perspectives on Jabhat al-Nusra’s Links with Al Qaeda. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 5(5), 6-10. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-May13.pdf>
- Kilberg, Joshua (2012): A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35(11), 810-830. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.720240>
- Kirchofer, Charles (2016, June): Targeted Killings and Compellence: Lessons from the Campaign against Hamas in the Second Intifada. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(3), 16-25. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/510>
- Kohlmann, Evan F. (2008, July): “Homegrown” Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror’s Newest Front. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618(1), 95-109. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317203>
- Kousary, Halimullah; Basit, Abdul (2015): Threat Group Profiles. In: Rohan Gunaratna; Douglas Woodall (Eds.) (2015): *Afghanistan after the Western Drawdown*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 113-136.
- Kuhn, Patrick M.; Weidmann, Nils B. (2015, September): Unequal we Fight: Between- and Within-Group Inequality and Ethnic Civil War. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(3), 543-568. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.7> URL: https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/31730/Weidmann_0-299578.pdf
- LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura (2016): Global Terrorism and the Deadliest Groups since 2001. In: David A. Backer; Ravinder Bhavnani; Paul K. Huth (Eds.): *Peace and Conflict 2016*. Abingdon: Routledge, 67-78.
- LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura; Miller, Erin (2015): International and Domestic Terrorism. In: *Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 146-172.
- Lebovich, Andrew (2017, June): AQIM’s Formalized Flexibility. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 56-66. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings->

and-the-islamic-state

Lehrke, Jesse Paul; Schomaker, Rahel (2016): Kill, Capture, or Defend? The Effectiveness of Specific and General Counterterrorism Tactics against the Global Threats of the Post-9/11 Era. *Security Studies*, 25(4), 729-762. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1220199>

Leuprecht, Christian; Hall, Kenneth (2014): Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function. In: Anthony J. Masys (Ed.): *Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security*. (Lecture Notes in Social Networks). Cham: Springer, 83-120. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04147-6_5 URL: http://post.queensu.ca/~leuprech/docs/chapters/Leuprecht_Hall_2014_Why%20Terror%20Networks%20are%20Dissimilar_How%20Structure%20Relates%20to%20Function_Networks%20and%20Network%20Analysis%20for%20Defence%20and%20Security.pdf

Lia, Brynjar (2015, August): Understanding Jihadi Proto-States. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 31-41. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441>

Lia, Brynjar; Nesser, Petter (2016, December): Jihadism in Norway: A Typology of Militant Networks in a Peripheral European Country. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 121-134. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/563>

Ligon, Gina Scott; Harms, Mackenzie; Derrick, Douglas C. (2015, Spring-Summer): Lethal Brands: How VEOs Build Reputations. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 8(1-2), 27-42. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.1.1436>

Ligon, Gina Scott et al. (2013): Putting the “O” in VEOs: What Makes an Organization? *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 6(1-3), 110-134. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2013.814069>

Lister, Charles (2016, November): Competition among Violent Islamist Extremists: Combating an Unprecedented Threat. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 668(1), 53-70. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716216668500>

Lister, Charles (2017, June): Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: To Unite or to Divide the Ranks? In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20-31. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>

Lobban, Richard A., Jr.; Dalton, Christopher H. (2017): Reformist, Revolutionary, and Islamist Insurgencies. In: *African Insurgencies: From the Colonial Era to the 21st Century*. (Praeger Security International). Santa Barbara: Praeger, 87-134.

Lohlker, Rüdiger (2015, March): Dschihadismus – eine religiös legitimierte Subkultur der Moderne. *Religionen unterwegs*, 21(1), 4-9; 16. URL: http://www.academia.edu/11953923/Dschihadismus_-_eine_religi%C3%B6s_legitimierte_Subkultur_der_Moderne

Lutz, Brenda J.; Lutz, James M. (2015, October): Globalisation and Terrorism in the Middle East. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(5), 27-46. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/459>

Lynch, Thomas F., III (2015, September): The Impact of ISIS on Global Salafism and South Asian Jihad. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 19, 85-108. URL: <http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/20150929CurrentTrends19.pdf>

Mahendrarajah, Shivan (2014): Conceptual Failure, the Taliban's Parallel Hierarchies, and America's Strategic Defeat in Afghanistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25(1), 91-121. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.893957>

Maras, Marie-Helen (2014): Terrorist Organizations and Cells. In: *The CRC Press Terrorism Reader*. Boca

Raton: CRC Press, 47-62.

Margolin, Devorah (2016): A Palestinian Woman's Place in Terrorism: Organized Perpetrators or Individual Actors? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(10), 912-934. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1148934>

Marongwe, Ngonidzashe (2015): International Terrorism Potential in Southern Africa. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(9), 776-793. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1039421>

Marsden, Sarah V. (2016): A Social Movement Theory Typology of Militant Organisations: Contextualising Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(4), 750-773. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.954039>

Mastors, Elena (2014): Breaking Groups. In: *Breaking Al-Qaeda: Psychological and Operational Techniques*. (2nd ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press, 163-182.

Mastors, Elena (2014): Breaking Relationships between Groups. In: *Breaking Al-Qaeda: Psychological and Operational Techniques*. (2nd ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press, 183-204.

Matesan, Ioana Emy; Berger, Ronit (2017): Blunders and Blame: How Armed Non-State Actors React to their Mistakes. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(5), 376-398. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1210891>

McBurney, Niamh (2017, April): "Wilayat Haramayn": Confronting Islamic State in Saudi Arabia. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(7), 7-10. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/TM_April-7-2017.pdf

McCabe, Thomas R. (2017, September): An ISIS-Al Qaeda Merger? *Small Wars Journal*, 9/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-isis-al-qaeda-merger>

McCants, William (2016, July): The Polarizing Effect of Islamic State Aggression on the Global Jihadist Movement. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(7), 20-23. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss78.pdf

McCoy, John; Knight, W. Andy (2017): Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(4), 267-299. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1206734>

McGregor, Andrew (2017, January): Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern Mali. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(2), 8-13. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TM_January_27_2017.pdf

Melander, Erik; Pettersson, Therése; Themnér, Lotta (2016, September): Organized Violence, 1989-2015. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(5), 727-742. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316663032>

Mendelsohn, Barak (2009): Spreading Jihad: From Local Jihads to a Global Jihad. In: *Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 37-62.

Mendelsohn, Barak (2015, August 9): Al Qaeda after Omar: Why his Death could Hurt the Terrorist Group and Empower ISIS. *Foreign Affairs*. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2015-08-09/al-qaeda-after-omar>

Mierau, Jochen O. (2015): The Activity and Lethality of Militant Groups: Ideology, Capacity, and Environment. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 8(1), 23-37. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2014.964740>

Miller, Erin (2016, October): Patterns of Collective Desistance from Terrorism: Fundamental Measurement Challenges. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(5), 5-21. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/538>

Mills, Colleen E.; Freilich, Joshua D.; Chermak, Steven M. (2017, September): Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine whether they Are “Close Cousins” or “Distant Relatives”. *Crime & Delinquency*, 63(10), 1191-1223. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128715620626>

Milton, Daniel; al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad (2015, March): Pledging Bay'a: A Benefit or Burden to the Islamic State? *CTC Sentinel*, 8(3), 1-7. URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue318.pdf>

Moghadam, Assaf (2006): Organizational Explanations of Terrorism. In: *The Roots of Terrorism*. New York: Chelsea House, 30-44.

Moghadam, Assaf (2015, March): Terrorist Affiliations in Context: A Typology of Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(3), 22-25. URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue318.pdf>

Moghadam, Assaf (2017, April): Marriage of Convenience: The Evolution of Iran and al-Qa'ida's Tactical Cooperation. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(4), 12-18. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss45.pdf

Morrison, John F. (2016): Fighting Talk: The Statements of “The IRA/New IRA”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(3), 598-619. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155941> URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10552/4849>

Morrison, John F. (2016, May-June): Trust in me: Allegiance Choices in a Post-Split Terrorist Movement. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 28(5-6/2016), 47-56. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2016.03.006> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_Morrison33/publication/298723766_Trust_in_me_Allegiance_choices_in_a_post-split_terrorist_movement/links/5706649508a668ed95cd7d/Trust-in-me-Allegiance-choices-in-a-post-split-terrorist-movement.pdf?origin=publication_detail

Morrison, John Francis (2017): Splitting to Survive: Understanding Terrorist Group Fragmentation. *Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice*, 3(3), 222-232. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/JCRPP-07-2016-0013>

Muckian, Martin J. (2006-2007, Winter): Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary. *Parameters*, 36(4), 14-25. URL: <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/06winter/muckian.pdf>

Mueller, John; Stewart, Mark G. (2015): Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and the Internet: The American Cases. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 8(2), 176-190. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1065077> URL: <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/HorganSagemanTaylorfin.pdf>

Mullins, Sam (2012): Understanding Terrorist Groups. In: Updesh, Kumar; Manas K. Mandal (Eds.): *Countering Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies*. New Delhi: SAGE, 118-142.

Myres, Graham (2012): Investing in the Market of Violence: Toward a Micro-Theory of Terrorist Financing. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35(10), 693-711. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.712031>

Nacos, Brigitte L. (2016): Organizational Structures and the Financing of Terror. In: *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. (5th ed.). New York: Routledge, 206-232.

Nagtzaam, Gerald (2017): By other Means: The Animal Liberation Front and its Purported Splinter Groups. In: *From Environmental Action to Ecoterrorism? Towards a Process Theory of Environmental and Animal Rights Oriented Political Violence*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 92-118.

Nakao, Keisuke (2015, September): Expansion of Rebellion: From Periphery to Heartland. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(5), 591-606. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315569332> URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2338414>

- Nance, Malcolm W. (2014): Identifying the Terrorist Group and its Cells. In: *Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practitioner's Manual for Predicting and Identifying Terrorist Activities*. (3rd ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press, 63-96.
- Nemeth, Stephen (2017): Rational Choice and Religious Terrorism: Its Bases, Applications, and Future Directions. In: James R. Lewis (Ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to Religion and Terrorism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 102-115. Book DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316492536>
- Nesser, Petter (Guest Editor) (2016, December): Jihadist Terrorism in Europe. [Special Issue]. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6). URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/issue/view/61>
- Nesser, Petter; Stenersen, Anne; Oftedal, Emilie (2016, December): Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 3-24. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/553>
- Novenario, Celine Marie I. (2016): Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(11), 953-967. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1151679>
- Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv; Weintraub, Michael (2015): Bargaining between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(3), 557-580. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.829459> URL: <https://folk.uio.no/haavarmn/BargainingRebels.pdf>
- Ogbogu, Jennifer (2015, August): Impact of Middle East Terrorism on North Africa. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 7(7), 11-17. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-August-2015.pdf>
- Ohlers, C. Alexander (2017): Operation Inherent Resolve and the Islamic State: Assessing "Aggressive Containment". *Orbis*, 61(2), 195-211. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.02.004>
- Ouellet, Marie; Bouchard, Martin; Hart, Mackenzie (2017, October): Criminal Collaboration and Risk: The Drivers of Al Qaeda's Network Structure before and after 9/11. *Social Networks*, 51, 171-177. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2017.01.005>
- Ozgul, Fatih (2016, December): Analysis of Topologies and Key Players in Terrorist Networks. *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences*, 56, 40-54. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2016.07.002>
- Pace, Nicholas B. (2014, November): Decentralization: The Future of ISIS. *Small Wars Journal*, 11/2014. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/decentralization-the-future-of-isis>
- Pall, Zoltan; de Koning, Martijn (2017): Being and Belonging in Transnational Salafism: Informality, Social Capital and Authority in European and Middle Eastern Salafi Networks. *Journal of Muslims in Europe*, 6(1), 76-103. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/22117954-12341338>
- Pantucci, Raffaello (2008, October): Operation Praline: The Realization of Al-Suri's Nizam, la Tanzim? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2(12), 11-16. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/59>
- Panwar, Namrata (2017): From Nationalism to Factionalism: Faultlines in the Naga Insurgency. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(1), 233-258. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1233642>
- Pape, Robert A. (2005): Suicide Terrorist Organizations around the Globe. In: *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 126-170.
- Parker, Tom; Sitter, Nick (2016): The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's not Waves, It's Strains. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 197-216. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112277>
- Pearson, Frederic S. (2017): Group Structure and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks: Further Explorations. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(3), 550-572. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112277>

058788

Pedahzur, Ami; Eubank, William; Weinberg, Leonard (2002, Autumn): The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(3), 141-147. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/714005625> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ami_Pedahzur/publication/261677390_The_War_on_Terrorism_and_the_Decline_of_Terrorist_Group_Formation_A_Research_Note/links/54252fba0cf26120b7ac74e8.pdf

Peil, Florian (2015): Der Islamische Staat in Nordafrika: Expansion zwischen Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. In: Janusz Biene; Martin Schmetz (Eds.): *Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat*. (Sicherheitspolitik-Blog Fokus). Frankfurt: Sicherheitspolitik-Blog, 43-47. URL: <http://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/files/2015/07/Kalifat-des-Terrors.pdf>

Phillips, Brian J. (2014): Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(2), 336-347. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12073> URL: <https://0fc35707-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/brianjphillips/phillipsISQonlinefirst.pdf>

Phillips, Brian J. (2015): What Is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical Implications. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(2), 225-242. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.800048> URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2291730>

Phillips, Brian J. (2015, January): Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(1), 62-75. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314550538>

Phillips, Brian J. (2017): Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves, Terrorist Groups, and Attack Lethality. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(3), 533-549. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1054927> URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2608771

Phillips, Vaughan (2017): The Islamic State's Strategy: Bureaucratizing the Apocalypse through Strategic Communications. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(9), 731-757. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1236571>

Piazza, James A. (2009): Is Islamist Terrorism more Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(1), 62-88. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802544698>

Pokalova, Elena (2017): The North Caucasus: From Mass Mobilization to International Terrorism. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(3), 609-628. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1307615>

Popovic, Milos (2015): The Perils of Weak Organization: Explaining Loyalty and Defection of Militant Organizations toward Pakistan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(11), 919-937. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1063838> URL: http://milosp.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/paper_2.pdf

Porter, Geoff D. (2015, May): Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas Attack. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(5), 14-17. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue54.pdf>

Potter, Philip (2014, December): ISIL's Inter-Organizational Relationships: Conflict and Cooperation. In: Hriar Cabayan; Sarah Canna (Eds.): *Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL*. (SMA Periodic Publication). Boston: NSI, 65-71. URL: <http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Multi-Method-Assessment-of-ISIL.pdf>

Qin, Jialun et al. (2005): Analyzing Terrorist Networks: A Case Study of the Global Salafi Jihad Network. In: Paul Kantor et al. (Eds.): *Intelligence and Security Informatics: IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, ISI 2005, Atlanta, GA, USA, May 2005, Proceedings*. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3495). Berlin: Springer, 287-304. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11427995_24

Rahmani, Waliullah (2016, September): The Taliban's "Double Act": Will the New Leadership Strategy End Infighting in the Group? *Terrorism Monitor*, 14(19), 7-9. URL: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/up->

[loads/2016/09/TM_Vol_14_Iss_19.pdf](#)

Ramsay, Gilbert A.; Marsden, Sarah V. (2015): Leaderless Global Jihadism: The Paradox of Discriminate Violence. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38(5), 579-601. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1032408>

Rapoport, David C. (2016): It Is Waves, not Strains. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 217-224. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112278>

Ratelle, Jean-François (2017, April): The North Caucasus Insurgency: A Potential Spillover into the Russian Federation? *Caucasus Analytical Digest*, 93(4), 2-5. URL: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CAD93.pdf>

Regens, James L.; Mould, Nick (2016): Continuity and Change in the Operational Dynamics of the Islamic State. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 10(1), 53-80. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1526>

Reuter, Christoph (2015, April 18): Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State. *SPIEGEL Online*. URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html>

Romaniuk, Scott Nicholas (2012): The Metamorphosis of Terror: From Al Qaeda to Global Salafi Jihad. In: Scott Nicholas Romaniuk (Ed.): *New Wars: Terrorism and Security of the State*. Pittsburgh: Red Lead Press, 159-178.

Romano, David (2013): Jihadists in Iraq. In: John L. Esposito; Emad El-Din Shahin (Eds): *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*. (Oxford Handbooks). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 616-629.

Ronfeldt, David (1999): Netwar across the Spectrum of Conflict: An Introductory Comment. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 22(3), 189-192. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761099265711>

Ronfeldt, David (2007): Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare. In: John Arquilla; Douglas A. Borer (Eds.): *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*. (Contemporary Security Studies). New York: Routledge, 34-55. URL: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1371.html>

Ronfeldt, David; Arquilla, John (2001, October): Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future. *First Monday*, 6(10). URL: <http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/889>

Ryan, Michael W. S. (2014, July): From Theory to Action: The Rationale behind the Re-establishment of the Caliphate. *Terrorism Monitor*, 12(15), 8-11. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue15_03.pdf

Saade, Bashir (2017): Hezbollah and its “Takfiri” Enemy in Syria: Rethinking Relationships between States and Non-State Actors. In: Rasmus Alenius Boserup et al. (Eds.): *New Conflict Dynamics: Between Regional Autonomy and Intervention in the Middle East and North Africa*. (Defence and Security Studies). [e-Book]. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS); American University of Beirut, 81-91. URL: <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-middle-east-and-north-africa-between-regional-autonomy-and-international-intervention>

Sageman, Marc (2005, April): Understanding Jihadi Networks. *Strategic Insights*, 4(4). URL: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/sageman_apr05.pdf

Sageman, Marc (2006): Understanding al-Qaida Networks. In: David G. Kamien (Ed.): *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook: The Definitive Guide for Law Enforcement, EMT, and all other Security Professionals*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 53-72.

Sanchez, Sergio E. (2015): Spider Web: Al-Qaeda’s Link to the Intelligence Agencies of the Major Powers. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 28(3), 429-448. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.992753>

- Sargsyan, Irena L.; Bennett, Andrew (2016): Discursive Emotional Appeals in Sustaining Violent Social Movements in Iraq, 2003–11. *Security Studies*, 25(4), 608–645. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1220203>
- Schillinger, Thomas (2016): Group Dynamics and Religious Terrorism. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 11(3), 334–348. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2016.1178016>
- Schoeneborn, Dennis; Scherer, Andreas Georg (2012, July): Clandestine Organizations, al Qaeda, and the Paradox of (In)Visibility: A Response to Stohl and Stohl. *Organization Studies*, 33(7), 963–971. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840612448031> URL: [http://www.zora.uzh.ch/67568/1/Schoeneborn %26 Scherer \(2012\) OS S%26S ZORA.pdf](http://www.zora.uzh.ch/67568/1/Schoeneborn_%26_Scherer_(2012)_OS_S%26S_ZORA.pdf)
- Schricker, Ezra (2017, January): The Search for Rebel Interdependence: A Study of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(1), 16–30. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316668570>
- Schroefl, Josef; Kaufman, Stuart J. (2014): Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(10), 862–880. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.941435>
- Schutte, Sebastian (2015, September): Geography, Outcome, and Casualties: A Unified Model of Insurgency. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(6), 1101–1128. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713520534> URL: <http://sebastianschutte.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/schutte11insurgency.pdf>
- Schuurman, Bart; Eijkman, Quirine; Bakker, Edwin (2015): The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(5), 906–925. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.873719>
- Self, Andrew; Ferris, Jared (2016): Dead Men Tell no Lies: Using Killed-in-Action (KIA) Data to Expose the PKK’s Regional Shell Game. *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, 8, 9–35. URL: [http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume8-2016/01-Dead Men Tell No Lies.pdf](http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume8-2016/01-Dead_Men_Tell_No_Lies.pdf)
- Seymour, Lee J. M.; Bakke, Kristin M.; Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2016, January): E pluribus unum, ex uno plures: Competition, Violence, and Fragmentation in Ethnopolitical Movements. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(1), 3–18. URL: DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315605571>
- Shama, Nael (2013): Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya and the al-Jihad Group in Egypt. In: John L. Esposito; Emad El-Din Shahin (Eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*. (Oxford Handbooks). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 603–615.
- Shapiro, Jacob N.; Siegel, David A. (2012, January): Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations. *World Politics*, 64(1), 39–78. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000293>
- Sharvit, Keren; Kruglanski, Arie W. (2012): The Social Psychology of Terrorism: Individual, Group and Organizational Processes. In: Agnieszka Golec de Zavala; Aleksandra Cichocka (Eds.): *Social Psychology of Social Problems: The Intergroup Context*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 308–336.
- Sheikh, Jakob (2016, December): “I Just Said It. The State”: Examining the Motivations for Danish Foreign Fighting in Syria. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 59–67. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/557>
- Sheikh, Mona Kanwal (2017, Winter): Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda’s Old Hotbed: Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Connections*, 16(1), 37–49. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.03>
- Simcox, Robin (2014): Al-Qaida Expands its Reach: The Terrorist Group Remains Relevant by Using Affiliates. *per Concordiam*, 5(3), 14–19. URL: http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V5N3_en.pdf
- Sinai, Joshua (2016, Fall): Threat Convergence: A New and more Lethal Category of Terrorist Warfare. *The*

Journal of Counter-Terrorism & Homeland Security International, 22(3), 20-27. URL: https://issuu.com/fus-teros/docs/iacsp_magazine_v22n3_issuu

Singh, Bilveer (2017, May): The Revival of Al Qaeda's Affiliate in Southeast Asia: The Jemaah Islamiyah. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(5), 5-8. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CTTA-May-2017.pdf>

Singh, Rashimi (2017): A Preliminary Typology Mapping Pathways of Learning and Innovation by Modern Jihadist Groups. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(7), 624-644. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237228>

Siqueira, Kevin; Sandler, Todd (2010, January): Terrorist Networks, Support, and Delegation. *Public Choice*, 142(1-2), Article 237. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9487-y> URL: <http://create.usc.edu/research/publications/1204>

Siyeche, Mohammed Sinan (2017, April): Salafism in India: Diversity and Challenges. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(4), 18-23. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CTTA-April-2017.pdf>

Siyeche, Mohammed Sinan (2017, May): The Islamic State in India: Exploring its Footprints. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(5), 23-27. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CTTA-May-2017.pdf>

Sjah, Adlini Ilma Ghaisany (2014, February): Tracing Al Shabaab's Decision to Cooperate with Al Qaeda in Somalia (2008). *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 5(1), 35-45. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.827>

Skovgaard-Petersen, Jakob (2017, Winter): Heirs of Abu Bakr: On the Ideology and Conception of History in al-Qaeda and Islamic State. *Connections*, 16(1), 25-36. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.02>

Soliev, Nodirbek (2017, February): The Rise of Uyghur Militancy in and beyond Southeast Asia: An Assessment. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 9(1), 14-20. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTTA-February-2017.pdf>

Soliman, Abdel Mohsen (2015): The Relationship between International Terrorism and Terrorism in North Africa. In: János Tomolya; Larry D. White (Eds.): *Terrorist Threats in North Africa from a NATO Perspective*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 124). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 92-99. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-587-6-92>

Souleimanov, Emil Aslan (2015, December): Making Jihad or Making Money? Understanding the Transformation of Dagestan's Jamaats into Organised Crime Groups. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1121871>

Speckhard, Anne; Yayla, Ahmet S. (2017, February): The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS's Intelligence Apparatus. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(1), 2-16. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/573>

Splidsboel Hansen, Flemming (2017, Winter): Jihad in Russian. *Connections*, 16(1), 77-86. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.06>

Steckman, Laura (2016, May): The Abu Sayyaf-ISIS Nexus: Rising Extremism and its Implications for Malaysia. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 8(5), 16-21. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CTTA-May-2016.pdf>

Steinberg, Guido (2015): ISIS vs. al-Qaeda: The Struggle for the Soul of the Jihadist Movement. In: Janusz Biene; Martin Schmetz (Eds.): *Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat*. (Sicherheitspolitik-Blog Fokus). Frankfurt: Sicherheitspolitik-Blog, 31-35. URL: <http://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/files/2015/07/Kalifat-des-Terrors.pdf>

Stern, Jessica (2003): Holy War Organizations. In: *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*.

New York: Harper Collins, 139-296.

Stern, Jessica (2016, October): ISIL and the Goal of Organizational Survival. In: Hilary Matfess; Michael Miklaucic (Eds.): *Beyond Convergence: World without Order*. [e-Book]. Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations [CCO], 193-211. URL: <http://cco.ndu.edu/BCWWO>

Stern, Jessica; Berger, J. M. (2015): The AQ-ISIS War. In: *ISIS: The State of Terror*. New York: HarperCollins, 177-198.

Stohl, Cynthia; Stohl, Michael (2007, May): Networks of Terror: Theoretical Assumptions and Pragmatic Consequences. *Communication Theory*, 17(2), 93-124. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2007.00289.x>

Stohl, Cynthia; Stohl, Michael (2011, September): Secret Agencies: The Communicative Constitution of a Clandestine Organization. *Organization Studies*, 32(9), 1197-1215. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840611410839>

Suedfeld, Peter; Brcic, Jelena G. (2011): Scoring Universal Values in the Study of Terrorist Groups and Leaders. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 4(2), 166-174. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2011.627939>

Sullivan, Edward R. (2015, August): The Islamic State: Terrorists or Millenarian Mass Movement? *Army War College Review*, 1(3), 13-25. URL: <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=788292>

Szekely, Ora (2015): Doing Well by Doing Good: Understanding Hamas's Social Services as Political Advertising. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(4), 275-292. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.995565>

Tankel, Stephen (2016): Beyond FATA: Exploring the Punjabi Militant Threat to Pakistan. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(1), 49-71. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.879056>

Thomas, Matthew J. (2013): Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 24(3), 413-435. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802611>

Tierney, Michael (2017, February): "Remote Controlled" Terrorism and its Implications for Counter-Terrorism Efforts. *Small Wars Journal*, 2/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/%E2%80%9Cremote-controlled%E2%80%9D-terrorism-and-its-implications-for-counter-terrorism-efforts>

Tokdemir, Efe; Akcinaroglu, Seden (2016, March): Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset: Measuring Popularity of Terror Groups. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(2), 268-277. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315626506>

Tominaga, Yasutaka (2017, January): There's no Place Like Home! Examining the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks through Terrorist Group Locations. *Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12061-016-9219-x>

Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg (2015, August): Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 48-60. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/443>

Torres Soriano, Manuel R. (2011): The Evolution of the Discourse of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Themes, Countries and Individuals. *Mediterranean Politics*, 16(2), 279-298. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2011.583747>

Torres-Soriano, Manuel R. (2015, August): The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades and al-Qaeda: Facts and Conjecture. *Media, War & Conflict*, 8(2), 181-198. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635215584280>

Torres-Soriano, Manuel R. (2016): The Hidden Face of Jihadist Internet Forum Management: The Case of Ansar Al Mujahideen. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(4), 735-749. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.950419>

- Townshend, Charles (2016): Wave and Strain. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 225-227. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112280>
- Trafton, Joseph L. (2007): Fighting Al Qaeda: Understanding the Organizational, Ideological, and Financial Aspects of a Global Network of Terror. In: James J. F. Forest (Ed.): *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives*. (Vol. 2: Combating the Sources and Facilitators). (Praeger Security International). Westport: Praeger, 479-495.
- Tucker, David (2012): Clandestine Threats, Networks, and Strategy. In: *Illuminating the Dark Arts of War: Terrorism, Sabotage, and Subversion in Homeland Security and the New Conflict*. New York: Continuum, 219-242.
- Turner, John (2015): Strategic Differences: Al Qaeda's Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 26(2), 208-225. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007563>
- Tziarras, Zenonas (2017): Islamic Caliphate: A Quasi-State, a Global Security Threat. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 12(1), 96-116. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2017.1228038>
- Ugarte, Eduardo F. (2008): The Alliance System of the Abu Sayyaf, 1993-2000. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31(2), 125-144. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701812902>
- van Buuren, Jelle; de Graaf, Beatrice (2014): Hatred of the System: Menacing Loners and Autonomous Cells in the Netherlands. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 156-184. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849932>
- van den Berge, Wietse (2016, Summer): Analyzing Middle Eastern Armed Non-State Actors' Foreign Policy. *Global Security Studies*, 7(3), 13-31. URL: <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Berge%20Non-State%20Actors.pdf>
- van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (2015, February): "Fight them until there Is no Fitnah": The Islamic State's War with al-Qaeda. *Terrorism Monitor*, 13(4), 6-9. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue4_02.pdf
- Torelli, Stefano Maria; Varvelli, Arturo (2015, September): Competing Jihadist Organisations and Networks: Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya. In: Arturo Varvelli (Ed.): *Libya's Fight for Survival: Defeating Jihadist Networks*. (EFD / CEP Report). Brussels; New York: European Foundation for Democracy (EFD); Counter Extremism Project (CEP), 14-37. URL: <http://europeandemocracy.eu/2015/09/libyas-fight-for-survival-defeating-jihadist-networks>
- Volders, Brecht (2016): Assessing the Terrorist Threat: Impact of the Group's Organizational Design? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(2), 106-127. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1092842>
- Wagemakers, Joas (2015, August): The Concept of Bay'a in the Islamic State's Ideology. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 98-106. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/448>
- Walker, Clive (2014): Extremist Organizations and Extremist Speech. In: *Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation*. (3rd ed.). (Blackstone's Guides). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 39-82.
- Watanabe, Lisa (2017, Summer): Islamic State in North Africa: Still there, Struggling to Expand. *Middle East Policy*, 24(2), 137-147. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12274>
- Watts, Clint (2016, July): Deciphering Competition between al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(7), 1-6. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss712.pdf
- Weinbaum, Marvin, G. (2017): Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(1), 34-56. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1266130>
- Weimann, Gunnar J. (2017): Between the Arab Revolutions and the Islamic State's Caliphate: Al-Qaeda Lead-

- ers' Online Propaganda 2012-2014. In: Maura Conway et al. (Eds.): *Terrorists' Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 136). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 129-145. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-765-8-129>
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2007): The Structure of Rebel Organizations. In: *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27-162.
- Weiss, Michael; Hassan, Hassan (2016): Al-Dawla: The Islamic “State” Sleeper Cells. In: *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. (Revised and Updated ed.). New York: Regan Arts, 194-215.
- Weiss, Michael; Hassan, Hassan (2016): Divorce: Al-Qaeda Splits from ISIS. In: *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. (Revised and Updated ed.). New York: Regan Arts, 143-159.
- Welch, Stewart (2015, November): The Starfish Caliphate: How ISIL Exploits the Power of a Decentralized Organization. *Small Wars Journal*, 11/2015. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-starfish-caliphate-how-isil-exploits-the-power-of-a-decentralized-organization>
- Whiteside, Craig (2017, June): A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(3), 2-18. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/605>
- Wight, Colin (2015): Terrorism: Types, Effects and Organization. In: *Rethinking Terrorism: Terrorism, Violence and the State*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 172-192.
- Willis, Jarryd (2017): Moving toward Extremism: Group Polarization in the Laboratory and the World. In: Susan C. Cloninger; Steven A. Leibo (Eds.) with the assistance of Mohammad Amjad: *Understanding Angry Groups: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on their Motivations and Effects on Society*. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 53-76.
- Wilner, Alex S. (2011, September): Opportunity Costs or Costly Opportunities? The Arab Spring, Osama Bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda’s African Affiliates. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5(3-4), 50-62. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/155>
- Winter, Lucas (2017, April): Syria’s Desert Hawks and the Loyalist Response to ISIS. *Small Wars Journal*, 4/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/syria%E2%80%99s-desert-hawks-and-the-loyalist-response-to-isis>
- Worsnop, Alec (2017): Who Can Keep the Peace? Insurgent Organizational Control of Collective Violence. *Security Studies*, 26(3), 482-516. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306397> URL: http://www.alecworsnop.com/uploads/5/7/9/8/57984421/whocankeepthepeace_worsnop.pdf
- Wyatt, Christopher M. (2000): Islamic Militancies and Disunity in the Middle East. In: K. R. Dark (Ed.): *Religion and International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 100-112. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403916594_5
- Yarchi, Moran (2016): Terror Organizations’ Uses of Public Diplomacy: Limited versus Total Conflicts. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(12), 1071-1083. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184064>
- Youngman, Mark (2016): Between Caucasus and Caliphate: The Splintering of the North Caucasus Insurgency. *Caucasus Survey*, 4(3), 194-217. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2016.1215055>
- Zahedzadeh, Giti (2017, May): Designed to Fail: Modeling Terrorism’s Losing Battle. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 8(2), 73-88. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1272>
- Zahid, Farhan (2014, October): Al-Qaeda’s Future in Pakistan amid the Rise of Islamic State. *Terrorism Monitor*, 12(20), 5-7. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue20_02.pdf

- Zahid, Farhan (2014, December): Lashkar-e-Zil: Al-Qaeda's "Shock and Awe" Force. *Terrorism Monitor*, 12(23), 3-5. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue23_01.pdf
- Zahid, Farhan (2017, January): Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(2), 6-7. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TM_January_27_2017.pdf
- Zahid, Farhan (2017, March): Afghan Forces' Unexpected Win: The Killing of Qari Saifullah Akhter. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(6), 5-7. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TM_March-24-2017.pdf
- Zahid, Farhan (2017, May): IS Footprint in Pakistan: Nature of Presence, Method of Recruitment, and Future Outlook. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(5), 9-12. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CTTA-May-2017.pdf>
- Zanini, Michele (1999): Middle Eastern Terrorism and Netwar. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 22(3), 247-256. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761099265757>
- Zech, Steven T. (2016): Decapitation, Disruption, and Unintended Consequences in Counterterrorism: Lessons from Islamist Terror Networks in Spain. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 32(2), 177-191. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1160489>
- Zech, Steven T.; Gabbay, Michael (2016): Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Insurgency: From Organization to Politics. *International Studies Review*, 18(2), 214-243. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv011>
- Zenn, Jacob (2013, March): Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru after the Mali Intervention. *CTC Sentinel*, 6(3), 1-8. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss3.pdf>
- Zenn, Jacob (2015, November): The Sahel's Militant "Melting Pot": Hamadou Kouffa's Macina Liberation Front (FLM). *Terrorism Monitor*, 13(22), 3-6. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue22_01.pdf
- Zenn, Jacob (2017, April): AQIM's Alliance in Mali: Prospects for Jihadist Preeminence in West Africa. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(8), 8-12. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/TM_April-21-2017.pdf
- Zenn, Jacob; Cisse, Abdou (2017, January): How Al-Qaeda will Benefit from Islamic State's "Greater Sahara Province". *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(1), 7-10. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/TM_January_13_2017.pdf
- Zenn, Jacob; Cristiani, Dario (2016, March): AQIM's Resurgence: Responding to Islamic State. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(5), 5-8. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Terrorism_Monitor_-_Volume_XV_Issue_5_02.pdf
- Zenn, Jacob; Pieri, Zacharias (2017, Summer): How much Takfir Is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram's Factionalization. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 11, 281-308. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/107>
- Zimmerman, Katherine (2017, June): AQAP Post-Arab Spring and the Islamic State. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 44-55. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>
- Zohar, Eran (2016): A New Typology of Contemporary Armed Non-State-Actors: Interpreting the Diversity. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(5), 423-450. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1099996>

Zúquete, José Pedro (2014): *Men in Black: Dynamics, Violence, and Lone Wolf Potential*. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(1), 95-109. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849920>

Grey Literature

Alkhouri, Laith (2017, March): *Al-Qaida & ISIS in North Africa: A Brief Examination of the Jihadi Terrorist Landscape*. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing “Terrorism in North Africa: An Examination of the Threat” on March 29, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20170329/105759/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-AlkhouriL-20170329.pdf>

Almohammad, Asaad H.; Speckhard, Anne (2017, April): *Abu Luqman – Father of the ISIS Emni: Its Organizational Structure, Current Leadership and Clues to its Inner Workings in Syria & Iraq*. (ICSVE Research Report). URL: <http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/abu-luqman-father-of-the-isis-emni-its-organizational-structure-current-leadership-and-clues-to-its-inner-workings-in-syria-iraq>

Almohammad, Asaad H.; Speckhard, Anne; Yayla, Ahmet S. (2017, August): *The ISIS Prison System: Its Structure, Departmental Affiliations, Processes, Conditions, and Practices of Psychological and Physical Torture*. (ICSVE Research Report). URL: <http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture>

Al-Sarhan, Saud (2015, September): *A House Divided: AQAP, IS, and Intra-Jihadi Conflict*. (King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies Commentaries). URL: <http://kfcris.com/en/view/post/22>

Baas, Saskia (2016, January): *Syria's Armed Opposition: A Spotlight on the “Moderates”*. (Small Arms Survey Dispatch No. 5). URL: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlights-2015/highlight-sana-dispatch5.html>

Bangerter, Olivier (2012, November): *Internal Control Codes of Conduct within Insurgent Armed Groups*. (Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 31). URL: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlight-op31.html>

Berger, J. M.; Morgan, Jonathon (2015, March): *The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter*. (The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper No. 20). URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-the-population-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter>

Bipartisan Policy Center (2014, November): *Terrorist Groups 101*. (HSP Issue Brief). URL: <http://bipartisan-policy.org/library/terrorist-groups-101>

Bodansky, Yossef (2015, June): *After Osama bin Laden and in the Aftermath of the Khorasan Pledge*. (ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, Issue No. 359). URL: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191915/359_Bodansky%20\(2\).pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191915/359_Bodansky%20(2).pdf)

Bowker, James; Tabler, Andrew J. (2017, April): *The Narrowing Field of Syria's Opposition*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Beyond Islamists and Autocrats Essay Series). URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-narrowing-field-of-syrias-opposition>

Brachman, Jarret M. (2016, February): *The War within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda's Undoing*. (JSOU Report 16-3). URL: http://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=19828858

Braniff, William [Bill] (2014, February): *n.t.* Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing “State of Al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Associated Groups: View from Outside Experts” on February 4, 2014. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-BraniffW-20140204-U1.pdf>

- Bunker, Robert J. (2016, March): *Old and New Insurgency Forms*. (SSI Monograph). URL: <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1313>
- Burweila, Aya (2014, October): *How to Lose a War: When your Allies Aid your Enemies*. (RIEAS Editorial). URL: <http://www.rieas.gr/images/editorial/ayausa.pdf>
- Cafarella, Jennifer; Casagrande, Genevieve (2015, October): *Syrian Opposition Guide*. (ISW Backgrounder). URL: <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-opposition-guide>
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) (2016, May): *Al-Qaeda, ISIL and their Offspring: Understanding the Reach and Expansion of Violent Islamist Extremism: Highlights from the Workshop*. (World Watch: Expert Notes series publication No. 2016-05-02). URL: <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/wrldwtch/2016/2016-05-02/20160502-en.php>
- Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS); United States Institute for Peace (USIP) (2015, August): *Understanding Alliances in Afghanistan*. (Study). URL: <http://www.caps.af/detail.asp?Lang=e&Cat=3&Con-tID=16584>
- Cook, David (Author); Brachman, Jarret; Heffelfinger, Chris (Eds.) (2006, January): *Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements*. (CTC's Jihadi After Action Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/paradigmatic-jihadi-movements>
- de Albuquerque, Adriana Lins (2017, January): *Terrorism in Africa: A Quantitative Analysis*. (FOI-R--4398--SE). URL: <https://www.foi.se/report-search/pdf?fileName=D%3A%5CReportSearch%5CFiles%5Ca-b7952a8-3bd5-4593-8342-acdbd2ba3b69.pdf>
- Farrell, Theo; Semple, Michael (2017, January): *Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a Decade of War*. (RUSI Briefing Paper). URL: <https://rusi.org/publication/briefing-papers/ready-peace-afghan-taliban-after-decade-war>
- Fishman, Brian (2009, March): *Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al-Qa'ida in Iraq*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu//posts/dysfunction-and-decline-lessons-learned-from-inside-al-qa-ida-in-iraq>
- Forest, James J. F.; Brachman, Jarret; Felter, Joseph (2006, February): *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu//posts/harmony-and-disharmony-exploiting-al-qaidas-organizational-vulnerabilities>
- Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2014, February): *The Arab Spring and Al-Qaeda's Resurgence*. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing "State of Al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Associated Groups: View from Outside Experts" on February 4, 2014. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-Gartenstein-RossD-20140204.pdf>
- Haid, Haid (2017, June): *Local Community Resistance to Extremist Groups in Syria: Lessons from Atarib*. (Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme Research Paper). URL: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/local-community-resistance-extremist-groups-syria-lessons-atarib>
- Helfstein, Scott (2012, February): *Edges of Radicalization: Individuals, Networks and Ideas in Violent Extremism*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu//posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism>
- Helfstein, Scott; Wright, Dominick (2011, May): *Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda*. (CTC Occasional Paper Series). URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Dimensions_CTC_May2011_Release.pdf
- Humud, Carla E. et al. (2014, October): *Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa*. (CRS Report for Congress R43756). URL: <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=758620>

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), The (2016): *Terrorist Groups*. In: Global Terrorism Index 2016. (Report), 49-60. URL: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2015, October): *Din Minimi: The Strange Story of an Armed Group in Aceh, Indonesia*. (IPAC Report No. 23). URL: <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/45/Din-Minimi-The-Strange-Story-of-an-Armed-Group-in-Aceh-Indonesia>

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2016, October): *Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia*. (IPAC Report No. 33). URL: <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/56/Pro-ISIS-Groups-in-Mindanao-and-Their-Links-to-Indonesia-and-Malaysia>

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2017, May): *How Southeast Asian and Bangladeshi Extremism Intersect*. (IPAC Report No. 37). URL: <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/60/How-Southeast-Asian-and-Bangladeshi-Extremism-Intersect>

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2017, July): *Marawi, The "East Asia Wilayah" and Indonesia*. (IPAC Report No. 38). URL: <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/61/Marawi-The-East-Asia-Wilayah-and-Indonesia>

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)'s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group (JWMG) Desk (2015, December): *The Unification between the Al-Murabitoun Organization and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Show of Strength or a Sign of Distress?* (ICT Articles). URL: <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1548/The-Unification-between-the-Al-Murabitoun-Organization-and-Al-Qaeda-in-the-Islamic-Maghreb> □

Johnston, Patrick B. et al. (2016): *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010*. (RAND Research Reports, RR-1192-DARPA). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1192>

Jones, Seth G. (2014, February): *Back to the Future: The Resurgence of Salafi-Jihadists*. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing "State of Al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Associated Groups: View from Outside Experts" on February 4, 2014. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-JonesS-20140204-U1.pdf>

Jung, Danielle F. et al. (2014, December): *Managing a Transnational Insurgency: The Islamic State of Iraq's "Paper Trail," 2005-2010*. (CTC Occasional Paper Series). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/managing-a-transnational-insurgency-the-islamic-state-of-iraqs-paper-trail-2005-2010>

Kean, Thomas H. et al. (2014, July): *Today's Rising Terrorist Threat and the Danger to the United States: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of The 9/11 Commission Report*. (Bipartisan Policy Center / Annenberg Public Policy Center Report). URL: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/rising-terrorist-threat-9-11-commission>

Kepel, Gilles; Wittes, Tamara Cofman; Levitt, Matthew (2017, May): *The Rise of Jihad in Europe: Views from France*. [Video]. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2806). URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-rise-of-jihad-in-europe-views-from-france>

Lahoud, Nelly (2012, June): *Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa'ida through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/beware-of-imitators-al-qaida-through-the-lens-of-its-confidential-secretary>

Lahoud, Nelly et al. (2012, May): *Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sideline?* (CTC Report). URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf

Laub, Zachary (2017, April): *Who's Who in Syria's Civil War*. (CFR Backgrounder). URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war>

Leney-Hall, Katya (2008, September): *The Evolution of Franchise Terrorism: Al-Qaeda*. (ELIAMEP Working Paper No 1). URL: http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/evolution_of_franchise_terrorism

[al-qaeda.pdf](#)

Ligon, Gina Scott et al. (2017, July): *The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles*. (START Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf

Lister, Charles (2016, November): *The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand*. (The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper No. 26). URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-free-syrian-army-a-decentralized-insurgent-brand>

Masoud, Tarek (2014, October 9): Why do Islamists Provide Services, and what do those Services Do? (Memo prepared for the “Islamist Social Services” Workshop, September 23, 2014). *POMEPS Blog*. URL: <http://pomeps.org/2014/10/09/why-do-islamists-provide-services-and-what-do-those-services-do>

Moghadam, Assaf (2015, January): *The Interplay between Terrorism, Insurgency, and Civil War in the Middle East*. (Analyses of the Elcano Royal Institute, ARI 4/2015). URL: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/riecano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari4-2015-moghadam-interplay-between-terrorism-insurgency-and-civil-war-middle-east

Neumann, Peter R. in collaboration with the BBC World Service and BBC Monitoring (2014): *The New Jihadism: A Global Snapshot*. (ICSR / BBC Report). URL: <http://icsr.info/2014/12/icsr-bbc-publish-global-survey-jihadist-violence>

Pham, J. Peter (2017, March): *n.t.* Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing “Terrorism in North Africa: An Examination of the Threat” on March 29, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20170329/105759/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-PhamJ-20170329.pdf>

Porter, Geoff D. (2017, March): *n.t.* Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing “Terrorism in North Africa: An Examination of the Threat” on March 29, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20170329/105759/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-PorterG-20170329.pdf>

Prucha, Nico (2015, October 26): The “Islamic State’s” Networks of Influence. *Jihadica*. URL: <http://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-states-networks-of-influence>

Quiggin, Tom (2014, May): *The Muslim Brotherhood in North America (Canada/USA)*. (Version 1.0). (TSEC Network Report). URL: <http://tsecnetwork.blogspot.de/2014/11/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-canada-and.html>

Rabasa, Angel et al. (2017): *Counternetwork: Countering the Expansion of Transnational Criminal Networks*. (RAND Research Reports, RR-1481-A). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1481>

Rassler, Don; Brown, Vahid (2011, July): *The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaida*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-haqqani-nexus-and-the-evolution-of-al-qaida>

Rollins, John (Coordinator) (2011, January): *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*. (CRS Report for Congress R41070). URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf>

Schweitzer, Yoram; Oreg, Aviv (2014, March): *Al-Qaeda’s Odyssey to the Global Jihad*. (INSS Memorandum No. 134). URL: <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6866>

Semple, Michael (2014): *Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement*. (USIP Peaceworks, No. 102). URL: <http://www.usip.org/publications/rhetoric-ideology-and-organizational-structure-of-the-taliban-movement>

Sheikh, Mona Kanwal (2016, July): *Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda’s Old Hotbed: Afghanistan and Pakistan*. (DIIS Working Paper 2016:07). URL: <http://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-emergence-of-islamic-state-in-af>

ghanistan-and-pakistan

Shemesh, M. (2017, July): *The Jaish Khalid bin Al-Walid Organization – ISIS Branch in Southwestern Syria in all but Name*. (MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series, No. 1323). URL: <https://www.memri.org/reports/jaish-khalid-bin-al-walid-organization-%E2%80%93-isis-branch-southwestern-syria-all-name>

Soufan Group, The (2016, January): *Libya, Extremism, and the Consequences of Collapse*. (Report). URL: <http://www.soufangroup.com/libya-extremism-and-the-consequences-of-collapse>

Souleimanov, Emil Aslan (2017, February): *The North Caucasus Insurgency: Dead or Alive?* (SSI Monograph). URL: <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1345>

Stenersen, Anne (2010, April): *Al Qaeda's Allies: Explaining the Relationship between Al-Qaeda and Various Factions of the Taliban after 2001*. (New America Foundation, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper). URL: http://www.academia.edu/15682310/Al_Qaedas_Allies_Explaining_the_Relationship_Between_Al-Qaeda_and_Various_Factions_of_the_Taliban_After_2001

Stuart, Hannah (2017, March): *Islamist Terrorism: Analysis of Offences and Attacks in the UK (1998-2015)*. (HJS Report). URL: <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/05/islamist-terrorism-analysis-of-offences-and-attacks-in-the-uk-1998-2015>

Swift, Christopher (2014, February): *Untangling the Terrorist Web: Categorization Prioritization in the Global War on Terror*. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing “State of Al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Associated Groups: View from Outside Experts” on February 4, 2014. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-SwiftC-20140204.pdf>

Watts, Clint (2013, December): *The Three Versions of Al Qaeda: A Primer*. (FPRI FootNotes). URL: <http://www.fpri.org/article/2013/12/the-three-versions-of-al-qaeda-a-primer>

Wehrey, Frederic (2017, March): *The Challenge of Violent Extremism in North Africa: The Case of Libya*. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing “Terrorism in North Africa: An Examination of the Threat” on March 29, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20170329/105759/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-WehreyF-20170329.pdf>

Zimmerman, Katherine (2013, September): *The al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy*. (AEI Critical Threats Project Report). URL: <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-al-qaeda-network-a-new-framework-for-defining-the-enemy>

Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information ([ZPID](http://www.zpid.de)). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to Perspectives on Terrorism. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her *doctoral thesis* on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de.

Resources

Bibliography: Life Cycles of Terrorism

Compiled and Selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2017-6]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on life cycles of terrorism (i.e., the history, origin, evolution, decline, and end of terrorist organizations, movements, types, and individuals). Though focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to September 2017. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, lifecycles of terrorism, history, origin, evolution, decline, end, current/future trends

NB: All websites were last visited on 23.09.2017. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

Bibliographies and other Resources

Berry, LaVerle et al. (1998, September): *Bibliography on Future Trends in Terrorism*. (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Report). URL: https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Future_trends.pdf

Hofmann, David C. (2012, December): Review Essay: Twenty Important Journal Articles on Radicalisation to, and De-Radicalisation from, Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(6), 104-113. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/234>

Hofmann, David C.; Schmid, Alex P. (2012, December): Selected Literature on (i) Radicalization and Recruitment, (ii) De-Radicalization and Dis-Engagement, and (iii) Counter-Radicalization and Countering Violent Extremism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(6), 114-143. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/235>

NATO Multimedia Library (2012, October): *The Iraq War, 2003-2011: Books*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 8/12). URL: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=10701676

NATO Multimedia Library (2013, March): *Africa: Conflicts and Crises of the Last Five Years*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 3/13). URL: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=10701671

NATO Multimedia Library (2013, October): *Islamist Challenges*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 7/13). URL: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=10701667

NATO Multimedia Library (2015, July): *Terrorism: An Overview of the Last Two Years*. Thematic Bibliography No. 4/15). URL: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=13067274

NATO Multimedia Library (2016, February): *From Al Qaida to ISIS: The Evolution of Terrorism*. (Thematic Bibliography No. 1/16). URL: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=19411574

Ontiveros, Suzanne Robitaille (1986): *Global Terrorism: A Historical Bibliography*. (ABC-CLIO Research Guides). Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Price, Eric (2012, May): Bibliography: Literature on Terrorism in History. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(2), 160-180. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/price-terrorism-in-history>

Price, Eric (2012, August): Bibliography: Literature on the Future of Terrorism (including Trends). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(3), 78-90. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/price-literature-on-the-future-of-terrorism>

Price, Eric; Schmid, Alex P. (2010, May): Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization from Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 4(2), 58-76. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/102>

Schmid, Alex P.; Price, Eric (2011, May): Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of Terrorists: Monographs, Edited Volumes, Grey Literature and Prime Articles Published since the 1960s. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 55(4), 337-348. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-011-9287-4>

Tinnes, Judith (2015, December): Bibliography: Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalisation. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6), 119-153. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/476>

Books and Edited Volumes

Acharya, Arabinda (2013): *Ten Years after 9/11 – Rethinking the Jihadist Threat*. (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series). Abingdon: Routledge.

Alimi, Eitan Y.; Demetriou, Chares; Bosi, Lorenzo (2015): *The Dynamics of Radicalization: A Relational and Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aly, Anne (2011): *Terrorism and Global Security: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. South Yarra: Palgrave Macmillan.

Armstrong, Karen (2015): *Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence*. New York: Anchor Books.

Aydınlı, Ersel (2016): *Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists*. (Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics, Vol. 3). Abingdon: Routledge.

Bernholz, Peter (2017): *Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values: History and Theory*. (Studies in Public Choice, Vol. 33). Cham: Switzerland. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56907-9>

Bjørge, Tore; Horgan, John (Eds.) (2009): *Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. (Cass Series on Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.

Bowden, Brett; Davis, Michael T. (Eds.) (2008): *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Breen Smyth, Marie (2007): *Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing Violent Pasts*. (Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution). Abingdon: Routledge.

Bull, Anna Cento; Cooke, Philip (2013): *Ending Terrorism in Italy*. (Extremism and Democracy, Vol. 18). Abingdon: Routledge.

Burleigh, Michael (2008): *Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*. London: HarperPress.

Carr, Caleb (2003): *The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare against Civilians*. (Revised and updated ed.). New York: Random House.

Celso, Anthony (2014): *Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle against the Near and Far Enemy*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Celso, Anthony N.; Nalbandov, Robert (Eds.) (2016): *The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century*. Quantico: Marine Corps University Press.

Chaliand, Gérard; Blin, Arnaud (Eds.) (2016): *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS*. (Updated

Ed.). Oakland: University of California Press.

Clubb, Gordon (2017): *Social Movement De-Radicalisation and the Decline of Terrorism: The Morphogenesis of the Irish Republican Movement*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.

Cockburn, Patrick (2015): *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*. (Updated ed.). London: Verso.

Connable, Ben; Libicki, Martin C. (2010): *How Insurgencies End*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-965-MCIA). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html>

Coolsaet, Rik (Ed.) (2011): *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*. (2nd ed.). Farnham: Ashgate.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2009): *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cruikshank, Paul (Ed.) (2013): *Al Qaeda*. (5 Vols.). (Critical Concepts in Political Science). Abingdon: Routledge.

Dudouet, Véronique (Ed.) (2015): *Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to Nonviolent Struggle*. (Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution). Abingdon: Routledge.

English, Richard (2015): *Illusions of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism*. (Proceedings of the British Academy). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

English, Richard (2016): *Does Terrorism Work? A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ensalaco, Mark (2008): *Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Fishman, Brian H. (2016): *The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2007): *My Year Inside Radical Islam: A Memoir*. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher.

Gerges, Fawaz A. (2005): *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gerges, Fawaz A. (2011): *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Germani, Luigi Sergio; Kaarhikeyan, D. R. (Eds.) (2005): *Pathways out of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Dynamics of Terrorist Violence and Peace Processes*. Elgin: New Dawn Press.

Glaser, Henning (Ed.) (2017): *Talking to the Enemy: Deradicalization and Disengagement of Terrorists*. (CPG Series of Comparative Constitutional Law, Politics and Governance, Vol. 4). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Gregg, Heather Selma (2014): *The Path to Salvation: Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad*. Dulles: Potomac Books.

Gunaratna, Rohan; Jerard, Jolene; Rubin, Lawrence (Eds.) (2011): *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-Terrorism*. (Cass Series on Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.

Gunaratna, Rohan; Woodall, Douglas (Eds.) (2015): *Afghanistan after the Western Drawdown*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gupta, Dipak K. (2008): *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation and Demise*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.

Haner, Murat (2018): *The Freedom Fighter: A Terrorist's own Story*. New York: Routledge.

Hanhimäki, Jussi M.; Blumenau, Bernhard (Eds.) (2013): *An International History of Terrorism: Western and*

Non-Western Experiences. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.

Hansen, Stig Jarle (2016): *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012*. (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Hegghammer, Thomas (Ed.) (2017): *Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139086141>

Hoffman, Bruce; Reinares, Fernando (Eds.) (2014): *The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death*. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia University Press.

Hopkinson, William; Lindley-French, Julian (2017): *The New Geopolitics of Terror: Demons and Dragons*. (Routledge Focus). Abingdon: Routledge.

Horgan, John (2009): *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.

Hughbank, Richard J.; Niosi, Anthony F.; Dumas, Juan Carlos (Eds.) (2010): *The Dynamics of Terror: The Creation of Homegrown Terrorists*. Mustang: Tate Publishing & Enterprises.

Husain, Ed (2007): *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, what I Saw Inside and why I Left*. London: Penguin Books.

Ishiyama, John (2018): *From Bullets to Ballots: The Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties*. (Democratization Special Issues). Abingdon: Routledge.

Jefferis, Jennifer (2016): *Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and its Future in Middle East Politics*. (Praeger Security International). Santa Barbara: Praeger.

Jones, Seth G. (2017): *Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jones, Seth G.; Libicki, Martin C. (2008): *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-741-1-RC). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.html>

Kaplan, Jeffrey (2010): *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism's Fifth Wave*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.

Kepel, Gilles; with Antoine Jardin (2017): *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West*. (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics). Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 2015)

Koehler, Daniel (2017): *Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century: The "National Socialist Underground" and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany*. (Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right). Abingdon: Routledge.

Koomen, Willem; van der Pligt, Joop (2016): *The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism*. Abingdon: Routledge.

LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura; Miller, Erin (2015): *Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database*. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.

Lahoud, Nelly (2010): *The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction*. London: Hurst.

Laqueur, Walter (2016): *A History of Terrorism*. (Expanded ed.). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Law, Randall D. (Ed.) (2015): *The Routledge History of Terrorism*. (The Routledge Histories). Abingdon: Routledge.

- Law, Randall D. (2016): *Terrorism: A History*. (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Leonisio, Rafael; Molina Aparicio, Fernando; Muro, Diego (Eds.) (2017): *ETA's Terrorist Campaign: From Violence to Politics, 1968-2015*. (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Vol. 36). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Lia, Brynjar (2005): *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions*. (Contemporary Security Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Lister, Charles R. (2015): *The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency*. London: Hurst.
- Lutz, James M.; Lutz, Brenda J. (Eds.) (2005): *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403978585>
- Marsden, Sarah V. (2017): *Reintegrating Extremists: Deradicalisation and Desistance*. London: Palgrave Pivot / Springer Nature. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55019-4>
- Mastors, Elena (2014): *Breaking Al-Qaeda: Psychological and Operational Techniques*. (2nd ed.). Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Miller, Martin A. (2013): *The Foundations of Modern Terrorism: State, Society and the Dynamics of Political Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Milosevic, Marko; Rekawek, Kacper (Eds.) (2014): *Perseverance of Terrorism: Focus on Leaders*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 117). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Mockaitis, Thomas R. (2007): *The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality*. Westport: Praeger Security International.
- Morrison, John F. (2013): *The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits*. (New Directions in Terrorism Studies). New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Moubayed, Sami (2015): *Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Murua, Imanol (2017): *Ending ETA's Armed Campaign: How and why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Musharbash, Yassin (2006): *Die neue al-Qaida: Innenansichten eines lernenden Terrornetzwerks*. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- Nawaz, Maajid (2012): *Radical: My Journey from Islamist Extremism to a Democratic Awakening*. London: W.H. Allen.
- Neumann, Peter R. (2016): *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West*. (Alexander Starritt, Trans.). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Paul, Christopher; Clarke, Colin P.; Grill, Beth (2010): *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-964-OSD). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html>
- Phillips, David L. (2009): *From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Pokalova, Elena (2015): *Chechnya's Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia's North Caucasus*. (PSI Guides to Terrorists, Insurgents, and Armed Groups). Santa Barbara: Praeger.
- Powell, Jonathan (2014): *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts*. London: The Bodley Head.
- Rabasa, Angel et al. (2010): *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-1053-SRF). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1053.html>

- Rapoport, David C. (Ed.) (2006): *Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*. (4 Vols.). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Sageman, Marc (2004): *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sageman, Marc (2017): *Misunderstanding Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sageman, Marc (2017): *Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Shibuya, Eric Y. (2012): *Demobilizing Irregular Forces*. (War and Conflict in the Modern World). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Smith, Paul J. (2008): *The Terrorism ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-First Century*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Soeters, Joseph L. (2005): *Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars*. (Contemporary Security Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Soufan, Ali (2017): *Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Speckhard, Anne; Yayla, Ahmet S. (2016): *ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate*. McLean: Advances Press.
- Staffell, Simon; Awan, Akil N. (Eds.) (2016): *Jihadism Transformed: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Global Battle of Ideas*. London: Hurst.
- Storm, Morten; with Paul Cruickshank; Tim Lister (2014): *Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda*. London: Penguin Books.
- Szekely, Ora (2017): *The Politics of Militant Group Survival in the Middle East: Resources, Relationships, and Resistance*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40141-6>
- Taylor, Max; Horgan, John (Eds.) (2000): *The Future of Terrorism*. Abingdon: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Turner, John A. (2014): *Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Upadhyay, Archana (2009): *India's Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North East India*. (Library of International Relations, Vol. 39). London: I.B. Tauris.
- Verkaik, Robert (2016): *Jihadi John: The Making of a Terrorist*. London: Oneworld.
- Vertigans, Stephen (2011): *The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and Processes*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Weinberg, Leonard (2012): *The End of Terrorism?* (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy). Abingdon: Routledge.
- White, Robert W. (2017): *Out of the Ashes: An Oral History of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement*. Newbridge: Merrion Press.
- Yilmaz, Kamil (2014): *Disengaging from Terrorism – Lessons from the Turkish Penitents*. (Routledge Transnational Crime and Corruption, Vol. 9). Abingdon: Routledge.

Theses

- Alsubaie, Saad Ali (2013): *The Impact of Regional Political Developments on the Evolution of Transnational Terrorism in Saudi Arabia*. (Doctoral Thesis, Kansas State University, Manhattan, United States). URL: <http://>

hdl.handle.net/2097/15169

Baker, Jonathan S. (2016, June): *Harbingers of the Caliphate: Islamic State Revolutionary Actions 2011-2014*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49330>

Baudon, Antoine Philippe (2017, March): *To Jihad and Back Home: Making Sense of French Individuals Engagement with Militant Salafi-Jihadism and Theorising their Disengagement*. (Doctoral Thesis, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom). URL: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12096>

Bester, Francina (2007, April): *New Trends in Contemporary International and Transnational Terrorism as Manifested in the Al-Qaeda Movement*. (Master's Thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2263/23925>

Bhashyam, Sumitra Sri (2014, January): *In the Opponent's Shoes: Modelling Dynamic Preferences of Malicious Agents*. (Doctoral Thesis, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom). URL: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/773>

Blessing, Jason Alexander (2013, May): *From "Total Liberation" to "Phased Liberation": Temporality and Identity in the Provisional IRA and Hamas*. (Master's Thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10919/23235>

Bolsinger, Diana Ingeborg (2016, May): *Chasing Utopia: How the Arab Spring Gave us Today's Islamic State*. (Master's Thesis, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, United States). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1186.2649>

Butler, Brett M. (2015, December): *Precipitating the Decline of Al-Shabaab: A Case Study in Leadership Decapitation*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47912>

Campion, Kristy Kate (2015, November): *Under the Shadows of Swords: Propaganda of the Deed in the History of Terrorism*. (Doctoral Thesis, James Cook University, Townsville, Australia). URL: <https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/48293>

Chelin, Richard Philippe (2015, November): *From Need to Greed through Creed: The Transformation of Al Qaeda Terrorism in the Islamic Maghreb and the Sahel*. (Master's Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10413/13400>

Church, Lindsay (2016): *ISIS Success in Iraq: A Movement 40 Years in the Making*. (Master's Thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, United States). URL: <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/36464>

Danzell, Orlandrew E. (2011): *Transition to Violence: An Evaluation of Political Parties and their Move to Terror*. (Doctoral Thesis, Kansas State University, Manhattan, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2097/8618>

De Silva, Sara (2013): *An Examination of the Lifecycle of the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia). URL: <http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3923>

Egudo, Margaret Mary (2016, November): *The Al-Qaeda Transnational Jihadist Movement in Historical Context: Understanding and Countering Religious and Secular Forms of Terrorism*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2440/103693>

Evertse, Sophia Joanne (2016, May): *The Evolution of a Militant Group: How ISIS Structured its Organization to Facilitate Rapid Growth from 2012 to the Establishment of the Caliphate in June 2014*. (Master's Thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: <http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/335092>

Frayman, Amir Pavlo (2014, April): *The Integration of Terrorist Organisations into Political Systems: Factors,*

- Dynamics and Circumstances that Lead to a Successful Transformation*. (Doctoral Thesis, King's College London, London, United Kingdom). URL: [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-integration-of-terrorist-organisations-into-political-systems\(9e68d9ac-ae00-414b-972b-d874358e8d02\).html](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-integration-of-terrorist-organisations-into-political-systems(9e68d9ac-ae00-414b-972b-d874358e8d02).html)
- Garnett, Jantzen W. (2015, December): *Terrorism and the Rise of ISIS in Egypt*. (Master's Thesis, Missouri State University, Springfield, United States). URL: <http://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/2551>
- Gerdes, Luke M. (2012): *On the Edge of Al-Qaida? Assessing Al-Qaida's Changing Role in Terrorist Attacks and Plots over Time*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, United States). URL: <http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13573>
- Graham, Suzanne (2004, November): *Terrorist Waves and Corresponding Terrorist Groups: A Comparative Analysis of the IRA, FARC and Al Qaeda*. (Master's Thesis, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, South Africa). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10210/1371>
- Grisham, Kevin Edward (2009, December): *Guerrillas today, what Tomorrow: Transformation of Guerrilla Movements*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of California Riverside, Riverside, United States). URL: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1278x05b>
- Iqbal, Khuram (2014, July): *Evolution of Suicide Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan*. (Doctoral Thesis, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/1054978>
- Kang, Charanjit Singh (2013, Summer): *The Rise and Decline of Sikh Anti-State Terrorism in India: An Economic Based Explanation*. (Doctoral Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada). URL: <http://summit.sfu.ca/item/13467>
- Kavanagh, Jennifer E. (2011): *The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/84524>
- Kenny, Noni (2013, November): *Meta-Level Terrorism Futures: Constructing and Deconstructing Using Causal Layered Analysis*. (Doctoral Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia). URL: <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/65277>
- Law, Nicholas Benjamin (2016, August): *The Franchising Effect on the Al-Qaeda Enterprise and Related Transnational Terror Groups: Patterns of Evolution of Al-Qaeda Affiliates in the 21st Century*. (Doctoral Thesis, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, United States). URL: http://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/10
- McCulley, Dylan P. (2016, September): *States of Terror: Understanding Evolving Islamist Terrorist Organizations and the Threat they Pose*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50590>
- Muhwezi, Andrew M. (2014, June): *Transnational Terrorism in East Africa: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of the Recent Rise in Kenyan Violence*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42693>
- Nawaz, Muhammad Asif (2017): *How Terrorism Ends: The Impact of Lethality of Terrorist Groups on their Longevity*. (Doctoral Thesis, Kansas State University, Manhattan, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2097/35788>
- Nessel, Richard A. (2012, June): *Why Failing Terrorist Groups Persist: The Case of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*. (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7392>
- Oberoi, Shelly (2015, Fall): *Map Based Application on Terrorism in Past and Present*. (Master's Thesis, San Diego State University, San Diego, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10211.3/164254>
- Okowita, Samantha Louise (2017, May): *Female Suicide Terrorism: An Analysis of Trends and Group Motiva-*

tions Linked to the Increase in Female Participation as Suicide Bombers. (Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, United States). URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4769

Ouellet, Marie (2016, Summer): *Terrorist Networks and the Collective Criminal Career: The Relationship between Group Structure and Trajectories*. (Doctoral Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada). URL: <http://summit.sfu.ca/item/16726>

Pitts, Damien Evan (2015, August): *New Destinations of Islamic Fundamental Terrorism: The Rise of Al Shabaab*. (Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, United States). URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/3499

Royston, Lisbet B. Ejlersen (2011, December): *A Qualitative Pattern Analysis of Suicide Terrorism: From Past to Future Trends*. (Master's Thesis, Texas State University, San Marcos, United States). URL: <https://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/4473>

Schuurman, Bart (2017, January): *Becoming a European Homegrown Jihadist: A Multilevel Analysis of Involvement in the Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005*. (Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1887/45328>

Turner, Carl Peter (2015, May): *How Terrorism Ends: A Comparative Conflict Analysis of Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Corsica*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom). URL: <https://hyla.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:13768>

Veerasamy, Namosha (2014, September): *CLC – Cyberterrorism Life Cycle Model*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10210/12393>

Vittori, Jodi (2008, June): *Idealism Is not Enough: The Role of Resources in the Autonomy and Capability of Terrorist Groups*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Denver, Denver, United States). URL: <http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/304636687.html?FMT=ABS&pubnum=3303538>

Wadugodapitiya, Menaka Dhananjali (2010): *Fragments of Terror: Memories and Narratives of Former Insurgents in Southern Sri Lanka*. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4082>

Walls, Erin (2017, April): *Waves of Modern Terrorism: Examining the Past and Predicting the Future*. (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10822/1043900>

Weston, Lorne (1989) *The FLQ: The Life and Times of a Terrorist Organization*. (Master's Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, Canada). URL: <http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/thesisfile61791.pdf>

Worrell, Blake (2007, December): *Determinants of International Terrorist Group Formation, 1968-1999*. (Master's Thesis, University of North Texas, Denton, United States). URL: <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5107>

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Abderrahim, Kader A. (2016, March): Libya, Daesh on Europe's Doorstep. In: Hedwig Giusto (Ed.): *Daesh and the Terrorist Threat: From the Middle East to Europe*. [e-Book]. Brussels; Rome: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS); Fondazione Italianeuropei, 52-57. URL: <http://www.feps-europe.eu/en/publications/details/376>

Abdulrazaq, Tallha; Stansfield, Gareth (2016, June-July): The Day After: What to Expect in Post-Islamic State Mosul. *The RUSI Journal*, 161(3), 14-20. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1184013>

Abdulrazaq, Tallha; Stansfield, Gareth (2016, Autumn): The Enemy within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul. *The Middle East Journal*, 70(4), 525-542. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3751/70.4.11>

- Abrahms, Max; Gottfried, Matthew S. (2016): Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(1), 72-89. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.879057>
- Acosta, Benjamin (2014): Live to Win another Day: Why many Militant Organizations Survive yet few Succeed. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(2), 135-161. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.862900> URL: http://www.benjaminacosta.com/download/i/mark_dl/u/4011265255/4623963642/Acosta2014a.pdf
- Adraoui, Mohamed-Ali (2017, July): Borders and Sovereignty in Islamist and Jihadist Thought: Past and Present. *International Affairs*, 93(4), 917-935. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix123>
- Ahmad, Aisha (2016): Going Global: Islamist Competition in Contemporary Civil Wars. *Security Studies*, 25(2), 353-384. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171971>
- Albert, Helmut (2005, June): „Al Qaida“, eine transnationale Terrororganisation im Wandel. *Die Kriminalpolizei*, 6/2005. URL: <http://www.kriminalpolizei.de/ausgaben/2005/juni/detailansicht-juni/artikel/al-qa-ida-eine-transnationale.html>
- Alexander, Yonah et al. (2017, June): Biological Terrorism: Past Lessons and Future Outlook. *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base*, 6(2). URL: <https://www.terrorisemelectronicjournal.org/knowledge-base/selected-seminar-reports>
- Alonso, Rogelio; Bada, Javier Díaz (2016): What Role have Former ETA Terrorists Played in Counterterrorism and Counterradicalization Initiatives in Spain? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(11), 982-1006. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1154365>
- Al Raffie, Dina (2015, February): Straight from the Horse's Mouth: Exploring De-radicalization Claims of Former Egyptian Militant Leaders. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(1), 27-48. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/400>
- Alschuler, Lawrence (2014, February): The Life Cycle of a British Islamist: A Jungian Perspective. [Commentary]. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 2(1), 31-42. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v2i1.272>
- al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2014, March): The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 16, 5-15. URL: https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1393/ct_16_posting.pdf
- al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2015, August): The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 117-129. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/447>
- al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2016, April): A Caliphate under Strain: The Documentary Evidence. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(4), 1-8. URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss421.pdf>
- Altier, Mary Beth; Thoroughgood, Christian N.; Horgan, John G. (2014, September): Turning away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(5), 647-661. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314535946> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mary_Altier/publication/266259819_Turning_away_from_terrorism_lessons_from_psychology_sociology_and_criminology/links/58af133292851cf7ae88f44a/Turning-away-from-terrorism-lessons-from-psychology-sociology-and-criminology.pdf
- Altier, Mary Beth et al. (2017): Why they Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts. *Security Studies*, 26(2), 305-332. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280307>
- Amghar, Samir; Khadiyatoula, Fall (2016): Disillusioned Militancy: The Crisis of Militancy and Variables of Disengagement of the European Muslim Brotherhood. *Mediterranean Politics*, 22(1), 54-70. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13622477.2016.1191111>

[org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1230941](https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1230941)

Andersen, Lars Erslev (2017, Winter): The Mole and the Mallet: Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the “Thirty Years’ War” in the Middle East. *Connections*, 16(1), 7-24. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.01>

Anderson, Noel (2016): Why Victories in Battle have not yet Finished the War against al-Shabaab. [Commentary]. *Survival*, 58(4), 51-62. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207947>

Angstrom, Jan (2017): Escalation, Emulation, and the Failure of Hybrid Warfare in Afghanistan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(10), 838-856. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1248665>

Antinori, Arije (2017): The “Swarm Wolf”: Understanding to Prevent the Evolution of Terror. In: Theodore J. Gordon et al. (Eds.): *Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 132). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 51-59. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-748-1-51>

Arsenault, Elizabeth Grimm; Bacon, Tricia (2015): Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(2), 85-112. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.977605>

Awan, Imran (2013): Muslim Prisoners, Radicalization and Rehabilitation in British Prisons. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33(3), 371-384. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2013.853979>

Bailey, Gavin; Edwards, Phil (2017, Spring): Rethinking “Radicalisation”: Microradicalisations and Reciprocal Radicalisation as an Intertwined Process. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 10, 255-281. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/92>

Bakker, Edwin (2015): History of Terrorism: A Constantly Changing Phenomenon. In: *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies: Comparing Theory and Practice*. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 47-66.

Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2016, Fourth Quarter): Abu Sayyaf Group’s Persistence: A Chronological Analysis of Crime-Terror Nexus in the Philippines and the ISIS Connection in Southeast Asia. *Peace and Security Review*, 7(15), 50-72. URL: <http://bipss.org.bd/pdf/7number15.pdf>

Bapat, Navin A. (2014): The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict. *International Interactions*, 40(4), 568-578. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.902818>

Barackskay, Daniel (2015): The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Examining the Role of Political Pragmatism in State Building and Activism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(3), 520-536. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.812035>

Barrelle, Kate (2015): Pro-Integration: Disengagement from and Life after Extremism. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 7(2), 129-142. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.988165>

Basit, Abdul (2015, November): Future of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Akhtar Mansoor. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 7(10), 9-13. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CTTA-November-2015.pdf>

Basra, Rajan; Neumann, Peter R. (2016, December): Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 25-40. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/554>

Beaurpere, Guillaume N. (2014, September): ISIS and Protracted War: Why Violent Extremists Persist in the Face of Defeat. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 6(8), 4-8. URL: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-September14.pdf>

Becker, Michael (2017): Why Violence Abates: Imposed and Elective Declines in Terrorist Attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(2), 215-235. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1011799>

- Bell, Kevin (2016, February): The First Islamic State: A Look Back at the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(2), 9-14. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss28.pdf>
- Besaçon, Marie (2017, May): Islam in from the Cold: A Muslim Brother's Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the Islamic Movement in the Sudan. *PRISM*, 6(4), 113-135. URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-4/PRISM%206.4%20Book.pdf
- Bin Hassan, Ahmad Saiful Rijal (2016, May): ISIS: Questions about its Survival & Ideology. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8(5), 4-8. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CTTA-May-2016.pdf>
- Bjørge, Tore (2011, May): Dreams and Disillusionment: Engagement in and Disengagement from Militant Extremist Groups. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 55(4), 277-285. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-011-9282-9>
- Bjørge, Tore (2013): Disengagement from Terrorism. In: *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 86-94.
- Blomberg, S. Brock; Gaibullov, Khusrav; Sandler, Todd (2011, December): Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations. *Public Choice*, 149(3-4), Article 441. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9837-4>
- Bloom, Mia (2017): Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and "Talent Spotting" in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(7), 603-623. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237219>
- Bobokulov, Inomjon (2016, July): IS in Afghanistan: Emergence, Evolution and Expansion. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8(7), 21-26. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/CTTA-July-2016.pdf>
- Bosi, Lorenzo; della Porta, Donatella (2015): Processes of Disengagement from Political Violence: A Multi-Level Relational Approach. In: Ioannis Tellidis; Harmonie Toros (Eds.): *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 81-100.
- Bowie, Neil G. (2017, August): Terrorism Events Data: An Inventory of Databases and Data Sets, 1968-2017. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(4), 50-72. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/622>
- Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina (2016): Cascades across an "Extremely Violent Society": Sri Lanka. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 10(1), 10-24. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.436>
- Brands, Hal; Feaver, Peter (2017, June-July): Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable? *Survival*, 59(3), 7-54. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1325595>
- Brescó de Luna, Ignacio (2017, August): From Militant Voices to Militant Irony: Examining Identity, Memory and Conflict in the Basque Country. *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, 13(3), 548-558. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v13i3.1324>
- Brett, Daniel (2017): Evolution and Rise of Contemporary Jihadism: From the Muslim Brotherhood to IS. In: Paulo Casaca; Siegfried O. Wolf (Eds.): *Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship*. (Contemporary South Asian Studies). Cham: Springer, 83-108. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55690-1_4
- Brzuszkiewicz, Sara (2016-2017, Winter): Political De-Radicalization: Why it is no Longer Possible in the wilāyat System of the Islamic State. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 9, 185-204. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/76>

Burchill, Richard (2018): Jihadist Insurgency and the Prospects for Peace and Security. In: Paul B. Rich; Richard Burchill (Eds.): *Jihadist Insurgent Movements*. Abingdon: Routledge, 230-239.

Burgess, Mark; Ferguson, Neil; Hollywood, Ian (2005): Violence Begets Violence: How Ordinary Civilians Become Drawn into the Cycle of Military Intervention and Violent Resistance. *Australasian Journal of Human Security*, 1(1), 41-51.

Burgess, Mark; Ferguson, Neil; Hollywood, Ian (2007, February): Rebels' Perspectives of the Legacy of Past Violence and of the Current Peace in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. *Political Psychology*, 28(1), 69-88. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00552.x> URL: <http://psych.brookes.ac.uk/publications/burgess2007.pdf>

Byers, Andrew; Mooney, Tara (2017, September): ISIS after the Caliphate. *Small Wars Journal*. 9/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-after-the-caliphate>

Byman, Daniel; McCants, Will (2017, Summer): Fight or Flight: How to Avoid a Forever War against Jihadists. *The Washington Quarterly*, 40(2), 67-77. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1328923> URL: https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Summer2017_Byman-McCants.pdf

Carnegie, Paul J. (2015, October): Countering the (Re-) Production of Militancy in Indonesia: Between Coercion and Persuasion. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(5), 15-26. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/458>

Carter, Alexander James (2017): Cumulative Extremism: Escalation of Movement–Countermovement Dynamics in Northern Ireland between 1967 and 1972. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 9(1), 37-51. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2016.1236830>

Celso, Anthony N. (2014): Al Qaeda's Post-bin Laden Resurgence: The Paradox of Resilience and Failure. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 25(2), 33-47. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-2685749>

Celso, Anthony N. (2014): Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality. *Orbis*, 58(2), 229-247. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2014.02.003>

Celso, Anthony N. (2016): Jihadist Failure, Resilience, and Never-Ending Warfare. [Review Article]. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(4), 813-822. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1205466>

Chernov Hwang, Julie (2017): The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists: Understanding the Pathways. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(2), 277-295. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1034855>

Clarke, Richard A.; Eddy, R. P. (2017): The Arabist: The Rise of ISIS. In: *Warnings: Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes*. New York: HarperCollins, 57-74.

Clifford, George M. (2017): Just Counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 10(1), 67-92. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1254369>

Clubb, Gordon (2014): "From Terrorists to Peacekeepers": The IRA's Disengagement and the Role of Community Networks. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(10), 842-861. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.941434> URL: <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/90275/8/Terrorists%20to%20Peacekeepers%20%283%29.pdf>

Clubb, Gordon (2016): Selling the End of Terrorism: A Framing Approach to the IRA's Disengagement from Armed Violence. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27(4), 608-635. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189492>

Clubb, Gordon (2016): The Role of Former Combatants in Preventing Youth Involvement in Terrorism in Northern Ireland: A Framework for Assessing Former Islamic State Combatants. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(9), 842-861. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1144917> URL: <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/90275/8/Terrorists%20to%20Peacekeepers%20%283%29.pdf>

ac.uk/95959/3/FinalPrevent%20Former%20Combatants.pdf

Cragin, Kim R. (2017): The Global ISIS Threat in Historical Context. *Pathways to Peace and Security*, 1/52, 77-90. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2017-1-77-90>

Cragin, R. Kim (2017, Spring): The November 2015 Paris Attacks: The Impact of Foreign Fighter Returnees. *Orbis*, 61(2), 212-226. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.02.005> URL: <https://rkimcragin.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/november-2015-paris-attacks.pdf>

Crenshaw, Martha (2011): How Terrorism Ends. In: *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences*. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 191-222.

Cristiani, Dario (2016, May): Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(9), 8-11. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/TM_May-5-2017.pdf

Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2006, Summer): How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups. *International Security*, 31(1), 7-48. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7>

Croy, Russell (2014, October): How do Insurgencies End? *Small Wars Journal*, 10/2014. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-do-insurgencies-end>

Čuček, Simona Hrastnik (2017, May): From Conversion to Jihad: Contemporary: Janissaries – A Slovenian Case Study. In: Vlado Azinović (Ed.): *Between Salvation and Terror: Radicalization and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in the Western Balkans*. Sarajevo: School of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo / Atlantic Initiative, 137-147. URL: <http://www.atlanticinitiative.org/project-activities-nato-debates/513-terror.html>

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja (2013): Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(2), 99-115. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.747073>

Day, Joel (2015, December): Terrorist Practices: Sketching a New Research Agenda. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6), 85-94. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/473>

de Bie, Jasper L. (2016, October): Involvement Mechanisms of Jihadist Networks. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(5), 22-41. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/539>

de Bie, Jasper L.; de Poot, Christianne J.; van der Leun, Joanne P. (2015): Shifting Modus Operandi of Jihadist Foreign Fighters from the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013: A Crime Script Analysis. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(3), 416-440. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1021038>

de Graaff, Bob (2016, October): IS and its Predecessors: Violent Extremism in Historical Perspective. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(5), 96-103. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/544>

de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno (2005, January): Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. *International Organization*, 59(1), 145-176. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050022> URL: <http://home.uchicago.edu/bdm/PDF/adverseterror.pdf>

de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno (2009): Commentary on Dipak Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation and Demise (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 2(2), 327-329. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539150903024849>

Destatte, Philippe (2017): Counter-Terrorism in Europe 2030: Managing Efficiency and Civil Rights. In: Theodore J. Gordon et al. (Eds.): *Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 132). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 87-105. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-748-1-87>

Destatte, Philippe et al. (2017): Identifying some Issues in the NATO Zone through Trajectories about the Future of Terrorism and Counter-Terror Strategies. In: Theodore J. Gordon et al. (Eds.): *Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal

Dynamics, Vol. 132). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 16-24. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-748-1-16>

Dettke, Dieter et al. (2016, September): Terrorism Generational Challenges: Political, Social, Economic, and Strategic Implications. *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base*, 5(2). URL: <https://www.terroris-melectronicjournal.org/terrorism-journal-1/volume-v-number-2/generational-challenges>

Dharmawardhane, Iromi (2013, December): Sri Lanka's Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-Affected Communities. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 7(6), 27-57. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/310>

Dixon, Paul (2015): How Terrorism Ends: Negotiating the End of the IRA's "Armed Struggle". In: Lee Jarvis; Michael Lister (Eds.): *Critical Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 187-209.

Dobbins, James; Jones, Seth G. (2017): The End of a Caliphate. *Survival*, 59(3), 55-72. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1325596>

Doboš, Bohumil (2018): Shapeshifter of Somalia: Evolution of the Political Territoriality of Al-Shabaab. In: Paul B. Rich; Richard Burchill (Eds.): *Jihadist Insurgent Movements*. Abingdon: Routledge, 209-229.

Dresden, Jennifer Raymond (2017): From Combatants to Candidates: Electoral Competition and the Legacy of Armed Conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 34(3), 240-263. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215593676>

Dukalskis, Alexander (2015): Why do some Insurgent Groups Agree to Cease-Fires while others do not? A Within-Case Analysis of Burma/Myanmar, 1948-2011. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(10), 841-863. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1056631> URL: http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/handle/10197/8472/Dukalskis_Studies_in_Conflict_%26_Terrorism.pdf

Elejabarrieta Diaz, Gorka (2015): From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists and back again: The Basque Case. In: Ioannis Tellidis; Harmonie Toros (Eds.): *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 146-164.

Englund, Scott; Stohl, Michael (2016, August): Violent Political Movements: Comparing the Shining Path to the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(4), 21-31. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/524>

Erlenbusch, Verena (2015): Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism in the French Revolution. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 8(2), 193-210. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1049842>

Falciola, Luca (2016): A Bloodless Guerrilla Warfare: Why U.S. White Leftists Renounced Violence against People during the 1970s. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(5), 928-949. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.982862>

Ferguson, Neil (2016, Spring): Disengaging from Terrorism: A Northern Irish Experience. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 6, 1-23. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/41>

Ferguson, Neil; Burgess, Mark; Hollywood, Ian (2008): Crossing the Rubicon: Deciding to Become a Paramilitary in Northern Ireland. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 2(1), 130-137. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.31>

Ferguson, Neil; Burgess, Mark; Hollywood, Ian (2015, April): Leaving Violence behind: Disengaging from Politically Motivated Violence in Northern Ireland. *Political Psychology*, 36(2), 199-214. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12103> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Neil_Ferguson4/publication/275466936_Leaving_Violence_Behind_Disengaging_from_Politically_Motivated_Violence_in_Northern_Ireland/links/553f46e80cf2574dcf626593/Leaving-Violence-Behind-Disengaging-from-Politically-Motivated-Vio-

[lence-in-Northern-Ireland.pdf](#)

Ferrara, Emilio (2017, December): Contagion Dynamics of Extremist Propaganda in Social Networks. *Information Sciences*, 418-419, 1-12. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2017.07.030> URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982259>

Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2016, December): The French “Iraqi Networks” of the 2000s: Matrix of the 2015 Terrorist Attacks? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 97-101. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/560>

Fishman, Brian (2016, October): Revising the History of al-Qa`ida’s Original Meeting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(10), 28-33. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss1010.pdf

Fortna, Virginia Page (2015, Summer): Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes. *International Organization*, 69(3), 519-556. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000089> URL: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fbab/61444d1697ec7cc08e720fd58bbe791ab5e3.pdf>

Galily, Yair; Yarchi, Moran; Tamir, Ilan (2015): From Munich to Boston, and from Theater to Social Media: The Evolutionary Landscape of World Sporting Terror. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(12), 998-1007. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1076640>

Gallagher, Martin J. (2017): The 2016 “Lone Wolf” Tsunami – Is Rapoport’s “Religious Wave” Ending? *Journal of Strategic Security*, 10(2), 60-76. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.2.1584>

Gargan, Ian et al. (2012): Terrorists Meeting their Victims: A Case Study of Psychologists’ Experiences of Former Terrorists Meeting Survivors. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research*, 4(4), 216-225. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/17596591211270707>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2017, June): A Strategic History of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Formation. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 32-39. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Barr, Nathaniel (2017, March): How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 21, 50-68. URL: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/20170331CurrentTrends21.pdf>

Gazdik, Gyula (2015): The Rise of Al-Qaida in North Africa: AQIM and its Role in the Region. In: János Tomolya; Larry D. White (Eds.): *Terrorist Threats in North Africa from a NATO Perspective*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 124). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 18-32. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-587-6-18>

Gergin, Nadir; Duru, Hacı; Çetin, Hakan Cem (2015): Profile and Life Span of the PKK Guerillas. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(3), 219-232. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.981989>

Giunchi, Elisa (2016, March): From the Afghan Resistance to Abbottabad: Thirty Years of Al-Qaedaism. In: Hedwig Giusto (Ed.): *Daesh and the Terrorist Threat: From the Middle East to Europe*. [e-Book]. Brussels; Rome: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS); Fondazione Italianeuropei, 23-33. URL: <http://www.feps-europe.eu/en/publications/details/376>

Gray, Simon; Adeakin, Ibikunle (2015): The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies. *African Security*, 8(3), 185-211. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.1069120>

Gregg, Heather Selma (2016): Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Funda-

- mentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 338-360. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.918879> URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49169/Gregg_Three_Theories_2016.pdf
- Guillou, Nat (2017, July): The Future of Sunni Jihadist Violence in Iran. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(15), 3-5. URL: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Terrorism-Monitor-July-28-2017.pdf>
- Gunaratna, Rohan (2016, February): Best Practices: Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Foreign Fighters. In: Carter Center, The (Ed.): *Countering Daesh Propaganda: Action-Oriented Research for Practical Policy Outcomes*. (Workshop Report). Atlanta: The Carter Center, 84-92. URL: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/countering-isis/counteringdaeshpropaganda-feb2016.pdf
- Gunaratna, Rohan (2017, July): The Siege of Marawi: A Game Changer in Terrorism in Asia. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(7). URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-July-2017.pdf>
- Gunaratna, Rohan; Oreg, Aviv (2010): Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(12), 1043-1078. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860>
- Gupta, Dipak K. (2016): Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Policy Conundrum. In: Norma C. Noonan; Vidya Nadkarni (Eds.): *Challenge and Change: Global Threats and the State in Twenty-First Century International Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature, 195-224. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48479-6_8
- Gvineria, Gaga (2009): How does Terrorism End? In: Paul K. Davis; Kim Cragin (Eds.): *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces together*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-849-OSD). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 257-298. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG849.html>
- Harmon, Christopher C. (2014): How other Terrorist Groups have been Defeated. In: *A Citizen's Guide to Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. (Citizen Guides to Politics & Public Affairs). New York: Routledge, 135-146.
- Haspeslagh, Sophie; Dudouet, Veronique (2015): Conflict Resolution Practice in Conflicts Marked by Terrorist Violence: A Scholar-Practitioner Perspective. In: Ioannis Tellidis; Harmonie Toros (Eds.): *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 103-123.
- Heath-Kelly, Charlotte (2016): Collective Memory and Terrorism. In: Richard Jackson (Ed.): *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 287-297.
- Hegghammer, Thomas (2016, December): The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 156-170. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/566>
- Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie (2016, December): Plebeian Jihadism in Denmark: An Individualisation and Popularization Predating the Growth of the Islamic State. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(6), 102-108. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/561>
- Hoffman, Bruce (2013): Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(8), 635-653. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.802973>
- Hoffman, Bruce (2015): A First Draft of the History of America's Ongoing Wars on Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(1), 75-83. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.974405>
- Holman, Timothy (2016, April): "Gonna Get Myself Connected": The Role of Facilitation in Foreign Fighter Mobilizations. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(2), 2-23. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/497>
- Holtermann, Helge (2016): How Can Weak Insurgent Groups Grow? Insights from Nepal. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 316-337. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.908775> URL: <https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=688&type=publicationfile>

- Horgan, John G. (2014-2015, Winter): What Makes a Terrorist Stop being a Terrorist? *Journal for Deradicalization*, 1, 1-4. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/1>
- Horgan, John G. et al. (2017): From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic State. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(7), 645-664. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1221252> URL: http://pelg.ucsd.edu/9.horgan_etal_ISIS.pdf
- Horgan, John G. et al. (2017): Walking away: The Disengagement and De-Radicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 9(2), 63-77. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2016.1156722>
- Horton, Michael (2016, October): AQAP in Southern Yemen: Learning, Adapting and Growing. *Terrorism Monitor*, 14(20), 7-11. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/TM_Vol_14_Iss_20.pdf
- Horton, Michael (2017, January): Fighting the Long War: The Evolution of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(1), 17-22. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CTC-Sentinel_Vol9Iss1123.pdf
- Horton, Michael (2017, July): Reclaiming Lost Ground in Somalia: The Enduring Threat of al-Shabaab. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(15), 8-11. URL: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Terrorism-Monitor-July-28-2017.pdf>
- Huesmann, L. Rowell (2010): How to Grow a Terrorist without Really Trying: The Psychological Development of Terrorists from Childhood to Adulthood. In: Daniel Antonius et al. (Eds.): *Interdisciplinary Analyses of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 1-21. URL: <http://www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/aggr/articles/Huesmann/2010.Huesmann.HowToGrowATerroris.InAntoniusEtAl.pdf>
- Ibrahim, Mahmoud A. A. (2016): Transformation of Egyptian Ex-Jihadism: History and Context. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 11(3), 298-333. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2016.1178020>
- Idler, Annette; Paladini-Adell, Borja (2015): When Peace Implies Engaging the “Terrorist”: Peacebuilding in Colombia through Transforming Political Violence and Terrorism. In: Ioannis Tellidis; Harmonie Toros (Eds.): *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 124-145.
- Ilardi, Gaetano Joe (2013): Interviews with Canadian Radicals. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(9), 713-738. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.813248>
- Iqbal, Mohammad Naved Ferdaus (2017, August): Leapfrogging: Terrorists and State Actors. *Small Wars Journal*, 8/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/leapfrogging-terrorists-and-state-actors>
- Iqbal, Khuram; De Silva, Sara (2013): Terrorist Lifecycles: A Case Study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 8(1), 72-86. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2013.789599>
- Jasper, Scott; Moreland, Scott (2016, October): ISIS: An Adaptive Hybrid Threat in Transition. *Small Wars Journal*, 10/2016. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-an-adaptive-hybrid-threat-in-transition>
- Jenkins, Brian Michael (2016, September): Fifteen Years on, where Are we in the “War on Terror”? *CTC Sentinel*, 9(9), 7-12. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss91.pdf
- Jensen, Benjamin (2015, September): How Movements Decline: Historical Insights on how Daesh Might “End”. In: Allison Astorino-Courtois et al. (Eds.): *White Paper on SMA Support to SOCCENT: ISIL Influence and Resolve*. (SMA Periodic Publication). Boston: NSI, 38-42. URL: <http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ISIL-Influence-and-Resolve.pdf>
- Jensen, Carl J. (2015, November): Potential Drivers of Terrorism out to the Year 2020. *American Behavioral*

Scientist, 59(13), 1698-1714. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764215588819>

Joffé, George (2016): The Fateful Phoenix: The Revival of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27(1), 1-21. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1122899>

Jones, Clarke R.; Morales, Resurrecion S. (2012): Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalization. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35(3), 211-228. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.648157>

Jones, Seth G.; Johnston, Patrick B. (2013): The Future of Insurgency. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(1), 1-25. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.739077>

Jones, Seth G. et al. (2017): The Rise and Decline of the Islamic State. In: *Rolling Back the Islamic State*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 13-37. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1912>

Jordan, Jenna (2009): When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation. *Security Studies*, 18(4), 719-755. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068> URL: <http://informationcollective.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Jordan.pdf>

Jordan, Jenna (2014, Spring): Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes. *International Security*, 38(4), 7-38. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157 URL: http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3804_pp007-038_rev.pdf

Kahan, Jerome H. (2016, July): Living with Terrorism: Unimaginable Nightmare or Prospective Reality. *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*, 13(2), 231-246. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2016-0003>

Kallberg, Jan; Thuraingham, Bhavani (2014): After the "War on Terror"—How to Maintain Long-Range Terrorist Deterrence. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 9(1), 19-31. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2013.877376>

Kamel, Kareem (2015, April): Understanding Taliban Resurgence: Ethno-Symbolism and Revolutionary Mobilization. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 15(1), 66-82. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12128> URL: http://www.fue.edu.eg/pdfFiles/Publications/Karim_Mahmoud_Kamel_El_Sayed_24500.pdf

Kaplan, Jeffrey (2016): A Strained Criticism of Wave Theory. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 228-235. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112279>

Kaplan, Jeffrey; Costa, Christopher P. (2015): The Islamic State and the New Tribalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(5), 926-969. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1094306>

Kaplan, Oliver; Nussio, Enzo (2015, November): Community Counts: The Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Colombia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215614506> URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138188

Kaplan, Oliver; Nussio, Enzo (2016, May): Explaining Recidivism of Ex-Combatants in Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716644326>

Karmon, Ely (2017, August): Central Asian Jihadists in the Front Line. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(4), 78-86. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/624>

Karpantschhof, René; Mikkelsen, Flemming (2017): The Rise and Transformation of the Radical Right Movement in Denmark, 1980-2015. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(8), 712-730. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1234313>

Kassimeris, George (2011): Why Greek Terrorists Give Up: Analyzing Individual Exit from the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(7), 556-571. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.578551>

- Khan, Shahab Enam (2017): Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(1), 191-217. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1266127>
- Kirchofer, Charles (2016, June): Targeted Killings and Compellence: Lessons from the Campaign against Hamas in the Second Intifada. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(3), 16-25. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/510>
- Kluch, Sofia Pinero; Vaux, Alan (2016): The Non-Random Nature of Terrorism: An Exploration of where and how Global Trends of Terrorism have Developed over 40 Years. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(12), 1031-1049. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1159070>
- Knights, Michael (2017, August): Predicting the Shape of Iraq's Next Sunni Insurgencies. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(7), 13-22. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss7-7.pdf
- Knights, Michael; Mello, Alexandre (2015, April): The Cult of the Offensive: The Islamic State on Defense. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(4), 1-7. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue42.pdf>
- Kobrin, Nancy Hartvelt (2016, October): Nobody Born a Terrorist, but Early Childhood Matters: Explaining the Jihadis' Lack of Empathy. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(5), 108-111. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/546>
- Kocabas, Y. Uğur (2017): Future of International Terrorism and NATO's Countering Measures. In: Travis Morris; Metodi Hadji-Janev (Eds.): *Countering Terrorism in South Eastern Europe*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 131). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 61-73. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-736-8-61>
- Koehler, Daniel (2015, December): Radical Groups' Social Pressure towards Defectors: The Case of Right-Wing Extremist Groups. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6), 36-50. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/470>
- Kruglanski, Arie W. et al. (2013, October): Terrorism—A (Self) Love Story: Redirecting the Significance Quest Can End Violence. *American Psychologist*, 68(7), 559-575. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032615> URL: <http://www.gelfand.umd.edu/Terrorism%20Self%20Love%20Story.pdf>
- Kuznar, Lawrence A. (2017): The Stability of the Islamic State (IS) Narrative: Implications for the Future. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 10(1), 40-53. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2017.1347694>
- Lakomy, Miron (2017, June): Cracks in the Online "Caliphate": How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(3), 40-53. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/607>
- Lebovich, Andrew (2017, June): AQIM's Formalized Flexibility. In: Aaron Y. Zelin (Ed.): *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 56-66. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>
- Lia, Brynjar (2016, Winter): Jihadism in the Arab World after 2011: Explaining its Expansion. *Middle East Policy*, 23(4), 74-91. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12234> URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Brynjar-Lia/publication/311438943_Jihadism_in_the_Arab_World_after_2011_Explaining_Its_Expansion/links/58466b9b08ae2d217569da72.pdf
- Lindekilde, Lasse (2016): Radicalization, De-Radicalization, and Counter-Radicalization. In: Richard Jackson (Ed.): *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 248-260.

- Linebarger, Christopher (2015): Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960-2001. *International Interactions*, 41(3), 583-600. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.984809>
- Lister, Charles (2015, September): Al-Qa`ida Plays a Long Game in Syria. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(9), 13-18. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CTC-SENTINEL-8-918.pdf>
- Lister, Charles (2016, March 14): Evolution of an Insurgency: How Syria was Radicalized. *Foreign Affairs*. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-03-14/evolution-insurgency>
- Lister, Charles (2016, September): The Dawn of Mass Jihad: Success in Syria Fuels al-Qa`ida's Evolution. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(9), 13-20. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CTC-SENTINEL_Vo-19Iss91.pdf
- Lund, Aron (2017, September 15): A Jihadist Breakup in Syria: Tahrir al-Sham Splits. *Foreign Affairs*. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-09-15/jihadist-breakup-syria>
- Lyons, Terrence (2016): From Victorious Rebels to Strong Authoritarian Parties: Prospects for Post-War Democratization. *Democratization*, 23(6), 1026-1041. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1168404>
- Mabon, Simon (2017): The Circle of Bare Life: Hizballah, Muqawamah and Rejecting "Being Thus". *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 18(1), 1-22. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2017.1297236>
- Marone, Francesco (2015): The Rise of Insurrectionary Anarchist Terrorism in Italy. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 8(3), 194-214. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1038288>
- Marsden, Sarah V. (2015): Conceptualising "Success" with those Convicted of Terrorism Offences: Aims, Methods, and Barriers to Reintegration. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 7(2), 143-165. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.1001421>
- Marsden, Sarah V. (2015): How Terrorism Ends. In: Caroline Kennedy-Pipe; Gordon Clubb; Simon Mabon (Eds.): *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 199-225.
- Martin, Susanne (2014): Dilemmas of "Going Legit": Why should Violent Groups Engage in or Avoid Electoral Politics? *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 6(2), 81-101. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2013.834375>
- Matanock, Aila M. (2016, November): Using Violence, Seeking Votes: Introducing the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(6), 845-853. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316668390>
- McCabe, Thomas R. (2017, August): The Islamic State after the Caliphate – Can IS Go Underground? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(4), 95-101. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/626>
- McDowell-Smith, Allison; Speckhard, Anne; Yayla, Ahmet S. (2017, Spring): Beating ISIS in the Digital Space: Focus Testing ISIS Defector Counter-Narrative Videos with American College Students. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 10, 50-76. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/83>
- McIntosh, Christopher (2014, Winter): Ending the War with Al Qaeda. *Orbis*, 58(1), 104-118. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.11.004>
- McQuinn, Brian (2016, March): DDR and the Internal Organization of Non-State Armed Groups. *Stability*, 5(1), Article 2. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.412>
- Medina, Vicente (2015): Brief History of Terrorism. In: *Terrorism Unjustified: The Use and Misuse of Political Violence*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1-22.
- Melander, Erik; Pettersson, Therése; Themnér, Lotta (2016, September): Organized Violence, 1989-2015.

Journal of Peace Research, 53(5), 727-742. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316663032>

Mierau, Jochen O. (2015): The Activity and Lethality of Militant Groups: Ideology, Capacity, and Environment. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 8(1), 23-37. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2014.964740>

Miller, Erin (2016, October): Patterns of Collective Desistance from Terrorism: Fundamental Measurement Challenges. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(5), 5-21. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/538>

Mills, Rachel (2016, Spring): From Terrorism to Political Participation: The Cases of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. *Al Noor*, 9(2), 12-21. URL: https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/caee23_36068b3ad7d6446d9b-b96514a9a3dd3a.pdf

Milošević, Ana (2017, May): Remembering the Present: Dealing with the Memories of Terrorism in Europe. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 8(2), 44-61. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1269>

Mironova, Vera; Sergatskova, Ekaterina (2017, September 7): The Chechens of Syria: The Meaning of their Internal Struggle. *Foreign Affairs*. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-09-07/chechens-syria>

Möller, Patrick (2016): Der Weg zur Generation Syrien – die Entwicklung des deutschen Dschihadismus. *JEX*, 3, 34-46. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/141>

Moody, Jessica (2016, October): The Niger Delta: Will Restarting Amnesty Payments Ease the Conflict? *Terrorism Monitor*, 14(20), 5-7. URL: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/TM_Vol_14_Iss_20.pdf

Morehouse, Matthew (2014): It's Easier to Decapitate a Snake than it Is a Hydra: An Analysis of Colombia's Targeted Killing Program. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(7), 541-566. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.913118>

Morell, Michael (2015, September): Fourteen Years and Counting: The Evolving Terrorist Threat. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(9), 1-4. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CTC-SENTINEL-8-918.pdf>

Morrison, John F. (2015): Peace Comes Dropping Slow: The Case of Northern Ireland. In: Ioannis Tellidis; Harmonie Toros (Eds.): *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis, and Opposition*. (Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 187-202.

Morrison, John Francis (2017): Splitting to Survive: Understanding Terrorist Group Fragmentation. *Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice*, 3(3), 222-232. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/JCRPP-07-2016-0013>

Msall, Kyle A. (2017, Spring): Perceptions of Extremists and Deradicalization Programs among University Students in Kuwait. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 10, 77-97. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/84>

Mühlhausen, Anna (2016-2017, Winter): Conflict Management, Transitional Justice and De-radicalization – Different, but Common Goals. *Journal for Deradicalization*. 9, 260-291. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/78>

Mullarky, Matthew (2017, April): Clemency and the Sword: Using Amnesty as a Weapon to Fracture and Defeat ISIL. *Small Wars Journal*, 4/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/clemency-and-the-sword-using-amnesty-as-a-weapon-to-fracture-and-defeat-isil>

Mullins, Sam (2010): Rehabilitation of Islamist Terrorists: Lessons from Criminology. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 3(3), 162-193. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2010.528438> URL: <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1237&context=lawpapers>

- Murphy, Daniel T. (2012, Summer): Demographics Dictate where Tomorrow's Extremists will Predominate. *The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International*, 18(2), 26-29. URL: https://issuu.com/fus-teros/docs/iacsp_magazine_v18n2
- Murua, Imanol (2017): No more Bullets for ETA: The Loss of Internal Support as a Key Factor in the End of the Basque Group's Campaign. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 10(1), 93-114. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1215628>
- Neiberg, Michael S. (2017): "No more Elsewhere": France Faces the New Wave of Terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly*, 40(1), 21-38. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302736>
- Noor, Masi; Brown, Rupert James; Prentice, Garry (2008, September): Precursors and Mediators of Inter-group Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A New Model. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 47(3), 481-495. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1348/014466607X238751>
- Nussio, Enzo; Howe, Kimberly (2016): When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(5), 848-867. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.955916> URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277954
- Nussio, Enzo; Oppenheim, Ben (2014): Anti-Social Capital in Former Members of Non-State Armed Groups: A Case Study of Colombia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(4), 999-1023. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.962438>
- Ogbogu, Jennifer Chidinma (2016, April): Nigeria's Approach to Terrorist Rehabilitation. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8(4), 16-21. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CT-TA-April-2016.pdf>
- Oppenheim, Ben et al. (2015, August): True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and why. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(5), 794-823. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715576750> URL: <http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/5670912ec7ba3.pdf>
- Orr, Conrad E. (2017, September): The Terrorist Diaspora, its Returnees, and Disrupting the Rise of Home-grown Violent Extremists. *Small Wars Journal*, 9/2017. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-terrorist-diaspora-its-returnees-and-disrupting-the-rise-of-homegrown-violent-extremist>
- Özderem, Alpaslan (2015): Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Ex-Combatants and Development with a Specific Reference to the Reintegration of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In: Paul Jackson (Ed.): *Handbook of International Security and Development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 442-456. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781955536.00036> URL: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30619338.pdf>
- Özderem, Alpaslan; Podder, Sukanya (2011, Winter): Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 4(4), 63-80. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.3>
- Palm, Niklas (2017, Spring): Radikalisierungsprozesse westlicher Dschihadisten: Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel Denis Cuspert. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 10, 98-146. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/85>
- Pantucci, Raffaello (2017, August): Britain on Alert: The Attacks in London and Manchester and the Evolving Threat. *CTC Sentinel*, 10(7), 1-8. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss7-7.pdf
- Parker, Tom; Sitter, Nick (2016): The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's not Waves, it's Strains. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 197-216. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112277>
- Pedahzur, Ami; Eubank, William; Weinberg, Leonard (2002): The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(3), 141-147. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2002.1055916>

[org/10.1080/714005625](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005625)

Pedahzur, Ami; Martin, Susanne (2017): Evolution of Suicide Attacks. In: Gary LaFree; Joshua D. Freilich (Eds.): *The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism*. (Wiley Handbooks in Criminology and Criminal Justice). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 339-352. URL: <http://journal-dl.com/downloadpdf/591088493fbb6e-13743fe6e7>

Perliger, Arie (2014, August): Terrorist Networks' Productivity and Durability: A Comparative Multi-Level Analysis. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 8(4), 36-52. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/359>

Phillips, Andrew (2010): How al-Qaeda Lost Iraq. In: David Martin Jones; Ann Lane; Paul Schulte (Eds.): *Terrorism, Security, and the Power of Informal Networks*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 133-155.

Phillips, Brian J. (2014): Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(2), 336-347. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12073> URL: <https://0fc35707-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/brianjphillips/phillipsISQonlinefirst.pdf>

Phillips, Brian J. (2017, September): Do 90 Percent of Terrorist Groups Last Less than a Year? Updating the Conventional Wisdom. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Advance Online Publication. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1361411> URL: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006865>

Phillips, Vaughan (2017): The Islamic State's Strategy: Bureaucratizing the Apocalypse through Strategic Communications. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(9), 731-757. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1236571>

Plebani, Andrea (2016, March): From Terrorist Group to Self-Proclaimed State: The Origins and Evolution of IS. In: Hedwig Giusto (Ed.): *Daesh and the Terrorist Threat: From the Middle East to Europe*. [e-Book]. Brussels; Rome: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS); Fondazione Italianeuropei, 34-41. URL: <http://www.feps-europe.eu/en/publications/details/376>

Pokalova, Elena (2017): The North Caucasus: From Mass Mobilization to International Terrorism. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 28(3), 609-628. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1307615>

Rabasa, Angel et al. (2006): Strategy, Structure, and Operational Evolution. In: *Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement*. [e-Book]. (RAND Monographs, MG-429-AF). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 23-55. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG429.html>

Raj, Andrin (2012, Winter): General Sarath Fonseka: The Defeat of the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the Re-emergence of the LTTE and the Strategic Plans of the Attack on the LTTE. *The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International*, 18(4), 50-53. URL: https://issuu.com/fusteros/docs/iac-sp_magazine_v18n4

Rapoport, David C. (2016): It Is Waves, not Strains. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 217-224. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112278>

Rapoport, David C. (2016, April): Why Has the Islamic State Changed its Strategy and Mounted the Paris-Brussels Attacks? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(2), 24-32. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/498>

Regens, James L.; Mould, Nick (2016): Continuity and Change in the Operational Dynamics of the Islamic State. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 10(1), 53-80. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1526>

Regens, James L. et al. (2016): Effect of Foreign Military Intervention and Controlled Territory on the Operational Tempo of al-Shabaab Attacks. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 9(1-3), 95-107. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2016.1267867>

Revkina, Mara; Mhidi, Ahmad (2016, May 1): Quitting ISIS: Why Syrians are Abandoning the Group. *Foreign*

Affairs. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis>

Rhoades, Ashley (2016, June): Love in the Time of Terror: From Breaking the Spell of the Red Army Faction to Dispelling the Allure of Al Qaeda. *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, 4(2), 110-126. URL: <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GSSR-Vol.-4-Iss.-2.pdf>

Riley, John et al. (2017): Escaping the LRA: Examining the Decision to Disengage from Militarized Dissident Groups. *African Security*, 10(2), 80-102. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2017.1305859>

Robinson, Glenn E. (2017, Fall): The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979-2017. *Middle East Policy*, 24(3), 70-88. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12287>

Rosenau, William et al. (2014): Why they Join, why they Fight, and why they Leave: Learning from Colombia's Database of Demobilized Militants. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(2), 277-285. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.700658>

Rosiny, Stephan (2015, Summer): The Rise and Demise of the IS Caliphate. *Middle East Policy*, 22(2), 94-107. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12131>

Roul, Animesh (2017, August): Al-Qaeda's Quiet Resurgence in India. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(16), 6-8. URL: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Terrorism-Monitor-August-15-2017.pdf>

Roy, Nate (2014, April): The Exhausted Insurgency. *Small Wars Journal*, 4/2014. URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-exhausted-insurgency>

Rudner, Martin (2013): Al Qaeda's Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(12), 953-980. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.842136>

Sasso, Alessandra (2016, March): The Origins and Affiliations of Islamic Terrorism in Africa. In: Hedwig Giusto (Ed.): *Daesh and the Terrorist Threat: From the Middle East to Europe*. [e-Book]. Brussels; Rome: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS); Fondazione Italianeuropei, 42-51. URL: <http://www.feps-europe.eu/en/publications/details/376>

Sawyer, Reid; Foster, Michael (2008): The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618(1), 197-211. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317697>

Schillinger, Thomas (2016): Group Dynamics and Religious Terrorism. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 11(3), 334-348. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2016.1178016>

Schmid, Alex P. (2016, June): Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(3), 26-32. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/511>

Schuurman, Bart; Bakker, Edwin (2016): Reintegrating Jihadist Extremists: Evaluating a Dutch Initiative, 2013-2014. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 8(1), 66-85. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1100648>

Schuurman, Bart; Eijkman, Quirine (2015): Indicators of Terrorist Intent and Capability: Tools for Threat Assessment. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 8(3), 215-231. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1040426>

Shaikh, Mubin (Interviewee); Bonino, Stefano (Interviewer) (2016, April): In Conversation with Mubin Shaikh: From Salafi Jihadist to Undercover Agent inside the "Toronto 18" Terrorist Group. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(2), 61-72. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/502>

Shapiro, Jacob (2016, September): A Predictable Failure: The Political Economy of the Decline of the Islamic State. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(9), 28-32. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss91.pdf

- Shelley, Louise I. (2014): The Evolution of Organized Crime and Terrorism. In: *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 97-131.
- Shellman, Stephen M.; Levey, Brian P.; Young, Joseph K. (2013, May): Shifting Sands: Explaining and Predicting Phase Shifts by Dissident Organizations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(3), 319-336. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312474013> URL: http://fs2.american.edu/jyoung/www/documents/shellman_levey_young_jpr_2013.pdf
- Sinai, Joshua (2017, Summer): A Model for Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Disengagement from Terrorism. *The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International*, 23(2), 24-28. URL: https://issuu.com/fusteros/docs/iacsp_magazine_v23n2_issuu
- Siyeche, Mohammed Sinan (2016, November): "Islamic State": Sowing the Seeds of its own Destruction. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8(11), 25-28. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-November-2016.pdf>
- Skovgaard-Petersen, Jakob (2017, Winter): Heirs of Abu Bakr: On the Ideology and Conception of History in al-Qaeda and Islamic State. *Connections*, 16(1), 25-36. URL: <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.1.02>
- Speckhard, Anne; Shajkovci, Ardian; Yayla, Ahmet S. (2017, February): What to Expect Following a Military Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq? *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 8(1), 81-89. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1341>
- Speckhard, Anne; Yayla, Ahmet S. (2015, December): Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: Why they Joined, what they Saw, why they Quit. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(6), 95-118. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/475>
- Spencer, Alexander (2016): New versus Old Terrorism. In: Richard Jackson (Ed.): *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 124-133.
- Stankovic, Tatjana (2015): Microdisarmament and Compliance Costs: An Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(9), 691-709. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1049052>
- Steed, Brian L. (2016): The History and Operations of ISIS: Iraq to Syria to Iraq again. In: *ISIS: An Introduction and Guide to the Islamic State*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 21-34.
- Steinmüller, Karlheinz (2017): The World in 2040: Framework Conditions for New Kinds of Terrorism. In: Theodore J. Gordon et al. (Eds.): *Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning*. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 132). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 25-33. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-748-1-25>
- Stenersen, Anne (2016, September): Al-Qa'ida's Comeback in Afghanistan and its Implications. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(9), 21-27. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss91.pdf
- Stern, Jessica (2016, October): ISIL and the Goal of Organizational Survival. In: Hilary Matfess; Michael Miklaucic (Eds.): *Beyond Convergence: World without Order*. [e-Book]. Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations (CCO), 193-211. URL: <http://cco.ndu.edu/BCWWO>
- Stern, Jessica (2016, November): Radicalization to Extremism and Mobilization to Violence: What have we Learned and what can we Do about it? *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 668(1), 102-117. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716216673807>
- Stern, Jessica; Berger, J. M. (2015): The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In: *ISIS: The State of Terror*. New York: HarperCollins, 1-12.
- Stern, Jessica; Berger, J. M. (2015): The Rise of ISIS. In: *ISIS: The State of Terror*. New York: HarperCollins, 33-52.

- Stern, Jessica; Berger, J. M. (2015): The Coming Final Battle? In: *ISIS: The State of Terror*. New York: Harper-Collins, 219-232.
- Sude, Barbara (2015, September): Assessing Al-Qa`ida Central's Resilience. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(9), 9-12. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CTC-SENTINEL-8-918.pdf>
- Suttmoeller, Michael J.; Chermak, Steven M.; Freilich, Joshua D. (2016): Only the Bad Die Young: The Correlates of Organizational Death for Far-Right Extremist Groups. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(6), 477-499. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116269>
- Swain, Ashok; Jägerskog, Anders (2016): The Rise and Fall of the Arab Spring and the Rise of the ISIS. In: *Emerging Security Threats in the Middle East: The Impact of Climate Change and Globalization*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 16-26.
- Testerman, Matthew (2015): Removing the Crutch: External Support and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(7), 529-542. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1016312>
- Titus, Michael; Gray, David H. (2015, Summer): Suppressing the Growth of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: An Examination of the Resurgence of AQAP in Yemen and Policies the United States can Employ to Mitigate the Threat. *Global Security Studies*, 6(3), 19-28. URL: <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Titus%20AQAP%20-AG.pdf>
- Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg (2016, August): Destroying the Islamic State Hydra: Lessons Learned from the Fall of its Predecessor. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(8), 1-6. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss8.pdf
- Townshend, Charles (2016): Wave and Strain. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), 225-227. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112280>
- Unal, Mustafa Cosar (2016): Opening a Door for Return to Home: Impact and Effectiveness of Turkish Repentance Laws. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(2), 128-164. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1093889>
- van der Heide, Liesbeth; Huurman, Robbert (2016, Fall): Suburban Bliss or Disillusionment – Why Do Terrorists Quit? *Journal for Deradicalization*, 8, 1-24. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/64>
- Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick (2016, January): Paradigmatic Shifts in Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role of Unaffiliated Sympathizers in Islamic State's Social Media Strategy. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 7(1), 36-51. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1183>
- Veness, David, Sir (2017, February): Global Trends in Terrorism. *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, Special Issue: What the New Administration Needs to Know about Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 20-25. URL: <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GSSR-What-the-New-Administration-Needs-to-Know-About-Terrorism-and-Counterterrorism.pdf>
- Vidino, Lorenzo (2015, April): Sharia4: From Confrontational Activism to Militancy. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(2), 2-16. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/415>
- Votel, Joseph L. (2015, July): Understanding Terrorism Today and Tomorrow. *CTC Sentinel*, 8(7), 2-5. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/CTCSentinel-Vol8Iss72.pdf>
- Watkins, Andrew (2016, March): Losing Territory and Lashing Out: The Islamic State and International Terror. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(3), 14-18. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss3_b5.pdf
- Weeraratne, Suranjan (2017): Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(4), 610-634. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1005742>

- Weinberg, Leonard (2008, June): Two Neglected Areas of Terrorism Research: Careers after Terrorism and How Terrorists Innovate. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2(9), 11-18. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/49>
- Weisfuse, Ari R. (2016, March): The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(3), 24-27. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss3b7.pdf>
- Wheatley, Joseph; McCauley, Clark (2008): Losing your Audience: Desistance from Terrorism in Egypt after Luxor. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 1(3), 250-268. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467580902853051>
- Whiteside, Craig (2016, August): New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-2016). *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(4), 6-20. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/523>
- Whiteside, Craig (2017, June): A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba'athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 11(3), 2-18. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/605>
- Whiteside, Craig (2018): The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare. In: Paul B. Rich; Richard Burchill (Eds.): *Jihadist Insurgent Movements*. Abingdon: Routledge, 15-48.
- Wilson, Tim (2017, February): Back to the Future: The Historian and the Threat Horizon. *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, Special Issue: What the New Administration Needs to Know about Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 26-33. URL: <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GSSR-What-the-New-Administration-Needs-to-Know-About-Terrorism-and-Counterterrorism.pdf>
- Windisch, Steven et al. (2016-2017, Winter): Disengagement from Ideologically-Based and Violent Organizations: A Systematic Review of the Literature. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 9, 1-38. URL: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/72>
- Winter, Charlie; Clarke, Colin P. (2017, January 31): Is ISIS Breaking Apart? What its Media Operations Suggest. *Foreign Affairs*. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-01-31/isis-breaking-apart>
- Woldemariam, Michael (2016): Battlefield Outcomes and Rebel Cohesion: Lessons from the Eritrean Independence War. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(1), 135-156. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.886575>
- Young, Joseph K.; Dugan, Laura (2014, April): Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 8(2), 2-23. URL: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/334>
- Zafra-Davis, Pola (2015): A History of Terrorism: Ideology, Tactics and Organization. In: Caroline Kennedy-Pipe; Gordon Clubb; Simon Mabon (Eds.): *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 33-52.
- Zahedzadeh, Giti (2017): Containing Terrorism: A Dynamic Model. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 10(2), 48-59. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.2.1565>
- Zahedzadeh, Giti (2017, May): Designed to Fail: Modeling Terrorism's Losing Battle. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 8(2), 73-88. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1272>
- Zech, Steven T. (2016): Decapitation, Disruption, and Unintended Consequences in Counterterrorism: Lessons from Islamist Terror Networks in Spain. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 32(2), 177-191. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1160489>
- Zekulin, Michael (2016): Endgames: Improving our Understanding of Homegrown Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(1), 46-66. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1084161>

Zelin, Aaron Y. (2015, May): The Rise and Decline of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 18, 104-118. URL: https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1470/current_trends18.pdf

Zhou, Zunyou (2016, April): Rehabilitating Terrorists: The Chinese Approach. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 8(4), 10-15. URL: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CTTA-April-2016.pdf>

Zulaika, Joseba; Murua, Imanol (2017): How Terrorism Ends – and does not End: The Basque Case. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 10(2), 338-356. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2017.1282666>

Grey Literature

Ahmed, Mubarak; Comerford, Milo; El-Badawy, Emman (2016, April): *Milestones to Militancy: What the Lives of 100 Jihadis Tell us about a Global Movement*. (Centre on Religion & Geopolitics Report). URL: <http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/jihad/milestones-militancy>

al-'Ubaydi, Muhammad et al. (2014, December): *The Group that Calls itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state>

Ashour, Omar (2016, April): *Enigma of "Baqiya wa Tatamadad": The Islamic State Organization's Military Survival*. (Aljazeera Centre for Studies Report). URL: <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/04/enigma-baqiya-wa-tatamadad-islamic-state-organizations-military-survival-160419081219493.html>

Bencherif, Adib (2013, October): *Les théories des mouvements sociaux et la dialectique des niveaux: Un cadre d'analyse pour l'étude des évolutions d'Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique*. (TSAS Working Paper Series, No. 13-04). URL: http://tsas.ca/fr/tsas_library_entry/tsas-wp13-04-les-theories-des-mouvements-sociaux-et-la-dialectique-des-niveaux-un-cadre-danalyse-pour-letude-des-evolutions-dal-qaïda-au-maghreb-islamique

Berger, J. M. (2017, April): *Extremist Construction of Identity: How Escalating Demands for Legitimacy Shape and Define In-Group and Out-Group Dynamics*. (ICCT Research Paper). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.1.07>

Brachman, Jarret (2016, February): *The War within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda's Undoing*. (JSOU Report 16-3). URL: http://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=19828858

Cafarella, Jennifer (2017, July): *n.d.* Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing "The Persistent Threat: Al Qaeda's Evolution and Resilience", July 13, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20170713/106235/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-CafarellaJ-20170713.pdf>

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) (2016, January): *The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East: Highlights from the Workshop*. (World Watch: Expert Notes Series Publication No. 2016-01-01). URL: <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/wrldwtch/2016/20160129-en.pdf>

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) (2016, May): *Al-Qaeda, ISIL and their Offspring: Understanding the Reach and Expansion of Violent Islamist Extremism: Highlights from the Workshop*. (World Watch: Expert Notes Series Publication No. 2016-05-02). URL: <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/wrldwtch/2016/2016-05-02/20160502-en.php>

Carter Center, The (2017, January): *The Evolution of Daesh Recruitment Propaganda in Light of Territorial Loss*. (Research Brief). URL: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/counter-ing-isis/research-brief-deash-territorial-loss.pdf

Castillejo, Clare (2016, March): *The Role of Ex-Rebel Parties in Building Peace*. (NOREF Report). URL: <https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Global-trends/The-role-of-ex-rebel-parties-in-building-peace>

- Chin, Warren (2015): *NATO and the Future of International Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. (COE-DAT Report). URL: <http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/researches/02-FutureofInternationalTerrorism.pdf>
- Clarke, Colin P. (2017, July): *The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the Caliphate*. Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States, July 13, 2017. (RAND Testimonies, CT-480). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/CT480>
- Conway, Maura; Dillon, Joseph (2016): *Future Trends: Live-Streaming Terrorist Attacks?* (VOX-Pol Case Study). URL: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Live-streaming_FINAL.pdf
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (2016, March): *Comparing Estimates of Key Trends in the Uncertain Metrics of Terrorism*. (CSIS Report). URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/key-trends-uncertain-metrics-terrorism>
- Cordesman, Anthony H. (2017, June): *Trends in Extremist Violence and Terrorism in Europe through End-2016*. (CSIS Report). URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/trends-extremist-violence-and-terrorism-europe-through-end-2016>
- Derksen, Deedee (2014, March): *Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past*. (USIP Peace Brief 168). URL: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/03/reintegrating-armed-groups-afghanistan>
- Dodwell, Brian; Milton, Daniel; Rassler, Don (2016, December): *Then and Now: Comparing the Flow of Foreign Fighters to AQI and the Islamic State*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/then-and-now-comparing-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-aqi-and-the-islamic-state>
- Entenmann, Eva et al. (2015, December): *Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector*. (ICCT Policy Brief). URL: <http://icct.nl/publication/rehabilitation-for-foreign-fighters-relevance-challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-criminal-justice-sector>
- Farnham, Nicholas; Liem, Marieke (2017, March): *Can a Copycat Effect be Observed in Terrorist Suicide Attacks?* (ICCT Research Paper). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.1.04> URL: <https://icct.nl/publication/can-a-copycat-effect-be-observed-in-terrorist-suicide-attacks>
- Farrell, Theo; Semple, Michael (2017, January): *Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a Decade of War*. (RUSI Briefing Paper). URL: <https://rusi.org/publication/briefing-papers/ready-peace-afghan-taliban-after-decade-war>
- Fishman, Brian (2009, March): *Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al-Qa'ida in Iraq*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/dysfunction-and-decline-lessons-learned-from-inside-al-qaida-in-iraq>
- Frampton, Martyn (2010, November): *The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism*. (ICSR Policy Report). URL: <http://icsr.info/2010/11/return-of-the-militants-violent-dissident-republicanism>
- Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The (HCSS) (2017, February): *The Rise and Fall of ISIS: From Evitability to Inevitability*. (Part of HCSS Strategic Monitor 2016-2017). URL: <http://hcss.nl/report/rise-and-fall-isis>
- Hedayah (n.d.): *Mapping the Experiences of Formers to Streamline the Process of Engaging in CVE*. (Workshop Report). URL: <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-175201716843.pdf>
- Hegghammer, Thomas (2010, February): *The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia*. (CTC Occasional Paper Series). URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-failure-of-jihad-in-saudi-arabia>
- Herbolzheimer, Kristian (2015, December): *The Peace Process in Mindanao, the Philippines: Evolution and Lessons Learned*. (NOREF Report). URL: <https://noref.no/Publications/Regions/The-Philippines/The-peace-process-in-Mindanao-the-Philippines-evolution-and-lessons-learned>
- Hoffman, Bruce; Levitt, Matthew (2016, November): *Post "Caliphate": The Future of the Salafi-Jihadi Movement*. [Video]. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2720). URL: <http://www.wash->

ingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/post-caliphate-the-future-of-the-salafi-jihadi-movement

Holmer, Georgia; Shtuni, Adrian (2017, March): *Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative*. (USIP Special Report 402). URL: <https://www.usip.org/node/101566>

Ingram, Haroro J. (2016, June): *A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications*. (ICCT Research Paper). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.19165/2016.1.06>

Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2017, April): *The Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah*. (IPAC Report No. 36). URL: <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/59/The-Re-emergence-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah>

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2017, February): *Yemen's al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base*. (Middle East Report N°174). URL: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base>

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2017, July): *How the Islamic State Rose, Fell and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb*. (Middle East and North Africa Report N°178). URL: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/178-how-islamic-state-rose-fell-and-could-rise-again-maghreb>

International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)'s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group (JWMG) (2017, May): *Hamza bin Osama bin Laden – Leader of Al-Qaeda's New Generation?* (JWMG Insights). URL: <http://www.ict.org.il/Article/2001/hamza-bin-osama-bin-laden-leader-of-al-qaedas-new-generation>

Jenkins, Brian Michael (2016, September): *Fifteen Years after 9/11: A Preliminary Balance Sheet*. (RAND Testimonies, CT-458). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/CT458>

Jenkins, Brian Michael; Willis, Henry H.; Han, Bing (2016): *Do Significant Terrorist Attacks Increase the Risk of Further Attacks? Initial Observations from a Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Europe from 1970 to 2013*. (RAND Perspectives, PE-173-RC). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/PE173>

Johnson, Casey Garret (2016, November): *The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan*. (USIP Special Report 395). URL: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/11/rise-and-stall-islamic-state-afghanistan>

Johnson, Robert (2015): *Future Trends in Insurgency and Countering Strategies*. (COE-DAT Report). URL: <http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/researches/04-FutureTrends.pdf>

Johnston, Patrick B. et al. (2016): *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010*. (RAND Research Reports, RR-1192-DARPA). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1192>

Jones, Seth G. (2014): *A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and other Salafi Jihadists*. (RAND Research Reports, RR-637-OSD). URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html

Jones, Seth G. (2017, July): *Rebuilding the Base: How Al-Qaida could Resurge*. (RAND Testimonies, CT-479). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/CT479>

Jones, Seth G. et al. (2017, June): *The Evolving Terrorist Threat: Implications for Global Security*. [Video]. (RAND Conference Proceedings, CF-370). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7249/CF370>

Joscelyn, Thomas (2017, July): *The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the Caliphate*. Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States, July 13, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20170713/106224/HHRG-115-HM00-Wstate-JoscelynT-20170713.pdf>

Kaaman, Hugo (2017, February): *The History and Adaptability of the Islamic State Car Bomb*. ZAYTUNAR-JUWANI. URL: <https://zaytunarjuwani.wordpress.com/2017/02/14/the-history-and-adaptability-of-the-islamic-state-car-bomb>

- Lefas, Melissa; Nozawa, Junko (2016): *Rehabilitating Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders in Detention: Advancing a Juvenile Justice Approach*. (Global Center on Cooperative Security / ICCT Report). URL: <https://icct.nl/publication/rehabilitating-juvenile-violent-extremist-offenders-in-detention>
- Levitt, Matthew (Ed.) (2016, August): *The Rise of ISIL: Counterterrorism Lectures 2015*. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 148; Counterterrorism Lecture Series, Vol. 7). Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-rise-of-isil-counterterrorism-lectures-2015>
- Manning, Ruth; La Bau, Courtney (2015, August): "In and Out of Extremism": How Quilliam Helped 10 Former Far-Right and Islamists Change. (Quilliam Report). URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/RuthManning2/publication/282611461_In_and_Out_of_Extremism/links/5613ef6208ae4ce3cc635f19/In-and-Out-of-Extremism.pdf
- Masbah, Mohammed (2017, April): *Morocco's Salafi Ex-Jihadis: Co-optation, Engagement, and the Limits of Inclusion*. (Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief No. 108). URL: <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb108.html>
- Neumann, Peter R. (2015, September): *Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors*. (ICSR Report). URL: <http://icsr.info/2015/09/icsr-report-narratives-islamic-state-defectors>
- Pack, Jason; Smith, Rhiannon; Mezran, Karim (2017, June): *The Origins and Evolution of ISIS in Libya*. (Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Report). URL: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-origins-and-evolution-of-isis-in-libya>
- Perliger, Arie; Milton, Daniel (2016, November): *From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/from-cradle-to-grave-the-lifecycle-of-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-and-syria>
- Peterson, Nicole (2017, August): *Future of ISIS: What do Experts Think will Happen Next?* (NSI / ViTTa Analysis). URL: <http://nsiteam.com/future-of-isis-what-do-experts-think-will-happen-next>
- Rollins, John (Coordinator) (2011, May): *Osama bin Laden's Death: Implications and Considerations*. (CRS Report for Congress, R41809). URL: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41809.pdf>
- Rosiny, Stephan (2016, July): *Brutalisation as a Survival Strategy: How the "Islamic State" is Prolonging its Doomsday Battle*. (GIGA Working Papers, No. 288). URL: <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publication/brutalisation-as-a-survival-strategy-how-the-islamic-state-is-prolonging-its-doomsday>
- Shatz, Howard J.; Johnson, Erin-Elizabeth (2015): *The Islamic State we Knew: Insights before the Resurgence and their Implications*. (RAND Research Reports, RR-1267-OSD). URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1267.html
- Simcox, Robin (2017, July): *The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the Caliphate*. Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States, July 13, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20170713/106224/HHRG-115-HM00-Wstate-SimcoxR-20170713.pdf>
- Souleimanov, Emil Aslan (2017, February): *The North Caucasus Insurgency: Dead or Alive?* (SSI Monograph). URL: <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1345>
- Speckhard, Anne (2017, March): *Recovery, Rehabilitation & Reintegration of the "Lost" Children Living and Serving under the Islamic State*. (ICSVE Brief Reports). URL: <http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/recovery-rehabilitation-reintegration-of-the-lost-children-living-and-serving-under-the-islamic-state>
- Strømmen, Ester E. J. (2017): *Jihadi Brides or Female Foreign Fighters? Women in Da'esh – from Recruitment to Sentencing*. (PRIO GPS Policy Brief 01|2017). URL: <https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=10546>

Tarnaala, Elisa (2016, June): *Women in Armed Groups and Fighting Forces: Lessons Learned from Gender-Sensitive DDR Programmes*. (NOREF Report). URL: <https://noref.no/Publications/Regions/Colombia/Women-in-armed-groups-and-fighting-forces-lessons-learned-from-gender-sensitive-DDR-programmes>

Veldhuis, Tinka M. (2015, October): *Reintegrating Violent Extremist Offenders: Policy Questions and Lessons Learned*. (GW Program on Extremism Occasional Paper). URL: <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Veldhuis.pdf>

Warner, Jason; Matfess, Hilary (2017, August): *Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational and Demographic Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/report-exploding-stereotypes-the-unexpected-operational-and-demographic-characteristics-of-boko-harams-suicide-bombers>

Watts, Clint; Shapiro, Jacob; Brown, Vahid (2007, July): *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*. (CTC Report). URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-misadventures-in-the-horn-of-africa>

Zeiger, Sara (2014, December): *Disengagement and De-Radicalization*. (Hedayah CVE Research Brief 1). URL: <http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-23201693446.pdf>

Zimmerman, Katherine (2017, July): *Al Qaeda's Strengthening in the Shadows*. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing "The Persistent Threat: Al Qaeda's Evolution and Resilience", July 13, 2017. URL: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20170713/106235/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-ZimmermanK-20170713.pdf>

Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D. is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information ([ZPID](http://www.zpid.de)). Additionally, she serves as Information Resources Editor to 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research. She wrote her [*doctoral thesis*](#) on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de.

Resources

Academic Theses (Ph.D. and MA) on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Related Issues, written in English between 2013 and 2017

Compiled and selected by Ryan Scrivens

Abstract

This bibliography contains doctoral dissertations (Ph.D.) and Master's (MA) Theses on issues relating to terrorism and counter-terrorism. Titles were retrieved manually by browsing the Open Access Theses and Dissertations (OATD) database, using the search term 'terrorism'. More than 1,400 entries were evaluated, of which 152 were ultimately selected for this list. All theses are open source. However, readers should observe possible copyright restrictions. The title entries are 'clickable', allowing access to full texts.

Bibliographic entries are divided into the following sub-sections:

1. *Terrorism Actors, Groups, Incidents, and Campaigns*
2. *Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Tactics, and Operations*
3. *Counter-Terrorism Policy, Legislation, Law, and Prosecution*
4. *Terrorism and the Media, Representations, and Public Opinion*
5. *State Repression and Civil War*
6. *Terrorism and the Internet*
7. *Terrorism and Gender*

1. Terrorism Actors, Groups, Incidents, and Campaigns

Abrahams, John A. *Ideological Radicalization: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Why Youth in Major U.S. Metropolitan Areas are More Likely to Become Radicalized*. MA Thesis, March 2017, Naval Postgraduate School. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/52941>

Bartoszewicz, Monika Gabriela. *Controversies of Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2013, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/3676>

Bell, Devon M. *The Sovereign Citizen Movement: The Shifting Ideological Winds*. MA Thesis, March 2016, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/48519>

Brooke, Nicholas. *The Dogs that Didn't Bark: Political Violence and Nationalism in Scotland, Wales and England*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2016, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/8079>

Cirino, Christopher. *Symbiotic Relationships in the Terrorist Decision Making Process: The Organizational Perspective of Tactics and Strategies*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Johns Hopkins University. URL: <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37226>

Coar, Kristen Rose. *Islamist Radicalization in the United States and the Influence of Western Jihadist Ideologies*. MA Thesis, 2013, San Diego State University. URL: <http://sdsu-dspace.calstate.edu/handle/10211.10/4763>

- d'Arcano, Pietro. *Fostering Disengagement: Lessons from Italy and South-East Asia*. MA Thesis, December 2016, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/51466>
- Del Villar, Erika Mae Lorenzana. *Terror as a Social Movement Tactic: Applying the Multi-Institutional Politics Approach to the Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group*. MA Thesis, 2013, University of Connecticut. URL: http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/513
- Dijken, Lara van. *The Scottish National Liberation Army: Marzipan Gang or Real Terrorist Threat? A Case Study of the Scottish National Liberation Army and the Reasons Why they did not Become a Large Terrorist Movement During the Years 1979-1997*. MA Thesis, June 2016, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/41449>
- Driscoll, John. *Exploring the Dramatization in Dabiq: A Fantasy Theme Analysis*. MA Thesis, June 2017, Oregon State University. URL: <http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/handle/1957/61735>
- Faulkner, Gerard. *Dirty Bombs to Clean Water: Hezbollah's Political Transition From 1984 – 1992*. MA Thesis, November 2015, University of Saskatchewan. URL: <https://ecommons.usask.ca/handle/10388/ETD-2015-11-2443>
- Ferguson, Michael P. *Institutionalizing Extremism: Ideological Warfare at the Crossroads of Soviet Revolution Theory and Islamic Feudalism*. MA Thesis, Fall 2015, San Diego State University. URL: <http://sd-su-dspace.calstate.edu/handle/10211.3/163594>
- Fisher, Michael G. *A Study of The Rise and Threat of the Islamic State of Iraq And Syria*. MA Thesis, December 2015, Angelo State University. URL: <https://asu-ir.tdl.org/asu-ir/handle/2346.1/30504>
- Fisseha, Mehari. *The Nexus Between Religion and Terrorism: An Investigation into the Boko Haram Killing Activities in Nigeria*. MA Thesis, May 2016, Uppsala University. URL: <http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A933994&dsid=-9146>
- Fourman, Jeffrey F. *When Insurgents Go Terrorist: The Role of Foreign Support in the Adoption of Terrorism*. MA Thesis, April 2014, Wright State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1399546682
- Gemeah, Ibrahim. *Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: A Comparative Study of the Jihadi Narratives*. MA Thesis, 2016, University of Washington. URL: <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/36787>
- Grigoryan, Hripsime. *International Terrorist Organizations*. MA Thesis, August 2017, California State University, Northridge. URL: <http://scholarworks.csun.edu/handle/10211.3/195492>
- Huggins, Rachel. *The Path to Terrorism: A Matter of Timing*. MA Thesis, July 2013, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska. URL: <https://dspace2.creighton.edu/xmlui/handle/10504/43845>
- Karakaya, Suveyda. *Religion and Conflict: What Explains the Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence” and Islamist Party Moderation?* Ph.D. Thesis, August 2013, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2441
- Lakhani, Suraj. *Radicalisation as a Moral Career: A Qualitative Study of How People Become Terrorists in the United Kingdom*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2013, Cardiff University. URL: <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/59779>
- Lillah, Hamid S. *Religious Extremism in Pakistan*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44606>
- Marsden, Sarah V. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Outcomes of Violent Political Contestation*. Ph.D. Thesis, July 2013, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/3970>

- Millán Sánchez, Marco A. *Terrorism Outsourced: The FARC's Criminal Alliances*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44615>
- Mitchell, Kathryn E. *Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Correlation Between Group Identity and Becoming Transnational*. MA Thesis, May 2013, Ohio University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1366131538
- Morales, Kendrick Thomas. *Commitment and Radical Religious Sects: An Empirical Examination of the Roots of Terrorism*. MA Thesis, 2014, Miami University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1415986828
- Ori, Konye Obaji. *Conceptualizing Boko Haram: Victimhood Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism*. MA Thesis, July 2013, Indiana University. URL: <https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/4079>
- Pitts, Damien Evan. *New Destinations of Islamic Fundamental Terrorism: The Rise of Al Shabaab*. MA Thesis, August 2015, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/3499
- Regan, Alison. *A Spatial Analysis of Terrorist Kidnapping Incidents in Afghanistan*. MA Thesis, Spring 2016, George Mason University. URL: <http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/10495>
- Roy van Zuijdewijn, J.H. de. *Fearing the Western Muslim Foreign Fighter: The Connection Between Fighting the Defensive Jihad and Terrorist Activity in the West*. MA Thesis, January 2014, Utrecht University. URL: <http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/290146>
- Sigler, Daniel K. A. *The Human Drones of ISIS: How 21st Century Terrorism uses Remote Warfare*. MA Thesis, June 2017, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55658>
- Simpson, Matthew Aaron. *Reanchoring Terrorism Studies: An Application of Social Movement Theory to the Concept of Domestic Terrorism*. Ph.D. Thesis, August 2014, University of Utah. URL: <https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=196775>
- Thapa, Manoj. *A Rationale for the Outcomes of Insurgencies: A Comparison Case Study Between Insurgencies in Peru and Nepal*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44681>
- Turhal, Tugrul. *Organizational Structure of PKK and Non-PKK-Linked Turkish Drug Trafficking Organizations: The Influence of Social Bonds*. Ph.D. Thesis, Fall 2015, George Mason University. URL: <http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/10137>
- Watt, Fraser James. *An Examination of British ISIL Recruits*. MA Thesis, July 2017, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/52313>
- Wilkey, Nicholas John. *Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. Ph.D. Thesis, April 2014, University of Adelaide. URL: <https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/87865>
- Wilkinson, Benedict James. *The Narrative Delusion: Strategic Scripts and Violent Islamism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2013, King's College London. URL: [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-narrative-delusion\(6d1253a8-87a8-46c0-8a9d-eb847ddf778d\).html](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-narrative-delusion(6d1253a8-87a8-46c0-8a9d-eb847ddf778d).html)
- Yilmaz, Bulent. *The Effect of Belief in Becoming a Member of a Terrorist Organization and the Impact of that Belief on the Level of Violence Exerted by the Terrorist Organization Members in Turkey*. MA Thesis, August 2013, Kent State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1377000529

2. Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Tactics, and Operations

Ameche, Michael. *Understanding the Global Special Operations Network's Value to Counterterrorism: A Balanced Scorecard Approach*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38871>

Barba, Paulo E. Santa. *Breaking Terrorists' Will to Fight*. MA Thesis, June 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/42721>

Bennett, Jr., John A. *Combating Terrorism with Local Policing Through Crime Reduction: Using Real-Time, Situational Awareness within a Distributed Common Operating Picture to Combat all Crime and Terrorism*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32793>

Besana, Matteo. *Targeting Westphalian Sovereignty: The Use of Armed Drones in Non-Conflict Areas*. MA Thesis, 2017, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/51475>

Bolstad, Jeffrey S. *Enhancing the NFL's Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Is the League's Security Scheme Able to Effectively Thwart Terrorist Attacks?* MA Thesis, September 2016, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50493>

Chang, FuWei. *The Study of Counterterrorism Mechanisms in Taiwan*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38897>

Cruz, Victor F. *Utilizing Current Commercial-off-the-Shelf Facial-Recognition and Public Live Video Streaming to Enhance National Security*. MA Thesis, September 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/43898>

Decker, Eileen M. *The Enemies List: The Foreign Terrorist Organization List and its Role in Defining Terrorism*. MA Thesis, March 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/41367>

Dur-e-Aden, Aden. *To Drone or not to Drone: A Comparative Analysis of the Effectiveness of the US's Drone Policy of Targeted Killing in the Contexts of Pakistan and Yemen*. MA Thesis, November 2014, University of British Columbia. URL: <https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0167052>

Eren, Yunus. *The Impact of Land Border Security on Terrorism Financing: Turkey's Southeast Land Border and the PKK*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38924>

Fisher, Daren Geoffrey. *The Impact of Natural Disasters on Kurdish Terrorism in Turkey 1987-2011: The Importance of Adequate Government Responses to Natural Disasters*. MA Thesis, 2014, University of Maryland. URL: <http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/15266>

Gailan, Mohammed. *National Security Concerns and the Kurdistan Region in a New Middle East: From Rebellion to Statehood*. MA Thesis, 2017, Swedish Defence University. URL: <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1138564&dswid=-8856>

Goldberg, Alexander Steven. *The Complexity of Countering Terrorism: Micro, Mid, and Macro Examinations*. MA Thesis, May 2015, Johns Hopkins University. URL: <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/38124>

Kanmaz, Mehmet A. *Countering Terrorist Financing: A Case Study of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California.. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44591>

LaChette, Aleisha. *Islamic Authority and the Articulation of Jihad: Approaching Jihadist Authority Through*

the Islamist Magazine Inspire. MA Thesis, April 2015, Virginia Tech. URL: <https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/handle/10919/52946>

Larkin, Patrick J. *Kashmir—The Key to Peace in Afghanistan*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32853>

Lee, Douglas R. *Prison Radicalization in County Jails: Disrupting Terrorist Acts Through Information Sharing*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44604>

Lindstrom, Tedric R. *Using Automatic Identification System Technology to Improve Maritime Border Security*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44607>

McConaghy, Kieran. *Terrorism and the State: Intra-State Dynamics and the Response to Non-State Terrorism*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2015, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/6535>

Morgan, Samuel A. *Security vs. Liberty: How to Measure Privacy Costs in Domestic Surveillance Programs*. MA Thesis, March 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/41421>

Ozkan, Ozcan. *A Law Enforcement Perspective to Intelligence Failure in Mass Casualty Terrorist Attacks by Global Jihadist Movements: A Comparative Study of Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 and November 15-20, 2003*. Ph.D. Thesis, May 2013, Rutgers University, New Jersey. URL: <https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/40432>

Owens, Kimberly B. *Beyond Hate: Countering Violent Extremism from the White Power Movement*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38992>

Parker, Marc. *Cicero, Money and the Challenge of 'New Terrorism': Is Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) a Critical Inhibitor? Should the Emphasis on Finance Interventions Prevail?* Ph.D. Thesis, November 2013, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/4900>

Paton, Stacy. *Evil Done Vulnerability Assessment: Examining Terrorism Targets Through Situational Crime Prevention*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Florida Atlantic University. URL: <http://fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau%3A13088>

Patti, Alexandra C. *Technology and Big Data Meet the Risk of Terrorism in an Era of Predictive Policing and Blanket Surveillance*. MA Thesis, 2015, University of New Orleans. URL: <http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2014>

Post, Jonathan F. *Thickening the Global SOF Network*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38995>

Rafiq, Muhammad Ahsen. *Countering Terrorism Through Control of Pakistan's Information Environment*. MA Thesis, September 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/43983>

Ringo, Brett M. *Domestic Terrorism: Fighting the Local Threat with Local Enforcement*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32889>

Rusev, Nikolay R. *What Strategy Should Bulgaria Pursue to Track and Disrupt Terror Networks in the Balkans?* MA Thesis, March 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/41437>

Schumacher, Justin M. *The Less You Know: The Utility of Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Counter-Terrorism*.

MA Thesis, March 2015, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45253>

Schwarz, Elke. *The Biopolitical Condition: Re-Thinking the Ethics of Political Violence in Life-Politics*. Ph.D. Thesis, November 2013, London School of Economics and Political Science. URL: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/760>

Shah, Zahra. *Countering Radicalisation by Engaging Mosques and Imams: The UK's Case*. MA Thesis, January 2016, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/38036>

Sowers, Troy A. *Creating a Better End Game Strategy: Fully Exploiting the Capabilities of Multiple Disciplines*. MA Thesis, September 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/37722>

Tsukayama, John K. *By Any Means Necessary: An Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis Study of Post 9/11 American Abusive Violence in Iraq*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2014, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/4510>

Umar, Aminu Mohammed. *Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis*. MA Thesis, June 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/34755>

Wickers, William F., Jr. *A Comprehensive Fusion Liaison Officer Program: The Arizona Model*. MA Thesis, March 2015, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45272>

Wright, Christopher E. *Hidden Threats: Reframing the Debate on Domestic Intelligence in an Age of Counterterrorism*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38701>

Wright, Lynn M. *The Emerging Threat of Domestic Terrorism: A Systematic Review of Evolving Needs, Threats, and Opportunities*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44693>

3. Counter-Terrorism Policy, Legislation, Law, and Prosecution

Alkiviadou, Natalie. *Challenging Right-Wing Extremism in England and Wales and Greece: Tools Available in International, European and National Law*. Ph.D. Thesis, May 2017, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. URL: <http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/handle/1871/55235>

Cieplak, Mary Victoria. *Bioterrorism Policy Reform and Implementation in the United States: The Impact of the 2001 Anthrax Attacks*. MA Thesis, April 2013, University of Birmingham. URL: <http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/4315>

Dickerson, Andrew Robert. *Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and Egypt*. MA Thesis, 2017, Wright State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1504050835338162

Everly, Macklin Keith. *Multicultural Public Policy and Homegrown Terrorism in the European Union*. MA Thesis, August 2014, Wright State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1409088787

Finegan, Rory. *Targeted Killings in Northern Ireland: An Analysis of their Effectiveness and Implications for Counter-Terrorism Policies*. Ph.D. Thesis, January 2014, Dublin City University. URL: <http://doras.dcu.ie/19724>

- Gomez, David C. *Should Cops Be Spies? Evaluating the Collection and Sharing of National Security Intelligence by State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32825>
- Guilhem-Ducleon, Erwin. *How Did Obama's Foreign Policy Encourage the Rise of ISIS?* MA Thesis, 2017, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/52569>
- Guiora, Amos Neuser. *Tolerating Extremism: To What Extent Should Intolerance be Tolerated?* Ph.D. Thesis, October 2013, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/21977>
- Haenflein, Rebecca. *The Cubicle Warrior: Drones, Targeted Killings, and the Implications of Waging a "War on Terror" from a Distance Under International Law*. MA Thesis, Fall 2015, Uppsala University, Sweden. URL: <http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A862385&dswid=-5817>
- Herron, Rachel Clare. *A Critical Systems Explanation for the Racial Effect of US and UK Counter-Terror Stop, Search and Surveillance Powers*. Ph.D. Thesis, October 2013, Durham University. URL: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/8481>
- Hickman, Peter Lightner. *The Lore of the Laws of War: Textual Constructions of Archetypal Identities in the War on Terrorism*. Ph.D. Thesis, April 2014, Arizona State University. URL: <https://repository.asu.edu/items/24866>
- Hoyt, Melanie Raeann. *A Game of Drones: Comparing the U.S. Aerial Assassination Campaign in Yemen and Pakistan*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Angelo State University. URL: <https://asu-ir.tdl.org/asu-ir/handle/2346.1/30273>
- Hussain, Nazia Hussain. *Tracing Order in Seeming Chaos: Understanding the Informal and Violent Political Order of Karachi*. Ph.D. Thesis, Spring 2016, George Mason University. URL: <http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/10468>
- Ilbiz, Ethem. *The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Counter-Terrorism Policy Towards the Kurdistan Workers Party*. Ph.D. Thesis, June 2014, University of Nottingham. URL: <http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14280>
- James, Brian C. *China's Interests in Afghanistan: Current Projects and Future Prospects*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38955>
- Jennings, Elaine. *U.S. Proliferation Policy and the Campaign Against Transnational Terror: Linking the U.S. Non-Proliferation Regime to Homeland Security Efforts*. MA Thesis, December 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38956>
- Johanson, II., David R. *The Long and Winding Road: Post-9/11 Intelligence Reforms a Decade Later*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32841>
- Johnson, Kirk A. *The Longue Duree: Indonesia's Response to the Threat of Jihadist Terrorism 1998-2016*. MA Thesis, June 2016, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/49499>
- Kelly, Robert J. *Applying the Israeli Practice of Reconstruction Following a Terrorist Attack as a Model for Cities in the United States*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32844>
- Kiefer, Lisa. *Muslim NGOs in the Context of the United Kingdom's "War on Terror" - A Case Study on Four UK-Based Muslim NGOs and the Impact of Counter-Terrorism Legislation*. MA Thesis, 2015, Leiden University. URL: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/35142>

- Machold, Rhys A. *Tentative Securities: 26/11, Israel and the Politics of Mobility*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2015, Wilfrid Laurier University. URL: <http://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1776>
- McFillen, Brian. *Shadow Boxing: How the Risk of Government Intervention Shapes Terrorist Organizational Structures*. Ph.D. Thesis, October 2013, Indiana University. URL: <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/18124>
- McPherson, Jared L. *Indefinite Detention as a Democratic Counterterrorism Policy*. MA Thesis, 2014, Wright State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1416091531
- Nater, Anson. *Killing in the Name of ...?: Conscientious Objection in the Age of the "Global War on Terror"*. MA Thesis, 2016, Brock University. URL: <http://dr.library.brocku.ca/handle/10464/9807>
- Núñez-Mietz, Fernando Gabriel. *Lawyering Compliance with International Law: Legal Advisors and the Legalization of International Politics*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2013, Ohio State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1370528559
- Oliveira de Sousa, Carlos Henrique. *A Criminal Law Approach to Terrorism in Brazil*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44636>
- Parker, Tony C. *Stablishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32881>
- Perez, Janelle Sofia. *Fighting Terrorism with Foreign Aid: A Case for Continued U.S. Assistance in Latin America*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Johns Hopkins University. URL: <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/37232>
- Perez, Luis Ricardo. *Threat Perception, Non-State Actors, and U.S. Military Intervention After 9/11*. MA Thesis, 2016, Virginia Tech. URL: <https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/handle/10919/73306>
- Ricci, Dennis N. *U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: A Case Study Analysis of Presidential Decision Making*. Ph.D. Thesis, April 2014, University of Connecticut. URL: <http://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/364>
- Saadat, Muhammad K. *The Drone Dilemma: Investigating the Causes of Controversy Between the United States and Pakistan*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44660>
- Såma, Kader. *A New Era of Terror: An Investigation of Non-International Armed Conflict and the Islamic State's Transnational Crusade for World Domination*. MA Thesis, Fall 2015, Uppsala University, Sweden. URL: <http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A894283&dswid=7806>
- Sharp, Vincent H. *Faded Colors: From the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS)*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32899>
- Taskale, Ali Riza. *Neoliberal and Militarised Post-Politics: Four Social Regimes, Four Affects and Radical Politics Today*. Ph.D. Thesis, February 2013, University of Sheffield. URL: <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4111>
- Tng, Eng Hock. *Terrorism in the Maritime Domain*. MA Thesis, March 2013, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32910>
- Tumushabe, Alex Bwoma. *The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States: A Case Study of the Republic of Uganda*. MA Thesis, March 2015, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45264>
- Veldhuis, Tinka. *Captivated by Fear: An Evaluation of Terrorism Detention Policy*. Ph.D. Thesis, March

2015, University of Groningen. URL: [http://www.rug.nl/research/portal/en/publications/captivated-by-fear\(b3538ab9-231c-4d03-aca0-d684ad5a6337\).html](http://www.rug.nl/research/portal/en/publications/captivated-by-fear(b3538ab9-231c-4d03-aca0-d684ad5a6337).html)

4. Terrorism and the Media, Representations, and Public Opinion

Al-Ameri, Mamdoh Suleiman. *Media and USF Students' Perception of Terrorism*. MA Thesis, March 2013, University of South Florida. URL: <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4429>

Atmore, Lorna Y. *Fear Factors In: Political Rhetoric, Threat Inflation, and the Narrative of September 11*. MA Thesis, December 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44515>

Beicken, Julie Anne. *Terrorism, Television, and Torture: Post-9/11 Morality in Popular Culture*. Ph.D. Thesis, May 2015, University of Texas at Austin. URL: <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/31585>

Brown, Danielle K. *Traditional and Interactive Documentaries: An Exploration of Audience Response to September 11 Documentaries in Different Formats*. MA Thesis, August 2013, Baylor University. URL: <https://baylor-ir.tdl.org/baylor-ir/handle/2104/8813>

Bueno Roldan, Rocio. *Estimates of the Effects of Terrorism and the Financial Crisis on Attitudes toward Immigrants in Spain, 2000 to 2011*. MA Thesis, March 2016, University of Cincinnati. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1470757818

Dargay, Lauren Michelle. *Relationships Between Elite News Frames and Frames in User Comments: An Analysis of Terrorism Coverage and Follow-up Comments on the New York Times Online*. MA Thesis, July 2016, Kent State University. URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1469783314

Davenport, Cory. *The Effects of Media Framing on Threat Perception Following an Act of Terror*. Ph.D. Thesis, May 2013, Texas Tech University. URL: <https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/ttu-ir/handle/2346/50321>

Delahunty, Susan. *Portraits of Middle Eastern Gulf Female Students in Australian Universities*. Ph.D. Thesis, July 2013, Edith Cowan University. URL: <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/585>

El Masry, Yara. *Representations of Political Violence in Contemporary Middle Eastern Fiction*. Ph.D. Thesis, February 2016, University of Essex. URL: <http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16563>

Eugenis, Katherine. *Who Will Tell the Story? Terrorism's Relationship with the International News Media*. MA Thesis, May 2013, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. URL: <http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/1822>

Franzén, Stina. *A Matter of Relations: A Reception Study of Global Audiences' Interpretations of, and Interest in, the Norwegian Terrorist Attacks in 2011*. MA Thesis, May 2014, Stockholm University. URL: <http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A726264&dswid=-4431>

Hakvåg, Hedda. *Remembering Terror, Remobilizing Whiteness: Norwegian Discourses of Nationhood After July 22*. MA Thesis, July 2015, University of British Columbia. URL: <https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/col-lections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0166368>

Hatton, Arthur T., Sr. *Anti-Muslim Prejudice when Exposed to News About Terrorism: The Roles of Negative Affect and Psychological Inflexibility*. Ph.D. Thesis, June 2017, Georgia Southern University. URL: <http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/1607>

Heckel, Jenny. *Remembering Meriwether: White Carolinian Manipulation of the Memory of the Hamburg Massacre of 1876*. MA Thesis, December 2016, Clemson University. URL: http://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/2558

Johnston, Matthew Scott. *Whiteness and Civility: White Racial Attitudes in the Concho Valley, 1869-1930*. MA Thesis, August 2015, Angelo State University. URL: <https://asu-ir.tdl.org/asu-ir/handle/2346.1/30428>

Josten, Jonathon M. *Conjuring September 11, 2001: Midwest Narratives in the Time of Death*. MA Thesis, May 2015, Oregon State University. URL: <http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/handle/1957/56342>

Lagat, Ivan K. *Remembering the 1998 Nairobi Terror Attack: Cultural and Trauma Memory and the Reconciliation of a Nation*. Ph.D. Thesis, May 2014, University of East Anglia. URL: <https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/52066>

Maynard, Joshua. *Radicalization Discourse in the United States: Analysis of the July 15, 2015 U.S. House of Representative Hearing on the Rise of Radicalization*. MA Thesis, Fall 2015, George Mason University. URL: <http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/10257>

Merati, Simona E. *Russia's Islam: Discourse on Identity, Politics, and Security*. Ph.D. Thesis, March 2015, Florida International University. URL: <http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1840>

Parker, Robin A. *Discursive Construction of Post-9/11 American National Identity: United by "The Enemy"*. MA Thesis, Spring 2014, George Mason University. URL: <http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/9063>

Pilecki, Andrew. *Doing Unjust Things in a "Just" Society: The Moral Justification of Structural Violence*. Ph.D. Thesis, September 2015, University of California, Santa Cruz. URL: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8md1s1wz>

Reid, Jay William. *Discourses of Film Terrorism: Hollywood Representations of Arab Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 1991-2011*. MA Thesis, October 2013, University of Adelaide. URL: <https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/handle/2440/85040>

Stack, Morgan. *Sourcing and Framing the 'War on Terror'. A Study of Attribution in Elite Newspaper Coverage*. Ph.D. Thesis, June 2013, Dublin City University. URL: <http://doras.dcu.ie/18613>

Witte, Oliver R. *Inflammatory and Conciliatory Rhetoric in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Content Analysis of How Three Newspapers Covered Two Provocative Events*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2014, Southern Illinois University. URL: <http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/866>

5. State Repression and Civil War at Home

Alsubaie, Saad Ali. *The Impact of Regional Political Developments on the Evolution of Transnational Terrorism in Saudi Arabia*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2013, Kansas State University. URL: <http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/15169>

Becker, Stuart David. *Imperialism and the Emerging White State in the Early Colony of Virginia*. MA Thesis, May 2014, Texas A&M University. URL: <http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/handle/1969.1/152726>

Burke, Emily A. *Historical Roots of Terrorism and Challenges to Turkey's Territorial Sovereignty*. MA Thesis, September 2014, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/43883>

Illingworth, James. *Crescent City Radicals: Black Working People and the Civil War Era in New Orleans*. Ph.D. Thesis, March 2015, University of California, Santa Cruz. URL: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1g4548w5>

Kerridge, Bradley Townsend. *Terrorism, Civil War, One-Sided Violence and Global Burden of Disease*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2013, University of Maryland. URL: <https://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/14209>

Kirchner, Magdalena. *Why States Rebel. Understanding State Sponsorship of Terrorism*. Ph.D. Thesis, April

2014, Heidelberg University. URL: <http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/17170>

Pfannenstiel, Melia T. *Strongmen and State Authority: A State-in-Society Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Sanctuaries*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2015, Kansas State University. URL: <http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/20117>

6. Terrorism and the Internet

Mauslein, Jacob A. *Three Essays on International Cyber Threats: Target Nation Characteristics, International Rivalry, and Asymmetric Information Exchange*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2014, Kansas State University. URL: <http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/18147>

Reynolds, Teddy. *Pulling Back the Curtain: An Examination of the English Defence League and Their Use of Facebook*. Ph.D. Thesis, 2015, University of St Andrews. URL: <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/6927>

7. Terrorism and Gender

Brody, Kathryn. *Minority Report: The Danger of Women in Islamic Terrorism and in ISIS*. MA Thesis, August 2017, Brandeis University. URL: <http://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/34131>

Kasatkin, Jacqueline-Marie W.W. *Veiled "Bombshells": Women's Participation in Islamist Extremist Organizations*. MA Thesis, June 2017, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. URL: <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/55633>

Lyness, Claire Frances. *Governing Bodies: Gender and the Politics of Corporeal Weaponization*. Ph.D. Thesis, September 2015, University of California, Santa Cruz. URL: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3f36t38f>

Okowita, Samantha Louise. *Female Suicide Terrorism: An Analysis of Trends and Group Motivations Linked to the Increase in Female Participation as Suicide Bombers*. MA Thesis, May 2017, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4769

Rashid, Naaz. *Veiled Threats: Producing the Muslim Woman in Public and Policy Discourse in the UK*. Ph.D. Thesis, March 2013, London School of Economics and Political Science. URL: <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/762>

Svensson, Emelie. *Democratic Strength and Cowardly Barbarism?: A Discourse-Theoretic Study on the Gendering of Terrorism in the Swedish Political Discourse*. MA Thesis, Spring 2016, Swedish Defence University. URL: <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A948467&dswid=-5176>

Zempi, Eirini-Chrysovalantou. *Unveiling Islamophobia: The Victimisation of Veiled Muslim Women*. Ph.D. Thesis, April 2014, University of Leicester. URL: <https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/28962>

About the Compiler: Ryan Scrivens is Associate Theses Research Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism' and Coordinator of the Canadian Network of Ph.D. Theses Writers of the Terrorism Research Initiative. He is also a Visiting Researcher at the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence and a Research Associate at the International Cyber Crime Research Centre. Ryan recently completed a Ph.D. in Criminology at Simon Fraser University, and has since been awarded a Horizon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Concordia University, working with Project SOME-ONE to develop ways to build resilience against radicalization leading to violent extremism and hatred.

Resources

Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Compiled and Selected by Berto Jongman

The items included below became available online in August and September 2017.

They are categorised under twelve headings:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Counter-Terrorism – General
6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad
8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies (including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization, Counter-Narratives)
9. Intelligence
10. Cyber Operations
11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies
12. Also Worth Reading

N.B.: 'Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects' is a regular feature in 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.

1. Non-Religious Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns

L. Dearden. National Action: banned neo-Nazi terrorist group still active in UK after finding loophole. *The Independent*, September 8, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/nazi-group-uk-national-action-banned-still-operating-loophole-soldiers-arrested-terrorism-plot-a7937206.html>

M. Rueda. FARC deal leaves Colombians out to dry. *Deutsche Welle*, September 6, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/farc-deal-leaves-colombians-out-to-dry/a-40365723>

Colombia strikes cease-fire deal with ELN guerrilla group. *Deutsche Welle*, September 4, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/colombia-strikes-cease-fire-deal-with-eln-guerrilla-group/a-40358647>

D. Peled. How a British neo-Nazi group turned to terrorism and recruited her majesty's soldiers. *Haaretz*, September 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/1.810888>

M. McHugh. New IRA develops different kind of 'crude but very effective' pressure-plate bomb. *The Independent*, September 2, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/londonderry-derry-police-service-northern-ireland-explosives-a7925536.html>

J. Haltiwanger. Are the Antifa terrorists? Feds have reportedly classified their activities as 'domestic terrorist violence.' *Newsweek*, September 1, 2017. URL: http://www.newsweek.com/are-antifa-terrorists-658396?utm_campaign=NewsweekTwitter&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social

- W. Mirza. Homeland Security downplays threat of domestic terrorism. *Muckrock*, February 22, 2017. URL: https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/feb/22/homeland-security-downplays-threat-domestic-terrorism/?utm_content=buffer3bff6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
- Colombia's FARC keeps name as group goes straight. *Deutsche Welle*, September 1, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/colombias-farc-keeps-name-as-group-goes-straight/a-40320796>
- J.R. Schindler. How to avoid America's coming Years of Lead. *Observer*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://observer.com/2017/08/russia-america-charlottesville-far-left/amp/>
- D. Burke. Chechen MP is shot dead as he drove to work in attack which was caught in dashcam footage. *Mail Online*, August 29, 2017. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4832828/Chechen-MP-shot-dead-drove-work.html>
- DAPL developer alleges 'eco-terrorism,' sues activist groups for \$1 billion. *Sputnik*, August 25, 2017. URL: <https://sputniknews.com/us/201708251056768689-pipeline-developers-sue/>
- S. McKay. The terrorists of the left. *The American Spectator*, August 22, 2017. URL: <https://spectator.org/the-terrorists-of-the-left/>
- Man stabs military police guard with samurai sword outside Taiwan presidential office. *The Straits Times*, August 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/man-stabs-military-police-guard-with-samurai-sword-outside-taiwan-presidential-office>
- A. Alsema. Why are Colombia's former guerrillas and their families assassinated? *Colombia reports*, August 16, 2017. URL: <https://colombiareports.com/colombias-former-guerrillas-families-assassinated/>
- W. Uwajaren. Gunmen attack EFCC headquarters in Abuja. *Sahara Reporters*, August 16, 2017. URL: <http://saharareporters.com/2017/08/16/gunmen-attack-efcc-headquarters-abuja>
- C.P. Blair. Looking clearly at right-wing terrorism. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 9, 2014. URL: <http://thebulletin.org/looking-clearly-right-wing-terrorism7232>
- S. Guzman. Colombia struggles to fill power vacuum. *The Cipher Brief*, August 16, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/latin-america/colombia-struggles-fill-power-vacuum?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=67b3471fc8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-67b3471fc8-121177853
- M. Yagoub. Despite peace talks, Colombia's ELN guerillas continue expansion. *InSight Crime*, July 31, 2017. URL: <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/despite-peace-talks-colombia-eln-guerrillas-continue-expansion>
- J.M. Berger. What the next round of alt-right rallies will reveal. *The Atlantic*, August 14, 2017. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/the-alt-right-stands-at-a-crossroads/536748/>
- A dark and constant rage: 25 years of right-wing terrorism in the United States. *ADL*, 2017. URL: <https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-united-states>
- J. Wilson, E. Helmore, J. Swaine. Man charged with murder after car rams anti-far-right protesters in Charlottesville. *The Guardian*, August 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/12/virginia-unite-the-right-rally-protest-violence>
- J. Ospina-Valencia. Colombia's former FARC rebels face political challenges following peace agreement. *Deutsche Welle*, July 28, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/colombias-former-farc-rebels-face-political-challenges-following-peace-agreement/a-39880337>

2. Religious (mainly Jihadi) Terrorism: Actors, Groups, Incidents and Campaigns

C.P. Clarke. How ISIS is transforming. Why predictions of its demise are premature. *Foreign Affairs*, September 25, 2017. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-09-25/how-isis-transforming>

Anwar al-Awlaki's violent legacy. *Counter Extremism Project*, September 2017. URL: <https://www.counterextremism.com/content/anwar-al-awlakis-violent-legacy>

ISIL: target Russia – featured documentary. *Al Jazeera English*, YouTube, March 30, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3HDytlHGHpY>

F. Zahid. Jamaat ul Ansar al-Sharia: the new al-Qaeda threat in Pakistan. *TerrorismMonitor*, 15(8), September 22, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/jamaat-ul-ansar-al-sharia-the-new-al-qaeda-threat-in-pakistan/?mc_cid=66d87b7e71&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

M. Horton. Is the Hasam movement the future of militancy in Egypt? *TerrorismMonitor*, 15(8), September 22, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/is-the-hasam-movement-the-future-of-militancy-in-egypt/?mc_cid=66d87b7e71&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

S. Maher. Parsons Green, and why more attacks on the West by Islamic State are inevitable. *New Statesman*, September 22, 2017. URL: <https://www.newstatesman.com/2017/09/parsons-green-and-why-more-attacks-west-islamic-state-are-inevitable>

A. El-Menawy. How Qatar being forced to stop funding terrorism led to Hamas and Fatah reconciling. *The Independent*, September 21, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/qatar-saudi-arabia-anti-terror-quartet-terrorism-isis-al-qaeda-hamas-fatah-palestine-a7959661.html>

B. Lintner. The truth behind Myanmar's Rohingya insurgency. *Asian Times*, September 20, 2017. URL: <http://www.atimes.com/article/truth-behind-myanmars-rohingya-insurgency/>

C. McCue, J.T. Massengill, D. Milbrandt, J. Gaughan, M. Cumpston. The Islamic State long game: a tripartite analysis of youth radicalization and indoctrination. *The CTC Sentinel*, September 21, 2017. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-state-long-game-a-tripartite-analysis-of-youth-radicalization-and-indoctrination>

T. Joscelyn. Islamic State rescinds one of its most problematic religious rulings. *FDD's Long War Journal*, September 20, 2017. URL: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/islamic-state-rescinds-one-of-its-most-problematic-religious-rulings.php>

H. Beech. Rohingya militants vow to fight Myanmar despite disastrous cost. *The New York Times*, September 17, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-militants.html?smid=tw-share&mtrref=t.co&gwh=AB12A1DD19480B57BCBC6A99E6B1696E&gwt=pay>

J. Cafarella, J. Zhou. ISIS's expanding campaign in Europe. *Institute for the Study of War (ISW)*, September 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/isiss-expanding-campaign-europe>

J. Holland-McCowan, D. Porter. ICSR Insight: The Catalonia attacks in context. *ICSR*, September 15, 2017. URL: <http://mailchi.mp/icsr/icsr-insight-is-attacks-in-tehran-scenarios-and-implications-472367?e=7549c-997cc>

B. Seftel. Al Qaeda thrives across weak West African states. *The Cipher Brief*, September 14, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/africa/al-qaeda-thrives-across-weak-west-african-states?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=f73f566c23-TCB+September+14+2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-f73f566c23-121177853

E. Robinson, D. Egel, P. B. Johnston, S. Mann, A.D. Rothenberg, D. Stabbins. When the Islamic State comes to town. Santa Monica: RAND, RR-1970-RC, 2017, 260p. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1970.html

Terrorist incidents sharply drop down in Pakistan. *Bernama*, September 11, 2017. URL: <http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v8/wn/newsworld.php?id=1390161>

A. Pandey. Myanmar's Rohingya rebels – what you need to know. *Deutsche Welle*, September 10, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-rohinga-rebels-what-you-need-to-know/a-40437412>

Amnesty: Boko Haram resurgence kills 381 civilians since April. *The Jerusalem Post*, September 5, 2017. URL: <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Amnesty-Boko-Haram-resurgence-kills-381-civilians-since-April-504266>

H.J. Schindler. Trends in ISIL financing. June 23, 2017. *GLOBSEC 2017*. URL: <http://globsec.org/globsec2017/news/trends-in-isil-financing>

B. Hoffmann. A growing terrorist threat on another 9/11. *The Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 2017. URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-growing-terrorist-threat-on-another-9-11-1504888986>

A. Soufan. Hamza bin Ladin: from steadfast son to al-Qa'ida's leader in waiting. *CTC Sentinel*, September 7, 2017. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/hamza-bin-ladin-from-steadfast-son-to-al-qaidas-leader-in-waiting>

A. al-Dassouky. The role of jihadi movements in Syrian local governance. *OMRAN for Strategic Studies*, July 14, 2017. URL: <http://en.omrandirasat.org/publications/papers/the-role-of-jihadi-movements-in-syrian-local-governance.html> - .WW4EhZpV0pY.twitter

Taliban leader claims they control 'over half' of Afghanistan. *21st Century Wire*, September 2, 2017. URL: <http://21stcenturywire.com/2017/09/02/taliban-leader-claims-control-half-afghanistan/>

J. Mitchell: inside the minds of the Islamists terrorists – full interview. *American Enterprise Institute*, YouTube, January 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4Isiw2doiA>

L. Bindner, R. Gluck. Wilayat Internet: ISIS' resilience across the Internet and social media. *Bellingcat*, September, 2017. URL: <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/09/01/wilayat-internet-isis-resilience-across-internet-social-media/>

A. al-Tamimi. Review of: S. Staffell, A. Awan (Eds.) *Jihadism transformed: al-Qaeda and Islamic State's global battle of ideas*. Oxford University Press, 2018, 296 pp. *The Middle East Quarterly*, 24(4), Fall 2017. URL: <http://www.meforum.org/6902/jihadism-transformed-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state>

M. Hamblet. The Islamic State's virtual caliphate. *Jihad in the West*. *The Middle East Quarterly*, Fall, 2017. URL: <http://www.meforum.org/6894/the-islamic-state-virtual-caliphate>

Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) Weekend Summary. *MEMRI*, Special Announcement No. 561, August 26, 2017. URL: <https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad-and-terrorism-threat-monitor-jttm-week-end-summary-264>

C. Reuter. Islamic State's demise. A terror group in its death throes? *Spiegel Online*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-on-its-heels-in-syria-and-iraq-a-1165164.html>

S. Zeiger. What happens after Daesh? Lessons from Africa, the Americas, and the Arab world. *TRENDS*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://trendsinstitution.org/what-happens-after-daesh-lessons-from-africa-the-americas-and-the-arab-world/>

K. Lavinder. Boko Haram stalks region despite territory loss. *The Cipher Brief*, August 30, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/africa/boko-haram-stalks-region-despite-territory-loss>

C. Paton. Iran: Islamic Republic is again largest backer of Hamas against Israel, providing weapons and money for 'resistance.' *Newsweek*, August 29, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/iran-islamic-republic-largest-backer-hamas-against-israel-providing-weapons-656256>

A. Spada. Islamism in the Middle East: a sectarian conflict? *Islam Media Analysis*, August 29, 2017. URL:

<http://www.islamedianalysis.info/islamism-in-the-middle-east-a-sectarian-conflict/>

L. Vedino. The roots of the Barcelona attack. In Catalonia, salafist terror is no surprise. *Foreign Affairs*, August 25, 2017. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2017-08-25/roots-barcelona-attack?cid=int-lea&pgtype=hpg>

A. Ahmad. Jihad & Co. Black markets and Islamist power. Oxford University Press, 2017. URL: <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/jihad-and-co-9780190656775?cc=ca&lang=en&>

E. Trager. The Muslim Brotherhood's fatal mistake. The miscalculation that tore up the group in two. *Foreign Affairs*, August 21, 2017. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2017-08-21/muslim-brotherhoods-fatal-mistake>

G. Wood. True believers. How ISIS made jihad religious again. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2017. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-08-15/true-believers>

G. Wood. What we still don't know about the Islamic State's foreign fighters. *The Atlantic*, August 2017. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/isis-foreign-fighters/537279/>

ISIS's increasing online outreach in Spanish, threats to Spain, in report posted by MEMRI's Jihad and Terror Threat Monitor (JTTM) project in April 2017. *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch No. 7057, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://memri.org/reports/isis-steps-up-media-outreach-in-spanish>

M. Weinbaum. Jihad in India, Kashmir and Afghanistan: a boost to Pakistan? *The Cipher Brief*, August 17, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/jihad-india-kashmir-afghanistan-boost-pakistan>

P. Byrne. Anatomy of terror: what makes normal people become extremists? *New Scientist*, August 16, 2017. URL: <https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23531390-700-anatomy-of-terror-what-makes-normal-people-become-extremists/>

A. Roul. Al-Qaeda's quiet resurgence in India. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(16), August 15, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaedas-quiet-resurgence-in-india/?mc_cid=aa07f34e4b&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

A. Davis. Rohingya insurgency gains momentum in Myanmar. *Asia Times*, August 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.atimes.com/article/rohingya-insurgency-gains-momentum-myanmar/>

N. Horadam, J. Sorhaindo. Profile: Sheikh Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur). *Critical Threats*, November 14, 2011. URL: https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/profile-sheikh-mukhtar-robow-abu-mansur?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=ctpalshabaableadership

H. Janjua. Pakistani Taliban starts magazine for would-be female jihadists. *The Guardian*, August 8, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/08/pakistani-taliban-starts-magazine-for-would-be-female-jihadists>

Hassan Hassan. The story of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's rise to prominence and what it means for Syria. *The National*, July 26, 2017. URL: <https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-story-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-s-rise-to-prominence-and-what-it-means-for-syria-1.614506>

3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics

N. Murad. 'Female lovers of martyrdom: an example of jihadi feminists?' *The Jordan Times*, September 23, 2017. URL: <http://jordantimes.com/opinion/nermeen-murad/female-lovers-martyrdom-example-jihadi-feminists>

A. Stoddard, A. Harmer, M. Czwarno. Aid worker security report 2017. Behind the attacks: a look at the perpetrators of violence against aid workers. *Humanitarian Outcomes*, August 2017. URL: <https://aidworker-security.org/sites/default/files/AWSR2017.pdf>

Hassan Hassan. New document sheds light on the changing nature of ISIL's combat tactics. *The National*, September 20, 2017. URL: <https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/new-document-sheds-light-on-the-changing-nature-of-isil-s-combat-tactics-1.630289>

R. Revesz. Build your own bomb: how Amazon's algorithm helps suggest explosive recipes. *The Independent*, September 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/amazon-algorithm-bomb-making-components-mother-of-satan-channel-4-investigation-a7954461.html>

Hassan Hassan. ISIL's latest revelations about new tactics are cause for concern. *The National*, September 20, 2017. URL: <https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/isil-s-latest-revelations-about-new-tactics-are-cause-for-concern-1.630289>

J. Vittori. How anonymous shell companies finance insurgents, criminals, and dictators. *ETH Zürich*, September 18, 2017. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/cc9d6a76-aec2-442b-892e-92825a7dbdd1?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook

P. Paganini. Learning about ISIS intentions using Open Source Intelligence. *Security Affairs*, August 20, 2017. URL: <http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/62185/terrorism/isis-open-source-intelligence.html>

A. Plaw, E. Santoro. Reaping the whirlwind: drones flown by non-state actors now pose a lethal threat. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(7), September 11, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/reaping-the-whirlwind-drones-flown-by-non-state-actors-now-pose-a-lethal-threat/?mc_cid=d96c238465&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

J. Crowe. How tactics of terror groups have evolved since 9/11. *Terror News*, September 11, 2017. URL: <https://terror.news/2017/09/tactics-terror-groups-evolved-since-911/>

K. Lavinder. How the Internet enables 'Terror 3.0'. *The Cipher Brief*, September 8, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/north-america/internet-enables-terror-3-0?utm_content=buffer-5564b&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Y.J. Bob. Israeli experts point at new ISIS trend: poison in malls. *The Jerusalem Post*, September 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Islamic-States-new-tactic-poisons-504443>

IS holds 11,100 blank Syrian passports: report. *AFP*, September 10, 2017. URL: <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/09/10/holds-11100-blank-syrian-passports-report>

S. Sinhai. Terrorists planning chemical attacks on planes, warns MHA. *The Times of India*, September 10, 2017. URL: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/terrorists-planning-chemical-attacks-on-planes-warns-mha/articleshow/60444638.cms>

S. Cottee, M. Bloom. The myth of the ISIS female suicide bomber. *The Atlantic*, September 8, 2017. URL: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/isis-female-suicide-bomber/539172/?utm_source=twb

I. Barsade, M.C. Horowitz. Militant groups have drones. Now what? *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, September 7, 2017. URL: <http://thebulletin.org/militant-groups-have-drones-now-what11089?platform=hootsuite>

S. Malm. ISIS tells its fanatics to poison foods in Western supermarkets after testing the method on its prisoners in Iraq. *Mail Online*, September 6, 2017. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4858242/ISIS-tells-fanatics-poison-food-Western-supermarkets.html>

J. Moore. ISIS is increasingly trying to attract women fighters in Iraq and Syria. *Newsweek*, September 4, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/isis-increasingly-trying-attract-women-fighters-iraq-and-syria-659181>

P. Verhoeven. Blowing-up Sagrada Familia was Plan A. *Terror News*, August 19, 2017. URL: <http://terror.news/2017/08/blowing-sagrada-familia-plan/>

- D. Goure. ISIS' terrorist revolution: sophisticated drone operations: pose grave threat to American forces. *The National Interest*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/isis-terrorist-revolution-sophisticated-drone-operations-22125?page=2>
- Al-Qaida affiliate mining uranium for Iran in Somalia. *Newsmax*, August 31, 2017. URL: <https://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/al-qaida-affiliate-mining-uranium/2017/08/31/id/811016/>
- Armour in the Islamic State, the story of 'The Workshop'. *Oryx Blog*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://spioenkop.blogspot.nl/2017/08/armour-in-islamic-state-story-of.html?m=1>
- A. Speckhard. Bride of ISIS: the making of a monster – part 1. *The Daily Beast*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/bride-of-isis-the-making-of-a-monsterpart-i>
- Italy suspects the mafia and ISIS teamed up to smuggle oil to Europe. *OCCRP*, August 2, 2017. URL: <https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/6798-italy-suspects-the-mafia-and-isis-teamed-up-to-smuggle-oil-to-europe>
- A. Rota. From teddy bears to bombs: the IEDs of ISIS – in pictures. *The Guardian*, October 29, 2016. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2016/oct/29/ied-isis-islamic-state-iraqi-kurdistan-peshmerga?CMP=share_btn_fb
- P. Gurski. An era of near unstoppable terrorism? The Hague: *ICCT*, August 29, 2017. URL: <https://icct.nl/publication/an-era-of-near-unstoppable-terrorism/>
- T. Allard, A. Beo Da Costa. Indonesian militants planned 'dirty bomb' attack- sources. *Reuters*, August 25, 2017. URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-idUSKCN1B51FW?il=0>
- H. Kaaman. The evolution of suicide car bombs examined. *Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://aoav.org.uk/2017/evolution-suicide-car-bombs/>
- UN: Boko Haram use of kids as 'human bombs' soars in 2017. *Associated Press*, August 22, 2017. URL: <https://apnews.com/8ab141b808f7439a9a7a27e136c634ed>
- J. Burke. How can cities protect their citizens against vehicle attacks? *The Guardian*, August 18, 2017. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/18/how-cities-protect-citizens-vehicle-attacks?CMP=share_btn_fb
- A. Taub. As vehicle attacks rise, an ordinary object becomes an instrument of fear. *The New York Times*, August 17, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/europe/barcelona-van-terrorist-weapon-fear.html>
- Amphetamine-like drug fuelling Syrian war could go global: scientists. *Reuters*, August 17, 2017. URL: <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/amphetamine-drug-fuelling-syrian-war-could-go-global-scientists-2046890579>
- J. Moore. ISIS members fleeing Raqqa 'emaciated, malnourished and high on drugs,' US coalition says. *Newsweek*, August 17, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/isis-members-fleeing-raqqa-emaciated-malnourished-and-drugged-us-coalition-651785>
- A. Rachman. Chemical-bomb plot inspired by Islamic State: Indonesia police. *The Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 2017. URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chemical-terror-plot-inspired-by-islamic-state-indonesian-police-say-1502873154>
- J. Moore. ISIS torture methods revealed: sitting with severed heads, fuel dousing and the 'flying carpet.' *Newsweek*, August 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/torture-methods-isis-revealed-sitting-severed-heads-fuel-dousing-and-flying-650828>
- T. Joscelyn. AQAP publishes guide for derailing trains in the US, Europe. *FDD's Long War Journal*, August 13, 2017. URL: <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/08/aqap-publishes-guide-for-derailing-trains-in->

the-us-europe.php

4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism

G. Price. Antifa leader explains violent movement: Nazi's shouldn't feel safe in public. *Newsweek*, September 14, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/antifa-berkeley-shapiro-violence-664936>

B. Lee. CREST guide: understanding the far-right landscape. *CREST*, July 14, 2017. URL: <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/understanding-far-right-landscape/>

E. Chenoweth. Trends in nonviolent resistance and state response: Is violence towards civilian-based movements on the rise? *Global responsibility to protect*, 9(1), 2017, pp. 86-100. URL: <http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/1875984x-00901006> Summarized in Nonviolent resistance and government repression. *Peace Science Digest*, 2017. URL: [Nonviolent resistance and government repression. Peace Science Digest](http://www.peacescience.org/nonviolent-resistance-and-government-repression)

M. Bray. Antifa: the anti-fascist handbook. Melville House, 2017, 288pp. URL: <https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1612197035?ie=UTF8&tag=thewaspos09-20&camp=1789&linkCode=xm2&creativeASIN=1612197035>

A. Dimaggio. Responding to Antifa and Riseup: on revolutionary politics and non-violence. *Counterpunch*, September 1, 2017. URL: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/09/01/responding-to-antifa-and-rise-up-on-revolutionary-politics-and-non-violence/>

L. Dearden. Muslims in Bradford receive letters threatening acid attacks and to 'kill scum.' *The Independent*, August 29, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/muslim-bradford-letters-acid-attack-threats-kill-scum-police-hate-crime-investigation-yorkshire-a7918206.html>

J. Wilson. Ruby Ridge, 1992: the day the American militia movement was born. *The Guardian*, August 26, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/26/ruby-ridge-1992-modern-american-militia-charlottesville>

Hate groups are growing under Trump. *The Atlantic*, August 15, 2017. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/536793/hate-groups-are-growing-under-trump/>

M. Lamoreux. The integral role conspiracies play in far-right violence. *Vice*, August 22, 2017. URL: https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/zmmzjx/the-integral-role-conspiracies-play-in-far-right-violence

Antifa battle plan leaked! – These documents reveal exactly what they aim to do!. *Daily Herald News*, August 20, 2017. URL: <http://dailyherald.news/antifa-battle-plan-leaked-documents-reveal-exactly-aim/>

The defenders. 117 environmental defenders have been killed so far in 2017 while protecting their community's land or natural resources. *Global Witness*, July 31, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2017/jul/13/the-defenders-tracker>

T. Squirrell. Linguistic data analysis of 3 billion Reddit comments shows the alt-right is getting stronger. *Quartz*, August 18, 2017. URL: https://qz.com/1056319/what-is-the-alt-right-a-linguistic-data-analysis-of-3-billion-reddit-comments-shows-a-disparate-group-that-is-quickly-uniting/?mc_cid=e4d508de89&mc_eid=69270b0d33

D. Frosch, C. McWhirter, R. Kesling. The new right-wing extremism: unified, tech-savvy and emboldened. *The Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 2017. URL: https://www.wsj.com/articles/right-wing-extremists-appeared-declining-and-disconnected-until-charlottesville-1502901201?utm_content=buffer6d15f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

5. Counter-Terrorism – General

Double-edged sword: vigilantes in African counter-insurgencies. *International Crisis Group*, September 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/b4942ba2-212b-490b-b635-a8ab71a2c0d1>

J. Fallows. The new series on the Vietnam War, and the mysteries of historical resonance. *The Atlantic*, September 19, 2017. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2017/09/the-new-series-on-the-vietnam-war-and-the-mysteries-of-historical-resonance/540144/>

A. Shortland, T. Keatinge. Closing the gap: assessing responses to terrorist-related kidnap-for-ransom. *RUSI*, September 12, 2017. URL: <https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/closing-gap-assessing-responses-terrorist-related-kidnap-ransom>

D. Byman, S. Simon. Trump's surge in Afghanistan. *Foreign Affairs*, September 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2017-09-18/trumps-surge-afghanistan>

D. Fear. 'The Vietnam War': inside Ken Burns' 18-hour doc on the era-defining conflict. *Rollingstone*, September 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.rollingstone.com/tv/features/the-vietnam-war-inside-ken-burns-definitive-18-hour-documentary-w503401>

A. Sehmer. The drone special issue. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(7), September 11, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/terrorism-monitor-the-drone-special-issue/?mc_cid=d96c238465&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

M. Hilal. The war on terror has targeted Muslims almost exclusively. *Counterpunch*, September 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/09/13/the-war-on-terror-has-targeted-muslims-almost-exclusively/>

J. Berke. 'You can't drone your way out of a problem': David Petraeus shares 5 key lessons from 15 years of fighting terrorism. *Business Insider*, September 4, 2017. URL: <https://www.businessinsider.nl/david-petraeus-on-5-key-lessons-from-15-years-of-fighting-terrorism-in-afghanistan-2017-9/?international=true&r=US>

B. Seftel. The legacy of leadership decapitation after 9/11. *The Cipher Brief*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/legacy-leadership-decapitation-911>

M. Leiter. Resilient ISIS immune to killing of its top leaders. *The Cipher Brief*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/resilient-isis-immune-killing-top-leaders>

A. Cordesman. The cost of a half strategy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen. *CSIS*, September 12, 2017. URL: <https://medium.com/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies/afghanistan-iraq-somalia-and-yemen-once-again-is-half-a-strategy-better-than-none-164b6f959335>

T. Bacon. How al-Qaeda survived for 16 years after staging the 9/11 attacks. *Newsweek*, September 11, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-16-years-911-and-still-going-strong-662763>

S.J. Frantzman. What the Syrian regime's assault on ISIS means for the region. *The Jerusalem Post*, August 19, 2017. URL: <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/What-the-Syrian-regimes-assault-on-ISIS-means-for-the-region-502872>

D. Cavanaugh. The CIA's counterinsurgency in Vietnam was brutal...and effective. *War is Boring*, September 6, 2017. URL: <https://warisboring.com/the-cias-counterinsurgency-in-vietnam-was-brutal-and-effective/>

Combating al-Qaeda in Syria: a strategy for the next administration. *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, January 11, 2017. URL: <https://timep.org/special-reports/combating-al-qaeda-in-syria-a-strategy-for-the-next-administration/>

List of designated terrorist groups. *Wikipedia*, 2017. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_groups

M.J. Totten. America's longest war is hardly its worst. *World Affairs*, August 29, 2017. URL: <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/americas-longest-war-hardly-its-worst>

R. Fisk. How did anti-Assad protests turn to war in Syria? *Counterpunch*, September 1, 2017. URL: <https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/09/01/how-did-anti-assad-protests-turn-to-war-in-syria/>

J.L. Hazelton. The 'hearts and minds' fallacy: violence, coercion, and success in counterinsurgency warfare. *International Security*, 41(1), Summer 2017, pp. 80-113. URL: <http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/hearts-and-minds-fallacy-violence-coercion-and-success-counterinsurgency-warfare>

B. Heuser, E. Shamir. (Eds.) *Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. National styles and strategic cultures*. Cambridge University Press, 2017. Review by T. McDermott. *The Strategy Bridge*, August 28, 2017. URL: <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/8/28/the-ugly-rhymes-of-history-reviewing-insurgencies-and-counterinsurgencies>

6. Counter-Terrorist Strategies, Tactics and Operations

C. Gaffey. Nigeria is putting 1,600 Boko Haram suspects on trial in front of four judges. *Newsweek*, September 25, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-nigeria-military-isis-670589>

N. Hamid. Terrorism: the lessons of Barcelona. *The New York Review of Books*, September 19, 2017. URL: <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/09/19/terrorism-the-lessons-of-barcelona/>

US-led airstrikes kill 2,617 civilians in Syria. *Xinhua*, September 24, 2017. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/24/c_136634178.htm

M. Hahm. Terrorism experts: here's how tech companies should see the problem. *Yahoo Finance*, September 21, 2017. URL: https://finance.yahoo.com/news/terrorism-experts-heres-tech-companies-see-problem-205353132.html?utm_content=bufferc35bc&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

E. Schmitt. Pentagon tests lasers and nets to combat a vexing foe: ISIS drones. *The New York Times*, September 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/world/middleeast/isis-drones-pentagon-experiments.html?smid=tw-share&mtrref=t.co&gwh=D0FBBCFBDA6AF71CEFD996B93F80619&gwt=pay>

L. Dearden. ISIS winning online war against government's anti-terror efforts, new report warns. *The Independent*, September 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-winning-online-war-propaganda-extremist-material-radicalisation-report-facebook-twitter-social-a7954246.html>

J. Moore. Donald Trump plans to allow special forces, CIA to target low-level jihadis outside war zones. *Newsweek*, September 22, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/trump-will-allow-special-forces-cia-target-low-level-jihadis-outside-war-zones-669353>

SIGAR report puts Afghan security deficiencies in focus. *Al Jazeera*, September 22, 2017. URL: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/sigar-report-puts-afghan-security-deficiencies-focus-170922063148773.html>

After the killing and death of about 3,100 people of civilians and fighters, ISIS loses its main stronghold and capital in Syria. *SOHR*, September 21, 2017. URL: <http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=74659>

P. Cruickshank. A view from the CT foxhole: an interview with Brian Fishman, counterterrorism policy manager, Facebook. *CTC Sentinel*, September 21, 2017. URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-an-interview-with-brian-fishman-counterterrorism-policy-manager-facebook>

J. Burke. How to detect a potential terrorist? Heed warnings from people who know them. *The Guardian*, June 11, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/10/how-to-detect-potential-terrorist-heed-warnings-of-family-and-friends>

C. Winter, H.J. Ingram. Why ISIS is so good at branding its failures as successes. *The Atlantic*, September 19, 2017. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/isis-propaganda/540240/>

T. Holt, J.D. Freilich, S. Chermak. Taking down websites won't stop terrorists and hate groups – if anything, it will make them stronger. *The Independent*, September 19, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/terrorists-terrorism-online-hate-internet-web-organising-social-media-groups-a7955536.html>

M. Frampton, A. Fisher, N. Prucha. The new netwar: countering extremism online. *Policy Exchange*, September 19, 2017. URL: <https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/the-new-netwar-countering-extremism-online/>

Profiling the CB adversary: motivation, psychology and decision. START Research Brief, September 2017. URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ProfilingCBAdversaryMotivationPsychologyDecision_ResearchBrief_Sept2017.pdf

Syria Situation report: August 31 – September 14, 2017. URL: <http://iswresearch.blogspot.nl/2017/09/syria-situation-report-august-31.html>

A. Erickson. Is it possible to protect a public transport system from terror? *The Independent*, September 16, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/parsons-green-latest-possible-to-protect-public-transport-from-terror-a7949966.html>

F.C. Hof. The revolution in Syria against Assad has failed, for now. *Newsweek*, September 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/revolution-syria-against-assad-has-failed-now-666184>

M. Horton. Drone warfare in Yemen: a catalyst for the growth and evolution of AQAP. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(7), September 11, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/drone-warfare-in-yemen-a-catalyst-for-the-growth-and-evolution-of-aqap/?mc_cid=d96c238465&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

'Will the 9/11 case finally go to trial?': Andrew Cockburn on new evidence linking Saudis to attacks. *Democracy Now!* September 13, 2017. URL: https://www.democracynow.org/2017/9/13/will_the_9_11_case_finally

J. Moore. Trump White House believes it can strike ISIS and al-Qaeda 'anywhere, anytime.' *Newsweek*, September 13, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/trump-white-house-official-beats-back-rand-paul-new-law-not-needed-isis-qaeda-663972>

J. Beck. The ruins of Mosul have exposed the future of high-tech warfare. *WIRED*, September 8, 2017. URL: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/mosul-iraq-bomb-disposal-unit?utm_content=bufferb7bbc&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Airpower Summary. AFCENT (CAOC) *Public Affairs*, August 31, 2017. URL: [http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower summary/Airpower Summary - August 2017.pdf?ver=2017-09-07-104037-223](http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-%20August%202017.pdf?ver=2017-09-07-104037-223)

W. J. Hennigan. Vast new intelligence haul fuels next phase of fight against Islamic State. *Los Angeles Times*, September 8, 2017. URL: [http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-isis-intel-20170908-story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New Campaign&utm_term=*Situation Report](http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-isis-intel-20170908-story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*Situation%20Report)

R. Jalabi, U. Laessing. Iraq holding 1,400 foreign wives, children of suspected Islamic State fighters. *Reuters*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-families-exclusiv/exclusive-iraq-holding-1400-foreign-wives-children-of-suspected-islamic-state-fighters-idUSKCN1BL0SF>

R. Pape. Don't overestimate drone strikes' power to kill high value targets. *The Cipher Brief*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/dont-overestimate-drone-strikes-power-kill-high-value-targets>

M. Leiter. Resilient ISIS immune to killing of its top leaders. *The Cipher Brief*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/resilient-isis-immune-killing-top-leaders>

- B. Seftel. The legacy of leadership decapitation after 9/11. *The Cipher Brief*, September 10-, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/legacy-leadership-decapitation-911?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=045274c494-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_09_10&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-045274c494-121177853
- R. Wright. Sixteen years after 9/11, how does terrorism end? *The New Yorker*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-does-terrorism-end>
- H. Keinon. Shin Bet head says hundreds of attacks have been thwarted this year. *The Jerusalem Post*, September 10, 2017. URL: <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Shin-Bet-head-says-hundreds-of-attacks-have-been-thwarted-this-year-504698>
- Nigerian army launches 'Exercise Python Dance II, set for crackdown on violent agitators, kidnappers and others in South-East. *Sahara Reporters*, September 9, 2017. URL: <http://saharareporters.com/2017/09/09/nigerian-army-launches-exercise-python-dance-ii-set-crackdown-violent-agitators-1>
- R. Tingle. Did Russia use the 'father of all bombs' to kill senior ISIS commanders? Reports claim biggest ever non-nuclear bomb has been detonated near Syrian city of Deir ez Zour. *Mail Online*, September 8, 2017. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4868138/Did-Russia-use-Father-Bombs-ISIS-Syria.html>
- R. Fisk. The West might hardly believe it, but it now seems the Syrian war is ending – and Assad is the victor. *The Independent*, The September 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/syrian-war-ending-bashar-al-assad-won-robert-fisk-syria-middle-east-israel-british-troops-a7933966.html>
- UN: civilian death toll in Yemen exceeds 5,000. *Deutsche Welle*, September 5, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/un-civilian-death-toll-in-yemen-exceeds-5000/a-40365797>
- B. McKernan. Israeli air force jets kill two in rare targeting of Syrian chemical facility. *The Independent*, September 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-syria-jets-bomb-air-strike-masyaf-hama-lebanon-kill-damage-assad-regime-a7933571.html>
- Special committee to tackle deficiencies in the fight against terrorism. *News European Parliament*, July 6, 2017. URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170629IPR78658/special-committee-to-tackle-deficiencies-in-the-fight-against-terrorism>
- Detecting carriers of dirty bombs. *Homeland Security News Wire*, September 5, 2017. URL: <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20170905-detecting-carriers-of-dirty-bombs>
- K. Dozier. Has the US air war killed 685 civilians – or more than 5200? *The Daily Beast*, September 1, 2017. URL: http://www.thedailybeast.com/has-the-us-air-war-killed-685-civilians-or-more-than-5200?via=twitter_page
- L. Dearden. Terrorists' families should be jailed if they fail to alert authorities, says Government's top terror adviser. *The Independent*, September 1, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/terrorists-families-friends-should-be-jailed-failing-alert-authorities-police-max-hill-isis-legal-a7924941.html>
- R. Kemp, A. Ostrovsky. What Europe can learn from Israel in its war against vehicle attacks and lone wolf terror. *IB Times*, August 22, 2017. URL: <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/what-europe-can-learn-israel-its-war-against-vehicle-attacks-lone-wolf-terror-1635945>
- W. Hasrat-Nazimi. Did Afghan minerals change Trump's mind about Afghanistan? *Deutsche Welle*, August 29, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/did-afghan-minerals-change-trumps-mind-about-afghanistan/a-40281449>
- Iran in the post-ISIS era: aims, opportunities and challenges. *The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/iran-post-isis-era-aims-opportunities-challenges/>

P. Wintour. UK government unveils £200m in aid to help fight Boko Haram in Nigeria. *The Guardian*, August 30, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/30/uk-government-announces-200m-care-package-fight-famine-caused-by-boko-haram>

A. McAllister. After a decade of delays, why the rush for the GITMO terror trial? *Newsweek*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/after-decade-delays-why-rush-gitmo-terror-trial-657120>

Top Afghan officials allegedly speak with Taliban nearly everyday. *Dawn*, August 30, 2017. URL: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1354807>

Who was behind the jihadist attacks on Europe and North America? *BBC*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-40000952>

S. Malm. Hundreds of divorced couples are forced to remarry in Chechnya – allowing the husbands to have two wives – because hardline president believes it will stop terrorism. *Mail Online*, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4822854/Divorced-couples-forced-remarry-Chechnya.html>

648 detained, 282 arrested in 117 ISL operations in Istanbul over one year. *Hurriyet*, August 29, 2017. URL: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/648-detained-282-arrested-in-117-isil-operations-in-istanbul-over-one-year.aspx?pageID=238&nID=117311&NewsCatID=509&utm_content=bufferc74a5&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer#

J.M. Berger. Countering Islamic State messaging through ‘linkage-based’ analysis. The Hague, ICCT Policy Brief, August 2017. URL: <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ICCT-Berger-Countering-IS-Messaging-Aug-2017-1.pdf>

J. King. As a European security chief, I can tell you the EU’s plans to tackle terrorism. *The Independent*, August 24, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/terrorism-europe-security-european-commission-eu-plans-strategy-anti-terrorism-a7910136.html>

J. Goodson. Twelve big changes in Afghanistan strategy. *Realcleardefense.com*, August 24, 2017. URL: http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/24/12_big_changes_in_afghanistan_strategy_112140.html

Israel’s Mossad submits report detailing Iran ‘growing influence in Syria.’ *Asharq al-Awsat*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://english.aawsat.com/theaawsat/news-middle-east/israels-mossad-submits-report-detailing-irans-growing-influence-syria>

R. Mason. Britain sends £9m to Libya to fight terror threat and migrant crisis. *The Guardian*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/23/britain-sends-9m-aid-package-libya-fight-terror-threat-migrant-crisis-boris-johnson>

T. Porter. As Trump announces troop surge, here are six blunders the US has made in Afghanistan. *Newsweek*, August 22, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/trump-troop-surge-six-blunders-us-afghanistan-653370>

K. Hulbert. Pakistan and US don’t see same urgency in terror fight. *The Cipher Brief*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/pakistan-u-s-dont-see-urgency-terror-fight>

B. Seftel. US calls Pakistan on its double-game. *The Cipher Brief*, August 23, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/u-s-calls-pakistan-double-game?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=ee18d64616-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_23&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-ee18d64616-121177853

I. Hamidi. Washington monitors 10,000 Qaeda militants in Idlib. *Asharq al-Awsat*, August 22, 2017. URL: <https://english.aawsat.com/ibrahim-hamidi/news-middle-east/washington-monitors-10000-qaeda-militants-idlib>

R. Nordland. What an Afghan victory looks like under the Trump plan. *The Bulletin*, August 23, 2017. URL:

<http://www.bendbulletin.com/nation/5538531-151/what-an-afghan-victory-looks-like-under-the?referrer=-section>

E. Nakhleh. What happens in the Middle East doesn't stay in the Middle East. *The Cipher Brief*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/happens-middle-east-doesnt-stay-middle-east>

N. Fishwick. European intel bound closer by terror. *The Cipher Brief*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/european-intel-bound-closer-terror>

M. Weinger. Barcelona attack: ISIS plot or copycat contagion? *The Cipher Brief*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/barcelona-attack-isis-plot-copycat-contagion>

A. Jawad al-Tamimi. The Iranian land route to the Mediterranean: myth or reality? *The American Spectator*, August 22, 2017. URL: <https://spectator.org/the-medias-revisionist-history-of-nazis/>

N. Kelly. Full transcript: Donald Trump announces his Afghanistan policy. *The Atlantic*, August 21, 2017. URL: <https://flipboard.com/@flipboard/-full-transcript-donald-trump-announces-/f-fc14c9c5f2/theatlantic.com>

L. Dearden. Terror laws should be scrapped, says government's independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. *The Independent*, August 19, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/terror-laws-uk-offences-abolish-max-hill-interview-independent-reviewer-legislation-isis-attack-a7883836.html>

F. Reinares. Islamic extremism is a growing presence in Spain. *The Globe and Mail*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/islamic-extremism-is-a-growing-presence-in-spain/article36033363/?service=amp>

P. Zelikow. The domestic terrorism danger: focus on unauthorized private militia groups. *Lawfare*, August 15, 2017. URL: <http://lawfareblog.com/domestic-terrorism-danger-focus-unauthorized-private-military-groups>

B. Hoffman. Spain a fault line between Islam and the West. *The Cipher Brief*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/spain-fault-line-islam-west>

K. McVeigh. UK's £2m support for Egypt security projects branded 'deeply disturbing.' *The Guardian*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/aug/18/uk-2-million-pounds-aid-support-egypt-security-projects-deeply-disturbing>

J. Moore. ISIS-inspired jihadis planned chemical bomb attack on Indonesia's presidential palace. *Newsweek*, August 17, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/indonesia-foils-isis-inspired-chemical-bomb-plot-presidential-palace-651774>

A. Harel. Israel struck Syrian and Hezbollah arms convoys nearly 100 times in five years, top general says. *Haaretz*, August 17, 2017. URL: <http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.807246>

Z. Abuza. The Uighurs and China's regional counter-terrorism efforts. *Terrorism Monitor*, 15(16), August 15, 2017. URL: https://jamestown.org/program/the-uighurs-and-chinas-regional-counter-terrorism-efforts/?mc_cid=aa07f34e4b&mc_eid=9942bc67e0

A. Comrade Godwin. Army launches strike force to wipe out Boko Haram from north eastern Nigeria. *Daily Post*, August 16, 2017. URL: http://dailypost.ng/2017/08/16/army-launches-strike-force-wipe-boko-haram-north-eastern-nigeria/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

A.P. Santos. How two brothers took over a Filipino city for ISIS. *The Atlantic*, August 12, 2017. URL: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/philippines-isis/536253/?utm_source=twb

Kabul police chief unveils new comprehensive security plan for the capital. *Khaama Press*, August 14, 2017. URL: <http://www.khaama.com/kabul-police-chief-unveils-new-comprehensive-security-plan-for-the-capital-03357>

J. Holland-McCowan. ICSR Report: War of shadows – how Turkey’s conflict with the PKK shapes the Syrian civil war and Iraqi Kurdistan. *ICSR Report*, August 8, 2017. URL: <http://icsr.info/2017/08/icsr-report-war-shadows-turkeys-conflict-pkk-shapes-syrian-civil-war-iraqi-kurdistan/>

M. Reitman. How tech companies are fighting the digital war against ISIS. *RealClearLife*, August 8, 2017. URL: <http://www.realclearlife.com/technology/tech-companies-can-fight-online-radicalization-smarter/>

Criticism of government’s counter-terrorism strategy is based on ‘ignorance,’ senior Scotland Yard chief says. *Telegraph*, August 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/07/governments-counter-terrorism-strategy-toxicis-based-ignorance/>

7. State Repression and Civil War at Home and Clandestine & Open Warfare Abroad

UN official: Rohingya exodus ‘most urgent refugee emergency in the world.’ *CBS News*, September 24, 2017. URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rohingya-exodus-most-urgent-refugee-emergency-in-the-world-un-official/>

A. Kay. UN commission of inquiry on Burundi request ICC to open investigation into crimes against humanity. *International Law Bureau*, September 24, 2017. URL: <http://www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/un-commission-of-inquiry-on-burundi-requests-icc-to-open-investigation-into-crimes-against-humanity/>

E. Schmitt. Iran is smuggling increasingly potent weapons into Yemen, US admiral says. *The New York Times*, September 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-houthis-fifth-fleet-admiral.html?smid=tw-share&mtrref=t.co&gwh=EA5AFA279C9D1D400E05BB0B417B5A75&gwt=pay>

P. Butchard. Strategy not sacrilege: state terrorism as an element of foreign policy. *E-international relations students*. September 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/09/18/strategy-not-sacrilege-state-terrorism-as-an-element-of-foreign-policy/>

C. Mortimer. Rohingya crisis: UN to investigate reports of ethnic cleansing by Burmese military of the Muslim minority group. *The Independent*, September 19, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-crisis-latest-news-un-burma-ethnic-cleansing-military-muslim-minority-villages-bangladesh-a7954626.html>

S. Mednick. Forgotten people stranded for years by South Sudan’s war. *Associated Press*, September 19, 2017. URL: <https://apnews.com/cce20e37a49146349d0ae46ff91ff2f9/Forgotten-people-stranded-for-years-by-South-Sudan’s-war>

Burma: satellite imagery shows mass destruction. 214 villages almost totally destroyed in Rakhine state. *Human Rights Watch*, September 19, 2017. URL: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/19/burma-satellite-imagery-shows-mass-destruction>

R. Chamseddine. Nearly 2,000 dead in Myanmar amid military-led ethnic cleansing of Rohingya. *Mintpress-news.com*, September 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.mintpressnews.com/2000-dead-myanmar-military-led-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya/232085/>

J. Kurlantzick. Genocide in Myanmar: this is no time to help their military. *Newsweek*, September 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/genocide-myanmar-no-time-help-their-military-663537>

S. Lotto Persio. Why Myanmar hates the Rohingya. *Newsweek*, September 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/why-myanmar-hates-rohingya-665883>

L. Woocher, S. Skjodt. Missed opportunities for prevention? A study of US policy and atrocities in Syria in since 2011. United States Memorial Holocaust Museum, August 2017. URL: <http://images.nymag.com/images/2/daily/2017/08/Woocher-summary.pdf>

S. Khan. Rohingya Muslim crisis: Burma's security forces using scorched earth tactics to drive out minority, new evidence finds. *The Independent*, September 14, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-muslim-burma-myanmar-latest-ethnic-cleansing-claims-scorched-earth-tactics-a7947476.html>

E. Lederer. UN chief calls for end to 'ethnic cleansing' of Rohingya Muslims as Security Council condemns violence. *The Independent*, September 14, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-ethnic-cleansing-genocide-latest-aung-san-su-kyi-refugees-burma-myanmar-un-bangladesh-a7945806.html>

E.M. Lederer. Rights groups say UN council ignores Rohingya 'cleansing' *Associated Press*, September 12, 2017. URL: <http://www.startribune.com/rights-groups-say-un-council-ignores-rohingya-cleansing/444054333/>

K. McVeigh. Egypt's security forces are enforcing 'torture assembly line.' *The Guardian*, September 6, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/06/egypt-security-forces-enforcing-torture-assembly-human-rights-watch-al-sisi>

367 enforced disappearances in Egypt within a year. *Middle East Monitor*, August 31, 2017. URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170831-378-enforced-disappearances-in-egypt-within-a-year/>

J. Moore. 75,000 people have disappeared under Syrian regime, same number that the Nagasaki atomic bomb killed. *Newsweek*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/syrian-government-has-disappeared-many-people-nagasaki-atomic-bomb-killed-657409>

N. Cutcher. Syria's 'disappeared' are murdered on an industrial scale. The UN must step in. *The Guardian*, August 30, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/30/syria-disappeared-murdered-industrial-scale-un-must-step-in>

Qatar's support for terrorism and extremism. *TRENDS*, July 27, 2017. URL: <http://trendsinstitution.org/qatars-support-for-terrorism-and-extremism/>

US, Israel 'masterminding' weapons supplies to 'terrorists' in Syria. *Middle East Monitor*, August 30, 2017. URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170830-us-israel-masterminding-weapons-supplies-to-terrorists-in-syria/>

B. McKernan. Inside Assad's prisons: horrors facing female inmates in Syrian jails revealed. *The Independent*, August 28, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/assad-prisons-women-syria-female-inmate-treatment-conditions-exclusive-life-jails-a7899776.html>

350 diplomatic flights carry weapons for terrorists. Azerbaijan's Silk Way Airlines transports weapons with diplomatic clearance for Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Congo. *Trud*, 2017. URL: <https://trud.bg/350-diplomatic-flights-carry-weapons-for-terrorists/>

Summary of the report of the UN Secretary-General: Implementing the responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention. Global Centre for the responsibility to Protect, August 2017. URL: <http://www.global-r2p.org/media/files/2017-summary-of-the-secretary-generals-report-on-r2p.pdf>

G. Evans, N.K. Seymoar. The responsibility to protect: re-energizing the key players. Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, March 22-24, 2017. The Simons Foundation Canada, SFU Centre for Dialogue. URL: [http://thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/Report of the Simons Forum on the Responsibility to Protect-Re-Energizing the Key Players_0.pdf](http://thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Simons%20Forum%20on%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect-Re-Energizing%20the%20Key%20Players_0.pdf)

'War crimes': ICC issues arrest warrant for Libyan commander. *Deutsche Welle*, August 15, 2017. URL: [http://www.dw.com/en/war-crimes-icc-issues-arrest-warrant-for-libyan-commander/a-40106727?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB 08/16/2017&utm_term=Editorial - Early Bird Brief](http://www.dw.com/en/war-crimes-icc-issues-arrest-warrant-for-libyan-commander/a-40106727?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2008%2F16%2F2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief)

8. Prevention and Preparedness Studies

(including Countering Violent Extremism, De-Radicalization)

Morocco to rehabilitate 'repentant' Islamists. *Middle East Monitor*, September 22, 2017. URL: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170922-morocco-to-rehabilitate-repentant-islamists/>

M. Grossman, P. Thomas, What are the barriers to reporting people suspected of violent extremism? *Radicalisation Research*, September 20, 2017. URL: <http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/barriers-reporting-extremism/>

E. Graham-Harrison. Attackers united by youth and driven by a search for meaning. *The Guardian*, September 16, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/16/terror-attackers-united-by-youth-and-search-for-meaning>

Talking terror: Andrew Silke. Weekly podcast by the Terrorism & Extremism Research Centre (TERC), UEL, September 2017. URL: <https://soundcloud.com/user-366747443/andrew-silke>

D. Muro (Ed.) Resilient cities. Countering violent extremism at local level. *Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB)*, September 2017 URL: https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/resilient_cities_countering_violent_extremism_at_local_level_-_Wb3UFJRmWyU.facebook

K. Brown, D. Koehler, N. Patel. Lost for words: questioning the relationship between trauma and radicalization. *Dart Center for Journalism & Trauma*, September 15, 2017. URL: <https://dartcenter.org/resources/lost-words-questioning-relationship-between-trauma-and-radicalisation>

S. Marsden, K. Knott, J. Lewis. Countering violent extremism: an introduction. *CREST*, August 29, 2017. URL: <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/countering-violent-extremism/>

M.B. Short, S.G. McCalla, M.R. D'Orsogna. Modelling radicalization: how small violent fringe sects develop into large indoctrinated societies. *Royal Society Open Science*, September 13, 2017. URL: <http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royopensci/4/8/170678.full.pdf>

Profiles of individual radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). *START*, September 2017. URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_ResearchBrief_Sept2017.pdf

K.J. Harris, E. Gringart, D. Drake. Leaving ideological groups behind: a model of disengagement. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, March 17, 2017. URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19434472.2017.1299782?utm_campaign=buffer&src=recsys&utm_medium=social&utm_content=buffercd4&utm_source=facebook.com&journalCode=rirt20

M. Kowalski (Ed.) Special issue: Jihadists in Syria and Iraq: recalibrating concepts, threat radar, and reintegration policies. *Security and Global Affairs*, Leiden University, September 2017. URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/governance-and-global-affairs/isga/isga-journal_special_issue-4.pdf?t=1&cn=ZmxleGlibGVfcml8y&refsrc=email&iid=c6beb85a93db4e9da8005f7b97dcc0b4&uid=209492244&nid=244+276893704

P. Gurski. The difference between mental illness and radicalization. *Resiliencepost.com*, September 7, 2017. URL: <https://resiliencepost.com/2017/09/06/the-difference-between-mental-illness-and-radicalisation/>

K.M. Sarma. Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism. *American Psychologist*, 72(3), 2017, pp. 278-288. URL: https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-amp0000121.pdf?mc_cid=e03da1be66&mc_eid=9189550ca5

E. Leonard Boyle, J.G. Horgan, M.B. Altier, N.D. Shortland. Why they leave: an analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts. *Security Studies*, 25(2), 2017, pp. 305-332. URL: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280307>

Security Union: Commission accelerates measures to prevent radicalization and the cyber threat. *European Commission – Press release*, June 29, 2017. URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1789_en.htm

Exploring the transferability and applicability of gang evaluation methodologies to counter violent radicalization. *IMPACT, Europe*, 2017. URL: <http://impacteurope.eu/portfolio/exploring-the-transferability-and-applicability-of-gang-evaluation-methodologies-to-counter-violent-radicalisation/>

Community policing to counter violent extremism: a process evaluation in Los Angeles. Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security. *START*, July 2017. URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_CommunityPolicingtoCounterViolentExtremism_July2017.pdf

S. Fillion. What we can learn from France's failed deradicalization. *La Stampa*, September 2, 2017. URL: <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/09/02/esteri/lastampa-in-english/what-we-can-learn-from-frances-failed-deradicalization-center-s126MYkCYw329OcwUd1UcJ/pagina.html>

M. McFaul talks with M. Crenshaw about terrorism and the role of radicalization. *World Class, Stanford, SoundCloud*, September 2, 2017. URL: https://soundcloud.com/fsistanford/terrorism-and-the-role-of-radicalization-on-world-class-with-michael-mcfaul?utm_source=soundcloud&utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=twitter

C. Dickey. Why terrorist recruits share these three motivations. *The Daily Beast*, August 28, 2017. URL: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/why-terrorist-recruits-share-these-three-motivations?source=twitter&via=desktop>

L. van der Heide, J. Geenen. Children of the caliphate: young IS returnees and the reintegration challenge. *The Hague, ICCT*, 8(10), August 28, 2017. URL: <https://icct.nl/publication/children-of-the-caliphate-young-is-returnees-and-the-reintegration-challenge/>

G. Selim, D. Gartenstein-Ross. Save the terrorism prevention toolkit. *War on the Rocks*. August 28, 2017. URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/save-the-terrorism-prevention-toolkit/>

Nafees Hamid. What makes a terrorist? *The New York Review of Books*, August 23, 2017. URL: <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/08/23/what-makes-a-terrorist/>

F. Manjoo. A hunt for ways to combat online radicalization. *The New York Times*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/technology/a-hunt-for-ways-to-disrupt-the-work-of-online-radicalization.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=76F89397779704848CFB8B8CB2398D7D&gwt=pay>

N.F. Johnson, M. Zheng, Y. Vobobyeva, A. Gabriel, H. Qi., N. Velasquez, P. Manrique e.a. New online ecology of adversarial aggregates: ISIS and beyond. *Science Magazine*, 352(6292), June 17, 2017. URL: <http://science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6292/1459.full>

C. Cao, M. Zheng, Y. Vorobyeva, C. Song, N.F. Johnson. Dynamic patterns in individual trajectories toward extremism. *Physics & Society*, June 6, 2017. URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.01594>

Imam Qari Asim. This is why young European Muslims are joining ISIS. *The Independent*, August 20, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/barcelona-spain-terrorism-young-european-muslims-joining-isis-a7903026.html>

S. Atran. Extremism is surging. To beat it, we need young hearts and minds. *The Guardian*, August 20, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/20/extremism-is-surging-to-beat-it-we-need-young-hearts-and-minds>

Best practices in preparing for and responding to domestic terrorism & mass casualty incidents. *START*, November 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.start.umd.edu/events/best-practices-preparing-and-responding-domestic-terrorism-mass-casualty-incidents>

Turning point. A new comprehensive strategy for Countering Violent Extremism. *CSIS*, November 14, 2016.

URL: <https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point>

Community-led Action in Response to Violent Extremism (CARVE) online training course enrolls more than 700 in first four months. *START*, August 9, 2017. URL: <http://www.start.umd.edu/news/carve-online-training-course-enrolls-more-700-first-four-months>

France's only de-radicalization center is closing. *The Local*, July 28, 2017. URL: <https://www.thelocal.fr/20170728/frances-only-deradicalization-centre-is-closing>

9. Intelligence

J. Menn. Distrustful allies force spy agency to back down in encryption fight. *Reuters*, September 21, 2017. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-standards-insight/distrustful-u-s-allies-force-spy-agency-to-back-down-in-encryption-fight-idUSKCN1BW0GV>

Spy files Russia. *Wikileaks*, September 19, 2017. URL: <https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/russia/>

N. Turse. How the NSA built a secret surveillance network for Ethiopia. *The Intercept*, September 13, 2017. URL: <https://theintercept.com/2017/09/13/nsa-ethiopia-surveillance-human-rights/>

H. Roonemaa. These cigarette smugglers are on the frontlines of Russia's spy wars. *BuzzFeed*, September 13, 2017. URL: https://www.buzzfeed.com/holgerroonemaa/these-cigarette-smugglers-are-on-the-frontlines-of-russias?utm_term=.bv2Yxo8W-.ro6WOA3V

E. Anderson. Commissioner calls for European intelligence system. *Politico*, September 4, 2017. URL: <http://www.politico.eu/article/commissioner-dimitris-avramopoulos-calls-for-european-intelligence-system/>

A. McCoy. Growing up with Big Brother. A historian tracks half a century of evolving state surveillance. *The Nation*, August 24, 2017. URL: <https://www.thenation.com/article/growing-up-with-big-brother/>

G. Corrado. The future of technologies. Machine intelligence at Google. *Brain Bar*, Budapest, YouTube, August 15, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3j6tyJ4DPQk>

M. Bazzell. Open source intelligence techniques. Resources for searching and analyzing online information (3rd Ed.), *Create Space Independent Publishing Platform*, 2017, 418pp. URL: <https://www.tobem.com/cyber-war/open-source-intelligence-techniques-resources-for-searching-and-analyzing-online-information/>

10. Cyber Operations

B. D. Williams. Report goes in-depth on power grid cyber vulnerabilities and why they won't be fixed soon. *Fifth Domain*, July 25, 2017. URL: https://www.fifthdomain.com/critical-infrastructure/2017/07/24/report-goes-in-depth-on-power-grid-cyber-vulnerabilities-and-why-they-wont-be-fixed-soon/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily Brief 7.28.17&utm_term=Editorial - Daily Brief

A. Hern. Major cyber-attack will happen soon, warns UK's security boss. *The Guardian*, September 22, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/22/major-cyber-attack-happen-soon-warns-uks-online-security-boss>

A. Greenberg. New group of Iranian hackers linked to destructive malware. *WIRED*, September 20, 2017. URL: <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/group-iranian-hackers-linked-destructive-140000691.html>

M. Knigge. EU-US Privacy Shield: 'America First must not mean America only.' *Deutsche Welle*, September 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/eu-us-privacy-shield-america-first-must-not-mean-america-only/a-40570389>

No nuclear weapon is safe from cyber attacks. *WIRED*, September 28, 2017. URL: <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/no-nuclear-weapon-is-safe-from-cyberattacks>

G.J. Voeltz. Rise of iWar. Identity, information, and individualization of modern warfare. *Skyhorse Publishing*, 2018, 186pp. URL: <https://www.tobem.com/cyberwar/rise-of-iwar-identity-information-and-the-individualization-of-modern-warfare/>

A. Klimburg. Darkening web. The war for cyberspace. Prentice Hall Press, 2017. URL: <http://www.tobem.com/cyberwar/the-darkening-web/>

J. Robertson, A. Diab, E. Marin, E. Nunes, V. Paliath, J. Skakarjan, P. Shakarian. Darkweb cyber threat intelligence mining. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 217pp. URL: <http://www.tobem.com/cyberwar/dark-web-cyber-threat-intelligence-mining/>

M. Armstrong. A strategic perspective on 'information warfare' & 'counter-propaganda'. *Mountainrunner.us*, March 20, 2017. URL: https://mountainrunner.us/2017/03/etc_hearing/

J. Dettmer. How to wage an information war. VOA, September 18, 2017. URL: https://www.voanews.com/a/how-to-wage-an-information-war/4033287.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

P. Paganini. UK government is hiring cyber experts for Dark Web investigations. *Security Affairs*, September 5, 2017. URL: <http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/62728/deep-web/uk-government-dark-web.html>

J. Seldin. Trump administration looking to 'real world' measures against cyber enemies. VOA, September 6, 2017. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-administration-real-world-measures-cyber-enemies/4017810.html>

J. Zittrain. 'Netwar': the unwelcome militarization of the Internet has arrived. *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 73(5), 2017, URL: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1362907>

EU chief calls for pan-European cyber agency. *Fifth Domain*, September 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2017/09/13/eu-chief-calls-for-pan-european-cyber-agency/>

Swiss state blocks cyber attack, but another hits contractor. *Fifth Domain*, September 15, 2017. URL: <https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2017/09/15/swiss-state-blocks-cyberattack-but-another-hits-contractor/>

K. von Hammerstein, R. Höfner, M. Rosenbach. Right-wing activists take aim at German election. *Spiegel Online*, September 13, 2017. URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/trolls-in-germany-right-wing-extremists-stir-internet-hate-a-1166778.html-ref=nl-international>

J. Rutenberg. RT, Sputnik and Russia's new theory of war. How the Kremlin built the most powerful information weapons of the 21st century – and why it may be impossible to stop. *New York Times Magazine*, September 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theory-of-war.html?smid=fb-share>

McAfee Labs Threat Report: June 2017. URL: <https://www.mcafee.com/uk/security-awareness/articles/mcafee-labs-threats-report-jun-2017.aspx>

2017 Data Breach Investigations Report. *Verizon*, 2017. URL: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2017_Report_en_xg.pdf

A. Soldatov. The Kremlin's VPN ban has KGB roots (Op-ed). The Kremlin's ban on VPN's is less about national security than self-preservation. *The Moscow Times*, August 1, 2017. URL: <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/ban-on-vpn-has-kgb-roots-58546>

Z. Alemar. Cyber campaign takes aim at ISIS recruiting. *The Cipher Brief*, September 5, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/cyber-campaign-takes-aim-isis-recruiting>

E. Lawson. Merged offline and online offensives hit ISIS. *The Cipher Brief*, September 5, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/merged-offline-online-offensives-hit-isis>

L. Maxey. US takes fight to ISIS on cyber battlefield. *The Cipher Brief*, September 5, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/u-s-takes-fight-isis-cyber-battlefield>

J. Couch. Is public sector cyber security adequate? *Dark reading*, September 7, 2017. URL: https://www.darkreading.com/application-security/is-public-sector-cybersecurity-adequate/a/d-id/1329797?pid=ms-gid=329318-msg_329318

Newly declassified documents show that CIA worked closely with owners and journalists with many of the largest media outlets. *Zero Hedge*, February 28, 2017. URL: <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-02-28/newly-declassified-documents-show-senior-cia-agent-and-deputy-director-directorate-i>

A. Greenberg. Hackers gain 'switch-flipping' access to US power grid control systems. *WIRED*, September 6, 2017. URL: https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-us-power-systems?m-bid=social_fb

D. Goodin. Hackers lie in wait after penetrating US and Europe power grid networks. *Ars Technica*, September 6, 2017. URL: <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/09/hackers-lie-in-wait-after-penetrating-us-and-europe-power-grid-networks/>

B. Toucas. Exploring the information – laundering ecosystem: the Russian case. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, August 31, 2017. URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/exploring-information-laundering-ecosystem-russian-case>

G. Wilford. Millions of Instagram users may have been affected by latest hack attack, social media giant warns. *The Independent*, September 2, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/instagram-cyber-attack-hack-celebrities-selena-gomez-justine-bieber-millions-ordinary-social-media-a7926211.html>

Pentagon wants to search 80% of world's IP addresses for viruses – DARPA docs. *RT*, September 2, 2017. URL: <https://www.rt.com/usa/401789-pentagon-ip-addresses-virus-darpa/>

Catching the hackers in the act. *BBC*, September 2, 2017. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40850174>

D. Bisson. Spyware deployed in state-sponsored attacks against India and Pakistan. *Graham Cluley*, August 29, 2017. URL: <https://www.grahamcluley.com/spyware-deployed-state-sponsored-attacks-india-pakistan/>

D. Westneat. UW professor: the information war is real, and we're losing it. *The Seattle Times*, March 30, 2017. URL: <http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/uw-professor-the-information-war-is-real-and-were-losing-it/>

Malware basics. Public awareness and prevention. *EUROPOL*, 2017. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/public-awareness-and-prevention-guides/malware-basics>

J.A. Lewis. The truth about a cyber Pearl Harbor. *CNN*, August 29, 2017. URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/29/opinions/truth-about-cyber-pearl-harbor-lewis/index.html>

L. Maxey. Homeland Security Council urges action before 'cyber 9/11' strikes. *The Cipher Brief*, August 27, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/homeland-security-council-urges-action-cyber-911-strikes?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=dfd10cba23-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_27&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-dfd10cba23-121177853

J. Cox. This is how to trick dark-web criminals into unmasking themselves. *The Daily Beast*, August 25, 2017. URL: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/this-is-how-cops-trick-dark-web-drug-dealers-into-unmasking-themselves>

J. Dunietz. Is the power grid getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks? Rising computerization opens doors to increasingly aggressive adversaries, but defenses are better than many think. *Scientific American*, August 23,

2017. URL: <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-the-power-grid-getting-more-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks/>

O. Bowcott. Dispute along cold war lines led to collapse of UN cyberwarfare talks. *The Guardian*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/23/un-cyberwarfare-negotiations-collapsed-in-june-it-emerges>

Trump elevates US Cyber Command to independent status. *RT*, August 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.rt.com/usa/400141-trump-cybercom-elevate-cocom/>

DIVSI-Studie zur Digitalisierung und Sicherheit. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, August 18, 2017. URL: https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2017/DIVSI-Studie_zur_Digitalisierung_und_Sicherheit_18082017.html

Bundeslagebild Cybercrime 2016 veröffentlicht. *Bundeskriminalamt*, August 17, 2017. URL: https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/Kurzmeldungen/170817_BundeslagebildCybercrime2016.html

J. Lewis. The devil was in the details: the failure of UN efforts in cyberspace. *The Cipher Brief*, August 6, 2017. URL: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/devil-was-details-failure-un-efforts-cyberspace-1092?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=beec94f164-EMAIL_CAM-PAIGN_2017_08_06&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-beec94f164-121177853

F. Ciluffo. Trust between criminals is the Darknet's real currency. *The Cipher Brief*, August 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/trust-criminals-darknets-real-currency>

R. Wainwright. How to raise the risk for criminals on the Darknet. *The Cipher Brief*, August 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/raise-risk-criminals-darknet>

C. Paton. ISIS 'outsources' terror attacks to the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan: UN report. *Newsweek*, August 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/down-its-luck-syria-and-iraq-isis-outsources-terror-attacks-pakistani-taliban-650926>

T. Porter. Anonymous declares 'Operation domestic terrorism' against the alt-right in new video. *Newsweek*, August 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/anonymous-declares-war-alt-right-new-video-650980>

11. Risk & Threat Assessments, Forecasts, Analytical Studies

A. Gabon. How the EU conceals far-right acts of terrorism against Muslims. *Middle East Eye*, September 1, 2017. URL: <http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/how-eu-conceals-far-right-acts-terrorism-against-muslims-298795357>

Sangwon Yoon. New tech startup predict the future by decoding the past. *Technocracy News*, September 10, 2017. URL: <https://www.technocracy.news/index.php/2016/04/06/new-tech-startup-predicts-future-decoding-past/>

P. Bergen. Sixteen years after 9/11: the state of the terrorist threat. *CNN*, September 10, 2017. URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/09/opinions/terrorism-16-years-after-9-11-opinion-bergen/index.html>

J. Moore. The new era: how terrorism has changed since the 9/11 attacks. *Newsweek*, September 11, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/new-era-how-terrorism-has-changed-911-attacks-661716>

Sixteen years after 9/11. *TSG IntelBrief*, September 11, 2017. URL: <http://thesoufancenter.org/httpthesoufan-center-orgtsc-intelbrief-sixteen-years-after-9-11/>

J. Crowe. Severe terror attack threat level in the UK for at least five years. *Terror News*, September 5, 2017. URL: <https://terror.news/2017/09/severe-terror-attack-threat-level-uk-least-five-years/>

US not vulnerable to terrorists: Trump's security adviser. *The Nation*, September 10, 2017. URL: <http://nation.>

com.pk/international/10-Sep-2017/us-not-vulnerable-to-terrorists-trump-s-security-adviser

D. Gartenstein-Ross. Terrorists are using drones now. And that's not the worst of it. *Fortune*, September 9, 2017. URL: <http://fortune.com/2017/09/09/september-11-terrorism-drones-technology/>

C. Coughlin. ISIS leader 'planning fresh wave of attacks' in revenge for defeats in Iraq and Syria, leading Iraqi official says. *Telegraph*, September 7, 2017. URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/07/isis-leader-planning-fresh-wave-attacks-revenge-defeats-iraq/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_tw

S. Schmalbruch. The 20 most dangerous countries in the world for tourists. *Business Insider*, June 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.businessinsider.com/dangerous-countries-2017-5?international=true&r=US&IR=T/-20-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1>

J. Meyer. FBI, Homeland Security warn of more 'Antifa' attacks. Confidential documents call the anarchists that seek to counter white supremacists 'domestic terrorists.' *Politico*, September 1, 2017. URL: <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/01/antifa-charlottesville-violence-fbi-242235>

J. Bartlett. The next wave of extremists will be green. Militant environmentalism is coming. And we aren't ready for it. *Foreign Policy*, September 1, 2017. URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/01/the-green-radicals-are-coming-environmental-extremism/>

List of terrorist incidents. *Wikipedia*, 2017. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents

J. Crowe. How bloody has 2017 been so far? *Terror News*, August 23, 2017. URL: <http://terror.news/2017/08/bloody-2017-far/>

G. Elia Valori. Jihadist terrorism in Italy: exhortations and prophecies – analysis. *Eurasiareview*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/31082017-jihadist-terrorism-in-italy-exhortations-and-prophecies-analysis/>

T.R. McCabe. Are returning jihadists a major threat? *The Middle East Quarterly*, 24(4), Fall 2017. URL: <http://www.meforum.org/6895/are-returning-jihadists-a-major-threat>

T. Worden. Britain is home to up to 35,000 Islamic fanatics of whom 3,000 are 'worrying' for MI5 says Europe's top anti-terror official. *Mail Online*, August 31, 2017. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4840604/Britain-home-35-000-Islamic-fanatics.html>

Myanmar. Atrocity Alert #69, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://createsend.com/t/j-C2E59E-0B50ABA0162540EF23F30FEDED>

A. Hall. Al-Qaeda plotting to attack European rail network and derail trains. *Express*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/847701/Al-Qaeda-attack-terror-threat-trains-derail-rail-network-Germany>

Atrocity Alert (DR Congo, Kenya, Iraq) No.67, August 16, 2017. URL: <http://createsend.com/t/j-F3D0D562B-0B91AF6>

N. Wolchover. A physicist who models ISIS and the Alt-right. *Quanta Magazine*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.quantamagazine.org/a-physicist-who-models-isis-and-the-alt-right-20170823/>

Overview: terrorism in 2016. *START Background Report*, August 2017. URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_OverviewTerrorism2016_August2017.pdf

A. Nowrasteh. Terrorism deaths by ideology: is Charlottesville an anomaly? *CATO at Liberty*, August 14, 2017. URL: https://www.cato.org/blog/terrorism-deaths-ideology-charlottesville-anomaly?utm_content=bufferb4e81&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

J. Rivinius. Terrorist attack deaths increase in Iraq, the West, despite decrease worldwide. *START*, August 14,

2017. URL: <http://www.start.umd.edu/news/terrorist-attack-deaths-increase-iraq-west-despite-decrease-worldwide>

UK terror threat increased by IS losses, security minister says. *BBC*, August 19, 2017. URL: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/uk-40985532>

A. Robertson. EUROPOL chief warns British tourists they face highest threat in Europe for a generation – but there won't be refunds for holidaymakers who want to cancel or come home. *Mail Online*, August 18, 2017. URL: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4802538/Foreign-Office-warns-terror-attacks-likely.html>

Young, angry, homegrown: most terror attacks in West carried out by 'violent millennials' without IS-links. *The New Arab*, June 30, 2017. URL: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/6/30/most-terror-attacks-in-west-committed-by-violent-millennials?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles

A.H. Cordesman. Terrorism and hate crimes: dealing with all of the threats from extremism. *Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)*, July 5, 2017. URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/terrorism-and-hate-crimes-dealing-all-threats-extremism>

J. Moore. Global deaths caused by militant attacks fall 20 percent in 2017, new report says. *Newsweek*, August 16, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/global-deaths-caused-militant-attacks-fall-20-percent-2017-new-report-says-651376>

Police chief says IS planning Merdeka attack in Perak. *Free Malaysia Today*, August 15, 2017. URL: <http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/08/15/police-chief-says-is-planning-merdeka-attack-in-perak/>

Twentieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. *UN Security Council*, S/2017/573, August 7, 2017. URL: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/573

Bundeslagebild Organisierte Kriminalität 2016. *Bundeskriminalamt*, August 2017. URL: <https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/organisierteKriminalitaetBundeslagebild2016.html>

R. Dugulin. After Mosul: the terrorist threat in Europe. *Global Risk Insights*, July 25, 2017. URL: http://global-riskinsights.com/2017/07/mosul-terrorist-threat-europe/?utm_content=buffer2eb92&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

12. Also Worth Reading

Religious conflicts on the rise in Africa. *Deutsche Welle*, September 23, 2017. URL: <http://www.dw.com/en/religious-conflicts-on-the-rise-in-africa/a-40645771>

SIPRI Yearbook 2017. Armaments, disarmament and international security. Summary. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/yb17-summary-eng.pdf>

New methods to assess risk of conflict and violence. Predicting changes in the Global Peace Index. *Institute for Economics & Peace*, 2017, 35p. URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/09/Risk-Report_Web_Final.pdf?utm_content=buffer3d4fd&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

M.G. Marshall, G. Elzinga-Marshall. Global report 2017. Conflict, governance, and state fragility. *Center for Systemic Peace*, 2017. URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2017.pdf>

R2P Monitor, #35, September 15, 2017. URL: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p_monitor_sept2017

[final.pdf](#)

S. Scutti. People are living longer, but violent deaths are on the rise. Deaths caused by war, terrorism spike over a decade. *Click2Houston.com*, September 14, 2017. URL: <https://www.click2houston.com/health/people-are-living-longer-but-violent-deaths-are-on-the-rise>

P. Bergen, D. Sterman, A. Ford, A. Sims. Jihadist terrorism 16 years after 9/11: a threat assessment. *New America*, September 11, 2017. URL: <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/policy-papers/jihadist-terrorism-16-years-after-911-threat-assessment/>

Terror Threat Snapshot September 2017. *Homeland Security Committee*, September 2017. URL: <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/09.08.17-Final-September-Terror-Threat-Snapshot-Report.pdf>

M. Galeotti. Conspiracy theories dominate East-West relations: time for realism. *Raam op Rusland*, September 18, 2017. URL: <https://www.raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/militair-beleid/711-conspiracy-theories-dominate-east-west-relations-time-for-realism>

E. Shearer, J. Gottfried. News use across social media platforms 2017. PEW Research Center, September 6, 2017. URL: http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2017/09/13163032/PJ_17.08.23_socialMediaUpdate_FINAL.pdf

R. Värk. Declared and undeclared wars. ETH Zürich, September 15, 2017. URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/96b16a05-21be-488e-803b-0d5c38d80952?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebookä

R. Harrison. Width, depth, and context in Thucydides. *The Strategy Bridge*, September 13, 2017. URL: <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/13/width-depth-and-context-in-thucydides>

Special issue: hybrid warfare. *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, September 12, 2017. URL: <http://thebulletin.org/press-release/special-issue-evolving-threat-hybrid-war11101>

E.A. Cohen. How Trump is ending the American era. *The Atlantic*, October 2017. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/is-trump-ending-the-american-era/537888/>

N. Klein. Season of smoke. In a summer of wildfires and hurricanes, my son asks ‘Why is everything going wrong?’ *The Intercept*, September 9, 2017. URL: <https://theintercept.com/2017/09/09/in-a-summer-of-wildfires-and-hurricanes-my-son-asks-why-is-everything-going-wrong/>

E. Lucas. Putin war games takes us closer to conflict. *The Sunday Times*, September 9, 2017. URL: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/putin-war-games-take-us-closer-to-conflict-pscbf3kk3>

G. Monbiot. Out of the wreckage: a new politics for an age of crisis. London: Verso, 2017. URL: https://www.guardianbookshop.com/out-of-the-wreckage.html?utm_source=editoriallink&utm_medium=merch&utm_campaign=article?utm_source=editoriallink&utm_medium=merch&utm_campaign=article

G. Monbiot. How do we get out of this mess. *The Guardian*, September 9, 2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/sep/09/george-monbiot-how-de-we-get-out-of-this-mess>

J. Beale. Can war games help us avoid real-world conflict? *BBC*, September 7, 2017. URL: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41172485>

M.J. Mazarr, A. Cevallos, M. Priebe, A. Radin, K. Reedy, A.D. Rothenberg, J.A. Thompson, J. Willcox. Measuring the health of the liberal international order. Santa Monica: RAND, RR-1994-OSD, 2017, 228p. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1994.html?adbsc=social_sustainable_international_order1785781&adbid=10156046556623676&adbpl=fb&adbpr=55708608675

J. Mecklin. Introduction: the evolving threat of hybrid war. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 3, 2017. URL: <http://thebulletin.org/2017/september/introduction-evolving-threat-hybrid-war11076>

O. Dammegaard – Do you know how to identify a false flag? 1 of 2. *Veritas Radio, YouTube*, August 31, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vPNCqqCYaQ>

D. Foley. The Deep State: how it came to be and why it fights so hard. *Intellectual Takeout*, September 1, 2017. URL: <http://www.intellectualltakeout.org/article/deep-state-how-it-came-be-and-why-it-fights-so-hard>

R. McGovern. Seymour Hersh honored for integrity, truth-telling. *Truthdig*, September 1, 2017. URL: <https://www.truthdig.com/articles/journalist-seymour-hersh-honored-integrity-truth-telling/>

D.W. Drezner. Are think tanks doomed? Nope. They're poised for a comeback. *Politico*, August 30, 2017. URL: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/30/are-think-tanks-doomed-215560>

Noam Chomsky: President Donald Trump & America. *YouTube*, August 28, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gyz5FXA6lQg>

E. Ackerman. Industry urges United Nations to ban lethal autonomous weapons in new open letter. *IEEE Spectrum*, August 21, 2017. URL: <http://spectrum.ieee.org/autoton/robotics/military-robots/industry-urges-united-nations-to-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-in-new-open-letter>

S.A. Topol. Attack of the killer robots. *BuzzFeed*, August 26, 2017. URL: https://www.buzzfeed.com/sarahatopol/how-to-save-mankind-from-the-new-breed-of-killer-robots?utm_term=.wdKAbLLG-.aqLQvnRP

S. Hayden. Killer robots are almost inevitable, former defense chief warns. *The Independent*, August 27, 2017. URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/killer-robots-bound-to-happen-general-sir-richard-barrons-elon-musk-tesla-united-nations-artificial-a7914931.html>

Noam Chomsky 2017 & Abby Martin – War, imperialism, and propaganda. *Cognitive Science, YouTube*, August 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XzEzLk7uuiA>

The future of humanity – Noam Chomsky (August new update 2017). *Cognitive Science, YouTube*, August 22, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SarS9MQi3q8>

Noam Chomsky explains why Muslims hate America! *Cognitive Science, YouTube*, August 13, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbR4ImUf3Q>

T. O'Connor. Next US war will be long, hard and take the entire country to win, army chief says. *Newsweek*, July 28, 2017. URL: <http://www.newsweek.com/next-us-war-long-hard-take-entire-country-win-army-chief-643520>

M. Benjamin. How to build a global movement to end mass killing. *Truthdig*, July 25, 2017. URL: http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/how_to_build_a_global_movement_to_end_mass_warfare_and_killing_20170725?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Truthdig+Truthdig%3A+Drilling+Beneath+the+Headlines

Nafeez Ahmed. Pentagon study declares American empire is 'collapsing,' *Information clearing house*, July 17, 2017. URL: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/47462.htm>

N.P. Freier, C.M. Bado, C.J. Bolan, R.S. Hume, J.M. Lissner. At our own peril: DoD risk assessment in a post-primacy world. *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)*, June 29, 2017, 145p. URL: <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1358>

W. Madsen. The end of the 'New American Century' pronounced by the Pentagon. *Strategic Culture*, July 23, 2017. URL: <https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/07/23/the-end-new-american-century-pronounced-pentagon.html>

About the Compiler: Berto Jongman is Assistant Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He is a former senior Military Intelligence Analyst and current International Consultant on CBRN issues. A sociologist by training, he also worked for civilian Swedish and Dutch research institutes. Jongman was the recipient of the Golden Candle

Award for his World Conflict & Human Rights Maps, published by PIOOM. He is editor of the volume 'Contemporary Genocides' and has also contributed to various editions of 'Political Terrorism', the award-winning handbook of terrorism research, edited by Alex P. Schmid.

About *Perspectives on Terrorism*

Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com>.

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Board, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

The Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism consists of:

Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief

Prof. James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor

Christine Boelema Robertus, Associate Editor for IT

Prof. Gregory Miller, Associate Editor

Dr. John Morrison, Associate Editor

Dr. Bart Schuurman, Associate Editor

Aaron Y. Zelin, Associate Editor

Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor

Judith Tinnes, Information Resources Editor

Berto Jongman, Assistant Editor

Michael Palmieri, Editorial Assistant

Jodi Pomeroy, Editorial Assistant