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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XIII, Issue 6 (December 2019) of Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT). Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), Vienna, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus in The Hague. All PoT issues are available at https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism.

Now in its thirteenth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has more than 8,700 registered subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence, Resources and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

A brief look at the content of the current issue:

The first of the six articles in this issue, by Donald Holbrook and John Horgan, explores the controversial relationship between ideology and terrorism. This is followed by Philip Johnson’s article on the adoption of state terrorism tactics by organised crime groups in Mexico. Next, Riccardo Marchi and Raquel da Silva analyze four decades of right-wing political violence in Portugal. Then James Lutz and Georgia Ulmschneider look at the impact of counter-terrorism on civil liberties in the United States, and Shashi Jayakumar and Cameron Sumpter explore the profiles of S.E. Asian foreign fighters, based on documents leaked from the Islamic State. In a final article, Maxime Bérubé and three of her colleagues reconstruct why ten Canadian right-wing extremists joined and ultimately left extremist violence-prone groups.

The articles section is followed by a Research Note on the literature on Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) by Joshua Sinai, our Book Reviews Editor.

The book review section begins with Alex Schmid’s review of a remarkable dissertation by Dirk Baehr on the root causes of radicalisation of jihadists in the German Federal Republic. Joshua Sinai presents more new books by listing their tables of content while Associate Editor Judith Tinnes continues her series of extensive hand-searched bibliographies with one on Terrorism Prevention. David Teiner offers our readers a bibliography on terrorism in Africa, focusing especially on Mali. This is followed by Associate Editor Berto Jongman’s regular survey of new web-based resources on terrorism as well as related subjects such as radicalisation and extremism. The December issue concludes with an overview of recent and upcoming conferences, symposia and workshops on terrorism-related subjects by Assistant Editor Reinier Bergema.

The current issue of Perspectives on Terrorism has been put together by Associate Editor Dr. Aaron Y. Zelin and Editor-in-Chief, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, with the support of co-editor, Prof. James J.F. Forest, and Associate Editor for IT issues, Christine Boelema Robertus, as well as with the help of Editorial Assistant Jodi Moore.

As this year comes to an end, we wish our readers a more peaceful and secure 2020.
Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking the Nut
by Donald Holbrook and John Horgan

Abstract
An enduring bugbear in the study of terrorism is conceptualizing the role ideology plays for individuals involved in such activities. Explanations range from presenting ideology as a key determinant to those who argue that it is often barely relevant at all. In this article we seek to reconcile competing notions of ideology in the emergence of terrorism by making the case for a non-binary conceptualization of ideology. Our approach here emphasizes interpretations of social identity over depictions of the doctrinal. We divide key concerns about ideology in individual processes to terrorism into three related arguments: ‘cognition’, ‘causation’ and ‘exposure’ and explore how these can be reconciled. This more nuanced conceptual understanding of ideology in processes leading to terrorism, we suggest, will aid our analysis of terrorism and the way in which we may approach ideological variables in its context.

Keywords: terrorism, ideology, cognition, belief, violence.

Introduction
The question ‘what causes terrorism?’ is perhaps both the most frequent and inevitable response to violent extremist events today. Though the search for satisfactory answers continues to elude even the most dedicated researchers, one common assumption centers around the role of ideology. That is to say, despite not necessarily knowing much about the precise mechanisms involved, we might safely assume that when it comes to explaining terrorism (as opposed to other kinds of illicit violent activities), that ideology plays at least some role in the development of violent extremist activity. However, there is no consensus in discussions about terrorism of what the role of ideology in these processes may look like. This article seeks to address that divergence.

On one end of the spectrum, depictions of terrorism as manifestations of cohesive ‘ideologies’ are a constant theme in the reactions of political leaders to such events, and these are amplified in the post-event dissections of the news media and other commentators.[1] Terrorists are thus simply seen as acting on behalf of some hostile ‘ideology’ as they carry out acts of violence. Counterterrorism efforts, in turn, become framed in explicitly ideological terms. A former British prime minister, for instance, declared that combating terrorism involved a “generational […] battle against a poisonous ideology”. [2] Such depictions seem to limit explanations for the causes of terrorism to the presence of ideology, to which many are exposed, whilst terrorism remains a rare outcome of a very complex set of processes.[3]

On the other end of the spectrum, there exists a strong body of scholarship—and one that has grown over the years—illustrating that consumption of, or commitment to, an ideology that endorses violence is not a strong predictor of involvement in terrorism. These scholars often see the role of ideology in the emergence of terrorism at an individual level as minimal or even absent.[4] Yet, while adoption of an ideology does not in itself lead people to become involved in terrorism, its role in these processes (and where and when precisely it becomes relevant for the individual) remains unclear, despite the attention the topic has received.[5]

The core dilemma is this: terrorism is defined as a form of political violence where existing norms of governing society are challenged. Ideas and beliefs are thus inherent, in some way, in its definition.[6] Remove this ideational ingredient and we are left with acts of violence whose intended projection is either more utilitarian or personal than symbolic, irrespective of the factors that may have led to them in the first place.[7] “A terrorist without a cause (at least in his own mind)”, Kellen suggested, “is not a terrorist”. [8] To be classified as terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security recently observed, there has to be a “discernable political, ideological, or religious motivation”. [9]
Why is all this important? We suggest that these arguments are not merely abstract or theoretical. The identification of politically or ideologically symbolic and communicative elements in the planning and execution of violence determines whether such acts *per se* are treated as terrorism, with concomitant implications for the way in which such cases might be investigated, by which branch of government, with what investigative powers and whether prosecutors would pursue them as violation of terrorism legislation. Consequently, this has significant implications for the individuals involved.[10] Reaching a ‘terroristic’ threshold by virtue of politically symbolic attributes, in the eyes of external observers, therefore, has very real consequences.

Our central argument is that notions of ideology in the emergence of terrorism can be clarified and conflicting depictions of its role and agency in these processes can be reconciled if we arrive at a non-binary conceptualization of ideology that emphasizes interpretations of social identity over depictions of the doctrinal.[11] Ideology is thus something that is fluid, not rigid, and not something that either “does or does not” impact individuals, depending on their substantive engagement with its content. Ideology is not something they either possess or do not possess and its impact can best be understood by virtue of the way in which the perception of their environment is shaped. This perception, in turn, can affect other processes that intertwine in individual trajectories towards violence. We suggest this conceptual understanding will aid the analysis of terrorism and the way in which ideology matters in this context.

To be clear, we are concerned here with the function of ideology in the emergence of terrorism and the way in which we can arrive at an understanding that incorporates different perspectives regarding the role ideology plays for the individual terrorist. We are not concerned with the study of ideology as an isolated phenomenon *per se*, the studies of which, as Leader Maynard observed, have produced varied understandings of the term.[12]

**The Problem with Ideology and Terrorism**

Let us begin by setting out the reason ideological explanations of involvement in terrorism are problematic. As noted, the correlation between ideology and terrorism is often seen to be weak. We divide this case against ideology’s significance in the emergence of terrorism into three related arguments: cognition, causation, and exposure.

In this section we look at these three positions in more detail. We then explore ways in which the questions they raise can be addressed by emphasizing an understanding of ideology in the emergence of terrorism that underscores its social dimensions. When viewed as a collective map to make sense of the world, we argue, ideology is relevant throughout these processes. With this understanding in mind, we revisit the cognition, causation and exposure arguments in the second half of this article and conclude that ideology can serve a variety of different purposes for those becoming involved in terrorism and that the activities it informs go beyond participation in violence *per se*.

A. Cognition

Many terrorists presented as religious extremists have had no history of religious engagement or even practice. Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who murdered 86 people during the 2016 Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, reportedly lived a life “far from religion” up until the last few days before the attack, where he started searching for Islamist extremist content online, including *nasheeds*—Islamic vocal songs—endorsing violence.[13] The story often seems similar with single issue terrorists and far-right extremists, especially lone actors. Darren Osbourne, who launched a vehicle attack against Muslims in north London in June 2017, was described during his sentencing as being driven by an “ideology of hate towards Muslims”. Yet he had reportedly spent only four weeks reading far-right material online, with his interest initially triggered by a BBC documentary about sexual abuse of young girls by British-Pakistani Muslim men in the UK.[14] This begs the question, if individuals are so ignorant of the tenets of the belief system that was meant
to have driven them, or to which their actions have been attributed, how can we describe their actions as ideologically motivated? And if they were not ideologically motivated, how can these individuals be described as terrorists?

Walter Laqueur has observed that “in every generation it was not the people most deeply convinced of the righteousness of their cause who were the activists, but the most aggressive and militant”. [15] Randy Borum echoed these findings, arguing that “some [terrorists] have only a cursory knowledge of, or commitment to, the radical ideology”. [16] Others have described how terrorists often “develop an instrumentalized cut-and-paste interpretation of a given ideology in order to justify their recourse to violence”. [17] Andrew Silke, in turn, pointed out: “at the early stages those that become involved in terrorism have a very limited understanding of the ideology—they are not scholars”. [18] Accounts of some travelers to Islamist extremist organizations fighting in the civil war in Syria would appear to confirm these observations. Some seemed to have virtually no expertise of their purported calling. There were accounts of travelers who had ordered copies of “The Koran for Dummies” and “Islam for Dummies” from the online retailer Amazon prior to their departure, which seems indicative of their utter lack of any prior ‘ideological’ involvement or preparedness. [19]

B. Causation

The causation argument is slightly different from the cognition argument, that posits that individuals do not understand the ideology that’s supposed to inspire them. This argument instead suggests that ideological variables are simply not that important or central to factors leading someone to becoming involved in terrorism, when other factors are considered. [20]

Randy Borum and Robert Fein, for instance, argued that, “even those who take up arms to fight under the banner of a global ‘cause’ or ideology may not be ideologically driven”. [21] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko argued that “there are many paths to radicalization that do not involve ideology. Some join a radical group for thrills and status, some for love, some for connection and comradeship. Personal and group grievances can move individuals toward violence, with ideology serving only to rationalize the violence”. [22] Marc Sageman, meanwhile, suggested that friendship networks were a stronger precursor to terrorist involvement than ideological engagement. [23] Researchers studying terrorism in Northern Ireland found that members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army were driven more by “the political situation and social juncture at the time rather than ideology”. [24] Silke, in turn, argued that individuals get drawn to terrorism because of “identity issues” rather than ideology: “[t]he evidence isn’t there to say ideology is the prime reason why people are becoming terrorists”. [25] Glazzard, meanwhile, argued that ideological explanations for involvement in terrorism were “at best a gross over-simplification” that left out factors “from socio-economic grievances to the lure of adventure to the primary human need for survival, […] identification with a group, socialization, and the effect of civil conflicts” that were “well-evidenced explanations for behavioral change”. [26] Ideology, in short, is seen to be peripheral or absent in many trajectories towards terrorism.

C. Exposure

The exposure argument is based on an understanding that consumption of ideological content endorsing terrorism, even extremist content disseminated by the terrorist organizations themselves, is common and much more common than acts or attempted acts of physical involvement in terrorist activities. “Many people are exposed to the impact of culture or political ideas, however, only a few select terrorism”, Martha Crenshaw wrote in 1988, [27] while Borum noted that most people “who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism”. [28] Practitioners have also pointed out that identification of individuals engaging with extremist ideological content endorsing terrorism is an insufficient indicator that they are about to participate in acts of terrorism simply since such activities, online especially, are so common. Investigations and surveillance would rarely be employed based simply on such patterns of viewing, requiring instead much more concrete indicators that individuals were preparing to mobilize to physical action. [29] Furthermore, we also have evidence suggesting that engagement with extremist ideological discourses and the social movements that
sustain them may even constitute a protective factor in relation to risk of involvement in terrorism if such activities ‘satisfy’ any need to participate—or to be seen to participate—in this milieu.[30] Ideology-based notions of risk of involvement in terrorism, in short, would generate a large volume of false positives.

Despite these observations, we are still left with the fact that ideology, in the form of some sort of engagement with political or religious beliefs and ideas, typically defines acts of violence as terrorism and separates them from other forms of violent crime. Investigations into terrorist plots have also consistently shown that “radical and extremist media” have been downloaded, shared and streamed in virtually all of them.[31] Terrorists have also authored their own ideological material and used attacks as platforms to publicize written manifestos, video announcements or other forms of communication. They are aware of the symbolism of their actions and the political consequences these will have.

The challenge is thus to develop a conceptualization of ideology for those involved in terrorism that accounts for the cognition, causation and exposure arguments as set out above. This, it should be noted, is distinct from developing more static definitions for ‘terrorism ideology’ which seem more specifically designed to capture ideational output from terrorist organizations or their proponents, irrespective of how that body of content may be acted upon or shape the activities of others in more indefinite ways.[32] To improve our understanding of ideology in the context of terrorism, however, we must understand both its composition and function.

Addressing the Problem

Ideologies have been described as systems of belief with collective properties and purpose. “An ideology”, J. Leader-Maynard observed, “is a distinctive system of normative, semantic, and/or reputedly factual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which underpins their understanding of their political world and shapes their political behaviour”. [33] The collective—social—components of ideology are central properties that are highlighted across the academic disciplines that have developed our understanding of the term. For Michael Freeden, the political theorist, ideologies constituted “imaginative maps [that are] collectively produced and collectively consumed in unpredictable ways”. [34] J. Wilson, a sociologist, similarly defined ideologies as cognitive maps of shared values and expectations delineating standards and expectations, thus serving both as a “clue to understanding and as a guide to action”. [35] The anthropologist Clifford Geertz, meanwhile, described ideologies as “maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience”. [36] How can these communal maps of our social world be ‘used’ to encourage collective violence?

To interrogate such notions of agency we need to explore the ways in which collective ideas unfold in social settings, in order to encourage and encase resistance against—or protection of—established norms and power structures.

Social-psychological models of collective action emphasize three antecedents of such resistance: (a) anger at perceived injustice, (b) social identification, and (c) beliefs about group efficacy. [37] Collective action is thus more likely when people have “shared interests, feel relatively deprived, are angry, believe they can make a difference, and strongly identify with relevant social groups”. [38] Such processes, J.T. Jost et al. argue, are inherently ideological, since they entail preferences concerning the prevailing social system (whether in support or opposition to the status quo) that are expressed in political ways. [39]

Here we need to pause and elaborate what we mean by ‘collective’ and ‘action’. Terrorism, after all, is often perpetrated by individuals who seem socially isolated and operate alone. [40] Yet their actions are designed to speak for or to a particular community, real or imagined, that share grievances, aspirations and envisaged ways in which to achieve them.

The Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, for instance, had no known associates and lived in complete isolation in a remote cabin without electricity or even running water as he planned and executed his prolonged letter-
bomb campaign. Through his violence he successfully coerced national newspapers to publish his political manifesto, *Industrial Society and its Future*. In it he wrote on behalf of an imagined collective, not as an individual, and called for mass mobilization in the interest of what he saw as a common cause.[41]

‘Action’, meanwhile, committed on behalf of a collective—real or imagined—can have different manifestations where participation in violence is only one possible outcome. Different forms of action might be supportive or conducive to terrorism, without involving direct participation in violence, including authoring or distributing manifestos, fundraising or even through public expressions of support for violence. Such behaviors constitute actions in their own right that often, depending on the legal context, carry significant risk for the perpetrator. Proponents of terrorist violence, in turn, have recognized that support for their cause can involve a variety of different roles through which wider mobilization of support can be achieved.[42] Such roles are not mutually exclusive. Kaczynski, in the example above, for instance, was both a perpetrator of political violence (and a talented bomb-maker) as well as a producer of explicit political content which the violence was meant to publicize. Violence, in short, is not the only form of action that is relevant to terrorism. We revisit this point in the final section of this article.

This understanding of terrorism involving diverse collective action becomes key to unlocking the role of ideology in these processes. If we look at the definitions above, a common thread that runs through them all is a sense of shared understanding within a given population. Individuals, in turn, can aid or support—however loosely—their kin in different ways that conform to the shared notions of community, threat or reward that the ideology conveys.

Ideology should thus be approached as a more fluid concept than some existing models on terrorism and its emergence assume. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko’s references to ideological variables in this context, for instance, through notions of ‘possessing’ “jihadist” or “radical” ideas and opinions, are more static than the literature on ideologies and their social underpinnings would suggest.[43] They also appear to assume that any ideological components are limited to radical or extremist interpretations that concentrate on condoning the use of violence. The reality may be more complex where ideology serves a much more holistic purpose: tying into all aspects of life, not just violence. Research into seized media from UK terrorism investigations, for example, found that extremist ideological content formed only a small component of a more comprehensive milieu, where even the extremist subset was composed of multifaceted types of discourse, ranging from abstract debates about violence to detailed prescriptions about targeting.[44] This might question the utility of bespoke definitions of ‘terrorism ideology’ as a body of ideas that explicitly call for the use of terrorist violence.[45] Such conceptualizations neither reflect the ideological output from groups such as ISIS, that mix extreme and non-extreme motifs in its media repertoire, or the range of ideological content with which terrorists engage.

**Grievance – Blame – Response**

M. Dugas and Arie Kruglanski’s conceptualization of ‘terrorism-justifying ideologies’ is more helpful. They based their definition on three key components: a collection of grievances, the identification of a culprit responsible for grievances, and arguments favoring terrorist acts for the community and individual. Echoing the definitions cited above, ideology, the authors argued, was thus “inextricably social”, consisting of a shared reality adopted by members of a collectivity and spread via the formation of social bonds.[46]

Dugas and Kruglanski’s approach reflects early contributions from sociology on the key components of ideology, as well as the literature on ways in which social movements seek to mobilize constituents, which helps us understand their agency in relation to terrorism.

In the 1970s, the sociologist John Wilson divided the structures of ideology into three related fields: diagnosis, prognosis and a rationale for action. Diagnosis introduced the notion of a common cause: the question was no longer, “why should this happen to me”, but “why should a thing like this happen to people like me.”
Prognosis elaborated a collective response in fulfillment of the common cause, while a distinct rationale for action identified those responsible for change. [47]

Ideology can thus acquire agency through political entrepreneurs communicating a vision of the world seeking to mobilize a given constituency to resist the status quo. Such a paradigm does not assume that mobilization of support is inevitable but helps us ask questions about whether the mobilizing message might resonate, concentrating on the interplay between a person's circumstances and the collective memory and identity of their social surroundings. [48]

Wilson’s conceptualization of ideological structures, in turn, has informed other related and corresponding models, in particular David Snow and R. Benford’s ‘collective action frames’, whereby social movement organizations developed ‘diagnostic’, ‘prognostic’ and ‘motivational’ interpretive structures—or frames—in order to mobilize constituencies [49]. The model has since been applied in numerous studies of terrorism and political violence [50] and these three components—problem diagnosis, prognosis, and response—feature in conceptual explanations about individual pathways leading to terrorism. [51]

**Ideology as a Social Fabric**

Concentrating on social dimensions of ideology that emphasize perceptions of collective grievance, common alternatives and a united response, therefore, enhances the utility of the term in its application to terrorism as socio-political violence and harmonizes its usage with other sources of explanation. [52] As noted, this approach is common in discussions of terrorist groups, leaderships or movements, but underutilized when it comes to broader questions about the function of ideology for the individual.

Ideology gains significance not just in the substance of any meaning conveyed but also in its modes of transmission and the linkages these exchanges establish. [53] Ideology is integral to, not separate from, the relational mechanisms involved in radicalization pathways and its processes of social learning, collective memory and other social constructs. [54] It imbues its components, such as status, belonging and reward, with significance which can only be understood in that ideological context: defining allegiances and roles, brotherhoods and sisterhoods, and the pull of immaterial rewards such as salvation through martyrdom.

Rather than resting uncomfortably alongside these processes as static doctrinal pillars impenetrable to all but dedicated ‘ideologues’, the role of ideology can best be explained through highlighting its social components, the collective maps and shared perspectives that help us make sense of the world and define who is or is not part of our community.

Indeed, such divisions—of community and non-community—are on open display by many who participate in, or endorse, terrorist violence and are legitimized with reference to ideology. [55] On the Islamist extremist side, several iterations of the proscribed Al-Muhajiroun group assumed names—‘The Strangers’, the ‘Saved Sect’—which they based on their interpretation of scripture; these emphasized their separation from wider society, with references to the group’s core ideological principles. [56] Research on far-right extremism, meanwhile, has emphasized the countercultural properties of its members. James Mason, the prominent American neo-Nazi, wrote in his collection of essays called ‘Siege’, that it was imperative for activists to be “alienated” from the “System”. [57]

These social enclaves are sometimes referred to as subcultures [58], where new moral frameworks are constructed [59] where even lethal violence against noncombatants can be presented as necessary and virtuous. [60] In one sense, ideology can thus ‘normalize’ what previously would have constituted deviance. [61] Interaction within the group offers social validation of beliefs that may be abhorrent to those who are outside it. [62]

It is through this understanding of the emergence of social collective and socially constructed sources of meaning that we begin to appreciate a more multifaceted role that ideologies can play in processes leading
toward terrorism. Ideologies provide a shared sense of belonging and stories that define that community, its heritage and common values. One does not need to ‘qualify’ with any level of ‘expertise’ or knowledge in discourses associated with particular ideologies to be affected by them, or for them, to impact on our frames of reference. As Yongman notes, “the term ideological […] should not be treated as a substitute for intellectual”.[63]

A *nasheed* celebrating the rewards of the martyrs once they ascend to the highest stages of heaven may evoke a powerful emotional response, irrespective of the recipient's cognitive capacity to dissect any theological underpinnings that might be associated with it. Indeed, we know that they are popular among individuals who do not even understand the lyrics, simply because they strike an emotional cord or reflect ‘membership’ of a social collective deemed desirable.[64] And one does not merely ‘possess’ certain ideas without having gone through a process where these ideas were acquired which also serves to shape our perspective. Jost et al. observe how people's emotional interaction with their social system is key to understanding their collective action. “Injustice can elicit negative system-level emotions (e.g., moral outrage), but people also share positive system-level emotions such as pride, satisfaction, gratitude, and joy”.[65]

In this sense, ideology is embedded throughout journeys towards terrorism, through the demarcation of a social collective whose interests are under threat. It is a looking glass through which to see the world, both its positive and negative aspects.[66] Grievances may be personal but through terrorism they are expressed through assumed prosocial means. The “modes of transmission”[67] that sustain this collective—whether speeches, stories, manifestos or other cultural produce[68]—are varied and can be as simple as the *nasheeds* that Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel began listening to in the days before his attack, depending on how they are presented and received.[69]

**Cognition, Causation, Exposure Revisited**

Where does this leave us in relation to the three arguments questioning the role of ideology in the context of terrorism? Let us take each one in turn.

**A. Cognition**

It seems beyond any doubt that terrorists or attempted terrorists and their supporters can be utterly ignorant of any technical aspects of the ideological tenets with which they may have identified, whether this is in the form of strategic thought or theological exegesis, geopolitical discourse or philosophical doctrine. Yet they can still develop emotional ties to a community through something as simple as a *nasheed*, a persuasive video or a friendly web forum. The modes of transmission that convey ideology are as varied in their composition as their impact on individuals is complex. As Lorne Dawson has observed, there is an important distinction between acquiring or engaging with the substance of scripture or theology of a religion on the one hand and religiosity, which refers to a strong religious feeling or belief, on the other:

> Faulty theology is not a reliable indicator of degree of religiosity or the primacy of religion in someone's motivations, as social psychologists should know. But many analysts fall prey to this illogical inference, arguing that the discrepancies between how jihadists, on the one hand, and how mainstream Muslims and scholars of Islam on the other hand, interpret the basic elements of the al-Qaeda ideology somehow refutes the sincerity of the religious commitments of the jihadists.[70]

It is equally plausible to assume that young, white and disenfranchised men and women may identify with concepts such as the ‘great replacement’ narrative, that posits that mass immigration and Islam pose an existential threat to ‘ethnonationalist’ European cultures, and project their own fears and grievances onto them, without having scrutinized, digested or even understood Anders Breivik’s 1,500-page manifesto from cover to cover, or the philosophical works of Guillaume Faye, Jean-Yves Camus, Bat Ye’or or their contemporaries.[71].
B. Causation

It again seems irrefutable that consumption of ideology alone, including extremist ideology, does not produce a terrorist. These processes are immensely complex and specific to individuals, while studies that have sought to identify patterns between them invariably identify nonideological variables. Yet, ideology, properly understood, does not sit opposite or isolated from these variables but rather imbues them with particular meanings in a given context.

As Hall observed:

> Nowadays the term ideology includes the whole range of concepts, ideas and images which provide the frameworks of interpretation and meaning for social and political thought in society, whether they exist at the high, systematic, philosophical level or at the level of casual, everyday, contradictory, common-sense explanation […] no ideology is ever wholly logical or consistent.[72]

Similarly, for David Snow, ideologies exist on a continuum from “a tightly connected set of values and beliefs at one end to a loosely coupled set of values and beliefs at the other end”[73] Ideology should thus not be limited to doctrine, doctrinal authorities or engagement, as is sometimes the case in analyses of terrorism, since this does not reflect common scholarly understanding of the topic. Ideology frames and adds significance to the factors (positive and negative, from the individual's perspective) that are frequently cited in relation to involvement in terrorism, including notions of kin, belonging, emotional attachment and a sense of shared heritage and grievance—elements that are articulated and contextualized with some reference to common beliefs. Indeed, these elements are central in propaganda output by terrorist groups seeking to appeal to a broader support base or to solidify their existing membership. In a 'self-interview' released to the public in 1974, for example, the Italian Red Brigades presented themselves as a militant vanguard of the entire “working class movement” tasked with “uniting the people, mobilizing and arming them” in order to establish a new “communist society” that would end the exploitation of the masses.[74] Notions of identity, camaraderie, altruism, status and reward, therefore, do not exist on one side of a conceptual dichotomy but are instead embedded within a broader ideological context from which they derive meaning.

C. Exposure

What about the exposure argument? Terrorist organizations usually have sizable propaganda wings that disseminate vast amounts of media content, distributed online. Added to this is material from their supporters, as well as from independent or nonaligned ideologues, and, given the fact that—as noted above—that terrorists’ interests are diverse, material from political or religious radicals may appeal and be relevant. The result is that the volume of ideological material available ‘out there’ is immense and easy to find. Scores may develop an interest in such material or stumble upon it without ever seeking to become involved in terrorism more directly through material or immaterial support. Yet one can hold views without being impressed by a need to act on them since other priorities might prevail, at a given point in the course of one’s life. The substantial sacrifices needed to become involved in terrorism usually rarely make terrorism an attractive or realistic option for most young people. Mobilization, as is now thoroughly established, is not the same as developing affinity for extreme ideas. Even if there is a desire to become physically or even passively involved in terrorism, there are constraints to be overcome, and much may depend on opportunities that arise, or the unavailability or cessation of potential or existing options. Some doors close, others may open.

Yet at the same time, participation in violence only forms one small, albeit important, part in a repertoire of roles and actions relevant to the emergence of terrorism. Individuals may well see themselves as part of a community that legitimizes or facilitates such violence, thus agreeing with the ideology that underpins it, without seeking or intending to seek direct participation in it. Just as we need more fluid understanding of ideology in the context of terrorism and its emergence, therefore, so too do we need to understand the diversity of action repertoires conducive to such action.

Let us, in conclusion, briefly examine this aspect more closely.
“Walking the Walk” vs. “Talking the Talk”

Ideology, as a collective map to view and make sense of the world, is relevant throughout processes leading to terrorism. These processes are a complex interplay of factors. For some, ideological components may be especially salient, while for others they may add meaning in subtler ways. The visibility and importance of these components may also differ at various points in an individual’s trajectory towards violence or supportive action and be triggered or affected by different life events. As Yongman notes, “we should not expect all actors within a movement to have an equal interest in articulating and debating positions on problematic aspects of social and political topics, even if they share the underlying beliefs”.[75]

Some may be more willing or able to engage in such debates than others, and those who are, are not necessarily those who are most likely to participate in violence.[76] But the sharing of ideas that convey an understanding of collective grievance, aspiration and a sense of community is relevant to terrorism in a variety of often interweaving ways. Perhaps the most obvious concerns ways in which ideological output legitimizes certain targets or methods employed through terrorist violence. But the role of ideological products can be subtler too. Morten Storm, a jihadist-turned-spy, described how books, lectures, videos “and conversations late into the night” guided him on his path towards militancy, whereby media conveying a particular ideological worldview served as a way to solidify bonds among new friends, as well as setting out more political or religious agenda or arguments.[77]

In 2018 'Fascist Forge', a prominent neo-Nazi web forum associated with a range of extreme right militancy, [78] posted a multipart written exam on its website which new users would have to complete before being granted full membership. The exam contained 26 questions testing new members’ knowledge of the movement's key literature and ethos. Ideology was thus being tested very explicitly and used as a form of vetting. But the process was also designed to engender a sense of community among the members who qualified. A curator of the website commented that the exam was an “effort to create and maintain a high quality Fascist community”.[79]

Whilst ideology can thus serve a variety of different purposes for those becoming involved in terrorism, the activities it informs go beyond participation in violence per se. Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American preacher who joined Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as its chief ideologue, conceived of 44 ways in which individuals could support the jihad, none of which explicitly involved carrying out acts of terrorism. [80] These ways included financial and logistical support, as well as generating their own media content to encourage yet more support for a common cause.

Conclusion

Research on violent extremism is perhaps enjoying its long-overdue golden age, with more researchers, better data, and greater respect for strong theory and rigorous methods than ever before. Despite great progress, the relationship between ideology and violence remains poorly understood. Individual pathways towards terrorism are immensely varied and complex and some, perhaps most, who go down those paths find ways in which to support violent outcomes while avoiding direct involvement in its execution. Such actions are celebrated and embraced at all levels of terrorist organizations, from group leaders and strategists to grassroot supporters. Causes, processes and conclusions are diverse. There is much more to be done regarding the exploration of how, where and when ideology matters for our understanding of violent extremism. We conclude by asserting that ideology is not merely one element that sits aside these pathways that some encounter and others do not. Rather, ideology is fundamentally part of the environment, affecting all who participate and their perceptions of what they encounter, in different ways and to differing degrees.
Notes


[10] The 2001 USA PATRIOT act defined domestic terrorism as acts intended to “intimidate or coerce the civilian population; […] influence the policy of a government” or affect its conduct; United States Congress, ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001’; URL: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf (Accessed October, 2018). The UK Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as acts where “the use or threat is designed to influence the government […] or to intimidate the public, and […] the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.” UK Parliament, 'Terrorism Act 2000'; URL: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1 (Accessed October, 2018).


[48] Framing scholars talk of three key factors inherent in relevancy: empirical credibility (including frame consistency communicator credibility), experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity, which relates to the degree to which a frame reflects core cultural myths and ‘domain assumptions’ of the constituency. Benford, R. and David Snow (2000) 'Framing Processes and Social Movements; An Overview and Assessment' in Annual Review of Sociology (Vol. 26, pp. 611-639); Campbell J. (1988) 'The
Power of Myth, Doubleday, NY.

[49] Benford and Snow divide ‘collective action frames’ - interpretive schemata designed to mobilise contention - into diagnostic frames which serve to diagnose “an event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration”, prognostic frames which articulate a “proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done”, and motivational frames that provide a “rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action”; ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization’, in: International Social Movement Research (vol.1, 1988, pp. 197-217) JAI Press Inc., Greenwich, Conn): pp. 199, 200-202.


[51] Borum, R. (2011) “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I. Borum discusses three key components in radicalization models: “(1) developing antipathy toward a target group; (2) creating justifications and mandates for violent action; (3) eliminating social and psychological barriers that might inhibit violent action”, p. 26.


[56] ‘Al-Muhajiroun’ itself refers to the small number of emigrants, the true and dedicated believers, who followed the Prophet Mohammed to Medina in 622 CE. Other names include ‘Al-Ghuraba’, the strangers, and ‘The Saved Sect’, referring to a prophecy that the group of true Muslims at the day of judgement will be as small as the first community of Muslims, with the rest being revealed as false pretenders and transgressors. See e.g. Graeme Wood, The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State, (London: Allen Lane, 2017).


[69] “A good nasheed,” the Yemen-based American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki argued “can spread so widely it can reach to an audience that you could not reach through a lecture or a book.” Anwar al-Awlaki (no date), ‘44 ways to support jihad’, (published online, Victorious Media), available from URL: https://ebooks.worldofislam.info/ebooks/Jihad/Anwar_Awlaki_-_44_Ways_To_Support_Jihad.pdf, as of October 2018, p. 19.


[80] Awlaki, A. (no date).
The Crime and State Terrorism Nexus: How Organized Crime Appropriates Counterinsurgency Violence

by Philip Luke Johnson

Abstract

Studies on the connections between organized crime and terrorism tend to focus on non-state armed groups, and on the convergence of violent tactics. This article demonstrates that such a focus can overlook well-documented connections between state terrorism and organized crime. Particularly in post-Cold War Latin America, criminal groups recruit violence specialists from military and paramilitary units with histories of using indiscriminate violence and other forms of terrorism during counterinsurgency campaigns. Through this recruitment process, tactics of state terrorism are appropriated into the repertoires of criminal groups. This article demonstrates this process with a case study of the Zetas in Mexico, which was the first group in the country to actively recruit soldiers with counterinsurgency training. By doing so, the group caused a paradigm shift in criminal operations in the country, leading to the widespread adoption of terrorist tactics. This case study highlights the need for scholars of terrorism and organized crime to bring state terrorism back in, and to more thoroughly examine the points of contact between state and non-state terrorism.

Keywords: Organized Crime, State Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Terrorist Tactics, Mexico, Zetas

Introduction

In 2010, the bodies of 72 men and women were found on an isolated property in San Fernando, Mexico. All had been executed. The massacre was perpetrated by the Zetas, a criminal organization with a strong local presence and a reputation for using indiscriminate violence. This massacre provoked widespread outrage, as the victims were migrants from Central America, passing through the area on their way north. They could offer little in terms of resources, information, or local leverage. A cable from the local U.S. consulate reflects the puzzling nature of the massacre: “It remains unclear how these deaths benefit the Zetas.”[1] Yet the killing was hardly an aberration: the following year, almost two hundred more bodies were found in unmarked graves in the same area.

The recurrence of acts of brutal and indiscriminate violence in Mexico since the start of the war on narco-trafficking at the end of 2006 has led to a broad scholarly debate as to whether organized crime in Mexico can be classified as terrorism, and furthermore over the question of whether criminal groups are appropriating terror-inducing tactics from terrorist networks in other parts of the world.[2] Across this debate, the point of reference is invariably non-state terrorist networks. However, there is little evidence to demonstrate traceable mechanisms for the transmission of tactics between criminal groups in Latin America and terrorist groups in other regions. To understand the use of terror-generating tactics by criminal groups and develop better counter-crime policy recommendations, scholars should be willing to look beyond the common focus on transnational, non-state terrorist networks, and to examine the full range of possible linkages between terrorism and organized crime.

This article argues in favor of including state terrorism as an important component of the full range of forms of terrorism. While criminal groups in Mexico bear certain correspondences with non-state terrorist networks in other parts of the world, these criminal groups also cultivate direct connections with current and former state counterinsurgency forces. Through these connections, tactics of state terrorism—such as the indiscriminate killing of civilians—are imported into the repertoires of criminal organizations. These linkages are better able to explain the adoption of patterns of indiscriminate violence by criminal groups, because a clear process of transmission can be demonstrated.
Through a case study of the criminal organization that first appropriated state terrorist tactics in Mexico, this article makes several contributions to current scholarly debates. By tracing the mechanism by which organized crime appropriated terrorist tactics used by state counterinsurgency forces, the article demonstrates the need to bring state terrorism back in as a relevant concept for understanding contemporary patterns of violence, and especially violence targeting civilians. In turn, this shift in focus means that scholars should rethink assumptions about the relationship between the state security apparatus and crime. Elite military forces are often taken to be the best means of combating organized crime, but throughout Latin America, there is ample evidence that members of these forces also make the most attractive recruits for criminal outfits. This has far-reaching security policy implications, e.g. how elite units are raised and trained, or how state forces are demobilized following conflict. Even when military units are disarmed and demobilized, the terrorist tactics learned by members of these units remain available for appropriation by criminal groups.

In developing this argument, the article proceeds through four sections. The first section surveys the literature on convergence between (organized) crime and terrorist groups, and argues for the importance of including state terrorism in this. The second section explains the logic of case selection, and provides context for the case study. The third section offers a study of how the Zetas criminal group appropriated elements of state counterinsurgency terrorism into its repertoire of violence. The final section concludes by looking to areas for further investigation.

**Bringing the State Terror Back In**

The levels of violence—in terms of frequency, visibility, and brutality—perpetrated by criminal groups in Mexico unsettle conventional theories of organized crime. Criminal groups are generally expected to shun broad publicity, flying under the radar of the state so as to maximize profits. Studies of mafias in various parts of the world characterize these groups as engaging in occasional acts of public violence, but for the most part relying on informal, often intimate networks through which to exert “hidden power.” Criminal violence in Mexico, by contrast, occurs on a scale which invites comparisons to civil war or insurgency, and with a degree of public brutality and lack of discrimination that invites comparisons with political terrorism. Such comparisons provoke debate about whether criminal groups could be categorized as terrorist actors. Much of this debate rages over the question of whether violence by criminal groups is political enough to count as terrorism. On one hand, criminal groups in Mexico are primarily driven by economic rather than political goals. On the other hand, criminal violence often has an intended political effect, such as the assassination of a local politician or mayoral candidate. The most nuanced scholarship on the topic charts a course between these extremes. Phillips argues that violence in Mexico is characterized by criminal groups using terrorist tactics. Lessing codes about 25% of violent events in Mexico between 2008 and 2011 as utilizing terrorist tactics, or what he calls violent lobbying. These studies follow Tilly’s lead, in that their focus is on whether actions can be classified as terrorist, rather than on whether groups can be classified as such.

At the level of terror-generating tactics, much has been made about apparent correspondences between the violence used by criminal groups in Mexico and the violence deployed by terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and al Qaeda. This scholarship draws on models of convergence, such as Makarenko’s concept of the crime-terror continuum, which spans from alliances of convenience between discrete groups, to the full amalgamation of features of crime and terrorism. This continuum, and similar models of a crime-terror nexus, center on the convergence of non-state groups. Such models address the logic of convergence, but give less attention to specific mechanisms or actors. Media coverage is sometimes assumed to provide a connection, but while the coincidence of highly mediated terrorist tactics in different regions of the world is striking, there is no clear mechanism of transmission. Indeed, the clearest cases of convergence come
within countries; one of Makarenko's examples is the campaign of terrorism implemented by Pablo Escobar's Medellín Cartel in Colombia in the 90s, which involved collaboration with domestic insurgent groups.[15] There is less evidence of transnational, trans-ideological alliances going beyond economic transactions to move illicit drugs, procure weapons, or launder money.[16]

Scholars do not need to look as far afield as the Middle East to find connections between Mexican criminal groups and terrorism. Identifying more direct and traceable connections, however, involves expanding the definition of terrorism to include state terrorism. Some scholars argue that terrorism is fundamentally a matter of asymmetrical violence, and can only be applied to non- or sub-state groups.[17] By contrast, the revised academic consensus definition of terrorism constructed by Schmid includes both state repression and irregular warfare by state actors as forms of terrorism.[18] In theory, many scholars acknowledge the conceptual validity of state terrorism, but then focus their analysis only on non-state terror.[19] Without presuming to resolve the difficult question of defining terrorism (let alone state terrorism), this study focuses on the tactics of state actors that match the most common components of definitions of terrorism, namely: the use of violence, targeted against civilians or non-combatants, for the purposes of spreading fear in a target audience beyond the direct victims of violence. This definition accords with many scholarly definitions, including the revised academic consensus definition, and the most frequently occurring definitional elements of terrorism, as described by Schmid and Jongman.[20] The operationalization of this definition for the purposes of this study is laid out in the next section.

For all the valid concerns about the utility of the concept of state terrorism, there is good reason to at least consider regime terrorism in examinations of the transmission of terror-generating tactics. The effective use of violence that produces terror usually requires the participation of skilled and willing “violence specialists.”[21] Many such specialists operate within or adjacent to the state, and even those specialists operating entirely outside of government adopt organizational structures similar to those of states.[22] Training programs are particularly important in this regard, as they facilitate the transmission of tactics and techniques to new recruits. For example, during the Cold War, the United States ran the School of the Americas training facility in Panama precisely to equip elite military units from allied Latin American countries with specialized counterinsurgency capacities. This specialization was to give elite military units an advantage over leftist insurgent groups in the region. However, in some cases this specialized counterinsurgency training also led to terroristic practices, such as in the case of the massacres at El Mozote and other sites in Salvador during the civil war.[23] U.S. training programs typically incorporate “train-the-trainer” modules, in which trainees are equipped to pass on their knowledge to other recruits.[24]

Specialization in violence creates, as it were, portable toolkits of tactics, that specialists can bring with them into new contexts. In many cases, this includes using violence for extra-legal or criminal ends. Auyero calls this a “gray zone” between state authorities and crime.[25] The connection between state security agents and organized crime has been observed in diverse contexts. In the 1860s, both Union soldiers and Confederate guerrillas remobilized after the American Civil War as bandits.[26] The fall of the Soviet Union saw state security agents in Eastern Europe develop emergent criminal enterprises and illicit markets.[27] The case study elaborated below focuses on this connection between state agents and organized crime, and demonstrates that it provides the key mechanism by which terrorist tactics were appropriated by Mexican criminal groups.

**Case Context and Design**

To trace the specific processes by which criminal groups adopt terror tactics, this article focuses below the level of the government and looks at the level of a violent non-state group. It uses a critical case study of one particular group to understand how terrorist tactics were transmitted from state counterinsurgency forces to organized crime formations. It is stressed here that the study does not claim that terrorist tactics are always transmitted in this way, but rather that in Mexico they were transmitted in this way, and to profound effect.
Critical cases are not necessarily generalizable to other contexts, but are important for the descriptive insights into complex processes that these can offer. This case study cannot prove that terrorist tactics are always or only transmitted in this way, but can demonstrate that the specific processes in this case became a paradigm for related cases.

During the 71 years of single-party rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico, drug trafficking and organized crime were largely kept in check by the state security apparatus.[28] With liberalizing reforms in the 90s and the advent of competitive elections, state control over illicit economies weakened, leading criminal groups to form their own private militias, and to growing contestation of lucrative trafficking routes.[29] This increased contestation, coupled with a shift in state strategy to targeting the leadership of organized crime groups, lead to fragmentation of major groups and spiraling levels of violence.[30] As a result, between 2007 to 2018, more than 250,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the country.[31]

Even within the general criminal landscape, the Zetas stand out. For a generation, the Zetas are a defining symbol of criminal violence in Mexico.[32] The main cartels in Mexico all formed private militias, but the Zetas are distinctive for being originally recruited from elite military units, rather than from local police forces and gangs.[33] The rise of the Zetas prompted the formation of similar groups—both as the Zetas reproduced their model of organization to expand their influence, and as rivals copied this model—leading to the “Zetanization” of organized crime in the country.[34] Following the Zetas’ lead, the Knights Templar organization also recruited Mexican elite soldiers.[35] One of “Chapo” Guzmán’s former bodyguards was a member of the same unit from which the Zetas emerged.[36] The Zetas are thus a critical case for understanding the violent tactics used by much of contemporary organized crime in Mexico.[37]

The case study of the Zetas developed below focuses on one specific terrorist tactic: the indiscriminate killing of unarmed civilians. This is not the only terror-generating tactic used by the Zetas, but it is a tactic that closely matches the definition of terrorism provided above. The study follows Kalyvas’s understanding of indiscriminate violence: the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, just in case they are (or become) enemies, or because they are associated with enemies (such as inhabiting a similar area, or speaking the same language).[38] In counterinsurgency contexts, this is sometimes known as “draining the sea,” and is most commonly utilized where a state faces a strong and popular insurgent force.[39] Such violence is not explicitly endorsed in counterinsurgency doctrine, but recurred in counterinsurgency operations in Latin America throughout the Cold War.[40] However, reports of such violence on the part of US-trained or allied militaries were routinely denied.[41]

This study traces the mechanism by which the Zetas appropriated terrorist tactics from elite counterinsurgent units. To do so, it looks at three processes: the recruitment of violence specialists from elite military units; the transmission of tactics to other recruits through training camps; and the use of indiscriminate violence by the Zetas in ways that resemble the violence used by elite counterinsurgency units. Interviews with current or former Zetas are exceedingly rare, due to obvious security and access issues.[42] In the absence of interviews to demonstrate these processes, this case study follows the lead of other studies that have drawn upon a diverse range of data, to create a series of snapshots that together illustrate these processes.[43]

Case Study: The Zetas

In 1997, the Gulf Cartel recruited Arturo Guzmán Decena to create a group of well-armed enforcers for the cartel. Guzmán Decena was a member of the elite military unit G.A.F.E. (Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales).[44] G.A.F.E. was created in 1986 as an elite anti-crime unit to enhance security while Mexico hosted the soccer World Cup. In 1994, G.A.F.E. was mobilized against the Zapatista uprising in southern Mexico.[45] Subsequently, G.A.F.E. soldiers were deployed in counter-narcotics operations in key trafficking regions such as Tamaulipas, the domain of the Gulf Cartel.[46] During that time, members of G.A.F.E. were trained by U.S., French, and Israeli special forces. Guzmán Decena recruited at least 30 other soldiers to
become the original Zetas, including trusted lieutenants such as Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, who would later lead the group.[47]

The founding members of the Zetas came from the Mexican military, but a subsequent wave of recruits came from the Kaibiles, an elite Guatemalan force. Kaibiles had a reputation for their brutal training practices and for participating in massacres during the Guatemalan Civil War.[48] Like G.A.F.E., the Kaibiles received elite international training, but the reputation of the Kaibiles soon became such that they also train soldiers from abroad.[49] Local reports suggest that the Mexican military collaborated with Kaibiles across the border in Guatemala during operations against the Zapatistas.[50] When the Zetas expanded into Guatemala, starting in about 2007, they recruited extensively from among the Kaibiles.[51]

By recruiting soldiers with elite training, the Zetas appropriated the counterinsurgency tactics of the state. The Zetas quickly earned a reputation for their tactical capabilities, introducing a previously-absent degree of paramilitary effectiveness to organized crime in Mexico. The Zetas also inherited a legacy of state terrorism—brutally violent practices upon which the reputations of G.A.F.E., and especially the Kaibiles, were founded. During the Zapatista uprising, members of G.A.F.E. were alleged to have massacred unarmed people, conducted disappearances (kidnappings followed by torture and murder), and mutilated the corpses of victims.[52] The Kaibiles took a lead role in terrorizing—and in some cases almost eradicating—indigenous communities during the civil war which had features of genocide, including, for instance, the mass killing of 200 unarmed civilians in the village of Dos Erres.[53] By recruiting members from these military units, the Zetas also acquired a reputation for terror. U.S. diplomatic cables on the Zetas demonstrate a preoccupation in U.S. foreign policy circles with the presence of Kaibiles among the Zetas, and the capacity for terrorism that the Kaibiles brought to the group.[54]

By 2007, the Zetas were operating with some autonomy from the Gulf Cartel. As the group expanded, it recruited beyond its original base. Later recruits often had little or no military background, and included child recruits.[55] These recruits could, however, earn an opportunity to undergo military-style training in one of the camps established by the Zetas, and so be inducted further into the group. Zeta protocol stipulated the creation of training camps as the first priority of new bosses; the organization spent an estimated US $8,000 per new recruit.[56] In 2007, a single camp housed over one hundred recruits.[57] These camps replicated elite training practices; both Zeta and Kaibil training paired up recruits, and use the same term to refer to these pairs as “brothers.”[58]

In addition to teaching weapons handling and tactical maneuvering, these camps blooded recruits by pressuring them to practice killing captives. The camps replicated the elite counterinsurgency training of the original Zetas, but further emphasized terror-generating tactics by encouraging brutal acts of violence. One Zeta recruit stated that dozens of captives were kept at the camp and used to practice violence and killing. Zeta leaders demonstrated how to kill the captives quickly and cruelly.[59] The Zetas were the earliest criminal group in Mexico known to have used camps to train specialists in violence, but other groups have subsequently adopted the practice.[60] Such training camps are a key feature of appropriation of state terrorism tactics by organized crime, as it allows tactics to be transmitted from state specialists to the criminal group.

By recruiting from elite counterinsurgent units, the Zetas appropriated the tactics of those units into their own repertoire. These tactics, including the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians, have been deployed in numerous cases by the Zetas. In 2010, the Zetas killed 72 undocumented migrants in San Fernando, Tamaulipas. The migrants had been traveling in buses, and were kidnapped en masse. They were summarily executed, and their bodies left in an abandoned building.[61] In 2011, the corpses of almost 200 more victims were found in mass graves in the same area.[62] The fallout from the first massacre—prompted by the survival of one victim who lived to flee the site and tell the tale—included a broad public outcry and increased security presence in the region.[63] Yet rather than moderating their violence, the Zetas increased it, both in terms of the number of people killed and in the level of brutality of their violence; most of the later victims were beaten to death. At the time of the first massacre, the Zetas believed that a rival cartel was
trying to conquer the area; one explanation for the massacre states that the migrants were killed just in case they worked (as so-called drug mules) for the rival cartel.[64] This resembles the “draining the sea” logic used to justify the annihilation of indigenous communities during the Guatemalan civil war; without good information, indiscriminate violence was the preferred counterinsurgency strategy.

Practices of state terrorism recurred in numerous other violent acts attributed to the Zetas. In 2011, the group killed over 300 people in and around Allende, Coahuila. They also used heavy machinery to tear down properties of victims, and torched buildings in the town. This scorched earth-style violence was prompted by reports that several locals were D.E.A. informants. Although these alleged informants were identified by the Zetas, the group chose to utilize indiscriminate violence against the entire community.[65] This type of methodical destruction of the physical environment is rare in situations of asymmetrical conflict, but can be found in accounts of state counterinsurgency terror tactics targeting entire communities.[66] Use of such violence by the Zetas suggests that other terrorist tactics beyond indiscriminate violence were also appropriated by the group from violence specialists of the state.

From 2009 to 2012, the Zeta group used Piedras Negras prison, again in Coahuila, as a site to murder and incinerate the bodies of about 150 people. This involved a steady process of collecting and transporting the victims—including several disabled activists on a pilgrimage to Mexico's northern border—to the prison, to be tortured and killed there.[67] In 2011, over 50 people died when the Zetas barricaded and burned a casino in Monterrey. The casino belonged to a rival of the Zetas, but the victims of the inferno were innocent customers and bystanders; the death of a pregnant woman provoked particular outrage.[68] Also in 2011, the Zetas killed and dismembered 27 farm laborers in Petén, Guatemala, and left messages scrawled in blood at the site. The messages indicated that the laborers were killed to send a warning to the farm owner.[69] Again, indiscriminate violence against innocent people was used to target a rival. In 2012, the dismembered bodies of 49 people were dumped on the side of the highway to Cadereyta, Nuevo León.[70] Investigations suggest that some of these victims were migrants from Central America. Here again, the Zetas used indiscriminate violence against bystanders to generate terror meant primarily for their rivals.

Recruiting elite counterinsurgent soldiers not only allowed the Zetas to appropriate tactics of state terrorism into the group's repertoire; this process of transmission also shaped the type of indiscriminate violence deployed by the Zetas. The parallels between the violence used by the Zetas and the violence used by elite counterinsurgency units are striking. As with the Kaibiles and G.A.F.E., the most notorious acts of the Zetas involve torture and slow and painful killing. Like in the case of the Dos Erres massacre in Guatemala, the second San Fernando massacre involved killing almost two hundred people, primarily by hand, and then dumping the bodies in mass graves. Zeta training included learning to kill captives with their bare hands.[71] Witnesses to the Allende massacre described the slow and methodical work of destruction by the Zetas, which took days to complete. Accounts of massacres by the Kaibiles similarly describe the unit slowly and systematically engaging in violence, and taking breaks before continuing the slaughter.[72] The Zetas learned much more than just the overall tactic of indiscriminate violence from the elite units from which they recruited; they even appropriated specific modes of indiscriminate violence from the state's counterinsurgency apparatus.

**Conclusion**

The appropriation of terrorist tactics by organized crime groups is a topic of urgent concern, but scholarly investigation of this topic has been limited by a narrow focus on convergence between criminal groups and non-state terrorist networks (particularly in Lebanon and Colombia). While the use of similar tactics by geographically and ideologically distant groups merits further investigation, connections between organized crime and state terrorism provide a direct explanation for the adoption of terror-generating tactics into criminal repertoires. These connections are sufficiently well documented that, in cases such as the Zetas, we can trace the linkages between crime and state terrorism down to the level of individual violence specialists.
The linkages between organized crime and state terrorism are strategic, not opportunistic or accidental. There is a clear direction and process of transmission from governmental elite counterinsurgency units to non-state criminal groups. In Mexico, these linkages were pioneered by the Gulf Cartel in the 90s through the targeted recruitment of elite Mexican soldiers, a strategy that was expanded to targeted recruitment of Guatemalan Kaibiles with their notorious reputation as instruments of state terrorism. Given the increasing criminal competition in Mexico, appropriating the tactics of state terrorism gave the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas a strategic advantage over their rivals. Among the many groups using violence to contest territory, the Zetas stood out with their reputation for generating terror—until other groups replicated their recruitment and training practices, as well as their violent tactics. The Zetas forged the connection between organized crime and state terrorism, but could not monopolize this, and as a consequence the tactics of state terrorism spread throughout Mexico.

Identifying the intersections of organized crime violence and state terrorism raises an important analytical issue for scholars of terrorism. 9/11 may have situated scholarly attention squarely on “new” non-state terrorist networks, but longer legacies of terrorism continue to exert powerful influence over contemporary patterns of crime.[73] The brutal Latin American counterinsurgency campaigns of the 80s and 90s have been eclipsed by the end of the Cold War and by the events on 9/11, but many of the perpetrators of state terrorist campaigns remain in formal and informal positions of power, and the tactics that they used to notorious effect continue to be taught and deployed by these perpetrators and their scions. To effectively analyze contemporary trends in the use of terrorism, scholars must not neglect these longer legacies of violence.

A critical case study like the one on the Zetas is not necessarily generalizable, and so further research should carefully explore possible linkages between state terrorism and organized crime in contexts beyond Mexico. For Guatemala, Paul and Demarest offered a detailed account of a death squad that mobilized out of the military, and terrorized a local community.[74] After the peace accords in Guatemala, much of the security and intelligence apparatus that perpetrated acts of state terrorism remains intact. Although the military ceded political power in the country, this apparatus merely shifted focus from counterinsurgency to organized crime.[75] In Colombia, the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces (A.U.C. for Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) saw networks of former paramilitary recruits re-mobilize as criminal groups. The A.U.C. was an important, informal element of the state’s counterinsurgency apparatus. Paramilitaries linked to the A.U.C. committed numerous massacres before being demobilized.[76] These practices continue among criminal groups with roots in the A.U.C.[77] These suggested test cases come from Latin American countries that have received extensive counterinsurgency support from the United States military. A further direction of inquiry would consider whether state terrorist tactics developed outside of the orbit of U.S. influence were and are also available for appropriation by criminal organizations. If the terror-generating tactics deployed by state security forces in Syria, for example, are not readily transmitted to criminal groups, we should consider what about Latin American (and U.S.-sponsored) state terrorism is so readily transmitted to other contexts.

Further research should also consider variations in the process of transmission identified here. Could state terrorist tactics be appropriated by other types of groups? Some former Kaibiles remobilized as mercenaries, raising the question of whether these tactics could be appropriated by private security outfits. Could the direction of transmission be reversed, with organized crime bringing violent tactics into the state? Given reports of Mexican criminal groups capturing or co-opting municipal and state governments, this possibility merits closer examination.

This crime and state terrorist nexus also has vital implications for security policy. Both U.S. foreign and Mexican security policy has emphasized the importance of equipping and deploying the Mexican military to fight a criminal insurgency waged by narco-terrorists.[78] Yet certain terrorist counter-insurgency tactics entered criminal repertoires precisely through highly trained and well-equipped counterinsurgent units. Rather than treating the military as a bulwark against organized crime and terrorism, then, security policy must grapple with the potentially compromised status of the security apparatus—especially in the long-term aftermath of brutal counterinsurgency campaigns. Greater vetting of recruits to counterinsurgency training programs is not enough here; the original Zetas were not recruited until after they had completed training.
Only with due attention to the possibility of a leakage of counter-insurgency tactics to organized crime will more effective security policies have a chance of being implemented.

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Notes


[15] The clearest cases of convergence come within domestic contexts, but even here the connections between insurgency and crime are often complicated. Escobar’s Medellín Cartel worked with insurgents, but also mobilized a coalition against insurgents. Other country contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate complex fields of interrelations between crime and political violence. Stepanova, Ekaterina. (2012) “Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan.” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, 2. Williams, Phil. (2009) Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq. Strategic Studies Institute.


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An Analysis of Testimonies in Trials Against Zeta Members in San Antonio, Austin, and Del Rio, Texas. University of Texas School of Law.


Political Violence from the Extreme Right in Contemporary Portugal

by Riccardo Marchi and Raquel da Silva

Abstract

In Portugal, extreme right political violence can be found in two different periods: in the period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy (between 25 April 1974 and the mid-1980s) and from the second half of the 1980s to the present. In the first period, militants who had been radicalised by the Colonial War (1961-1974), the anti-imperialist mobilisation of the extreme left student movement in the academic crises of the 1960s, but also by the actions of the revolutionary leadership of the transition process after the April Revolution. Militants were active in politically violent organisations aimed at stopping the advance of Communism in Portugal. Among these organisations, the ELP (Exército de Libertação de Portugal / Portugal’s Liberation Army) gained salience and will be explored in-depth in this chapter. The second period was characterised by a new extreme right showcasing an ethno-nationalist political identity and discourse, which fused both the ultra-nationalism of the old extreme right and the neo-Nazi racism of the skinhead subculture. Initially, the MAN (Movimento de Acção Nacional / National Action Movement) was key in uniting the nationalist militants and the skinheads. After its dismantling by the authorities, it was replaced by the PHS (Portugal Hammerskins). The dynamics of both organisations is explored in detail throughout this chapter. For this, the research uses a qualitative methodology based on interviews carried out with extreme right militants, on documentation produced by the different movements and on archive material produced by the police and court investigations.

Keywords: anti-communism, radical right, democratic transition, Portugal, Portuguese Liberation Army, right-wing extremism, skinheads

Introduction

For an analysis of extreme right political violence in Portugal, it is necessary to consider the chronological dynamics of this political family as of 25 April 1974. On this date, the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas / Armed Forces Movement) carried out a military coup, also known as the April Revolution, which overthrew the authoritarian regime of Estado Novo and started the transition to democracy. The offensive of the extreme right began in this historical context, which can be divided into two different phases, spanning a period of four decades. The first phase began with the defeat of the authoritarian regime and ended in the mid-1980s. The second phase started in the second half of the 1980s, leading up to the present.

To these two distinct phases correspond two distinct generations of extreme right militants, who had adopted different sociological and ideological standpoints. In the first phase, militants were radicalised in the early 1960s as a consequence of the crisis afflicting the Portuguese overseas empire (the so-called colonies), characterised by the outbreak of the Colonial War in 1961 and by the anti-imperialist mobilisation of the extreme left student movement throughout the 1960s. With the fall of the regime, which initiated the process of democratic transition, this nationalist generation encouraged the emergent right-wing parties and movements, initially, to attempt to safeguard the Portuguese presence in Africa through legal political means and, later on, to resist (violently) the advance of communism in Portugal.[1]

The protagonists of the second phase (second half of the 1980s), on the contrary, experienced neither the authoritarian regime nor the myth of a pluri-continental and multi-racial empire.[2] This generation started its political militancy a decade after the end of the decolonisation process, in a broadly consolidated democratic system, where leftist forces, like the PCP (Partido Comunista Português / Portuguese Communist Party), actively participated in the political and administrative organisation of the country.[3]
A common point of both generations was their mobilisation through the creation and development of organisations (political parties and movements), operating as legitimate political actors, as well as the engagement of some of their elements in clandestine and violent actions. In the case of the first generation, this type of actions mostly happened during the so-called PREC (Processo Revolucionário em Curso / Ongoing Revolutionary Process), which started with the failed right-wing coup d' état on 11 March 1975 and ended with the failed left-wing coup d' état on 25 November 1975. The months of the PREC were characterised by political turmoil and instability, by a country politically divided between “democrats” and “reactionaries”, with both committing excesses and driving the country towards a near civil war scenario.

[4] In this period, as part of a broad front of anti-communist resistance, the clandestine organisation closest associated with the extreme right was the ELP (Exército de Libertação de Portugal / Liberation Army of Portugal). As far as the second generation is concerned, clandestine and violent actions were closely linked to the arrival in Portugal of the skinhead subculture towards the end of the 20th century and its organisational evolution at the beginning of the 21st century. The Portuguese skinhead movement began to be structured in the late 1980s, integrating into the already existing nationalist organisation MAN (Movimento de Acção Nacional / Movement of National Action). At the beginning of the new millennium, the skinhead movement was strengthened by the creation of the PHS (Portugal Hammerskins), which for a brief period appeared at the forefront of the nationalist milieu.[5]

In the following pages, the article traces the movements of the Portuguese extreme right from the period preceding the April Revolution to the present, focussing particularly on the politically violent organisations. It is based on interviews with former extreme right militants, as well as by the analysis of literature produced by scholars and journalists and documents produced by the political organisations under examination and by the political establishment (e.g., police, Constitutional Court).

**The Extreme Right in the Democratic Transition**

When Estado Novo’s regime was overthrown on 25 April 1974, the Portuguese right-wing split into various political parties and movements to enter the democratic structure. Its most radical militants had been mobilised in the 1960s by the need to defend the Portuguese overseas empire, which was under attack in the context of the colonial war. They blamed Marcelo Caetano, who had replaced António de Oliveira Salazar in 1968 as prime-minister and stayed in power until the 25 April 1974, of being used by liberal forces who were interested in distancing Portugal from its African possessions and in the country's integration in the European Economic Community (EEC), and for allowing the occurrence of the April Revolution.[6] The latter was seen as a disastrous date in Portuguese history, [7] opening the possibility for the implementation of a “Marxist/Communist/collectivist/totalitarian dictatorship worse than Salazar’s”.[8]

Given the political scenario of transition, the extreme right was divided into two distinct strategic lines. The first one accepted the new democratic situation and founded a political party – the MFP/PP (Movimento Federalista Português/Partido do Progresso / Portuguese Federalist Movement/Progress Party) – with the aim of competing for the Constituent Assembly of 25 April 1975. The second strategic line fully rejected any type of adherence to the revolutionary political system and founded a political movement – the MAP (Movimento de Acção Portuguesa / Portuguese Action Movement) – with the aim of bringing together the extreme right resistance, mainly from student organisations of the 1960s, but also from the paramilitary structures of the former regime (Legião Portuguesa / Portuguese Legion and Mocidade Portuguesa / Portuguese Youth), and from the political police, also known as PIDE/DGS (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direção Geral de Segurança / International and State Defence Police/Directorate-General of Security).

In the early months of the democratic transition, these two organisations were characterised by a clear disparity in their resources, but also by a common weakness in failing to have much impact on the national political scene. Although the MFP/PP enjoyed a greater ability to capture logistical and financial support from the different right-wing factions, it remained, as well as the MAP, a marginal player in the transition process. The same happened to other organisations situated at the extreme right of the political spectrum.
due to their open criticism of the decolonisation process.[9] However, despite constituting a minor part of the right-wing landscape in Portugal after the 25 April 1974 events, the extreme right parties and movements were the ones most repressed by the leftist military and political parties because they were seen as the armed wing of the conservative reactionary forces in the shadow of General António Spínola, then President of the Republic. After the April Revolution, General António Spínola, who had been deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces during the deposed regime, was part of the conservative faction of the MFA. He started by heading the Junta de Salvação Nacional (National Salvation Board) and then became the first President of the Republic, in May 1974.

The repression of the extreme right was first openly demonstrated on 28 September 1974, when supporters of President Spínola called for a demonstration of the conservative forces to consolidate the President’s political position, which became known as Maioria Silenciosa (Silent Majority). Such a demonstration was seen by the extreme left as a counter-revolutionary action engendered by the extreme right with Spínola’s support, which aimed at provoking a harsh reaction from the left, so the President of the Republic could declare a state of siege, put an end to the revolutionary process and take control of the decolonisation process.[10] Allegedly, this perceived attempt at a coup d’état was financed by economic groups linked to the deposed regime and the civilians taking part in it were armed by the extreme right. In this context, on the eve of the demonstration, hundreds of weapons were seized in raids conducted by the leftist forces. In the headquarters of the MFP/PP, they found lists of weapons of war and materials suitable for urban guerrilla warfare. In the headquarters of the MAP, there was a shotgun with telescopic sight, creating the rumour of an imminent terrorist attack against the Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves. Thus, what was, for the extreme right, a simple and legitimate mobilisation in support of President Spínola, inspired by the demonstration in favour of General de Gaulle in May 1968 in France, turned into a repressive Marxist wave, resulting in hundreds of people being arrested and exiled abroad.[11]

On 11 March 1975, history repeated itself. General Spínola, still President of the Republic, led an armed action to supposedly prevent the killing of his supporters within the armed forces. According to information provided by the Spanish secret services to the extreme right based in Madrid, such plot was orchestrated by the extreme left and became known as Matança de Páscoa (Easter Massacre). The real authors of such a plot – the extreme left to replace Spínola or the extreme right to create chaos – are still the object of debates among historians. What is clear is that General Spínola and his collaborators acted ingenuously, committing mistakes at both political and military levels. Their armed reaction was quickly defeated, provoking another repressive wave against the right, which meant new arrests and escapes out of the country, this time including General Spinola himself, who sought exile in Brazil.

The second wave of Marxist repression sharply increased both the number of political prisoners in Portugal (around 2,000) and of political exiles abroad (estimates point to a total of 20,000 to 30,000 people), particularly in neighbouring Spain. This laid the groundwork for the creation of armed clandestine organisations, which perceived themselves as part of the anti-communist resistance. As one extreme right former militant exiled in Spain put it:

“After 11 March in Portugal there was no democracy, make no mistake.[…] In the period from March 1975 to November 1975, the real situation in Portugal was that things happened that had nothing to do with democracy.” [12]

According to this former militant, anyone who would disagree with the Council of the Revolution – an institution set up by the MFA after 11 March 1975 to lead the transition process, playing a tutelary role in the selection of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister – was subjected to “warrantless arrests”, “popular trials”, “simulated executions” and being “held in jail without talking with a lawyer”. He also mentioned the control of the media and the “increasing weight of the Communist Party”, which led extreme
right militants to the conclusion that they were “gradually walking towards a totalitarian state” a state which would be tougher than the previous authoritarian regime because “the human rights violations that occurred in Eastern Europe were always worse than the worst times under Estado Novo”. This was complemented by the views of another extreme right former militant, who pointed out that the PCP had created “a policy of terror”, which inhibited the resistance of most Portuguese citizens:

“What was happening was that the Portuguese people, who were not Communist, were afraid. They were afraid because they thought that the PCP had the majority and ruled everything, because that was the image portrayed by the PCP: ‘The people are with us and we will never be defeated’. Then, we had to prove that the PCP was a minority, that the PCP could be made afraid, if necessary, and that most of the Portuguese people was not Communist.” [13]

In this context, three main organisations emerged: 1) the ELP (Exército de Libertação de Portugal / Portugal's Liberation Army) (which was perceived at the time as the flagship of the Portuguese extreme right); 2) the MDLP (Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal / Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal); and 3) the Plano Maria da Fonte (Maria da Fonte Plan).

The MDLP was created by General Spínola from his Brazilian exile and was led on the ground by Commander Guilherme Alpoim Calvão. The latter had been a naval officer involved in the events of 11 March 1975, which resulted in his exile in Spain. Some MDLP supporters lived in Portugal, while other were exiled abroad. They were either military men who supported General Spínola or anti-communist civilians. Among the latter, there were prominent MFP/PP cadres who constituted MDLP’s Political Commission. The MDLP aimed at multiplying anti-communist armed actions in Portugal to incite the population against the forces of the extreme left. Their strategy was to create liberated zones in Portugal, starting in the north, laying the foundations for the return of General Spínola to the country to head a provisional government.[14]

The Maria da Fonte Plan was designed by three men: Jorge Jardim, a businessman based in Mozambique with links to the intelligence services of different Western countries during Estado Novo: Waldemar Paradela de Abreu, a liberal publisher and Major José Sanches Osório, part of the MFA and anti-communist clandestine militant after 11 March 1975. They were joined by individuals connected to the Catholic Church and to moderate parties, whose members started to feel frightened by the radical escalation of the transition process. The uniqueness of this organisation lay in the interaction with local caciques, who had operated their clientelist networks since the end of the nineteenth century in Portugal, and with the hierarchies of the Catholic Church in the north of Portugal, which offered a wide base of popular support to the anti-communist uprising. The northern Catholic landowners did not readily accept the socialist proposals of the Council of the Revolution in power. This predisposed them to respond to the call of anti-communist organisations to show their dissatisfaction by attacking left-wing parties’ headquarters after the Sunday mass or after political rallies.[15] Thus, the preferred strategy of the proponents of the Maria da Fonte Plan was to mobilise the crowds. They used to infiltrate packed places, such as markets, and incite the people to attack the headquarters of left-wing parties, placing bombs, throwing Molotov cocktails and starting fires, as explained by one extreme right former militant:

“We especially encouraged uprisings of the population in the various villages, towns and cities, against the headquarters of the Communist Party. When there were markets and fairs, we took advantage and carried out armed break-ins, destroying the premises, papers, and so on.”[16]

These three organisations – the ELP, the MDLP, and the Maria da Fonte Plan – were flanked by almost three dozen other minor organisations.[17] They participated equally in the anti-communist armed operations taking place in Portugal during the PREC and, particularly, during the so-called Verão Quente (Hot Summer) of 1975.[18] They integrated the broad Portuguese anti-communist front, which included moderate parties, Catholic hierarchies, and the anti-Marxist military faction of the MFA.[19] This front was also supported by Western countries, such as the USA and Great Britain, which started as staunch supporters of the armed resistance, but gradually turned to Mário Soares and his Socialist Party as the pillars of the anti-communist opposition.[20]
Despite constituting rather small organisations, at least in number of militants, the operational capacity of the different armed groups was remarkable. Between May 1975 and April 1977, 566 acts of political violence were carried out, including bombings, assaults on political headquarters, fires, shootings, physical assaults and the death of around ten individuals.[21] Of these attacks, 34% were directed at the PCP.[22] which, between July and November 1975, saw more than 100 of its headquarters across the country assaulted.[23] From a geographical point of view, more than 70% of the actions were carried out to the north of the city of Rio Maior, where the armed revolt began and where the extreme right was able to gather more popular support. On one hand, in the words of one extreme right militant, the Northerners “did not want to see their land devastated” by Communist policies, and, on the other hand, the Catholic Church was still very much connected to the “old regime” and would, if necessary, “bring a popular army to arms” to fight the “red invasion”.[24]

**The ELP**

Within the broad anti-communist front, the ELP appeared as the most prominent organisation of the Portuguese extreme right. This might be explained by two aspects: this organisation conducted the first extreme right armed action in Portugal and its core militants had been protagonists of the deposed regime. In this vein, MDLP militants, for instance, assumed that in the imagination of the Portuguese people, the ELP had played a much larger role in the political violence carried out by the extreme right in the 1970s. One former militant explained:

> “The ELP has, even today, you can still see remnants of the ELP on the walls [referring to graffiti]… the ELP created a major impact on the Portuguese public opinion, when they were in Spain, having a near zero contribution in terms of action, right? The psychological part was ELP, ELP, ELP…”[25]

This notion is justified by two features of the ELP. First, the acronym. When said in Portuguese, ELP sounds like the English word *help*, contributing to build the image of an organisation which was going to save the nation from the communist evil – “the name by itself is amazing, isn’t it?” commented one MDLP militant. Second, the propaganda strategy: ELP militants tried to look like the well-known violent organisations of their time – “Then they made a press conference hooded like ETA, which caused a huge impact and made the first page of the newspapers.” These factors are believed to have led people in Portugal to be much more aware of the ELP and to mythologise it as the “bogeyman”, saying “it was the ELP” or “look out, the ELP is coming!” However, MDLP militants emphasised that the ELP was a very small organisation, which lacked credibility, being known for taking the credit for violent actions conducted by other organisations. Additionally, they considered that the ELP aimed at the impossible – “the return to the past state of things, to a regime like Estado Novo’s.” Similar characterisations have been given by those responsible for the Maria da Fonte Plan. José Sanches Osório, for example, defined the ELP as “an undemocratic Fascist movement ... led by pseudo-enlightened crypto-Nazi tendencies”.[26] Waldemar Paradela de Abreu disqualified the ELP as “half a dozen individuals with limited operational capacity”.[27]

Finally, former militants, such as Miguel Freitas da Costa, stress how the leftist factions of the MFA helped create the myth that the ELP was a highly structured and efficient clandestine organisation.[28] The bigger and more dangerous the ELP appeared, the more they could play up the threat it posed to the Portuguese democratic transition.

**Recruitment**

As already mentioned, the core militants of the ELP were former elements of the authoritarian regime, including the number two in the hierarchy of the political police Agostinho Barbieri Cardoso, *Estado Novo’s* minister Manuel Cotta Dias, Angola’s governor-general Fernando Santos e Castro, and former members of the special forces of the Portuguese Legion, such as José Rebordão Esteves Pinto. These individuals were not only significant due to their previous positions, but also due to their networks. José Rebordão Esteves Pinto,
for instance, played a major role in the formation of ELP’s clandestine network. He belonged to the extreme right opposition to Marcelo Caetano, which since the late 1960s had actively collaborated with the French exiles of the OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète / Secret Armed Organisation) in Lisbon.[29] Together, they organised the counter-subversive structure Aginter Presse, which was led by Guerin Serac and transferred to Madrid after 25 April 1974. In the Spanish capital, the reconstituted Franco-Portuguese network cooperated with the Italian neo-fascist exiles of Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale led by Stefano Delle Chiaie.[30]

Thus, in January 1975, ELP’s core militants began contacting their former Portuguese comrades who kept being sent into exile, but also new people caught up in the repressive wave of 28 September 1974. In most cases, the latter did not have a long history in the extreme right, but after experiencing political backlash from the extreme left, were ready to join the ELP. This is evidenced by two important testimonies of former ELP militants, who were active in Spain and Portugal respectively: Miguel Freitas da Costa and Sebastião de Lancastre.[31] The former decided to travel to Spain to join his already exiled father Eduardo Freitas da Costa, a renowned intellectual nationalist, encountering the ELP through José Rebordão. The latter began travelling to Spain after 28 September 1974 to visit his uncle, Manuel Braancamp Sobral, also a renowned intellectual nationalist, exiled in the neighbouring country. In Madrid, he was contacted by Miguel Freitas da Costa who invited him to join the ELP and, more specifically, to start a cell in Lisbon. Having accepted the invitation, Lancastre formed his own cell, composed of half a dozen members of his family and friendship circles. The activity of this cell never went beyond the production and distribution of clandestine anti-communist propaganda and the custody of detonators delivered by operatives from Madrid. Nonetheless, these testimonies confirm the mechanism of co-optation of personal networks employed by the ELP for its own organisation and proliferation.

The ranks of the ELP were also filled by legionaries and former colonial war combatants.[32] Despite describing, in general terms, the enlistment in the ELP as a rather simple and rudimentary process, some veterans recall complex recruitment mechanisms to enter this organisation. For instance, Luis Cordovil was contacted by unknown people who had him travel through several European capitals to London where he was trained alongside other Portuguese in subversive warfare techniques;[33] and Rafael Caimoto Duarte was recruited in South Africa and sent to northern Portugal where he participated in the bombings of left-wing parties’ headquarters, only to later find out that these were actions planned by the ELP.[34]

Aims, Organisational Dynamics, and Strategies

According to Carlos Dugos, [35] who interviewed ELP’s leaders whilst in exile in Spain, the organisation aimed to achieve: the restoration of national unity, which had been jeopardised by the Marxist revolution; the real independence of the fatherland, which was threatened by the Communist world; and cultural freedom, which had been subjugated by Marxist dogmatism. Regarding the colonial issue, the ELP took an integrationist approach, which defended the permanent integration of the colonies in national territory. This approach would mean the eradication of the many existing differences between Portugal and its colonies; the defeat of the liberation movements from the colonies through war; and the disposition of the Portuguese people to finance and accomplish all this.[36]

The ELP had a central command in Madrid and several operative cells in both Spain and Portugal. Each cell was composed of less than ten members and did not have contact with the other cells in order to guarantee that its militants knew the smallest possible number of comrades. From the operational point of view, the ELP strategy was modelled on theories of revolutionary warfare, which had been learned in the counter-subversive warfare courses of the 1960s in both the Portuguese military milieu engaged in the colonial war and amongst French OAS exiles in Spain.[37]

The ELP aimed to create and multiply cells of sabotage at different levels (e.g., cities, companies, schools) to spread chaos and render ineffective the civil and military power controlled by the government of Vasco Gonçalves. This would, thus, provoke the population’s revolt against the government and the MFA. This plan
was never implemented in its entirety, or at least never went beyond the occasional armed actions. The most daring sabotage operations planned, such as damaging Lisbon's water supply network, were not carried out. The operational difficulties of the ELP were also evidenced by some glaring failures. On 14 September 1975, an ELP van carrying weapons, explosive material, coils for radio broadcasting, and false documents was seized by the authorities in Oporto. The militants' oversight in this situation led to the loss of all the material gathered for the planned assault on the radio station *Radio Clube Miramar*. On 26 September 1975, two ELP militants died when driving a car full of explosives for the destruction of a Portuguese radio television antenna in Monsanto. The militants' mistake was to use remote-controlled detonators in the vicinity of radio antennas. This type of operation had already taken place in the declining phase of the extreme right's armed struggle, after the peak of the 'hot summer' of 1975, in which the ELP conducted dozens of assaults and bombings, but without carrying out any actions with major consequences.[38]

Likewise, attempts to consolidate the propaganda structure, which was supposed to work in parallel to the armed action, were never very effective. For instance, the effort to set up mobile radio stations along the Spanish-Portuguese border for anti-communist broadcasts had little effect. The organisation's official bulletin—*Libertação* (Liberation)—offering instructions on guerrilla warfare (e.g., how to manufacture Molotov cocktails) was only published twice between August and September 1975.[39]

**The Denouement of the Clandestine and Violent Extreme Right in the Democratic Transition**

On 25 November 1975, a new test of strength arose between the different military factions of the MFA: an attempted armed coup led by the extreme left faction was defeated by the intervention of a group of commandos led by Jaime Neves.[40] Historiography considers this date the turning point in the Portuguese transition, ending the PREC and normalising the democratisation process.[41] This date also had repercussions on the clandestine extreme right. All armed organisations began to demobilise because they believed that the danger of Communist escalation was over.[42] As one extreme right militant put it: “after the 25 November we shut the door and left […] Communism had not entered Portugal”.[43] This reaction was also helped by the fact that the anti-communist component of the Council of the Revolution in collaboration with the anti-communist parties – began to (informally) negotiate a ceasefire with extreme right organisations and the return of their members to Portugal, not facing judicial repercussions.[44] In this sense, most extreme right militants who had been involved with politically violent organisations were able to return to Portugal without facing arrest or any other type of judicial consequences. As explained by a former ELP militant:

> “In January 1976 I returned to Portugal. A member of the Council of the Revolution said I could return. I went to Lisbon and after some time I went to Caxias where my file was closed without any reprisals. I was freed from any illegal situations.” [45]

However, compared to other clandestine organisations, the ELP accepted the 25 November 1975 less favourably. This date was seen as the symbol of the betrayal of moderate political–military elites in relation to the clandestine militants because, on the one hand, it did not outlaw the PCP and, on the other hand, it did not recognise the role of armed groups in defeating the civilian and military extreme left.[46] This sense of frustration led some ELP militants to continue armed actions throughout 1976. In fact, this year saw a considerable level of political violence in Portugal. However, it cannot be attributed to the ELP in its previously organised hierarchical structure. On the contrary, this was the consequence of the activity of a few disenfranchised militants from different anti-communist organisations who felt that they still had “a score to settle” with “those who carried out the April Revolution”, as pointed out by one extreme right militant who integrated the so-called *Rede Bombista do Norte* (Northern Bombing Network), after 25 November 1975.[47]

It is interesting to note that regarding the political violence committed in Portugal by the extreme right during the transition process to democracy, the only instance in which a judicial process took place was in connection with the Northern Bombing Network.[48] This was a hybrid anti-communist structure, active
between October 1975 and July 1976, in the withdrawal phase of clandestine organisations, which comprised extreme right militants, but also ordinary police officers and criminals, who carried out dozens of bombings, resulting in four deaths. Of the sixteen defendants in the judicial process, only five received prison sentences, ranging from three to twenty years.[49]

The Violent Extreme Right in the Consolidated Democracy

The end of the revolutionary phase of the Portuguese transition to democracy and the start of the normalisation phase of the democratic process in the second half of the 1970s culminated in the constitutional revision of 1982. This ended the military’s control over political power, dissolving the Council of the Revolution and considerably decreasing politically violent activities. Although violent confrontations continued to take place between radical groups, mainly between the newly created ones of nationalist character and in the student milieu, at the beginning of the 1980s Portugal entered a period of dwindling politically violent activities. The generation of extreme right-wing militants of the 1960s and 1970s had abandoned politics. One of them explained that:

“When there was freedom after 25 November, a new freedom, like the one after 25 April, the people concerned, or most of them, withdrew from politics. All the Spinolist military were never heard from again. I withdrew completely from politics [...] Most of the people who were with me in Spain never engaged in politics again.” [50]

However, in 1985, the MAN (Movimento de Ação Nacional / National Action Movement) appeared, founded by a young right-wing dissident from the mainstream party CDS, Luís Paulo Henriques. The MAN started as a classic nationalist organisation, still attached to the authoritarian past and to the pre-April Revolution claim of the pluri-continental and multi-racial dimension of the Portuguese empire. Nonetheless, throughout the second half of the 1980s, the MAN began to strengthen its relations with its European counterparts and to introduce in Portugal the anti-immigration and racist discourse already en vogue in France, England, and Germany.[51]

This type of discourse got some traction in Portugal in this period, due to the socio-demographic changes taking place in this country. These included the modification of the ethnic structure of the suburbs of the two main metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto by four consecutive waves of immigration, which in 1980 represented 0.5% of the population and at the beginning of the twenty-first century had increased to 2%. [52] The first wave, from 1975 until the beginning of the 1980s, was composed by the so-called returnees from the former African colonies. These were former white settlers who felt forced to abandon the Portuguese colonies in Africa after their national independence, holding, for this reason, strong vengeance feelings toward black and mestizo Africans.[53] This first wave was also composed by some black citizens of the fallen empire, who had, however, lost their Portuguese citizenship. The second wave started after Portugal joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 and was composed by African workers, as well as Brazilian workers at the beginning of the 1990s, attracted by Portugal’s industrialisation boom caused by European funds flowing into the country. The end of the 1990s saw the third wave of immigration in Portugal, composed by Eastern European workers. Finally, the fourth wave of immigration at the beginning of the twenty-first century was characterised by a decrease in immigrants from both Africa and Eastern Europe while immigration from Brazil kept at the same levels.

In the midst of this changing social fabric emerged a new generation of right-wing extremists. They were, often, the children of returnee and/or proletarian parents who had settled in the periphery of the main cities, increasingly occupied by immigrants, as well as the children of middle-class city folks who saw themselves surrounded by shanty towns inhabited by immigrants.[54] In this context, and in an atmosphere devoid of positive political developments, created by the previous forty years of authoritarianism, these young people were easily influenced by foreign political trends, in particular, by the extremism of the skinhead subculture conveyed by the Portuguese media and by accounts of relatives and friends who had emigrated to France and Great Britain.
The Portuguese Skinheads and the MAN

In this sense, the first Portuguese skinheads connected to the only existing nationalist organisation in Portugal, the MAN, due to their analogous identities and racist discourse.[55] In turn, MAN leaders saw the opening to the skinhead movement as a quick way to boost the movement's numbers and capacity. This created, from an organisational point of view, a binary structure: on one hand, there was an organisation with an official hierarchy, perfectly delineated, but only real on paper; on the other hand, there was an organisation with a broad militant base consisting of informal local cells – at neighbourhood or at school levels – which was extremely autonomous and uncontrollable by the leadership of the MAN.[56] This broad militant base was composed of individuals in their twenties, who possessed low educational levels (mostly secondary education and unfinished university degrees) and non-specialised professions. There was no older generation to stand behind them, no veterans of nationalist militancy who could act as mentors or advisors. This duality of a poorly functioning hierarchy and an extremely autonomous base was a constant throughout MAN's existence. Symptomatic in this respect was the meeting in Oporto in December 1989 between MAN leaders and the skinhead movement of the North in order to discuss the integration of the latter into the former, which ended in a violent clash.[57] The organisational duality was also reflected in the strategic duality of the MAN: the hierarchy of the organisation relied on the classic political militancy, which was based on propaganda, mobilisation, and media promotion. In contrast to this, the skinhead base only occasionally adhered to the leadership strategy, being more concerned with the implementation of its subculture of belonging, characterised by the organisation of concerts, neo-Nazi aesthetics, and street violence.[58]

The growing number of episodes of inter-ethnic and/or political violence carried out by skinheads in the second half of the 1980s culminated in the murder of a militant of the PSR (Partido Socialista Revolucionário / Socialist Revolutionary Party), José Carvalho, on 28 October 1989, by a group of neo-Nazis who intended to enter the headquarters of the far-left party to attend a concert. The eight skinheads involved in this incident were immediately identified, prosecuted and convicted. The alleged killer was sentenced to twelve years in jail, three individuals to sentences of between five and seven years, two individuals received suspended sentences of less than two years, and the remaining two were acquitted. Following this murder, the Attorney General of the Republic ordered a police investigation on the extreme right landscape in Portugal, in order to clarify the size of the skinhead phenomenon and its links to the MAN. This led the police to wiretap the telephone conversations of prominent extreme right activists in Portugal, between December 1989 and April 1990. Based on the investigations, the police concluded that during the period of September to November 1990, the MAN was in a phase of militant growth, greater structuring and internationalisation. However, in fact, the growth phase can be traced back to 1987-1989, since in 1990 the MAN was already suffering from a deep crisis due to the many internal diatribes and defections following the 1989 criminal offence.[59] In 1991, the police obtained authorisation from the Criminal Investigation Court to carry out domestic raids on the leader of the MAN, as well as on several prominent militants. This operation, at this point in time, encountered a movement already in crisis. The interrogations carried out following the raids allowed the police to demonstrate skinheads’ membership of MAN, but could not to prove either a correspondence between the MAN structure and the skinhead movement, nor the existence of a MAN project to organise the Portuguese skinhead movement.[60]

Despite these results, in July 1991, the Attorney General of the Republic sent a request for the extinction of the MAN to the Constitutional Court. The request was based on three rules of Portuguese law: 1) article 46, number 4 of the Portuguese Constitution according to which organisations that embody a Fascist ideology are not allowed; 2) law number 64/78, which also forbids organisations that have a Fascist ideology; and 3) article 10 of the Law of the Constitutional Court which attributes to the Constitutional Court the competence to declare if an organisation has adopted the Fascist ideology and to decree its extinction”. The most serious accusation made by the Attorney General of the Republic to the MAN was to attempt to unleash a revolutionary process for the overthrow of the political-constitutional system and for the establishment in Portugal of a “Nationalist State”.[61] This accusation was based, essentially, on the ideological aspect of the MAN, which was possible to be outlined thanks to the abundant material seized in the militants’ house raids.
In the last quarter of 1991, the Attorney General of the Republic and the Constitutional Court were dedicated to the identification of the legal representatives of the MAN. Several individuals were interrogated by the former between January and March 1992 and were finally summoned by the latter in June 1992 to start the process of dismantling the movement. The proceedings before the Constitutional Court ran from September 1993 to January 1994, ending four years after the first investigation and three years after the self-dissolution of the movement.[62] The conclusions of the Constitutional Court confirmed that the MAN was indeed an organisation which had a leading structure and a set of means targeted at a common goal. Regarding the fact that the MAN did or did not espouse Fascist ideology, the Constitutional Court pointed out some characteristics of the movement that support such an accusation, such as its ultranationalist and antidemocratic character, as well as the apology of historical Fascist regimes and personalities. With regard to violence, it was not possible to define the MAN as an a priori violent organisation. Thus, the Constitutional Court questioned whether it should be considered Fascist purely by dint of its ideological characteristics. Given this legal-constitutional problem, the court decided not to resolve it, appealing to the fact that the self-dissolution of the movement had already removed all justification for a possible extinction measure. This prevented the Constitutional Court from undertaking the delicate task of inaugurating a legal precedent with respect to organisations of the extreme right and therefore, those involved were spared the heavy penalties stipulated by the legal system.

The Portugal Hammer Skin

The repression followed by the 1989 assassination and the constitutional process against the MAN resulted in the disappearance of the more structured organisation of the Portuguese extreme right, allowing the return to unstructured forms of mobilisation without hierarchies.[63] The small organisations created from the debris of the MAN never succeeded in achieving the same relevance as the dissolved organisation and did not even attempt a project of uniting the extreme right. This lack of a substantive political project and the preponderance of subculture behaviour in the younger generation of the extreme right led to the postponement of episodes of political and racial violence until mid-1990s. On 10 June 1995, after a troubled night in central Lisbon, extreme right extremists beat to death a Portuguese citizen of Cape Verdean origin, Alcindo Monteiro. The arrest of several nationalist militants and the subsequent prosecution led to the sentencing, in 1997, of ten skinheads to between sixteen and seventeen years in prison and of six skinheads to between two and thirteen years in prison.[64] This was the severest punishment ever, in Portugal, for hate crimes committed by extreme right militants and a hard blow to the nationalist arena. As a consequence, the Portuguese extreme right was, in the second half of the 1990s, once again deserted by its former militants. Only a few small organisations remained active, but in an extremely hostile milieu to extreme right ideas. In this context, the charismatic figure of Mário Machado emerged at the beginning of the new millennium. Mário Machado became a skinhead at the age of fourteen. In 1997, he received a two-year prison sentence for involvement in the events which culminated in the murder of Alcindo Monteiro, despite not having been part of the group of people who physically committed the crime.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Mário Machado devised an innovative organisational strategy for the Portuguese extreme right organised along three axes: 1) to restructure the Portuguese skinhead movement into one of the largest international organisations of this subculture – the Hammerskins Nation (HSN); 2) to promote a networked structure of all the smaller extreme right Portuguese organisations through the Internet; and 3) to operate, in parallel, through street movements and through the political party Partido National Renovador (National Renewal Party), which was founded in 1999 by old school nationalists and young people from the MAN.[65]

As for the skinhead structuring, in 2003 Mário Machado founded the Portuguese chapter of HSN, under the name of Portugal Hammerskins (PHS). Throughout its existence, the PHS never exceeded 150-200 militants across the country and kept the original model put into place by the HSN, namely a three category hierarchy: 1) the Hangarounds, who were individuals close but not yet belonging to the organisation; 2) the Prospects, who were individuals waiting to join but under scrutiny; and 3) the Hammers, who were full members of
According to the judicial authorities, the PHS was characterised as a group engaged in propaganda for the white race, showcasing a racist discourse less focused on supremacy and more focused on the defence and safeguard of the existence of the white race, allegedly threatened by the growth of other races and mass immigration.

Regarding the promotion of the extreme right network, Mário Machado was the first, in the Portuguese nationalist arena, to consistently rely on the Internet, creating the Forum Nacional (National Forum). He was inspired by the online militancy of the German far-right, with whom he was in contact. The National Forum was managed in a professional manner. It had a team dedicated to the daily production of content and two moderators who constantly monitored the various sections of the Forum. Unlike the PHS, the Forum brought together extreme right activists from the most diverse orientations, reaching 20,000 users. The exponential growth of online activism registered by the Forum alerted the authorities to this phenomenon and convinced them of the need to intervene, despite their overestimation of the danger of the network as a structure with defined common objectives and strategies.

In terms of political party activities, Mário Machado promoted the Frente Nacional (National Front), which was an organisation composed of a variety of militants (not only skinheads), whose purpose was to influence the leadership of the PNR. Since 2005, their objective was largely achieved, thanks to the presence of elements of its restricted circle in the PNR's governing bodies. This multifaceted strategy was a notable success in terms of mobilisation and media visibility. To cite only two examples: in 2005, the National Front organised a demonstration against crime attended by five hundred people, making it the largest demonstration of the extreme right since the transition years; in 2007, the National Forum planned and financed, through its subscribers, a controversial billboard against immigration placed in the centre of Lisbon. This was inspired by an anti-Turkish poster created by the German NPD and it gained media and political attention for several weeks.

According to Mário Machado's defence lawyer, the PHS played a central role in attracting the attention of the media and in mobilising the extreme right sympathisers, both due to the careful aesthetics of its militants and to the leader's charisma. However, the National Forum's ability to attract followers also captured the attention and concern of the authorities. In April 2007, the authorities decided to intervene against this tripartite structure – the PHS, the National Front/Forum, and the PNR. However, they did so differently from the constitutional process against the MAN, where they had focused on the Fascist character of the organisation. In this case, they focused on the most active and vulnerable component from the criminal point of view: the fact that the PHS was heavily involved in hate crimes and political violence. With such a focus, police operations led to the arrest of 31 individuals; the authorities also carried out 55 searches, seizing banned weapons and IT equipment used to spread hate, violence and racial discrimination. In this context, dozens of nationalist militants and sympathisers – mostly between the ages of 15 and 20 years old – were interrogated at the headquarters of the DCCB (Direcção Central de Combate ao Banditismo / Central Directorate for Combating Banditry). However, particular attention was paid to the inquiry into the core militants of the PHS.

Thus, the public prosecutor's strategy was to prosecute individual crimes related to racist propaganda or political violence, which was possible in almost 60 cases. Of these, only 15 individuals belonged to the PHS. From a socio-demographic point of view, those involved in the process came, mainly, from the proletarian and sub-proletarian strata of the suburbs of the metropolitan area of Lisbon. PHS's skinhead milieu was composed exclusively of young workers, while secondary or university students focused more on the Causa Identitária (Identitarian Cause), which was an autonomous nationalist organisation, despite participating in PNR and National Front initiatives. At the end of the trial, only three defendants were convicted of political crimes with an effective prison sentence: two PHS militants were convicted for crimes of physical violence (one against an anti-Fascist militant and one with racist overtone) and one PNR sympathiser was sentenced to three years in prison for posting a racist comment in the Forum, in which he called for the death of black people. Mário Machado – the only person to be held in custody at the beginning of the operation – received a suspended sentence and left jail. Despite few convictions leading
to actual arrests, the whole police operation managed to dismantle the nationalist scene once more.\[76\]

The judicial operation of 2007 was possible thanks to the daily surveillance of the authorities on the activities of the extreme right.\[77\] When the lawsuit was filed, there was already a two-to-three-year history of surveillance and wiretapping carried out by the DJCB. The authorities accumulated a large amount of evidence and substantiated the case through a number of small crimes. One of these, for example, was improper participation in a public place: the Hammers went to Oporto to beat up a skinhead affiliated with the rival organisation Blood & Honour, who worked in a supermarket. For this, they entered the supermarket after its closing time to the public which led to the condemnation of entering a place prohibited to the public, although the attack did not ultimately occur.

In parallel to the results of the police investigation, there were particularly serious episodes of political violence transmitted by the media. The most famous of these was the 2006 interview given by Mário Machado to the public television channel RTP, where while holding a shotgun he said that the extreme right was ready for the armed struggle in the event of ethnic riots.\[78\] In the court process, the defendants had to respond to dozens of similar petty offences. In support of the allegation, the authorities, on the basis of the results of years of surveillance, invited the parties to present a complaint. For example, during another trip to Oporto, the Hammers had an incident with a citizen of African descent, with whom they started a brawl, which was video recorded by the police.

Subsequently arrested for drug offences, the Afro-descendant citizen was invited to file a complaint for racist aggression. The public prosecutor tried to demonstrate that this extreme right network constituted a structured racist organisation and that all the episodes of imputed criminality were part of an organic strategy of a racist nature.\[79\] Thus, there were no direct accusations of being a Fascist subversive organisation such as in the case of the MAN. In doing so, however, the public prosecutor’s office was careful not to over-engage the militants of the Identitarian Cause or of the PNR, even though they had all been raided by the police, including the latter party’s headquarters. This was due to the fact that, on the one hand, Identitarian Cause’s activists did not have ideological or violent crimes to account for, and, on the other hand, to involve a legal political party like the PNR would have set an unwelcome precedent. Therefore, the aim of the judicial process was not to connect the whole nationalist galaxy with each other, but to target the most vulnerable link – the skinheads – and to make use of the most effective instrument in their reach – the National Forum. The intention was to obtain the maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for belonging to and being active in organisations of this type. However, at the end of the process this scheme did not work. According to the Hammerskins defence lawyer, the whole process was fragile because the organisation itself was quite fragile and only the Forum's action in terms of attracting sympathisers and networking could be relevant.\[80\]

There was a good number of facts to build a case, but they were all unconnected and difficult to attribute to a single concerted strategy. Thus, the convictions were focused on individuals and not really linked to the PHS as an organisation. For the defence lawyer, the public prosecutor was neither interested in promoting a constitutional procedure against the PHS, nor in a case against a collective organisation, but only in obtaining the highest number of individual convictions to dismantle the nationalist scene.\[81\]

**Conclusion**

Throughout the four decades of Portuguese democracy, extreme right-wing political violence has profoundly changed, accompanying the changes in political contexts, which influence how it is carried out and who the militants involved are. In the transition to democracy, the cadres of armed clandestine networks stemmed from political militancy in the nationalist groups or from the paramilitary organisations of the deposed authoritarian regime. This factor provided good doctrinal and technical training, strengthened in operational terms by the experience of the colonial war. In consolidated democracy, the politicisation of the militants of the late 1980s took place in the nationalist vacuum of the post-transition. This has led to extremely fragile paths of radicalisation in doctrinal terms and to militant practices characterised by violent actions that are less a product of elaborated, long-term strategies, but more punctual episodes of little or no political valence.
This difference between the two periods is evident in the repertoire of violent actions: while the transition generation took advantage of popular mobilisations for attacking the headquarters of leftist parties or engaged in armed actions against selected targets, the more recent generation did not engender any armed campaign against selected targets and the most serious episodes (the 1989 and 1995 homicides) resulted from spontaneous waves of urban violence.

As regards the political context, the ELP clandestine network, although somewhat marginalised by other players, participated in the broad anti-communist resistance front in the revolutionary period of 1975. This broad front included other non-right-wing clandestine networks, some individuals from the Armed Forces involved in the military coup of 25 April 1974 and mainstream political parties. Its perceived victory against the extreme left forces at the end of the democratic transition allowed extreme right politically violent militants to avoid any kind of judicial consequences at the moment of their disengagement during the post-revolutionary democratic normalisation. The violent groups of the late 1980s and their early 21st century counterparts, on the contrary, have always remained totally isolated in fringes with subcultural and pre-political characteristics, disconnected from political actors other than the microcosm of the Portuguese extreme right. Their proximity to other nationalist parties or groups has made this whole political area vulnerable, alienating moderate militants who disagree with using violence.

From the sociological point of view, although the transition militants were recruited from among popular strata, the cliques of the extreme right-wing clandestine network came from the middle-upper bourgeoisie, with some elements even of the nobility, with a higher academic background. In the succeeding decades, on the contrary, a proletarianisation of the violent militancy of the extreme right was seen in consonance with the characteristics of the international skinhead movement.

Finally, despite anti-communism being common to all generations, there is a radical change of motivations in the basis of radicalisation and violent action: the political violence of the transition was aimed at safeguarding the Portuguese multi-racial and pluri-continental empire; the political violence of the last radical generations has been exercised on behalf of the white Portugal and Europe against any project of a multi-racial and multicultural society.

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Notes


[9] These included the Catholics of the MPP (Movimento Popular Português / Portuguese Popular Movement) and of the PDC (Partido da Democracia Cristã / Christian Democratic Party), the liberals of the PL (Partido Liberal / Liberal Party), the legionaries of the PNP (Partido Nacionalista Português / Portuguese Nationalist Party) and of the PTDP (Partido Trabalhista Democrático Português / Portuguese Democratic Labour Party).


[12] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.

[13] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.


[16] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.

[17] Such as the BAT (Brigadas Anti-Totalitárias / Anti-Totalitarian Brigades), the CDN (Comandos Democráticos do Norte / Northern Democratic Commanders), and the Viriatos.


[19] The moderate parties included the PS (Partido Socialista / Socialist Party), the PSD (Partido Social Democrata / Social Democratic Party) and the CDS (Centro Democrático e Social / Social Democratic Centre).


[24] Interviews conducted in February 2013 by the second author.
[25] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.


[28] Interview conducted in June 2018 by the first author.


[31] Interviews conducted in June 2018 and May 2018, respectively, by the first author.

[32] Among these stand out the commandos led by Colonel Gilberto Santos and Castro, who fought in Angola, in November 1975, with UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* / National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and with FNLA (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* / National Liberation Front of Angola) in order to avoid the conquest of power by the Marxist and pro-Soviet MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* / Popular Liberation Movement Angola).


[38] Maria José Tíscar, 2014, op. cit., p. 188.


[43] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.


[45] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.


[47] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.


[50] Interview conducted in February 2013 by the second author.


[55] The convergence of ideas between the skinhead movement and the MAN became explicit with the publication of the first issue of *Combate Branco* (White Combat) in July 1987 – a fanzine, whose “principal goal” was “the organization of a Portuguese skinhead movement” (see “Editorial,” *Combate Branco*, no. 1, July (1987), p. 1).


[59] The report commissioned by the Attorney General of the Republic speaks of the continual ‘ebb and flow’ of members (Constitutional Court process 364/91, point 194, folio 56).


[61] Riccardo Marchi, 2019, op. cit., p. 150.


[68] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.


[70] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.


[72] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.


[74] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.

[75] Mário Machado returned to the court in 2009 for petty crime, receiving a 10-year prison sentence, which was added to the 2007 conviction. In prison, Mário Machado clashed with both HSN and PHS militants. The last media reported court action against the PHS was in 2016. However, what actually happened was the arrest of former elements of the skinhead organisation now involved in petty crime, including drug trafficking.


[77] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.

[78] This episode was the subject of an independent judicial proceeding outside the 2007-2008 trial and led to Mário Machado being given a 4-month suspended prison sentence. This conviction was not for racism, but for illegal possession of weapons and for social alarm.


[80] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.

[81] Interview conducted in October 2018 with the lawyer José Manuel de Castro by the first author.
Civil Liberties, National Security and U.S. Courts in Times of Terrorism

by James M Lutz and Georgia Wralstad Ulmschneider

Abstract

Civil liberties in democratic countries have been threatened by counterterrorism measures that sacrifice liberty for security. The United States has been no exception. The courts in the United States have often been seen as the bastion of civil liberties protection, but they have given Presidents and Congresses a great deal of deference in dealing with foreign policy and latitude when national security is an issue. This deference and the latitude on national security issues - especially after 9/11, the lack of judicial information in the foreign policy area, and the nearly absolute (plenary) power over immigration issues held by Congress and the executive branch have created a toxic mix which has resulted in significant reductions in individual liberties. An understanding of the limitations of judicial action also contributes to any explanation of the difficulties involved for formulating an effective counterterrorist policy.

Keywords: Democracy, Human Rights, National Security, Patriot Act, Terrorism, 9/11

Introduction

Since the attacks on 9/11, the struggle against terrorism has taken center stage for many governments throughout the world. Of course, many nations were already focused on terrorist activities since such violence was hardly new in Sri Lanka, India, Israel, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, and many other countries. West European countries, Australia, Canada, and the United States, however, only took greater notice since the attacks of 9/11 and the bombing in Bali in 2002 as well as the Madrid train bombings in 2004. These signalled an increased danger of terrorism for the West. Recent attacks in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, London, Manchester and other cities have increased these levels of concern. One consequence of the greater apprehension and fear in many Western democracies has been an increase in tension between the perceived need to provide security and the continued respect for the protection for the civil liberties accorded to individuals suspected of being terrorists or having linkages with terrorists—or even of sympathizing with the plight of the groups that the terrorist organizations claim to represent. The United States has been no exception to this trend and has even become more focused on security concerns since the devastating 9/11 attacks occurred on American soil. During peacetime, it frequently has been the US judicial branch that has been very protective of individual civil liberties. In many respects, however, this branch of the government has provided only limited protections in an era with heightened fears of terrorism. The courts have accepted the adoption of enhanced security measures by the other branches. The court decisions and practices have accepted a toxic mix composed of deference to the other branches in foreign policy and national security decisions, plenary power in the area of immigration control, and lack of opportunities for judicial oversight due to limited information on foreign policy issues. The lack of judicial protection has perhaps been most obvious in regard to immigrants and foreign residents in the United States, but it has affected citizens as well.

The following discussion will first look at the tensions between security and liberty in democratic systems in regard to terrorist threats. This serves to provide a general background to the situation in the United States. It will then look at the failure of the courts over time to provide protection for migrants and for citizens as well. It is important to note that this lack of protection is not a new phenomenon. The deference to the executive and legislative branches and the long-established principle that these branches have virtually unlimited plenary power in the area of immigration control, provides the background for understanding why there are such limited protections in this area and raises concern for civil liberties in an era of continuing international
terrorism on a global level.

**Security and Liberty: Tensions in Democracies**

There has always been tension between the security of the state and its citizens and constitutional guarantees of liberties for those same citizens. The fear for individual safety can be the enemy of civil liberties. Although no country has provided its citizens with absolute liberties and freedom of action, a key tenet of democracy in Western political systems has been the protection for individual rights. At various times leftist groups in Europe sought to use this fear to get their governments to limit civil liberties in response to terrorist attacks. They thought that the elite would be forced to adopt restrictions on civil liberties of the people in defense of capitalist domination of the polity and society and that the subsequent popular response would be the mobilization of the masses to change the system of exploitation of the masses.[1]

When faced with challenges from the left in the latter part of the twentieth century, most democracies managed to avoid major limitations on civil liberties. Italy, for example, faced a significant threat from the Red Brigades. The government defeated the group and other leftists without relying on extra-constitutional changes and limitations on civil liberties.[2] There were contingency plans for the military and security forces to use clandestine security groups to create increased tensions that would have permitted or forced the government to introduce significant restrictions on leftist groups; yet in the end the plans for such an intervention were discovered and blocked before there was any effort to implement these plans.[3] When former Prime Minister Aldo Moro was kidnapped and then killed, public opinion turned against the Red Brigades. This decline in public support and more effective counterterrorism efforts led to the effective dismantling of the group.[4]

On the other hand, from 1983 to 1987 the Spanish government utilized a clandestine, unofficial death squad, the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group (GAL), to track down and kill Basque nationalists in Spain and France. There can be no doubt that such extra-judicial executions constitute a major violation of civil liberties. Once it was discovered that this group was operating, it was disbanded, and persons involved with the GAL received significant jail sentences.[5] In Turkey, on the other hand, high levels of terrorism and other violence between leftists and rightists triggered military coups in 1971 and 1980. The weight of the crackdown following the first coup largely fell on the left,[6] while members of the right-wing groups were protected by sympathetic personnel in the security agencies.[7] After the military returned power quickly to civilians, the violence involving the left and right reappeared and became worse. The second coup in 1980 led to repression of violent groups on both the left and the right.[8] Although the military on both occasions dealt with the instability using enhanced security measures, these limitations were not continued after the violence was brought under control and power was returned to civilian politicians.

Over many years of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) did lead to enhanced security measures in the United Kingdom with concomitant limitations on civil liberties. The aftermath of the pub bombings in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 led to the passage of a series of legal measures designed to deal with the IRA terrorist threat. These measures were ostensibly temporary but eventually were given a permanent base.[9] New laws granted enhanced powers to the police and security forces. They were permitted to hold people for longer periods of questioning if they were suspected of terrorism or of having links with Irish nationalist terrorist groups. It even became a crime to not report IRA activity to the authorities.[10] Further, anyone suspected of providing support for the IRA could have their property or financial assets seized because of the connection.[11] The laws also permitted a form of internal exile in which it was possible that residents of Northern Ireland would not be allowed to enter Great Britain. [12] The British started to use preventative detention or internment of suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland for indefinite periods of time rather than relying on convictions in trials to impose prison sentences. [13] These actions were taken against both Irish nationalists and members of Protestant paramilitary groups that were engaged in communal violence against suspected Irish nationalists and Catholics in general. [14] Some of the individuals subjected to indefinite detention were subjected to enhanced interrogation.
techniques. Their situation reached the European Court of Human Rights in a case brought by Ireland against the United Kingdom where the court ruled that their treatment was inhumane but not torture. The idea of indefinite detention for suspected terrorists was extended in 2001 to include persons who are “certified” as international terrorists by appropriate government officials.

The British government opted to create Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland where juries were not utilized and convictions or acquittals were dependent upon the decision of the judge. The British were forced to use this expedient because of IRA intimidation of juries had prevented convictions for obvious terrorists. These courts, moreover, were also permitted to include evidence based on unsubstantiated reports by informers. The atmosphere of tension in Northern Ireland also led to a tendency of police and juries in Great Britain to be quick to convict any Irish suspects of terrorist violence. The police were willing to “enhance” the available evidence to obtain convictions, and juries were willing to believe the worst of defendants; consequently, there were convictions of individuals who were not guilty of the crimes they were charged with. This general atmosphere and the quickness to reach a conviction resulted in anyone with Irish connections becoming part of a suspect community where individuals were prejudged as guilty.

Today, Muslims in the United Kingdom have replaced the Irish as the major suspect community. There are still some limitations in place on individual rights, such as prosecution for “glorifying terrorism” or inciting terrorism.

A number of other governments in democratic states increased security measures in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. European democracies enacted changes in anti-terrorism laws and restrictions on civil liberties. Britain, France, and Germany joined the United States, Australia, and Canada as the most restrictive of individual rights among democracies. In addition, there has been an increase in cooperation among governments in tracking terrorists or providing information and sharing intelligence on their activities with other governments. European governments share the information that has been gathered with data mining of communication patterns of individuals. In Asia, Malaysia like other countries has adopted preventative detention and other new security laws to deal with the threat of terrorism.

There is little doubt that there have been significant pressures to limit civil liberties that increased in the aftermath of major terrorist incidents (in the case of 9/11) or major campaigns (in the case of the IRA).

The restrictions on civil liberties in democratic countries that have occurred may ultimately be counterproductive. Terrorist attacks have weakened public support for protecting the civil liberties in democratic states. There has been a decrease in the protection provided by national judiciaries when it comes to the defence of the civil liberties of those suspected of connections with terrorist organizations that have accompanied this decline in public support. The United States has been no exception to this trend. Muslim defendants have become a suspect community in the United States in many respects, and portions of the American public favor the detention of suspected terrorists and restrictions on their legal rights. Public views on the need to limit the rights of suspects, however, have not extended to right-wing extremists suspected of terrorist activities.

In much of the post–World War II era, courts have been conscious of the need to protect individuals’ civil liberties, but the willingness of the courts to safeguard these rights has proven to be limited in some ways when such protection conflicts with foreign security issues. Ultimately weakening support for civil liberties does meet with the approval of terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda who view the lack of protection as weakening their opponents in their efforts to counter terrorist violence. One study found that democracies with high levels of support for civil liberties have been less susceptible to terrorism. Extremist groups can gain recruits when individuals become suspect because of their community or group identification. How well American courts manage to remain the traditional defenders of civil liberties thus becomes extremely important in this rather hostile environment.
Defense of Civil Liberties by Courts in Period of Heightened Fear

The reluctance of U.S. courts to provide relief to persons who might be facing intrusive or unrestrained government activity has been present for over a century in terms for potential immigrants and non-citizens resident in the country. The principle that the other two branches of government have virtually unlimited power in areas of immigration was established more than a century ago in key decisions; the precedents that were established so early continue to limit the role of the judicial branch. In the aftermath of the increase in terrorism with the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Oklahoma City Bombings, the 9/11 attacks, and the increase in domestic and international terrorist attacks in the twenty-first century, even American citizens have come to have less protection from the courts in at least some circumstances.[30]

Immigrants and the Idea of Plenary Power: The Early Examples

Immigrants have always had fewer protections than US citizens. They have been targeted as potential terrorists not only in the twenty-first century but in earlier periods as well. Anarchists at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century became a suspect group, and efforts were made to exclude them. The Red Scare after World War I led to a significant attempt to deport “foreign radicals”. Migrants from predominately Muslim countries have just been the most recent group of individuals to be denied entry, to face deportation, or to be subjected to other limitations. In many cases, all of these groups have had limited or even nonexistent support from the American judiciary.

The Supreme Court in early decisions acknowledged the idea of plenary power in the area of immigration in 

**Chae Chan Ping v. United States** in 1889 and in **Nashimura Ekin v. United States** in 1892.[31] In these cases, the Supreme Court had affirmed the right of the national government to exclude immigrants if officials thought it was necessary for any reason as long as they operated within the limits of existing laws established by Congress.[32] In 1893 in **Fong Yue Ting v. United States** the Supreme Court specified that the right to deport non-citizens was absolute and unqualified.[33] The courts would not intervene since the other branches were considered to have this complete plenary power to do as they saw fit.[34] It was a sign of the times that the courts were willing to grant such broad plenary powers to the other branches when they were being used to exclude or deport Asians.

This doctrine also underlay the willingness of the courts to support the Anarchist Exclusion Act. The courts upheld the Immigration Act of 1903, usually referred to as the Anarchist Exclusion Act, which was passed after the assassination of President McKinley by an anarchist who actually was a natural born US citizen. The 1903 act and its later extension gave immigration officials great latitude in determining who could be denied admittance into the country. The Supreme Court even acknowledged that if there was evidence that the laws or their application were flawed, that it was up to Congress to correct the problem by changing the laws, not the courts [35]. This judicial approach clearly gave Congress a free hand to act (or not) and conferred significant power. The intent, of course, was to exclude foreign radicals because of their political beliefs. The right of the national government to prohibit the admission of individuals solely on the basis of their political beliefs was upheld by the Supreme Court in **US ex rel John Turner v. Williams** in 1904 that dealt with the deportation of an anarchist.[36]

Courts also frequently tolerated a variety of activities that were directed against domestic and foreign radicals during the Red Scare after World War I. Actions against such radicals peaked with what came to be known as the Palmer Raids. Due to President Wilson's incapacity as a consequence of a stroke, Attorney General Palmer felt that he had a free hand to deport communists, socialists, and radicals.[37] Approximately 6,000 radicals were rounded up in the Palmer Raids although less than a thousand were actually deported.[38] He was able to rely at least in part on the Anarchist Exclusion Act in these efforts. There was no effective interference from the courts in Palmer’s efforts to rid the country of foreign radicals. What limited any influence that the courts might have had in dealing with the presumed threats to civil liberties due to national security concerns about foreign radicals was the willingness of the courts to defer to other branches of government, combined with judicial doctrines previously established in the area of immigration law.
The fate of the individuals who were detained was determined in administrative hearings. In these hearings, which were considered to be civil processes rather than criminal ones, the government could present hearsay evidence, could rely on information gathered in searches and seizures without warrants, whereby the persons detained had limited or no access to legal counsel. Hearsay evidence and materials from secret intelligence sources could be used, and some evidence was presented in the private chambers of the judge with no opportunity for the persons facing deportation to challenge such evidence. Further, the courts had previously ruled that since deportation was not punishment as would be the case in criminal proceedings, persons facing immigration hearings did not have the due process rights that would have been present in criminal trials. In essence the proceedings could be and often were extremely one-sided. Persons considered to be radicals were also held under immigration rulings in what was the American version of preventative detention until they could be removed from the country. Such detention could be short-term or even long-term with no potential for judicial appeal. The mass deportations that Palmer was planning were only prevented by the actions of other government officials. Some of these same powers were given anew to government officials with the passage of the USA Patriot Act.

Deference to Other Branches

This latitude in dealing with non-citizens has been buttressed by the fact that the Supreme Court, setting the precedent for lower courts, has accepted that Congress, and especially the President, have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and information to deal with foreign policy issues, a view that was directly stated in the 1936 Curtiss Wright decision (United States v. Curtiss Wright Corporation) which included the statement that the Supreme Court lacked the expertise to second guess the government’s foreign policy decisions. This decision is known for implanting in constitutional law the proposition that the presidency is the sole organ for conducting foreign policy which presented presidents with inherent power not constrained by Congress or the judiciary. Such deference has come to provide a major limitation on the willingness of the courts to protect civil liberties when foreign affairs are involved. This deference in the foreign policy area is even more marked when it includes national security claims and when immigration law is involved since the legislative and executive branches have acknowledged plenary power in this area given the fact that the issues are considered to be political ones decided by the elected branches of government. The combination of plenary power in immigration plus national security expertise, and later the sole organ theory of presidential power in foreign policy, has combined into a cocktail of doctrines that is lethal for the rights of non-citizens suspected of radical ideas or of supporting terrorism.

Deference to the position of the other branches in terms of foreign policy knowledge was present more recently with the various travel bans created by President Trump. It is true that the various iterations of President Trump’s travel ban faced difficulties in the courts but not because of a refusal to defer to the executive branch. The initial executive orders were badly prepared and incomplete and to some extent displayed inappropriate prejudice. The travel ban was confusing in terms of who would or would not be admitted, and the priority given to Christian refugees created First Amendment questions. The White House argued that the ban was not reviewable by the judiciary, a premise that was rejected. The judgments against the ban, however, did not challenge the plenary power of the legislative and executive branches. The ban was not religiously neutral, was vague in terms of implementation, and did not address a number of due process issues. The travel bans dealt with domestic policy (migration) that had foreign policy implications (security issues). Eventually, however, the courts accepted the travel bans when the executive orders were correctly prepared. At no point was there any significant consideration as to whether the bans on migrants from particular countries was good or bad foreign policy because courts do not pass judgment on the value of the courts. In addition, there appears to have been no documentation presented which demonstrated that there had been no one from some of these countries who had been implicated in any terrorist actions on US soil, notwithstanding the claim in the executive order that “[n]umerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted in terrorism-related crimes since September 11, 2001 who entered the United States.” The principle that the travel bans were acceptable as a means of maintaining national security was confirmed. President Trump, of course, used the travel ban to solidify support with his base, drawing on the fears and
ethnocentrism of some Americans. There is an interesting historical parallel. Attorney General Palmer attempted to leverage his actions to deport un-American radicals to provide an issue that would create an opportunity for him to gain the Democratic nomination for the presidency for the 1920 election. His efforts to promote a political run for the presidency failed, however, perhaps because the nomination was in the hands of party regulars who were less influenced by his actions that targeted the radicals than might have been the case with populist feelings among the general public at that time.

US Citizens and Residents and Limits on Foreign Policy Issue Involvement

The deference of the Supreme Court toward the executive branch has been increased by the war analogy connected with the Global War on Terror and the continuation of the view that there is an ongoing struggle with an enemy. An additional area of concern involves the use of warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court established in 1978 and later given increased powers under Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush. The increases in power that occurred after the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995 were in the interests of furthering national security. The court has the power to issue warrants for foreign individuals who are under suspicion of working for other governments or involved in terrorist groups or maintain contacts with these or US citizens or residents who have contacts with such outside interests. FISA warrants issued by the court can be used for monitoring communications related to operations of foreign governments or groups. Such warrants became more important after 9/11 as a means of preventing terrorist attacks on US soil or attacks against US interests overseas. These warrants can approve wiretaps, secret searches, access to library records, reviews of financial information and inquiries into internet use. While such warrants do require probable cause as a justification for these activities, requests to the FISA Court apparently are infrequently declined. The executive branch has been very supportive of the use of such warrants until recently when, somewhat ironically, individuals close to the Trump presidential election campaign apparently became targets for investigation because of their possible connections with foreign groups. One consequence has been concern about their use or abuse from conservative political groups that had previously been largely silent about FISA warrants as part of the Global War on Terror. The judicial branch has accepted the use of such warrants in general, and it is extremely difficult for individuals to challenge such surveillance activities, especially since oftentimes the individuals under surveillance are unaware that they are under observation or the subject of related actions. In the aftermath of the bombing by Timothy McVeigh in 1995, President Clinton signed new legislation, the Espionage Act, that made the deportation of those suspected of terrorism easier than it had previously been. This legislation was somewhat ironic given the fact that McVeigh was a US citizen just as McKinley’s assassin had been. This legislation provides greater scope for federal investigations of possible terrorists that potentially came at the expense of civil liberties. After 9/11 the standard for securing a FISA warrant was weakened. It was no longer necessary to demonstrate probable cause in order to receive judicial authorization but relied on the weaker standard of a preponderance of evidence.

The passage of the USA Patriot Act after 9/11 gave the authorities even greater power to deal with threats or what might be considered potential threats. Individuals who are suspected of supporting terrorist groups or who appeared to be endorsing terrorism could now be deported or prevented from entering the country. Further, persons entering the United States can be detained if the Attorney General (or some lower ranking official in the Justice Department) has a reasonable suspicion that the person represents a threat to national security or has been engaged in terrorist activities. Individuals so detained are provided with no right to a review hearing or given a chance to challenge the government’s evidence that led to these suspicions. Other provisions have made it possible to accelerate deportations of foreign nationals. Even when resident aliens cannot be deported, they can be held indefinitely. In one case, indefinite detention was overturned in court but only because Congress had not passed a law permitting such actions. Once Congress did pass such a law, the opportunities for judicial intervention were, however, significantly reduced. The plenary powers granted to the executive and legislative branches more than a century earlier in areas of immigration and later in terms of national security are still limiting the courts. Further, individuals charged with terrorist
acts can be detained and questioned initially with fewer rights than those accorded suspects in criminal cases. [56] The names of those who are being detained do not even have to be released. [57] This approach is very reminiscent of the Alien Exclusion Act. The plenary powers to deport resident aliens and conduct hearings with no regard to the due process rights of the individuals detained. [58]

What is considered support for a terrorist group under the Patriot Act—and thus illegal—can be wide-ranging. It can be construed to include giving verbal support or expressing sympathy for the conditions that led a dissident group to use violence. Further, the deportations are based on speech rather than conduct and there is an assumption of guilt by association rather than by any actions that are actually undertaken. In addition, this provision has in effect denied entry into the country on the basis of a mere speech act rather than actual conduct. [59] Individuals can be targeted on the basis of what they might do rather than what they did. [60] It was now easier under the Patriot Act for the government to freeze the financial assets of individuals or an organization under suspicion. Prior to the act, a special designation was required under existing legislation to impose financial sanctions. With the passage of the Patriot Act it became possible for assets to be frozen in aid of an investigation in order to prevent the movement of these assets to foreign locations. [61] Any challenge to the official designation of a group as one that is supporting terrorism takes place in an administrative hearing rather than a court. [62] As already noted, such administrative hearings provide few protections to individuals under official scrutiny. Finally, the Patriot Act enhanced earlier provisions that made the provision of legal assistance and expert advice as constituting material support for terrorist organizations. These provisions have been upheld by the Supreme Court in the Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project that will be discussed below. [63] The acceptance of these limitations on individual and group rights by the courts as necessary provisions for dealing with foreign threats to national security has come at the expense of providing protection for the rights of individuals simply suspected of inappropriate activity.

The Patriot Act also allowed other types of government activities that could infringe on civil liberties. It permitted more latitude in efforts to detect money laundering—provisions that have been among the less controversial extensions of government power. [64] Efforts of the Bush Administration to indefinitely hold “enemy non-combatants” at Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba and to use enhanced “interrogation techniques” against suspected terrorists also raised significant questions in the United States and worldwide about US commitment to civil liberties. In this last area the judicial branch proved to be more effective in protecting the rights of those who were being detained, perhaps, in part, because the courts could rely on their knowledge of judicial procedures and established doctrines in the criminal justice system supportive of civil liberties. These situations also involved legal processes where the Supreme Court could be less concerned about foreign policy consequences or face fewer pressures to defer to the other two branches of government due to their presumed superior expertise. Deference to the executive branch in the area of foreign policy also played a significant role in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Holder v. Humanitarian Legal Project case in 2010. This case addressed the use of the legal provisions that prohibited assistance to dissident groups to prevent the Humanitarian Law Project from facilitating their negotiations with their governments for solutions to the issues between them. The Humanitarian Law Project was charged with providing material assistance to two foreign terrorist organizations. [65] The Supreme Court accepted limitations on the activities of the Humanitarian Law Project, and therefore other private organizations, that was assisting the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and its successors and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—usually referred to as the Tamil Tigers) as well as Hamas whose situation became attached to the case. The advice that was proffered by the Humanitarian Law Project was considered material assistance to the groups and therefore prohibited by law because the organizations had been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the Secretary of State. This decision by the Supreme Court accepted the foreign policy position of the United States in support of its allies abroad without significant questioning of any basic facts. In the case of the PKK, the Turkish government was opposed to the idea of negotiations; instead the government preferred a military solution to the problem. [66] The efforts to use the military to eliminate the threat to the Turkish state by Kurdish dissidents to date have been less than totally effective. The government of Sri Lanka in its battles with the Tamil Tigers was
willing to negotiate at some points in time but after the tsunami of 2001 had weakened the separatists, the
government was determined to eliminate the threat once and for all—even at the cost of high levels of civilian
casualties. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, negotiations between the two sides have offered the best
hope for a solution in the form of the Oslo Peace Accords. Had Americans been involved in the preliminary
consultations between the PLO and Israeli representatives, after the Humanitarian Law Project decision, they
would have been in violation of later laws.

The Humanitarian Law Project decision to limit negotiations also ignored the fact that one of the major
ways in which terrorism has come to an end in many countries has been through negotiations.[67] One
study found that for terrorist groups that survived for longer than a year, they were slightly more likely to
end by successful negotiations than by military efforts at eliminating them.[68] The successful negotiations
that ultimately ended the conflict in Northern Ireland included the good offices of President Clinton as
a mediator. While the government of Sri Lanka defeated the Tamil Tigers through military efforts, it did
negotiate before, namely with the leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or Peoples Liberation Front,
which had also launched a terrorist campaign against the government. The JVP never received the FTO
designation even though it was almost as much a terrorist organization as the Tamil Tigers. The government
of Sri Lanka never pressed to have the JVP so designated because it was willing to negotiate with that
group unlike the LTTE.[69] As a result of the negotiations the violent activity by the JVP was ended, and
the JVP and its supporters were accepted back into the political system as active participants. Even though
negotiations can work, there is a widespread fear among governments, including governments of US allies,
that negotiations might grant legitimacy to dissident groups.[70] Granting such implicit legitimacy to
dissident is often the last thing a government desires—as was the case for the LTTE and the PKK.

One important fact in any judicial proceeding is that restrictions on support for foreign terrorist groups
have been linked to a group’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the Secretary of
State. When a group is given this designation, it becomes difficult or even impossible to operate within the
United States or to solicit funds. Placement of a militant group on the FTO list criminalizes virtually all
contact.[71] It also becomes easier to extradite individuals suspected of membership in such groups. While
membership in an FTO is not directly prohibited, it can be construed as providing support, especially if
an individual is paying membership dues.[72] This designation also makes it illegal for US citizens or legal
residents to provide any types of assistance that would permit the organization to save its own resources
for other activities, which, of course, could include support for violent actions. Court decisions have, as
a consequence, resulted in limitations on freedom of speech and association.[73] In theory, independent
advocacy was still permitted by the Humanitarian Law Project decision.[74] Even though individual US
citizens are still allowed to advocate for groups that have been designated as FTOs, they can only do so
independently and with no coordination with the group in question. The Obama administration, however,
chose to consider the writing of an amicus curiae brief in support of an FTO to constitute coordination.[75]
At least one lower court, moreover, has indicated that coordination does not even require direct contact.
[76] This type of interpretation can have a chilling effect since there could be a claim that any type of
advocacy could be considered coordination, leading groups and individuals to self-censor in order to avoid
prosecution.[77]

The basic problem with judicial recognition of the FTO designation is that while it was established by
legislative action, there are no clear criteria to determine which political organizations rightfully receive
the designation. The presumption is that the executive branch utilizes the designation as part of its foreign
policy, but there are virtually no checks on how relevant the basis for the designation is. The designation is
considered to be an administrative process, and, thus, it is not subject to judicial review.[78] Designations
can be made not only on the basis of actual attacks but also when there is an assumption that a particular
group might be a threat.[79] The threat assessment, moreover, is not reviewable by outside actors such as
the courts.[80] The designation can be used to support foreign allies against dissidents whether that support
is deserved or not. Ultimately the designation can be quite arbitrary.[81] The designation of FTO status can
be revoked by Congress or the Secretary of State, or (at least in theory) by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals.
A number of examples illustrate how arbitrary the FTO designation can be. A comparison of terrorist designations by different governments demonstrates great variability. As of 2010, the United States had forty-five groups given the official designation. Although the United States and the United Kingdom agreed in twenty-seven cases, in another forty cases one country or the other included a group on its list when the other country did not. The British list included many groups, including the IRA, that were not on the US list. The United States did include a splinter Irish group—perhaps as a concession to the British government (or to reality). Canada had thirty-two of the same groups on its list, but in twenty-three cases Canada excluded groups that could be found on the US list; furthermore, Canada included seven not on the US list. Australia, on the other hand, had the greatest correspondence to the US list. There were only eighteen organizations designated, but all of them were on the US list. In contrast, the United States and India have great divergence. There were only five groups in common and sixty-six cases where only one country included an organization but the other did not.[86] The Indian list includes many groups active in Kashmir or organizations which are local to the South Asian region. The obvious conclusion is that governments create definitions or put violent groups on their respective prohibited lists that fit their own needs or respond to local political situations. They may avoid putting other groups on their official lists because they do not threaten their interests or because there could be domestic or international complications should they do so.

Probably the most obvious example of an omission in the US list of FTOs was the fact that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was never on it. The IRA has been an obvious terrorist group, but there was significant American opposition to officially proclaiming it to be a terrorist organization. Sentiment in the United States among Irish Catholics supporting the unification of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, even among those who disagreed with the tactics of the IRA, made it politically unwise to label the IRA as a terrorist group. Thus, for many years it remained much easier for Americans to provide verbal and material support to the goals of the IRA and to publicly argue on its behalf that it was for groups with the FTO designation. The precedent of providing the executive branch extreme discretion in designating FTOs carried over into President Trump’s executive order that established the travel ban. The travel ban executive order in Section 3 specifies that countries subject to the travel ban are to be determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence.[87] This leaves the designation solely within the purview of the executive branch, just as is the case with the FTO designation.

Deference to the other branches due to the lack of expertise on the part of the Justices of the Supreme Court or the lower courts could in theory be rectified by presentations of expertly prepare amicus curiae (friends of the court) briefs that would bring additional views pertinent to cases involving national security and terrorism to the attention of the Justices. Such briefs are typically supplied by organizations that perceive that the outcome will be important to their own interests. The government, of course, has experts with the necessary background and appropriate credentials to support its positions. Experts with terrorism and national security knowledge are at a disadvantage in providing information in an appropriate form in any effort to challenge the government’s arguments since the debates occur in a legal setting. For example, there were no presentations by academics about the value of negotiations or challenges to the position of the governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. The briefs filed in the court on behalf of the Humanitarian Law Project focused on the limiting effects on freedom of assembly and speech
and other constitutional issues that were involved and not on the merits of the governmental policies. Only one brief in support of the government, included marginal outside references. It was also the brief that brought Hamas into the limelight as another FTO that should not receive any assistance.[88] The inclusion of Hamas with the Tamil Tigers and the Kurds was an inspired political choice since it placed the defendants on the side opposite of Islamic extremists. It also drew upon the pattern of deference of the courts to the other branches and the limited availability of competing information by foreign policy experts from outside of the government. While the choice of Hamas as the sole non-party FTO may have been coincidental, when significant sections of officialdom and the populace view anyone who is Muslim with suspicion, coupled with the centrality of al-Qaeda as the chief enemy in the war on terror, introducing an Islamist group here was a neat trick. Because al-Qaeda is not a good example, as it has only a violent wing, bring up one of the other detested Islamist bogeymen is a way of diverting attention from the specific examples of the PKK and LTTE to underscore one of the more unnerving and misunderstood aspects of the war on terror.[89]

Given the variability of amicus curiae briefs and the difficulties that the Justices could have in weighing the merits of competing arguments in the foreign policy arena, they cannot consistently depend upon such briefs to provide them with the necessary information to determine the validity of policy choices.

Conclusions

The deference of the courts to other branches, the lack of alternative information sources, and the idea of plenary power established in key early cases and carried into the current century have proven to be a toxic blend for civil liberties in the United States. Although there have been judicial decisions that have been supportive of individual civil liberties and the rights of association in cases involving national security, in many other cases this toxic blend has led to court opinions that have limited the ability of citizens and legal residents to speak or act in support of foreign organizations or populations facing repression—or what might be seen as repression. Non-citizens may also face the threat of deportation without due process safeguards. Furthermore, these actions can be applied in effect on the basis of race, religion, place of national origin, or political beliefs, which would obviously allow the government to discriminate on these criteria.[90] It would appear that the early important cases giving plenary power to other branches in regard to immigrants drew upon anti-Asian animus present in the United States in the late nineteenth century.

Freedom of speech and association should not be limited in discussions of controversial issues or restricted because a group has been designated as an FTO. There are also implicit limitations on rights of association and freedom to assemble to protest government policies since these might be considered assistance to foreign terrorists. What might be considered support for terrorist groups has been broadened in such a way that a great deal of free discussion is potentially stifled as individuals and groups seek to avoid facing charges under existing laws. Even if individuals or organizations can successfully defend themselves—unlikely as that may be, it would require an expenditure of resources that could otherwise be used for different purposes, and the threat of prosecution for what might be prohibited activities can be a mechanism for intimidating persons who do not agree with the official policy of the United States or its foreign allies.

Judicial decisions and non-decisions are counterproductive in terms of limiting or ending group involvement in terrorist actions. The efforts of the Humanitarian Law Project, for example, created the potential to assist violent opposition groups to make the transition to peaceful efforts when opposing official policies. As noted, this type of transition is, in fact, one of the ways in which terrorist groups can effectively transform themselves into peaceful participants in the political system. While negotiations are not always successful—as the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords demonstrates—any successful negotiations that end violence are to be valued. While there may be some citizens who object to permitting former terrorists to freely participate in the political systems of their countries, it is a way to reintegrate members of the terrorist organization into society. The decisions by the Supreme Court, however, have made it more difficult for groups to follow this process. As a consequence, periods of violence in at least some situations may be prolonged because this option is not available for organizations in the United States.
These concerns have been exacerbated by the willingness of the Supreme Court as well as lower courts to defer to the executive branch and Congress because of their presumed expertise in the foreign policy arena. Such deference has been obvious with the continued existence of weaker criteria for deportations or exclusions under the Patriot Act and with the judicial willingness to accept the vague and imprecise criteria for determining that organizations will be designated as FTOs (or not)—with all the limitations that go with that designation. One potentially serious consequence of this deference is that it can lead to suboptimal counterterrorism efforts.[91]

The failure of the courts to provide greater protection of civil liberties because of deference and long-established views of plenary power can have negative policy implications. When counterterrorism policies ignore civil liberties they can become suboptimal because they can play into the hands of terrorist groups. There have been times when violent dissident organizations have even actively sought to push governments to limit civil liberties. They have followed a provocation strategy in which they attempt to have new limitations imposed in the hope that the governmental system will be weakened.[92] It has been argued that democracies have been proven to be susceptible to overreacting when terrorist attacks have occurred since their populations have shown a willingness to trade liberty for greater security.[93] Limitations in the United States could reduce the appeal of the country as an example abroad and provide useful themes for propaganda designed to recruit members to do battle against US allies abroad or the United States or its interests. The American judiciary has actually furthered the goals of these types of groups at times with the failure to act and, in other cases, by supporting limitations on citizens or legal residents in the United States or by those seeking to legally enter the country. What might help to redress this imbalance would be mechanisms that would permit those with recognized foreign policy expertise to present their views on the wisdom or likely success of foreign policy decisions and the likely consequences. That could at least reduce the problem of deference to the other branches even if that situation cannot be avoided entirely. Groups involved in presenting amicus curiae briefs could play their part by doing more to provide expert presentations. However, the courts have to demonstrate a willingness to accept the credentials of those outside the government who are likely to offer differing viewpoints from the policies in question and consider them equally with the information provided by the government and its officials. Until the courts allow themselves to have greater input, the toxic blend will continue to negatively affect civil liberties for citizens and non-citizens and undermine US counterterrorism efforts.

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Notes


[15] European Court of Human Rights, “The Case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71” (1978); URL: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506#{%22itemid%22:[%222001-57506%22]}


[31] Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States 142 U.S. 651 (1892).


[56] Cole and Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 201-205.


[60] Cole, op. cit., p. 3.


[76] Bhagwat, op cit., p. 590.
[87] Section 5 (g) “Executive Order.”
[88] Ulmschneider and Lutz, “Terrorism Analysis.” The brief utilized materials written by staff members of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank with a pro-Israel orientation.
[90] Saito, op. cit., p. 35.
Southeast Asian Fighters from Islamic State Leaks: A Historical Snapshot
by Shashi Jayakumar & Cameron Sumpter

Abstract
Recruits entering territory controlled by ISIS came from a staggering array of nations. Upon arrival, the de facto ISIS border authority asked would-be fighters to complete a questionnaire seeking their personal details and experiences. Much of the resulting data from early-2013 to mid-2014 was eventually leaked by a disillusioned IS member in 2016, and analysts have since pore over the material, identifying trends and characteristics among the foreign fighters. The present article uses part of the dataset that concerns the early wave of Southeast Asians who went to pursue militant jihad in the Middle East. It teases out strands, comparing individual data to what is known from other information, and attempts to situate some of the individuals into their milieu back home. It also contrasts this Southeast Asian data to broader studies of others who entered ISIS territory, and attempts to reach conclusions on what the motivations and characteristics of the Southeast Asians may have been compared to the wider dataset.

Keywords: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, Islamic State, Profiles, Radicalisation, South East Asia, Terrorism

Introduction
Sometime in early 2016, a defector from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leaked a sizeable tranche of administrative records concerning approximately 4,000 of the organisation's foreign recruits. The publication of this data was a coup not only for the media, which first published selected documents, but also for the security services. Despite gaps in information (the tranche is only a snapshot from the period from early 2013 to 2014), the overall consensus among experts is that the documents are authentic.[1] The records shed considerable light on the administrative operations of ISIS, and in particular the General Administration of Borders, the department responsible for foreign jihadi recruits. The majority of the data comprises personal responses to a questionnaire (23 questions in all) completed by individuals entering geographic areas controlled by ISIS. These include standard questions such as date and place of birth, hometown, telephone number, education and blood type. The fighters came from over 70 nations, with Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey and Egypt making up the top five countries of origin in terms of numbers. Excellent analyses of the wider data set have already been published regarding what the complete tranche says about individuals joining ISIS at that point in time.[2] Publications have also included analyses of regional fighters from North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula[3], and those specifically from Saudi Arabia.[4] This paper attempts a preliminary investigation of what information the tranche contains on Southeast Asian fighters, comparing and contrasting records completed by S. E. Asian recruits, where appropriate, with the data and conclusions from the overall tranche, through reference to previously published analysis.[5]

Background
Southeast Asian Islamist militants have a history of travelling to conflict zones, both on foreign soil and among the outer islands of Indonesia's vast archipelago. In 1984, amid growing interest in the Afghan jihad resisting Soviet invasion, Osama bin Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam set up an office in northern Pakistan to facilitate the arrival of foreign fighter support. An Afghan Wahhabi mujahidin leader named
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was put in charge of the new initiative. The following year, two Indonesian clerics named Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir fled to Malaysia following a government crackdown on subversive Islamist activity in Indonesia. During the 1970s, the pair emerged as leaders of the Darul Islam movement, which had been advocating a national Islamic identity and governance to varying degrees since Indonesia’s struggle for independence in the 1940s. Soon after settling in Malaysia, Sungkar and Baasyir organised a trip to Saudi Arabia to seek support and funding for their movement’s endeavours; and on the way back they made a stop in Peshawar to inquire about training programmes for Southeast Asian militants.

The Indonesian ideologues managed to strike a deal with Sayyaf, and within months the first of what would be ten batches of over 200 Southeast Asian Darul Islam recruits were sent to a camp outside the Pakistani town of Sadda, roughly 40 km from the Afghan border. Instruction included basic military tactics, weapons training and bomb making, and a heavy measure of ideology, particularly from the writings of 13th Century Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. Very few (if any) Southeast Asians actually took up arms against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Rather, their mission was to acquire skills for jihad back in Indonesia, where the nation's secular President Suharto was seen as suppressing Islamist aspirations.

As Pakistan authorities began curbing militancy in the early to mid-1990s, Sungkar moved the training exercises to the southern Philippines, where the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was waging an insurgency on the southern island of Mindanao. The newly established Jemaah Islamiyah, which sought a pan-Southeast-Asian Islamic state, installed itself near the local militants’ Camp Abu-Bakar, about 100 km south of Marawi City, where Sadda camp alumni continued training and passed on their knowledge to more recent recruits.

When former Indonesian President Suharto’s 31-year rule ended amidst a popular uprising in the late 1990s, communal violence broke out in the Maluku islands and later in a central province on the island of Sulawesi. Purist Salafi militants travelled north from Java to ‘protect’ local Muslims, while Salafi-Jihadists from different groups followed suit—some from various Indonesian islands, others from a training camp in the Philippines. Jihadi involvement evolved into a broader terrorist campaign, including a suicide and truck bomb attack in Bali in 2002 which killed over 200 people. Two Malaysians named Azhari bin Husin and Noordin M. Top, who settled in Indonesia in the 1990s and early 2000s, would go on to lead a string of bombings and plots during the 2000s.

Following a sustained police crackdown on militancy and an organisational cost-benefit analysis of strategy, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) relinquished violence in 2007 to focus on outreach and building its base. But when conflict escalated in Syria in 2011, the organisation’s leaders soon saw an opportunity for a small number of its people to train with Syrian-based jihadi militias, particularly Jabhat al-Nusra, the al Qaeda-linked group which split from ISIS in 2013. The few JI cadets who made the trip were reportedly well-educated, with strong Islamist credentials, having studied at prominent Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, and generally stayed only for short periods before returning home.

Indonesians who travelled to join ISIS on the other hand, appear to be more of a self-funded bunch of intrepid militants, representing a range of different jihadi organisations back home. In 2016, Greg Fealy wrote there was “no single profile” among would-be ISIS fighters from Southeast Asia; they possessed a range of educational credentials, engaged in various professions and belonged to different age groups—though they tended to be younger than those joining non-ISIS militias. However, Fealy highlighted that one “important generalization” about ISIS recruits from Indonesia and Malaysia was the crucial role played by personal relationships for acquiring information and organising logistics.

The most detailed research on Indonesian ‘foreign fighters’, and indeed violent extremism in Indonesia more generally, has come from researchers at the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). In early 2015, IPAC wrote that organisational affiliation among militants in Indonesia was “not a reliable guide”
to which individuals are likely to pledge allegiance to ISIS.[21] However, while recruits derived from different regions and various organisations, Kirsten Schulze points out they were broadly connected by the influence of one man—Aman Abdurrahman, a takfiri ideologue from West Java currently on death row for inciting terrorist violence in Indonesia.[22]

Militants seeking to join ISIS apparently required a letter of recommendation (tazkiyah), which was provided after candidates had proven themselves to at least one selection committee.[23] Before September 2014, Aman Abdurrahman was reportedly running committees in several locations from his prison cell, until an associate was arrested and the system was suspended.[24] Potential ISIS recruits were motivated to a lesser or greater degree by several factors. A central narrative that resonated among Indonesians was the “End Times” prophecy, which claimed the Syrian conflict represented a final apocalyptic battle between Muslims and Western crusaders.[25] Further pull factors were the rapid military achievements of ISIS, its successful control of territory, and the subsequent proposition of life in a ‘caliphate’. [26]

The number of Southeast Asians who travelled, or attempted to travel, to ISIS-controlled territory has long been contentious, with government agencies releasing different figures, and other numbers emerging from researchers, academics and the international press. Few people from the Philippines or Thailand are thought to have made the trip, as Islamist militants from both countries focused more on conflicts at home, in Mindanao and Patani respectively. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed 50 of its nationals were in Syria as of December 2013, but was apparently uncertain.[27] In June 2015, the Indonesian police counterterrorism unit, Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), had confirmed 202 Indonesians were in Syria and Iraq, but thought there were likely dozens more.[28] By early 2017, Indonesia’s counterterrorism agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme) stated there were roughly 500 Indonesians fighting with ISIS in Syria, while more had died or failed to make it across the border.[29]

The leaked data from mid-2013 to early-2014 represents only a percentage of these recruits during a time window leading up to al-Baghdadi’s caliphate declaration in June 2014. However, the data reveals some interesting dynamics in comparison with the wider global tranche. It confirms some of the initial observations from Indonesia experts cited above, but suggests that early Southeast Asian ISIS recruits were older than suspected - something which also complicates the issue of recommendations, which will be drawn out in the analysis below.

Section 1: Biographical Details

The Southeast Asian data set analysed for this article contains 95 individuals who crossed into ISIS-controlled areas in Syria from Turkey. It includes 90 Indonesians and five Malaysians. All are adult males, except for two 12-year-old boys. One of the questions asked is what kind of combat role they would like to obtain, which suggests the questionnaire was primarily aimed toward those intending to fight for the organisation. A number of women and children from Indonesia and Malaysia are known to have made the trip to the Islamic State’s ‘caliphate’, but none are recorded in the tranche under study.[30] While it is possible the leaked data is from a questionnaire only given to men, IPAC has noted that early ISIS recruits from Indonesia were motivated to fight, so they did not bring family members.[31]

Over the past 15 years, Indonesia’s jihadi movement has been relatively splintered due to geographic location, varying strategic emphasis, commitment to different leaders, and pressure from the security services. Despite variations in spelling, individuals in the list who could be identified by name and additional information have known links to a number of these groups, which supports assertions made by IPAC and others in 2015. Given the lack of Arabic and English language skills among the majority of Southeast Asians arriving in Syria, the disparate recruits soon consolidated into a military unit in September 2014, which came to be known as Katibah Nusantara, basing itself in the north-eastern Syrian province of Hasakah.[32]
Place of Origin

Each questionnaire included a space for individuals to fill in the street, city and country from which they originated (see figure 1 below). The majority of individuals simply listed their home province and country. Almost 80% of the Indonesian recruits (71 individuals) were from Java, which is home to over half the nation’s population and contains several districts with long histories of Islamist militancy. Over 30% of the Indonesians hailed from East Java, a province which witnessed a coordinated suicide bombing attack on three churches in May 2018, involving three families with their children in tow.[33] While not directly linked to militants in Syria, the families are alleged to have been members of, or at least closely tied to Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a loosely connected network of ISIS-supporters in Indonesia.[34]

The most likely reason for the high number of individuals from this region is their personal connection to one successful recruiter named Abu Jandal al Tamimi, whose details appear in the data set; he reportedly returned home to Indonesia at least once to collect more intrepid militants.[35] According to the data, he appears to have arrived in late March 2014 with 18 of the recruits from the data set who hail from East Java. Abu Jandal was also cited by many of the recruits as a vouchsafe, which will be elaborated below.

The remaining 20% of the Indonesian recruits (16 individuals) were mostly from areas which have been associated with Islamist militancy, including Sulawesi (though precise provinces were not specified), South Sumatra, and the Sumbawa city of Bima.[36]

Age and Marital Status

Probably the most distinctive aspect of the Southeast Asian data is the advanced age of the recruits. While the average age at the point of joining was 21 years old for the five Malaysians, the figure rises to 32 among the Indonesians, which is more than five years older than the average age of the 4,173 other recruits in the
full dataset (26-27 years old). Indeed, Indonesian nationals represented the second oldest national cohort after recruits from Algeria.[37] The median was also high, with over 55 percent of the Southeast Asian respondents over the age of 30.

If individuals did not provide their current age, but instead gave both their date of entry and date of birth, it was simple to calculate. Nine individuals did not provide their age or date of entry and date of birth, so it was impossible to discern how old they were upon entry. Among the Southeast Asians, 40 of the recruits stated they were single with no children, while the rest were married – one with two wives and one with three wives. All but four had at least one child. According to the data set, the group of 18 who arrived with Abu Jandal had 56 children between them.

It is possible the higher age among Indonesian recruits is related to relative access to resources. Travel expenses from Indonesia, including flights, ground transportation in Turkey and accommodation en route to the Syrian border have been estimated to cost between $1,000-1,500 (Rp.15,000,000-21,000,000)[38] which is a substantial sum in a nation where the average monthly salary is under Rp.3,000,000 ($215).[39] Perhaps militants in their 30s were more capable of pulling together the money than their younger comrades.

However, a more robust reason for the advanced age of recruits may be the statistical weight of the travelling cohort led by Abu Jandal, who was 39 years old when he crossed into Syria in March 2014. One member of the 18-strong group was a 12-year-old boy, but if this individual is omitted from the set, the average age among them is 37.4 years at the time of crossing. Indeed, the average age of all 30 recruits from East Java (minus two 12-year-old boys) was 37.8 years old. It seems most likely the higher mean age among the Indonesian recruits is influenced by this older group of men all hailing from East Java, who may have represented veteran militants sent to blaze the trail for the several hundred Indonesians who would follow in their footsteps.

**Previous Travel Experience**

Few of the Southeast Asian recruits reported much international travel experience. As with others in the wider data set, there is ambiguity over the completion of this part of the form. Some respondents submitted only Turkey as a travel destination, while others left this space blank or put “none”. All of the individuals on the list crossed into Syria from a point in Turkey, which authorities have identified as a primary route into the caliphate for extremists from Indonesia.[40] One of the Malaysians had also travelled to Jordan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Seventeen of the Indonesians had been to three or four countries, but none had visited more than four. One Indonesian had travelled to the United States, while another had visited the United Kingdom.

**Section 2: Education**

Each of the registration documents required the individuals to give both their educational qualifications and level of sharia (religious) knowledge. Twenty-nine of the recruits from the Southeast Asian contingent claimed a secondary education, whereas 27 had attended at least some portion of a university programme. All those who attended high school, middle school or primary school were classed in the basic category (seven percent). Finally, 34 individuals left the box blank, indicating they either did not attend an educational institution or did not want to reveal their qualifications.

Average levels of education were higher among the group of 18 people who followed Abu Jandal to ISIS-controlled territory in March 2014. Nine members of this group stated they had received university education, seven cited a secondary level, and two a primary education. Of the nine with at least some tertiary education, only one could be considered to be in a ‘professional’ career – a doctor, while the others said they had been merchants, mechanics or construction workers.

The entire set of leaked documents analysed by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) team shows that 1,028 individuals (25 percent) who responded to the question claimed to have attended some form of post-high school, university, or college-level education, while 2,085 individuals (50 percent) listed either elementary or middle school education.[41] Although the high number of non-responses to education
questions among the Southeast Asians makes any accurate comparison or contrast difficult, it appears that levels of tertiary education were similar to the total average, while substantially fewer stated they had received or completed secondary schooling. In any case, there is quite significant difference among the levels of education the Southeast Asians had attained, therefore little to suggest that a specific educational level had much bearing on likelihood for mobilisation.

![Level of Religious Education](image)

**Level of Religious Education**

Each of the registration documents also required individuals to reveal their level of *shari'a* knowledge, which was divided into three categories: basic, intermediate and advanced (*see figure 2*). In the full dataset, 70 percent had a basic level of sharia knowledge, while only five percent stated they had an advanced understanding. Southeast Asians appear to have considered themselves generally more advanced than the average recruit, with 33 claiming to have a basic knowledge, 24 reporting an intermediate knowledge and 13 individuals (or 14%) rated their knowledge as advanced. The remaining 26 did not provide an answer to this question.

While the Southeast Asian data set is relatively small (*n*=95), the percentage of recruits who stated a high level of religious knowledge is substantially greater than that of the wider tranche, in which half of the nations represented (35 of 70) did not have a single fighter who characterised his/her knowledge as advanced.

**Subject of Study**

Seventeen of the Southeast Asian respondents specified their area of study in the questionnaire. Nine individuals claimed to have studied a subject related to Quranic studies/Arabic Language/Sharia (all Indonesian; six advanced and three intermediate). The rest had studied a range of subjects such as medicine, law, engineering, economics and tourism. All of the more highly educated individuals declared their level of religious knowledge as basic.

What is interesting about the Southeast Asian ‘advanced’ group is that almost all are listed as having spent time in other countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. Furthermore, the average age of the Indonesians claiming advanced knowledge of Islam was 24 years old, which is eight years younger than their wider cohort. Their answering in this way is likely the result of recent studies abroad in Islamic doctrine and
Indeed, over half of those who stated an advanced knowledge of Islam said they had received university education. Four such names in the list fit the description of young men known to have been studying at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, before the Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan described them as ‘missing’ in August 2013.[45] According to the arrival data, three of them crossed into the north-western Syrian city of Azaz from Turkey on 22 August 2013, while the fourth entered at the same point six weeks later. Three of the young men, who were aged between 25 and 27, were from Central Java and one from East Java. According to research from IPAC, one of these students was the son of a religious instructor who had trained along the Afghan–Pakistan border in the mid-1980s, while another was the son of a leading figure in the Indonesian extremist organisation *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT).[46]

Personal connections appear to be a common theme among clusters of individuals who arrived together from Southeast Asia, which is unsurprising given the practicality of individuals with little travel experience supporting each other on a relatively long and uncertain journey.

**Occupation**

Twenty-three individuals (22 percent) in the Southeast Asia dataset listed no former occupation or claimed to have been unemployed before travelling to join Islamic State. Of the remaining individuals, 17 (16 percent) stated they had worked as merchants; 15 (14 percent) listed themselves as students; and 8 (7 percent) had higher level jobs, including computer company employees, an architect, an industrial engineer, someone working with computer networks, and a doctor. These higher skills (such as management, electronics, medicine) were often noted by the ISIS border authority in the registration questionnaire as the organisation conducted methodical talent scouting to identify recruits capable of contributing to the state building project.[47]

The prominence among the Indonesian recruits of students and lower skilled positions such as merchants is largely in line with analysis of the wider data set, which found the highest proportion of recruits to have been students, self-employed, low-skilled traders or unskilled labourers.[48] The term ‘merchants’ in the Southeast Asian context could refer to the informal sale of products such as Islamic books, clothing or traditional medicines, which are common sources of income for those associated with jihadi networks in the region, particularly in Indonesia.[49] However, they could also be food cart salespeople who have no specific connection to the extremist movement.

Those in the Southeast Asian data set who cited no job before travelling represent a potentially higher rate of unemployment than the national average in Indonesia, which in 2013-14 was around six percent. However, ambiguity over the stated responses and the relatively small sample size makes it difficult to draw conclusions as to whether joblessness was a factor in mobilisation. Given the costs involved in traveling to Syria from Indonesia, it seems unlikely that socioeconomic hardship was a driver for Indonesians to make the journey to join ISIS, as it appears to have been for recruits from North Africa, for example.[50]

One of the Southeast Asians stated he had been in prison before making the trip to Syria. The man’s name is Abdul Rauf and the additional biographical information he provided in the questionnaire clarifies his identification as a former convict who served over eight years for involvement in the October 2002 Bali bombing which killed 202 people in a nightlife district of the popular tourist destination. Released in 2011, Abdul Rauf was reportedly a “model prisoner” who had apparently sought to ‘help’ Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar (in some unspecified way) after he was released, but was ultimately convinced to travel to Syria while visiting an associate named Rois at a maximum security prison; Rois is awaiting a death sentence for his central role in planning the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta.[51]

**Section 3: Fighter Profile**

When joining the Islamic State, individuals were asked to choose whether they wanted to become a fighter, suicide bomber (*istihhadi*) or kamikaze attacker (*inghimasi*).[52] Only 12 percent of the individuals in the full
dataset expressed a preference for a suicide bomber role, and those who claimed an “advanced” knowledge of sharia were less likely to express a desire to fill a suicide role than those with limited knowledge. From the Southeast Asian contingent, all of those who claimed to have an advanced level of sharia sought a fighting role. In the full Southeast Asian dataset, 93 of the individuals applied to be fighters, while only two (both Indonesian) chose suicide bomber (see figure 3). The remaining six recruits left the question blank. Both individuals who applied to be suicide bombers were married, had a secondary school education, worked as merchants, and used the same smuggler, though they arrived at different times through different points of entry.

One of the questions posed to recruits is whether they had ever previously participated in jihad. Only four individuals (all Indonesian) claimed to have jihad experience. Two simply replied “yes” to the question, while one claimed to have fought in Yemen, and one specified that he had spent a year fighting for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. This MILF-linked militant, who recorded his name as Noor Rosikhin, alias Abu Usama Ali al Indonesi, is a known member of a West Java-based extremist group called Ring Banten. He had been arrested twice in Indonesia during the 2000s, but had never been charged. [53] Born in 1975, Noor Rosikhin (also spelled Nur Roskin) would have been in his mid-20s when Jemaah Islamiyah sent Indonesian militants to train in an ungoverned area on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

Of the remaining individuals in the Southeast Asian dataset, 83 indicated they had no prior jihadi experience before travelling to Syria, and eight left the question blank. One fighter, a Malaysian, stated he had no previous jihad experience but under a miscellaneous notes category claimed he had spent time with the Sham al Islam brigade and after that with Az al Deen al Qassam, the military wing of the Palestinian organisation Hamas. If true, this 22-year-old would appear to be an outlier as Hamas is not known to have attracted foreign fighters in recent years. Indeed, Hamas has no policy of welcoming overseas militant volunteers and it would have been extremely difficult to enter the Gaza Strip or West Bank without a legitimate reason, so it is hard to see how the young Malaysian could have spent time on the ground with the organisation.
Crossings and Smugglers

The Southeast Asian recruits in the data set reached Syria through four different entry points, all from Turkish territory (see figure 4). The most common crossing was into the Syrian border town of Tel Abyad, 100km to the north of Raqqa city, with 35 recruits entering across points along the nearby border. The next most popular entrance point with 32 crossings was 100 km further east, into the Syrian city of Jarablus, which flanks the river Euphrates. Twenty-one people in the sample of Southeast Asians crossed 100 km further east still, near the city of Azaz, 50 km north of Aleppo, while three outliers crossed the border 50 km to the east of Aleppo, into the town of Atimah. In the wider data set, 19 different areas were used as entrance points into Syria, though as with the Southeast Asians, the vast majority entered into Tel Abyad, Jarablus or Azaz.

![Figure 4](image)

One smuggler was responsible for facilitating 52 of the 95 Southeast Asian crossings into Syria. This individual, Abu Mohammad al-Shamali, is a significant figure, at times going by the name Tarrad Mohammad al-Jarba. A British newspaper report from 2016 stated al-Shamani was responsible for transferring over 6,000 recruits over the border into Syria, which apparently represented one-third of the foreign fighters who had joined ISIS to date.[54] An Iraqi by birth, al-Shimali has been publicly identified as the Islamic State's Border Chief and an important figure in the group’s Immigration and Logistic Committee. [55]

The fact that the Southeast Asians both entered Syria around the same areas as most other recruits and largely went through the most popular people smuggler may not be surprising. Hailing from 10,000 km away, few of the Southeast Asians would have knowledge of the region and they likely shared contacts and information among themselves which produced minimal variation between the routes taken.

Vouchsafing

The Southeast Asian recruits indicated a total of 22 different individuals who had vouched for them. The majority of names listed are aliases of Indonesian extremists, some of whom are well known. Most frequently cited was Abu Jandal al Tamimi, whose real name is Salim Mubarok. He apparently vouched for 30 of the recruits in the data set. Abu Jandal, who was killed in late 2016 near Mosul, Iraq, was from the city of Malang in East Java and had been a member of a purist Salafi militia which fought in communal conflicts.
in Indonesia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Proficient in Arabic, Abu Jandal became an important go-between for Indonesians seeking to enter the caliphate and reportedly returned to Indonesia two or three times from the Middle East to recruit more manpower.[56]

As mentioned above, Abu Jandal appears to have sent a group of 18 people (17 men and one 12-year-old boy, all from East Java) across the border from Turkey into Tel Abyad, Syria, on 24 March 2014. All 18 people who preceded him over this crossing cited Abu Jandal as having vouched for them, with Abu Jandal then crossing through the same area himself six days later with his 12-year-old son and one other man.

The prevalence of would-be Southeast Asian militants travelling together highlights the trend of horizontal peer-to-peer mobilisation, which has been noted elsewhere, such as among disenfranchised youth in Western European cities.[57] While Indonesians and Malaysians who travelled to the Pakistan-Afghan border from the 1980s were largely recruited by the organisation Darul Islam, which covered their travel costs, those attempting to join ISIS in Syria appear to have organised themselves through localised networks and often travelled in pairs or small groups.[58] The contemporary cohort of intrepid jihadis from Southeast Asia supposedly needed to provide the name of at least one respected leader who had ostensibly ‘vouched’ for them. However, it seems personal relationships with other travellers were more consequential in terms of reaching ISIS-controlled territory, at least in the early days, than the direction of jihadi leadership back home.

Abu Jandal cited Abu Bakr al Indonesi, Sheik Oman Abdul Rahman and Abu Slimane as having vouched for him. Abu Bakr is most likely Abu Bakar Baasyir, one of the founders of Jemaah Islamiyah, who has spent much of the past 15 years in prison. Interestingly, Baasyir did not pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and its caliph until July 2014, months after the men entering Syria claimed he was vouching for them.[59] ‘Abu Bakr’ was also the vouchsafe of the four students who had disappeared from their Islamabad university in August 2013, as well as a group of nine men who entered near Azaz on 14 October. All those who put down Abu Bakr’s name entered through Azaz.

The Sheik Oman Abdul Rahman referred to by Abu Jandal is unlikely to be the late ‘Blind Sheik’ who died in US custody in 2017, but rather an alias of Southeast Asia’s most notorious ideologue in recent years, Aman Abdurrahman, who also goes by the alias Abu Suleman al Arkhbili (or Abu Slimane). He was cited by 14 individuals on the list. Like Baasyir, Aman Abdurrahman has spent a majority of the past 15 years in prison but still managed to remain the most influential figure among jihadi networks in Indonesia, if not the entire region.[60] Also fluent in Arabic, Aman has translated dozens of jihadi texts into Bahasa Indonesia over the years, which were then smuggled out of prison by his followers and dispersed in various forms. This commitment to spreading propaganda, including his own writings, is said to have won the West Java cleric respect among Islamic State leaders.[61]

Another name which appears 15 times as having vouched for the recruits is Abu Miqdad al Indonesi (or Muqdad/Maqdad). The most prominent Indonesian known to use this alias is a man named Mohamad Sibghotullah, who spent three years in prison from 2011-2014 for involvement in a terrorist training camp. Soon after he was released in early 2014 for good behaviour and for cooperating with state-run de-radicalisation programmes, Sibghotullah attempted to travel to Syria to join the caliphate but was intercepted by police in Malaysia and sent back to Indonesia.[62]

One 21-year-old from Surabaya stated he had been vouched for by Abu Suhaib al-Fransi, a French convert in his 60s who had been involved with Jabhat al-Nusra but later switched sides to ISIS. The young Indonesian represents an outlier in other ways; for instance, he stated he had spent four months in Turkey before crossing into the Syrian town of Atimah, east of Aleppo in December 2013.

Interestingly, al-Faranlsi did not join ISIS until after the declaration of the caliphate, seven months later, in June 2014, which suggests that at this early stage of the so-called Islamic State, there was a certain fluidity in administrative protocol. It seems that names who were ‘recognised’ in some sense as being trustworthy could carry weight and influence, and facilitate passage, as appears to be the case here; actually being a card-carrying ISIS member was not of primary importance. This may explain why many of the Indonesians who
entered through Azaz provided Abu Bakar Baasyir's name before the elderly cleric had pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi’s caliphate. Perhaps they had joined another group active in the Aleppo region first, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, and then decided to join ISIS at some later point.

However, it is fair to say that over the past 15 years Baasyir has been the most famous jihadi ideologue in Southeast Asia, given his leadership position in Jemaah Islamiyah during the first Bali bombing in 2002. It is therefore possible that recruits cited his name as they thought it would more likely be recognised by jihadis in the Middle East. While recommendation from a trusted ISIS recruiter is thought to have been required for acceptance into territory controlled by the organisation, it is not clear that such references were stringently vetted, at least in the early days of 2013 to early 2014.

Conclusions

Sifting through the evidence provided by what is left of the Islamic State's bureaucratic records, and attempting to understand the trajectories and eventual fates of those on the terrorist organisation's books, is a task that will occupy analysts for years to come. The data set on Southeast Asian recruits analysed here is admittedly limited, offering only a snapshot of ISIS recruitment for a period of less than one year leading up to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a ‘caliphate’ in June 2014, but represents a small contribution to the overall effort.

Given the number of Southeast Asians present in the data is smaller than that of other regions and nations, such as North Africa or Saudi Arabia, for example, it is difficult to draw too many conclusions based on a quantitative assessment. As with data on fighters from dozens of other nations, that regarding the Southeast Asians also contains unanswered questions, ambiguous responses and spelling inconsistencies, which all limit opportunities for making concrete claims about the type of fighters entering ISIS-controlled territory during this period.

The data set contains no information on individuals from other Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines or Singapore, from which small numbers of militants are known to have travelled to join or fight for ISIS.[63] It is possible recruits from these nations entered at a different time, or that the list of Southeast Asians analysed here is incomplete, even for the stated period. This is also true of the Southeast Asian children – particularly from Indonesia – who were trained as soldier ‘cubs’. The data set includes two 12-year-old boys, but it appears the personal details of women and children were either not recorded at all, or were recorded using a separate questionnaire.

Despite these important caveats, the data set provided interesting insight into aspects of Southeast Asian ISIS recruits. Notably, the Indonesian militants (who make up the majority of this tranche) are five to six years older than the average recruit who entered ISIS territory during this time. The most likely reason for this discrepancy is the group of older jihadis from East Java, who either travelled with Abu Jandal or claimed he had vouched for them. They may well represent a veteran cohort of pathfinders for other less experienced recruits to follow.

Socio-economic indicators became a point of contention in attempts to identify the drivers to travel for jihad in Syria in Iraq.[64] Studies which have attempted, for example, to analyse data for North African recruits have suggested that in particular provinces, economic hardship and marginalisation may have played a role in mobilising individuals to join ISIS—something which does not appear to be the case for Southeast Asians who successfully made the trip.[65] This is not to say there is an important difference between processes of radicalisation among people in the Maghreb and Indonesia, nor that Southeast Asian ISIS recruits have a unique socio-economic profile, as there may well have been other Indonesians who wanted to make the trip but were unable to collect enough money. However, the data on age, education and occupation among the Southeast Asians suggests that economic hardship was not a driver for recruits from this region seeking to join ISIS.
Indonesian recruits were also more likely to claim advanced religious knowledge than the average recruit in the wider data set. Those who stated this higher knowledge were considerably younger compared to their compatriot recruits and many had recently studied in the Middle East or Pakistan. These younger Indonesians studying abroad possibly had access to greater financial resources to make the trip to Syria than their age-group peers back home, and if not, they were certainly closer to their intended destination which would have made the journey less expensive.

Another point of interest was the diversity of vouchsafes provided by the Indonesians, which suggests that, initially, specific recommendations may have been less important than previously thought. Aman Abdurrahman is known to have been respected among ISIS officials in Syria, but he did not pledge allegiance until April 2014. Perhaps early recruits simply used his name anyway, as he was the most respected ideologue in Indonesia at the time. Information on vouchsafes and previous experiences by one or two on the list suggests that a small number may have been in the region for some time, possibly having initially gone to work with charitable organisations and subsequently became involved in militancy, either on their own accord or through relationships developed on their travels.[66]

Finally, the Southeast Asians on the list which could be identified, either directly by name or through a combination of the responses they provided, have had known links to a number of different Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia. On one hand this highlights the fractured nature of the jihadi movement in Southeast Asia over the past decade or so, but on the other it shows how the rapid success of ISIS in Syria and Iraq managed to bring disparate networks together to fight under its flag, even from thousands of miles away.

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Notes


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See Bank Indonesia data: URL: https://www.bi.go.id/sdds/.


Dodwell, Milton & Rassler, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

Ibid., p. 18.


While a number of young Indonesians pursue Islamic religious studies abroad, a 2016 study from the Lowy Institute which interviewed 47 Indonesians studying in Egypt and Turkey found strong support for democracy and no support for ISIS. See: Bubalo, Jones & Nuraniyah, “Indonesian students in Egypt and Turkey” Lowy Institute (April 2016). URL: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesian-students-egypt-and-turkey (accessed 22/4/19).


Ibid., p. 23.


Ibid., p. 18.


Converging Patterns in Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Canadian Right-Wing Extremists

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Abstract
In recent years, research on pathways in and out of violent extremism has grown at a staggering rate. Yet much of what is known about these oftentimes “mysterious” processes does not necessarily shed light on the specific aspects of right-wing extremism, and especially not from a Canadian perspective. In an effort to bridge this gap, we use a life-course criminology approach to draw from the voices of former extremists to gain insights into their respective trajectories in and out of violent extremism. A total of 10 life course interviews were conducted with former Canadian members of violent right-wing extremist groups. Analyses of these data suggest that even if there is no single trajectory in and out of violent extremism, there are still converging patterns such as the attraction for common pull factors and a profound dedication to the right-wing cause. Our analyses also demonstrate that the emotional toll of leaving the movement is often characterized by exhaustion, isolation and regrets.

Keywords: Violent extremism; right-wing extremism; pathways; life-course criminology; qualitative research.

Introduction
A lack of access to individuals who adopt right-wing extremist (RWE) ideologies has meant that the literature dealing with pathways in and out of violent right-wing extremism, in addition to other literature in terrorism and extremism studies, has long been criticized for its lack of studies based on primary data.[1] Although the situation has decreased in recent years, Schuurman's recent review shows that just over half of the studies on terrorism published between 2007 and 2016 rely on first-hand data, the rest still being based on secondary data, such as court records, books, media reports and other open sources.[2][3] Furthermore, as Simi, Sporer and Bubolz noted, criminology has shied away from researching violent extremism due to the political commitments of the actors who adopt these ideologies, which normally falls outside of the purview of criminologists.[4] However, several recent studies have shown that a life-course criminology approach may be particularly relevant to the study of violent extremism.[5] Accordingly, this article portrays the life course of violent extremists to uncover converging patterns in their pathways that can help to better understand changes in their behaviors and belief systems over time. More specifically, our study relies exclusively on primary data obtained by interviewing former members of Canadian violent RWE groups.

Studying the Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism
The process by which an individual comes to use violence in the name of a radical ideological, religious or political cause is generally referred to as “radicalization”. [6] This process tends to be described as a gradual adherence to extremist beliefs, feelings and behaviors that drive an individual—through various mechanisms—to legitimize the use of violence. [7] McCauley and Moskalenko aptly noted that “there are multiple and diverse pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalization”. [8] As is generally the case for most criminal behaviors, [9] one’s past history, early life, and events both across the life course and social relationships can influence pathways towards violent extremism. [10] Since the early 1990s, Sampson and Laub acknowledge the importance of childhood behavior, but also argue that several elements of informal social control (i.e., peers, family, siblings, employer, etc.) can have a significant impact on a deviant trajectory
in adulthood as well as on desistance.[11] They also consider delinquency as the result of a combination of individual actions and influences from situational contexts and social interactions. In this vein, it seems appropriate to consider radicalization as a deviant behavioral change and to think of how these contributions to the understanding of the criminal phenomenon can help us understand the factors that influence a person’s trajectory towards violent extremism.

Several push and pull factors seem to contribute to the process of radicalization towards violent extremism. Push factors are underlying vulnerabilities that could explain an interest in extremist ideology, such as socio-economic factors, negative experiences, or experienced/perceived grievances.[12] In contrast, pull factors relate to other aspects of this commitment that have proved to be appealing to the individual. They are, for example, motivations related to the need for meaning, identity, belonging or justice, as well as to utopian promises and religious-based arguments.[13] Worth noting, however, is that there is no consensus on which factors deserve the most attention. Further, their relative effects are very difficult to assess and to distinguish. Bokhari and colleagues, for example, found that engagement in violent extremism “occurs both in a top-down and a bottom-up pattern—that is, there have been both push and pull factors, often operating at the same time: the people interviewed claim their personal conviction, but emphasize the importance of someone introducing them to the ‘possibilities.’”[14]

Several studies based on primary data have highlighted the relevance of these push and pull factors for RWEs. For instance, Hamm’s extensive work on American Skinheads have shown the more than powerful influence of a delinquent sub-culture that characterizes this movement.[15] The role of such subculture in a radicalization process reflects, as other researchers have also shown, the internalization of political ideologies based on “non-politicized ideals”—e.g. justice and freedom—and the integration of an identity associated with an interest in the emblematic figures of white supremacism, the influential racist Skinhead bands—such as Skrewdriver—and the racist literature and propaganda.[16] Other important studies are worth highlighting here, especially those that draw from the unusually large set of 47 interviews conducted by Blee, DeMichele and Simi with RWEs from the U.S.[17] These studies have, among other things, focused on some crucial elements relating to involvement in, and disassociation from, violent extremism. For instance, the authors suggest that entry into white supremacist groups involves rituals that enable emotional and identity constituencies, as well as the creation of social ties, brotherhood and collective identity.[18] Once engaged, they highlight the addictive nature that characterizes many trajectories in right-wing extremism, and which can pose an important challenge in the process of leaving.[19] Regarding the latter more specifically, the authors emphasize several factors that seem to favor disengagement. The most common of these is a process of disillusionment based on a dissonance between “(positive) earlier life or expectations and their subsequent (negative) experiences”.[20][21] They also found that changes in social relationships, exposure to diversity and bad experiences arising from their involvement in the movement, such as violence and incarceration, could push them to leave.

With respect to the process of leaving violent extremism, two distinct constructs are also important to understand: deradicalization and disengagement. Although these terms are often used interchangeably, they do not have the same meaning. The term “deradicalization” refers to the process by which individuals are diverted from an extremist ideology, wherein they eventually reject the extremist ideology and adopt the values of the law-abiding majority.[22] On the other hand, “disengagement” refers to the process of individuals leaving the extremist group or movement with which they are associated in order to reintegrate into society.[23] This process of disengagement, in the case of violent groups in particular, is often hard to undertake because of constant in-group social pressure and the possible use of retaliatory violence against defectors.[24] As Windisch and colleagues explained, “deradicalization involves a change in belief; whereas, disengagement is characterized by a change in behavior.”[25] These two processes can therefore occur separately or simultaneously, depending on the context in which they take place. However, several studies have found that deradicalization can have a significant impact on disengagement, where being disillusioned
by the group or the ideology may be a first step towards leaving a violent group. [26] One important model that could be applied here to understand how leaving extremism generally occurs (both from deradicalization and disengagement perspectives) is Barreille’s “Pro-Integration Model.” [27] This model argues that five key domains are crucial to the process of leaving extremism: a fundamental change in the social relations and an openness to the “other,” a disillusionment from radical ideas, a process of identity rebuilding, a need for physical and/or psychological support, and a pro-social engagement. In order to further develop the knowledge regarding pathways in and out of violent extremism, this article will explore the narratives of former members of violent RWE groups, drawing on a life-course criminology perspective.

**Current Study**

This study is part of a larger project that draws from the voices of Canadian former right-wing extremists. These shared their experiences and thoughts on how to build resilience towards radicalization leading to violence based on their pathways in and out of violent extremism. Also included in the project are the voices of key stakeholders: law enforcement and community activists. Both were asked to develop a series of interview questions that they would ask former extremists, and a refined version of these were put to former extremists during the interview process. The purpose of this approach was simple: to develop a multidimensional interview guide rather than a uniquely academic perspective. The following is an overview of the data collection and analysis process.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

Prior to conducting the interviews with former extremists, Canadian law enforcement officials and community activists were asked to generate lists of questions that they would ask formers if they were given the opportunity. Including interview questions from these stakeholders—rather than solely generating a list of questions derived from literature reviews of academic and public policy documents—provided a triangulated, multidimensional framework to guide the interviews. The questions concerned the life course before, during and after their time in violent extremism, including their identities, roles, goals and activities. Duplicate questions were removed, and organized into the following categories:

- Before the radicalization process
- Radicalization process
- Experiences in the violent extremist movement
- Leaving violent extremism
- Reflections after leaving violent extremism.

Once the list of interview questions was finalized, the next step was to recruit former extremists to participate in the study. Initially, we relied on our contacts with former extremists from our previous research on right-wing extremism in Canada to gain access to this hidden population. [28] Over time, we developed a level of trust with a few members of this community, and they eventually referred us to other Canadian former extremists who would potentially participate in the study. Overall, a total of 10 former right-wing extremists participated in the current study and were recruited using a snowball sampling technique. Interviews were conducted either in person or via telephone or Skype between March and September of 2018, ranging from approximately 1.5 to 7 hours in length, with an average of 4 hours. All interviews were semi-structured, using approximately 275 open-ended questions from the lists submitted by law enforcement and community activists. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. All names were de-identified for the purpose of ensuring participant confidentiality.
A thematic coding scheme based on the interview grid guided the analysis. Using NVivo 13, we coded and analyzed every interview independently, identifying themes and patterns with respect to the questions that were asked. We then cross-analyzed themes across the 10 interviews in order to uncover the main converging patterns in the pathways in and out of their trajectories.

Sample Characteristics

The sample included 8 males and 2 females, ranging from 27 to 44 years old (average age: 38). Each identified themselves as a former extremist, meaning that they no longer shared an affiliation with a “white power” group. More specifically, the study participants have not been involved in the right-wing extremist movement for an average of 6.5 years. Most were born in urban or suburban cities in Canada, but all were involved in violent extremist groups located in major Canadian urban centres. The amount of time that each participant spent in the right-wing extremist movement ranged from 4 to 22 years with an average of 13 years. Their roles in these mostly racist Skinhead groups ranged from presidents and sergeants to enforcers, musicians, and spokespersons. Roughly half of the participants, however, were deemed to be in the “upper echelon” of the Canadian movement; in other words, many were leaders in the particular group(s) that they were associated with. A small portion of the participants described themselves as violent extremists while most claimed to be part of violent extremist groups without being violent themselves. Most of these participants, however, identified as being “off the grid”, meaning that they did not make it publicly known, either through media or public events, that they were previously part of an extremist movement. Similarly, the majority of these participants noted that they had never participated in a research study. It is worth noting that most of this information on our participants comes from their own words. It is therefore possible that this representation may differ from reality because of social desirability bias, or to avoid criminal justice procedures after all. However, our focus on “off the grid” formers is a way to avoid the delivery of pre-scripted streamlined narratives.

In terms of their upbringing and early life, most of the participants were born into middle or upper-middle-class families with married parents, grew up in urban/suburban areas, and had a diverse group of friends. Although they rarely had strong relationships with their families, most were not generally neglected or abused during childhood. However, the participants’ accounts of their upbringing and early life differed in many respects. To illustrate, most of them felt different and/or disconnected from their family and peers. Additionally, a number of participants had experienced bullying, at times by people from another ethnic background. According to one of the interviewees, that might explain a subsequent desire to bully back:

*I think about it now too. It’s like, maybe that’s why I got into bullying others, right. Or racism. Or behavior that, you know … and othering, you know, just all that kind of stuff. Because I experienced it, maybe I thought, well, shit I’m not going to be that guy getting bullied. I rather be the bully, right. (Participant 2)*

While half of the participants had no problem with the law before becoming involved in the movement, the other half had committed petty crimes and violence during adolescence. For most of them, their parents did not support their beliefs and noticed changes in their behavior and attitude. As the study participants reported, there were clear signs of their interest in RWE ideologies. For example, some became angrier and more aggressive, openly dropped racial slurs, became more anti-social and pulled away from family and friends. Obsessed by RWE literature, they began dressing as white power Skinheads, wearing white power patches and swastika signs including tattoos, and listening to white power music. They also claim that although their parents may not have understood their degree of involvement in violent extremist groups, the latter were aware they were heading down this path and did nothing to stop them.

Likewise, they were all introduced to different aspects of right-wing ideologies at a young age. For instance,
many were exposed to such ideologies through relatives or friends and only a few were directly recruited by people from the RWE movement. Not all of them really believed in the cause in the early stages of their involvement process, as they were sometimes more interested in the brotherhood and camaraderie aspects. As a result, most of them searched for like-minded people to surround themselves with, mostly offline but sometimes online following their exposure. Others saw the movement as a solution to the problems they had at the time, such as being bullied, feeling isolated, and performing poorly in school. According to the literature, “much of the research on Skinheads suggests that there is a large degree of variation in home-life characteristics of Skinheads,”[29] and it is still the case here as our participants followed very different paths. Nonetheless throughout these interviews, we were still able to uncover key patterns in the pathways they have taken since childhood and that led them to violent extremism, as other researchers have uncovered.[30]

Converging Entry Patterns

While participants’ pathways into violent extremism were diverse, they shared similar influential drivers. Among these similarities, in what follows, we highlight their need for identity and belonging, as well as power and invincibility. The results of our analyses of the data reveal how participants’ dedication to the cause becomes a major factor in their lives.

Similar Sources of Influence

The ten former violent RWEs that were interviewed mentioned several sources of influence that impacted their radicalization process. In an effort to learn about various extreme right belief systems, several participants in the study described how they spent countless hours watching war movies, television shows and documentaries about the Nazi regime, fascism, immigration, and races and culture, as well as countless hours reading extreme right-wing literature, either online or offline. Worth highlighting, though, was that their exposure to extreme right-wing material did not happen in isolation. Rather, “hanging out” and spending time with other RWEs allowed them to “discover” specialized hate material—especially material that was inaccessible prior to their involvement in the movement, such as mail-order books and magazines. As one participant explained:

*It just started slowly forming in my mind and then he had mail-order books and everything and he was always like, “Here, read this!” And everything was so well written and so intelligent, I could read a novel in an evening. I just burned through the book. (Participant 7)*

Similarly, participants stressed the importance of spending time with like-minded peers, as doing so served as an influential source of approval, reinforcing and amplifying the radical viewpoints and belief systems expressed in the material they were reading. As one participant explained it:

*I was reading a lot … you know, and I’d get the magazines. I’d sit and devour them. I was hanging out with [a friend] and his friends sometimes. I was spending a lot of time with [other group members]. And, I mean, honestly there was a lot of, you know, just … armchair activism. You know, sitting in coffee shops and talking about how we want the world to change. (Participant 3)*

Participants also expressed that, although they isolated themselves from their former social networks and families while on a pathway into violent extremism, they maintained tight-knit relationships with a small network of individuals who facilitated the development of their radical beliefs.[31]

It is worth highlighting that very few of the participants turned to the Internet to find peer support from other RWEs, and most participants in the study noted that the offline interactions were influential during their pathway into violent extremism.[32] However, those who used the Internet to access RWE materials or communicate with peers noted that the Internet was merely a facilitator, as has been found in other
Participants, for example, noted that they used the Internet to connect and communicate with international affiliates and to share white power music, but most feared that their online activity was being monitored by law enforcement and anti-racist activists. As one participant in our study noted:

*I did have a Stormfront account. It’s just… I remember my recruiter had warned me not to post on it because apparently, they will trace your IP address and then come and get you.* (Participant 6)

As a result, many participants were fearful about maintaining online relationships during their pathway into violent extremism. After all, the extremist groups that most of these former members were associated with engaged in high levels of violence and criminality. Participants also noted that attending RWE events where they could interact with their peers, was among the most influential pull factors into violent extremism. Several participants noted that white power concerts in particular were not only a central component of the movement but an important catalyst for their own pathway into violent extremism. While several participants discussed attending organized talks in which influential figures from the RWE movement gave speeches about immigration for instance, the majority described how white power concerts and music were a way to further explore RWE views and feel like being a part of “the brotherhood,” as has been found by other researchers. One participant, for example, noted that:

*Well, I mean, first of all, that’s [music] a way to get your message across. Because instead of listening, a lot of people, especially young people, don’t wanna listen to long-ass speeches […] they just want to listen to loud music. They wanna hear, you know, loud guitars and punk or metal or music they can mosh to and be angry to. And then hear messages that will be angled towards those ideas.* (Participant 1)

**Being Pulled Towards Violent Extremism**

For many of the study participants, it was clear that their identities were intricately linked to the Skinhead subculture or the group to which they belonged. For instance, participants oftentimes described how the collective identity of the group replaced their own identity and discussed how engaging in this type of movement gave them a sense of purpose. It gave them the feeling of being part of something that is bigger than themselves, and that they were doing something good for their society:

*I felt … and, you know; again this is another point I feel deeply embarrassed about now, but I felt at that time that what I was doing was making the world a better place … that I was creating positive change for Canada. That I was doing something, not just for me, not just for my community, but for the country. That I was saving—that I was helping to save Canada. And … so, you know, it was completely warped from the truth of what [the group] was about and what I was about too. Like it was, you know, I was a very hateful person. But I really like kind of bought the thing that people say, “Well, you know, it’s not about hate. It’s about loving your own people.” And I felt that I was making sacrifices and I was standing up for my beliefs in order to make Canada a better place.* (Participant 3)

Participants noted that the extremist groups with whom they associated consisted largely of hyper-masculine, violent individuals who were at constant odds with each other and jockeying for a leadership role in the movement. Yet, while participants often described the frequent infighting both within and between RWE groups, the consensus was that the groups served as “a second family,” especially because most participants noted that they did not have strong relationships with their own families. In addition, participants frequently noted that the sense of belonging they felt in the violent extremist groups was enhanced because they felt like they shared common interests with group members. This “second family” narrative, according to a few participants, was often used to recruit new members. As one participant explained it:

* […] the main thing he [a recruiter] did was belonging. He promised me, “hey, if you come and hang out*
and I’ll introduce you to these more guys.” And I always wanted to belong to something….Because I had
failed at sports. I had failed at joining gangs. I had failed at, you know, many different groups of friends
too. So, it was like … yeah. He just had—he offered that, he offered that availability too—“hey, look at
this group. All you need to do is be white.” You know? (Participant 2)

In describing this collective identity, participants frequently discussed feelings of power—an emotion that
many had not felt until they joined the violent extremist group. Being a member of a RWE group gave our
interviewees a sense of belonging, protection, and as one participant put it, “invincibility.” As two study
participants further explained it:

I think that respect, the fear, the—all that stuff, that was a big part for me. You know, you’re walking
around, and people know you’re—you know, you got a shaved head, the boots, the whatever. You may
not be wearing your gang colors, but—You can still tell who’s a Skinhead, right. So, you know, walk into
a bar, you know, nine times out of ten you’re not, you know, maybe you’re not getting respect from the
regular people, but people are afraid of you, right. (Participant 2)

But nothing … at all, could match the feeling of … intoxicating power and invincibility that I felt.
(Participant 3)

This sense of power, which comes from commiserating with violent and/or criminal acolytes, has long been
studied in gang environments and can also apply to other social movements.[35] For most of the participants
in our study, the sense of belonging and subsequent brotherhood was the initial appeal to violent extremist
groups while an adherence to a radical and extremist ideology came only after joining the movement. Radical
ideologies serve as a tool to legitimize hate and violent behavior. However, once the process of radicalization
had begun, adherence to the ideology occupied the most important place in the study participants’ daily lives.

Being Committed to the Cause

When describing their pathway into violent extremism, participants commonly discussed being “all-in”; in
other words, they would not be considered a formal group member unless they immersed themselves in
the radical beliefs, proving to the others that they were completely part of the group and “the family.” This
required that they show their dedication to radical beliefs, in part out of fear that others might perceive
them as “race traitors,” as several participants explained, which other researchers have also found.[36] As we
have said earlier, there is no single ideology behind right-wing extremism, but for these Skinheads and their
associates, the main concern was the rise of a white marginalization phenomenon in Canada and engaging
in a “RAHOW A” (RAcial HOly WAr) was the preferred solution. They saw themselves as victims to the point
of comparing themselves to refugees who have lost their property, family members, and had to leave their
country of origin:

I can’t believe that I thought these people had it better than me. Like a Syrian refugee has it better
than me. Really? So—but that’s how they’ll—that the mind-set you have to live in when you’re in
that movement. You have to live like everything’s been taken away from you. Which, in all fairness, is
delusional. (Participant 2)

For them, immigration in Canada is problematic because they foresee “whites” becoming a minority, losing
control of the country and eventually being expelled from it. It is a problem that, in their opinion, the
Canadian public is not sufficiently aware of. To this end, the distribution of flyers and online activism act
as a means to raise awareness among the general public. As these RWE groups consider that a race war is
imminent, the use of violence becomes a necessity. However, the degree of violence varies, as detailed by one
of the study participants:
There's always going to be violence in the far-right extremist movement. But the level of violence is really dependent on individuals and which types of groups you're dealing with. You mentioned [a specific hate group] earlier, right. They are significantly known around the far right to be one of the most—if not the most, violent white power Skinhead group. And they're feared. Even by far-right guys. So, it's, you know, yeah ... for them it's not about ... I think that group it's not about belonging. That group is about, you know, maybe not race war, but definitely violent acts that support white supremacy. (Participant 2)

As we have also pointed out, most of them saw themselves as soldiers, warriors and saviors of the “white race.” Violence, in this context, was aimed at protecting the “white race” they perceive as marginalized and persecuted. Members of the groups must be able to rationalize the use of violence in the name of a cause or the belief in a forthcoming race war. In relation to our interviewees, about half of them were already familiar with crimes and violence prior to joining a violent RWE group, but the other half had to accept it throughout their radicalization process:

I think once you kinda jump right in, and you're immersed in it, you don't know any better, and you just kind of ... you just like ... I wouldn't say the violence was like an everyday thing, but it was definitely a part of the culture ... and the more you're in it, the more you just accept it. That's just ... that's just the norm. (Participant 1)

Violence, hatred and anger were an integral element of these RWE groups, and its members managed to rationalize these behaviors through different mechanisms. Several participants referred to the normalization of the violent ideology following repeated exposure, [37] as well as how they frequently blamed others for their acts:

I thought it was fully justified. Because apparently everybody else was a threat to us. Therefore, we needed to respond like that. (Participant 6)

Our analyses show that the participants were uniformly committed to the battle to save their white race and had bought into the ideology with a certainty that created an ironclad rationale:

It's just saturating yourself in ideology where, you know, you're so ... you're so certain that you're right. That everything else is wrong. You don't, you won't look at opposing opinions and if you look at them, you'll shoot them down, you say, "Well, no, that's wrong." [...] You know, and that [the immersion] could be, that can take many forms. You know, whether it's losing your job, or choosing where you live, always looking at the people you surround yourself. The types of things and activities that you do. And it becomes more and more ... for me, it just became more and more about the movement ideology. I never really cared about anything else. I didn't care about anybody else. Because like, this is what's important. It's bigger than me. That you know, I didn't want to do sports. I didn't wanna do, you know, things that didn't involve the movement. (Participant 1)

As illustrated above, the RWE movement became a complete obsession affecting virtually every aspect of the participants' lives. Among other things, involvement in the movement had an impact on their profession, social network, recreational activities and, of course, their values and political considerations. Yet, despite all of this, they were able to make their way out of it, and although they were fully immersed in the ideology, about half of them had, at one time or another, questioned their beliefs, as well as the relevance of their engagement to the group. The forthcoming section details the reasons behind those second thoughts and the fact that they eventually changed their belief system, attitudes and behaviors.
Converging Exit Patterns

Even though study participants experienced unique pathways out of violent extremism, we were able to identify some converging patterns. We note that fatigue and exhaustion of hatred appear over time, and that participants rely on developing normative social interactions such as building relationships with family and friends. Participants also perceived that leaving RWE groups was not an easy task; the violent and criminal nature of these groups creates additional layers of barriers to disengagement, such as greater in-group social pressure and retaliatory violence against defectors.[38] Once having successfully left, most of the study participants noted that they felt remorse and suggested that pro-social engagement helped them in many ways.

Exhaustion of Hatred, Aging Out, and Family Building

Among the common patterns between the former violent RWEs we interviewed, there was a general feeling of exhaustion towards hate, anger and negativity. Many of them told us that once their lifestyle changed, they really understood how hate could be heavy to bear and mentally draining. In other words, they were simply tired of hating, or as one study participant put it:

*I just got tired of it. Got tired of the negativity. Got tired of the ... bullshit. I went back to school to do another degree. Started meeting other people. Realizing, you know, I was limiting myself with the people that I know... Just basically said that enough is enough.[...] it's just a very negative movement. It's just constant pissing and moaning about how sh*t people's lives are. How crappy the world is and, you know ... how crappy the world is perceived for white people and you know ... just it's a very negative, it's very narrow ... narrow-minded ... just got tired of that.[...] Just tired of the stupid idiots, tired of the ideology ... tired of uneducated morons, tired of people with mental health issues. Tired of ... the constant drinking, the infighting between the groups. Just tired of ... just, you know after two decades or so, just tired of everything in general ... just a bunch of people going nowhere ... talking in circles. (Participant 5)*

As one can see from this last quote, after spending some time in the movement, participants grew out of their commitment and began to feel uninspired by it. If one of the push factors that may have led most of them towards violent extremism was feeling isolated and disconnected from their entourage, the above quote shows that similar feelings can also be symptomatic of a pathway out of violent extremism. In the same vein, study participants began to focus on life events of a pro-social and normative variety, including meeting a life partner and the birth of children. These well documented and researched turning points in life influenced many of the study participants to reconsider their commitment to violence.[39] As one participant explained it:

*Namely ... the birth of my first child and wife continually just telling me, “what are you doing? You're going to end up dead. You’re going to end up in prison. These people are a joke. These people are—don't even believe in this shit,” you know. But, you know, the big part here for me was my daughter, right. Like ... how could I teach her to hate those other people ... because of their race, or their religion, or their whatever, right. Like I couldn't. And also, the danger that would put my family in, right. It was one thing to be a single guy and be in this, ’cause I’m only putting me at risk. But, putting my own children at risk just because of, you know, I feel like I want to be in ... a cool group of guys. That's kind of stupid, isn't it? (Participant 2)*

Thus, these participants reached a point where they became disillusioned by either the group or the ideology to which they had subscribed; many of them had second thoughts long before they opted to change their lives and leave the group. It is worth noting that a quick intervention is key, since, as is well known in the literature, the deeper the deviant engagement, the more difficult it is to leave such movements.[40]
Identity (Re-) Building

Another point of convergence in the study of participants’ pathways out of violent RWE groups relates to the many challenges they faced when leaving their respective groups and abandoning their respective ideological affiliations. Tony McAleer, former white supremacist and co-founder of ‘Life After Hate,’ [41] calls one of the most important of these challenges the “void.” [42] More specifically, this expression refers to the moment when a disengaging extremist finds himself devoid of a social circle on which to rely. Based on what we have seen from their pathways into violent extremism, study participants were indoctrinated into ideologies of violence that were reinforced by the social networks afforded to them by the RWE groups. In the process, they abandoned their old friends and sometimes their families. When these extremists chose to leave their respective groups, they acknowledged that after severing ties with the social network of RWEs, they found themselves isolated until they managed to rebuild a new group of peers. During the time that the majority of the study participants left extremism, EXIT or deradicalization/disengagement programs were essentially non-existent in Canada. And for those who recently left extremism, they noted that they were not approached by such programs. Therefore, they built their new social networks by themselves or they reconnected with their former peer groups they had prior to joining these movements.

According to study participants, this period of isolation involved two specific challenges. First, as is the case with drugs or alcohol addicts, they feared that maintaining a relationship with RWEs might cause them to be drawn back into the movement. This particular observation confirms what Simi and his colleagues proposed, namely that “the addictive qualities of [white supremacist] identity has substantial theoretical implications. Identities may be constructed and performed through situational occasions, but when these situations are routinized, insular, and involve extreme hatred, the persistence of these identities may be much greater than previously thought.” [43] As one participant noted:

No, it's like a junkie. You don't want to go hang out in a heroin den after you get yourself straight. I can't hang out with these guys. How can I hang out with these guys, when I can't take anything that they say seriously? How can I hang out with them when they're so close-minded and so closed off? I don't want to hear those ideas anymore. I don't want that in my life, around my life. (Participant 7)

Secondly, the groups in which most study participants were involved did not tolerate defectors. Fearing retaliation from their former RWE group members—aimed either at themselves or their families—interviewees withdrew quietly and inconspicuously:

I didn't want to make a big scene. I was worried about having a big incident. So, I just kind of wanted to just kind of fade out, as opposed to being like, “Am I leaving? You know, this is over.” I didn't want to do that, I just wanted to kind of like disappear. (Participant 1)

After I left I was … you know, not—because I didn't—have an opportunity to testify or do anything of the nature that would give me, you know, access to witness protection or anything like that, I really had no option but to return to my parents' house. And all the Nazis knew that address. There was another Skinhead living in full view of my parents' house who could track my comings and goings as well as theirs. And there were certainly some instances of intimidation that occurred that, you know, I was worried. And in fact, I've been more worried in recent years where I've been harassed by somebody who was a [group] member and they doxed my parents. My elderly, frail, sick parents got fucking doxed. And I was really scared that something was going to happen to them. And I'm really grateful that nothing did, and they don't live at that address anymore but… (Participant 3)

In order to facilitate their disengagement process, as well as to evade possible retaliation, many of these participants decided to move to other cities. Isolating themselves was a catalyst for personal change,
especially as they began adopting new lives based on pro-social values.

For many of the study participants, rebuilding their identity to reflect normative societal standards was and continues to remain a key challenge. They had to reframe themselves as non-hateful and build a new social network. In fact, the importance of their commitment to the RWE movement and the prescriptive ideological framework imposed within, often leaves extremists directionless when they choose to exit:

Like by the time I left, everything—like my entire world was seen through a racist lens. And it was … to the point that when left, I didn't know what I wanted to wear. I didn't know what box of cereal I wanted to eat. I didn't know what to watch on television. You know, everything was viewed in this … you know, in this very conscripted, limited way. (Participant 3)

The development of a new identity may lead to full-family involvement, finding a new job, becoming re-engaged in pre-movement activities or hobbies, or reconnecting with previous social circles. Throughout this process, they usually start to socialize or even make friends with people from different backgrounds and nationalities. According to some of them, these new relationships have allowed them to develop a greater openness, as well as a non-discriminatory outlook towards human relationships:

But the process was just kind of like, getting away from that, it took a long time. And I think, working where I work, with so many different types of people, from like all over the world, has totally changed my view on everything. 'Cause I made some good friends who were from like, everywhere. Like one of my good friends now, she's from Trinidad. And she's like the best. She's like such a good friend. And it's just, you look past everything you did, and you just see the person. And it took, I don't know. I don't know how long it took, but it took years to get out of that mindset, like totally. (Participant 1)

Employment opportunities are considered a positive factor for the reintegration of former extremists. However, as Laub and Sampson suggest, the pro-social influence does not necessarily result from being employed, but rather from the multiple social dynamics afforded therein.[44] Study participants’ narratives highlight the distinction between deradicalization and disengagement. As evidenced from the quote above, leaving a peer group with a bad influence may happen quickly, but the change in beliefs and attitudes is more gradual. It is for this reason that we believe that those who wish to leave this kind of trajectory require constant help adapted to their needs to cope with isolation and reconstruction. A preventive strategy in this regard aims to build on the experience of former extremists, and it turns out that this practice can also be beneficial for them in expressing remorse for their actions. In the next section, we will see how some of the study participants experienced this event.

Remorse, Regrets and Giving Back

Study participants’ narratives revealed that while in the movement, many had second thoughts about having joined a RWE group. At the end of their engagement in violent extremism, some began to feel greater remorse for what they had done to innocent people in the past:

And … yeah I just—I took a long time and carried, and still carry, so much guilt that it—My self-esteem took a tremendous hit and I felt like… I felt like I was the worst person for a long time. And I ended up self-sabotaging a lot of things, especially employment that I—employment opportunities that I had that, you know, that I felt, you know, I didn't deserve this break. (Participant 3)

They became aware of the extent of the physical and psychological damage they caused. While they acknowledge their inability to change the past, they focus on adopting pro-social behaviors and consider how they perceive others in society. For some, giving back to society is a significant way to address their feelings of guilt. This can take many forms such as volunteering with stigmatized and victimized communities,
involvement in various prevention programs and assistance to security and police forces in countering violent extremism. By helping the victims of extremism, as well as extremists looking for a way out, they hope to discourage this phenomenon in the years to come:

You know what, I carried a lot of shame for quite a number of years there. But now that I’m volunteering with [a helping program], as shameful as some of the experience is I think it was a fair trade-off because now I’m able to give you guys all these insights which will hopefully help in the future. (Participant 6)

The involvement of former extremists in helping others to disengage generates a circular pattern of prevention. In fact, several reported having been influenced by other former extremists’ testimonies to share their experiences to dissuade others from going down the same path, or to motivate some to disengage. As they were heavily committed to the cause in their pathways, they later invest their time in fighting the movement they were in. Again, their engagement affords them a sense of purpose and the feeling of being part of something that is bigger than themselves.

Concluding Remarks

This study intended, among other things, to fill an empirical gap in the current literature on right-wing extremism by looking at in-depth life-course interviews of former extremists to uncover similar themes within their trajectories in and out of violent RWE groups. Based on the testimonies of ten Canadian former RWEs, we were able to underline some converging patterns and similarities between these two processes. Among other things, we saw that their journey towards violent extremism was a central part of their lives, and that it was the result of multiple sources of influence and a mix of identity, belonging and status needs. With respect to the pathways out, it appeared to us that aging out, fatigue and social relationships could lead to group disengagement. However, engaging in this process often involves an important period of isolation, coupled with fears, remorse, regrets and rebuilding of identity. These findings also highlight the importance of similarities between these converging patterns. Together with other aspects, we noted similar push and pull factors among study participants, such as the need for purpose or identity. In addition, feeling isolated and disconnected from peers seems to have led to a change of trajectory in both cases. Finally, we have found that identity rebuilding processes and major changes in peer networks also coincide with pathways in and out of violent extremism.

Overall, it is interesting to see that we can link some of the findings of this study to a multitude of other studies on the subject. As we have seen from the participants’ upbringing and early lives, our sample was very heterogeneous. In contrast to Laub and Sampson, we could not consider our sample as having shared beginnings, but they definitely had divergent lives before and after their involvement in violent extremism. However, we found converging patterns in their pathways in and out of violent extremism, which we consider to be crucial aspects to consider in the development of prevention strategies. For example, we found that their journey towards violent extremism was not isolated. Although the study participants were all part of violent RWE groups, other people influenced their radicalization process before joining any group. In fact, they were exposed to the ideology by somebody else, and then sought to solidify their beliefs. The study participants’ testimonies also showed the crucial relevance of pull factors. As Simi, Sporer and Bubolz have found, despite the ideological immersion in which extremists find themselves, their initial attraction seems to have been motivated more by non-ideological factors.[45] As such, other researchers have also noted that listening to white power music such as Nazi punk rock, or other genres like nationalist socialist black metal, combined with group dynamics, contributed to their ideological acceptance process.[46] Moreover, the converging patterns we outlined in the pathways out of violent extremism completely support Barrelle’s “Pro-integration” model. Study participants emphasized the relevance of considering isolation and the rebuilding of identity that characterizes leaving extremism, the exhaustion and disillusionment that facilitate behavioral
and belief system changes, and the benefits of social support and pro-social behavior.

If there is no single trajectory towards violent extremism, there is probably no single strategy to counter it.[47] Nonetheless, we can draw from the current study to suggest that some prevention strategies may have significant potential. First, our study showed that extremists occasionally have second thoughts, even during their involvement in a violent extremist group. During that period of their life, they may be disillusioned by their group or ideology for different reasons, or simply be pondering their future. Considering that some of the study participants told us that having a trustworthy person with whom to openly talk could have deterred them from going down that path or motivate them to leave once involved, it is of utmost importance to educate people about right-wing extremism and offer the necessary resources to help violent extremists return to a pro-social path. For instance, this can be achieved through various EXIT programs, or by the simple intervention of former extremists asking open-ended questions.[48] As many of the study participants carry the burden of their past, their involvement in prevention strategies might help them to mitigate their remorse by giving back to society. In addition to the formers, the involvement of family members also appears very important to us. As we have seen, parents or relatives of the study participants were almost all aware that they were headed down that path, but they failed to act. We believe that this is more of a matter of education than parental negligence or bad faith. Indeed, engaging in discussions with youth or young adults on sensitive issues such as violent right-wing extremism is not easy, and we believe that more research and awareness campaigns should be dedicated to this subject.

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Notes


[32] It is worth noting that this might have something to do with the average age of the participants, as well as the timing of their pathways in. Most of the participants got in the movement between late 1990s and early 2000s. At that time, the Internet and social media were not used as they have been since.


[34] Brown, 2004; Cotter, 1999; Tanner and Campana, 2014.


[38] Koehler, 2015.


[40] Laub and Sampson, 2003.

[41] For more info on Life After Hate, see URL: https://www.lifeafterhate.org/


Research Note: Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism: A Literature Review

by Joshua Sinai, with Jeffrey Fuller and Tiffany Seal

Abstract

This Research Note is a summary of the findings of a larger literature review of more than 200 publications on what their authors consider to be Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) in Counter-Terrorism (CT) efforts and in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs. Specifically, the MoEs in CT and CVE interventions are examined in terms of how the literature discusses their outcome, Evidence gaps which need to be filled are identified, and recommendations for further research on these issues are made. The general objective is to identify findings that contribute to upgrading the effectiveness of the various communities involved in responding to terrorist threats and in understanding how to weaken the drivers of radicalization and recruitment.

Keywords: counter-terrorism, countering violent extremism, research, measuring effectiveness, literature review

Introduction

For this Research Note (RN), slightly more than 200 English-language publications were selected - mostly books, (monographs and edited volumes) as well as a small number of articles. These were published during the period 2008 to 2019 (with a few notable publications predating 2008). They are all listed in the bibliography at the end of this RN. Given the many disagreements among authors regarding the issues reviewed here, an effort was made to incorporate as many diverse perspectives as possible to provide both comprehensive and balanced coverage. The RN is divided into two parts: literature on counter-terrorism interventions and literature on countering violent extremism. Gaps and conclusions are identified towards the end.

Counter-Terrorism Interventions

According to the literature reviewed, positive outcomes in CT interventions result from several factors. These include formulating appropriate metrics to assess programmatic effectiveness and implementing comprehensive and integrated CT response measures. Since governments, particularly in the West, also face terrorist threats emanating from foreign countries where hostile terrorists find safe havens, effective cooperation with allied governments is crucial. Effective CT intervention also needs to focus on terrorists’ activities in cyberspace, because the Internet provides them with the capacity to reach adherents and operatives anywhere around the world, whether to radicalize, communicate, or fundraise, without having to cross physical borders.

In general, to be effective, CT interventions need to understand the nature of the terrorist threats in terms of their physical geographical location as domestic, transnational, international, state, or in cyberspace. It is also important to understand the types of adversary groups, whether these are hierarchically organized, loosely networked, lone-actors, or state sponsored, or combination of these types. CT campaigns also need to understand the nature of adversaries as political, religious, criminal, or other types, as well as their linkages with other terrorist groups. This is crucial in enabling a CT intervention to comprehensively address these geographic typologies and organizational and ideological types with appropriate strategies. (Omand, 2010, p. 214; Prunckun and Whitford, 2019, p. 244; and Sinai, 2019, p. 133)

CT interventions also need to address vulnerabilities in the partnerships between terrorist groups, their state
sponsors, as well as within terrorist groups themselves. (Mobley, 2012, p. 249) It is important to focus on the nature of the interrelations among groups because the gathering and analysis of data utilizing terrorist organizations as the single or main unit of analysis is no longer adequate, as the threat emanates from a variety of affiliated groups. (Moghadam, 2017, p. 269) This requires understanding the nature of terrorist group alliances, beginning with anticipating when such alliances are likely to occur, and then seeking to degrade such alliance infrastructures, in terms of hubs and when they are formed. (Bacon, 2018, p. 281) In terms of MoE, CT interventions need to be aware of the early stages of an insurgency and implement appropriate response measures to prevent it from growing in intensity to a level where it becomes difficult to be controlled. (Connable and Libicki, 2010, p. 152)

CT interventions also need to proactively counter the activities of terrorist adversaries in cyberspace. This presents unique challenges because while a terrorist operative's movements might come under video surveillance in physical space, they are more difficult to track in cyberspace. The cyberspace allows them to expand their operational reach and target their operations to distinct geographic areas. (Bunker and Heal, editors, 2014; Coker, 2015, p. 93) To counter terrorists' operations in cyberspace, terrorism informatics software tools can aid in identifying the origins of terrorist operatives in cyberspace's dark web and also provide cues as to how and where they might conduct attacks in physical space. (Chen, Reid, Sinai, Silke, and Ganor, (Eds.), 2008; Davis, Perry, Brown, Yeung, Roshan, and Voorhies, 2013).

Frameworks and Metrics of Effectiveness

In addition to these general intervention measures, the literature also highlights the importance of formulating effective frameworks and metrics to guide CT interventions. One framework is based on David Easton's concept of process and outcome goals that need to be addressed in a CT campaign. Both of these are identified, in a terrorism context, as potential vulnerabilities for terrorist groups that need to be targeted to reduce their overall capabilities to conduct warfare. Process goals are defined as those that sustain a group as an organizational entity over time, while outcome goals are those that achieve their goals, such as operational activities to conduct attacks. (Cragin and Daly, 2004, Abrahms, 2018) A variation utilizes an effects-based approach, with indicators, thresholds, and input (i.e., process) and output (i.e., outcome) measures that need to be addressed. (Connable, 2010)

Operationally, positive outcomes in CT campaigns consist of reducing terrorist groups’ capabilities in terms of their processes (i.e., sustenance) and the outcomes of their warfare campaigns in terms of being able to mount attacks. This is accomplished in several ways. A group's process component can be degraded by targeting several of its components. In general, this includes targeting its pivotal leadership, which can weaken and fragment it (Clark and Newman, 2006, pp. 79, 83; Cragin, Chalk, Daly, and Jackson, 2007, pp. 93-97; Jones and Libicki, 2008, p. 130; Vertigans, 2011, p. 146); disrupting its recruitment (including its recruiters) (Clark and Newman, 2006, pp. 79, 83; Crouch, 2010, pp. 130-131; Davis and Cragin, editors, 2009, p. 396); degrading financial networks, communications, and travel (Clarke and Newman, 2006, pp. 79-83; Hazen, 2013). Also, by degrading its communications capabilities, (Clarke and Newman, 2006, pp. 79-83); and degrading its technological innovation capability. (Cragin, Chalk, Daly, and Jackson, 2007, pp. 93-97; Jackson, 2005, pp. ix, xv; Martin and Weinberg, 2017, p. 236)

A CT campaign’s desired outcome measure consists of several components to achieve terrorism’s termination. These range from employing military, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and other relevant measures to degrade a terrorist adversary’s capability to mount attacks, to engaging in a peace process to resolve a terrorist conflict’s underlying causes that give rise to its grievances and agendas. A comprehensive approach is involved in terminating a terrorist insurgency, which for both government and terrorist adversaries involves effectively managing their process and outcome components. In general, terrorist groups have a “natural
history,” with a trajectory consisting of a beginning, middle, and an end. (Weinberg, 2011, p. 123) The key to accelerating terrorism termination is to identify ways to separate a terrorist group from its “nominal” constituency (Weinberg, 2011, p. 123) and to promote desertions and defections from the group. (Connable and Libicki, 2010)

In a related framework, CT measures need to degrade the terrorist adversary at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This involves degrading a terrorist organization (operational, i.e., its process) and decreasing its attacks (tactical, i.e., its outcome), in order to prevent terrorists from coercing governments into granting them undesired political concessions (strategic, i.e., outcome). (Peter Krause in Muro, editor, pp. 47-48)

In a similar approach, although utilizing a framework of deterrence, effective CT is viewed as a combination of success in influencing a terrorist adversary’s decision making rationale to attack (i.e., process), even if its motivation to attack is not diminished, and decreasing its capability to attack (i.e., outcome). (Wenger and Wilner, (Eds.), 2012, pp. 317-318)

With terrorist groups striving to achieve the five objectives of attention, acknowledgment, recognition, authority, and governance (with authority and governance the most difficult for them to achieve), the task of CT intervention is to counter each of these objectives in an effective manner. (Hoffman, 2017, p. 268)

Also, viewing terrorist rebellions as a protracted war of attrition, the effectiveness of a government’s CT intervention measures needs to be examined longitudinally, along multiple lines of effort (LoE), with interim- and long-term milestones to produce end-state objectives. (McFate and Laurence, (Eds.), 2015, p. 201; Lieberman, editor, 2018). Perl (2005, p. 7) argues that a longitudinal approach will enable CT planners to identify changes in terrorists’ evolving “goals, strategies, tactics and operating environments,” thus providing them a capability to prevent a terrorist group from embarking on a “quantum change” in their warfare to reach a higher level.

Progress in CT intervention is determined by the interactions between a campaign’s logical lines of operation (LLOs) in achieving its overall end state. A combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators can be used to measure progress against goals. (United States Government, Department of the Army, 2007, pp. 189-190)

Another approach is to view CT MoEs as measures of performance (MoPs) (i.e., process) in terms of the numbers of arrests of terrorists, and measures of effect (MoEs) (i.e., outcome) in terms of reducing the degree of insurgent influence in a conflict area. (McFate and Laurence, editors, 2015, p. 173)

Several approaches exist that apply a center-of-gravity (CoG) focus to identify a terrorist adversary’s vulnerabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. (Kilcullen, 2013; Shapiro, 2015, pp. 255-269; United States Government, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006; Wilner, 2015, p. 173) In one approach, the CoG focuses on a terrorist group’s organizational vulnerabilities to degrade its situational awareness and maintenance of “trust and control” by making it difficult to enforce internal discipline, disrupt its funding operation, and degrade its technological warfare capability (i.e., process) in order to prevent it from achieving its desired political impact (i.e., outcome). (Shapiro, 2015, pp. 255-269) In a similar approach, a group’s organizational structure and compartmentation (i.e., its process) can be exploited by sowing discord and distrust among members by playing leaders off against each other. (Mobley, 2012, pp. 248-249)

Effective CT needs to address how terrorists themselves view their MoEs. For example, terrorists might redirect their resources towards less frequent but more devastating attacks as they view success metrics differently than their government adversaries. (Perl, 2005, p. 2, 10)

Another framework applies a risk management approach to MoEs in terms of a CT intervention’s capability
to reduce the risk of terrorism. In this approach, the benefits of expending resources to establish the risk-reducing security framework are assessed in terms of their capability to mitigate the threat which are compared to the likelihood of the terrorist adversary’s capability to conduct attacks if such security measures were not in place (Mueller and Stewart, 2016, p. 25) MoEs are assessed in terms of a risk-based cost-benefit approach to prioritize CT response measures, assessing overall risk measured by the degree of threat, the vulnerability of a target including the expected cost to protect it, and the consequences in terms of loss of attacking the target.

The risk management approach is further distinguished between an attack’s primary impact in terms of fatalities and injuries, property damage and economic disruption, and secondary loss in terms of political, social, economic and legal costs. (Posner, 2007, pp. 211-215) In a similar risk management approach, the ordering of threat, vulnerability and consequence needs to focus on disrupting terrorists’ planning stage, with preparations to respond in the aftermath, in case an attack occurs. (Haberfeld and von Hassel, editors, 2009, pp. 341-346; Omand, 2010, pp. 323-324)

It is important to apply appropriate MoE research methodologies to guide a CT intervention to avoid negative outcomes. However, to some authors, it is ineffectual to view effectiveness in CT interventions in terms of only quantifiable metrics such as the lowered frequency or number of terrorist attacks, the number of plots disrupted, or the degree of lethality caused by attacks in terms of the numbers of fatalities these inflict, because a terrorist adversary might view success in their MOEs differently. (Boyle, (Ed.), 2019, p. 473; Crenshaw and LaFree, 2017, p. 167; Perl, 2005, p. 2, 10) Terrorists, for example, rather than plan frequent and low-impact attacks, might redirect their resources towards less frequent but more devastating attacks in order to achieve greater publicity for their cause. (Perl, 2005, p. 2, 10) Also, terrorists might use violence as part of their competition for ascendancy vis-à-vis other terrorist groups within their constituency. This makes the number and rate of their attacks difficult to quantify since their cost-benefit analyses may be based on their own local criteria. (Heilberg, O’Leary, and Tirman, (Eds.), 2007, p. 398)

Four types of MoEs that negatively affect CT campaigns and serve to prolong a conflict include having means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries become blurred, and the search for a “perfect peace” replaces a reality of more limited results. (Cronin in Webel and Tomass, (Eds.), 2017, p. 256)

Finally, the measures used by governments in responding to the terrorist threats facing them are crucial in determining the effectiveness of their CT measures. According to Bosi, Demetriou, and Malthaner (Eds., 2014, p. 17) certain governments respond in a primarily coercive way to outbreaks of violent extremism, so the impacts of such responses need to be analyzed. To avoid such ineffectual government responses because of their inability to control such adversaries, several authors recommend formulating a threat assessment that is evidence-based, so as to avoid threat inflation and overreaction. To such authors, this will be accompanied by “dialing down” their rhetoric, viewing terrorism as ordinary crime, accepting uncertainty, maintaining civil liberties, and not over-militarizing their response. (English, 2009, pp. 120-140; Gomis, 2016, pp. xviii-xx; Jackson, editor, 2018, p. 2; Kurzman, 2011, pp. 203-204; Richardson, 2007, pp. 203-232; Sageman, 2016, p. 167; Sageman, 2017, p. 371; Shemella, 2011, pp. 371-373; Tembo, 2015, pp. 128-135)

**Gaps in Research**

Some publications highlight several research gaps in assessing CT intervention effectiveness. The gaps identified are definitional, methodological, and programmatic. In one gap, it is difficult to define terrorism because there “is not one terrorism but a variety of terrorisms,” making it difficult to reach a consensus on the subject of investigation. This has led to a lack of uniform coding and counting rules in entering incident-related data across a range of terrorism databases. (Laqueur and Wall, 2018, p. 195; Jackson, (Ed.), 2018, p. 51) Moreover, there is no agreement on an overarching causal theory of terrorism, making it difficult to identify effective
solutions. Due to the lack of definitional consensus, with CT measures being context-dependent, it is difficult to use data and statistical methods to generalize or to predict potential outcomes of government responses in specific cases. (Cronin, 2009, pp. 18, 30, 185)

In another definition gap, several authors argue that there is no agreement or universal theory of what constitutes success and failure in CT, in terms of objective, evidence-based measures to assess degree of progress toward attaining end-states. (Cronin, 2009, p. 30; Forest, 2019, p. 414, Lum and Kennedy, (Eds.), 2012, p. 367; Muro, (Ed.), 2018, p. 173) One reason is an insufficient understanding of the objectives of terrorist groups, including the activities that distinguish them from ‘ordinary criminality’ such as the intention for their incidents to “resonate beyond the immediate both in terms of time, proximity, and numbers killed and physically injured.” (Muro, (Ed.), 2018, p. 173; Tembo, 2015, p. 125). Another identified gap refers to the difficulty of assessing what is a rare frequency occurrence, especially given the relative rarity of such incidents in the West, and the lack of access to government information about its activities. (Lum and Kennedy, 2012, p. 367)

As pointed out by several authors in the literature surveyed, effective CVE programs consist of early intervention, de-radicalization, disengagement, as well as reintegration and rehabilitation. (Bjorgo and Horgan, (Eds.), 2008, pp. 247-253; Neumann, 2016, pp. 182-185; Sinai, 2017) Integrated and multifaceted approaches are required across micro-, meso-, and macro-levels, with a wide range of CVE and CT partners. These measures need to be comprehensive, threat-focused, as well as tailored and specific to the situation at hand, but also sustainable. (Ahmed, Belanger, and Szmania, 2018, p. 92; Bos, 2018, p. 274; Holmer, Bauman, and Aryaeinejad, 2018, p. 18; United States Institute of Peace, 2019)

In another approach, CVE programs need to counter a three-component-based ascending pyramid of radicalization, consisting of sympathizers at the bottom, activists in the middle, and terrorists at the top. A scoring system can be utilized to assess measures of effectiveness, ranging from very high to failure. (Sinai, 2017)

In the case of religiously driven violent extremists, effective CVE measures consist of influencing religious leaders to embrace non-violence as a way to fulfill their aspirations, preventing discrimination against members of their religious community, ensuring that CT is not a war against their religion, implementing a social-welfare program that provides opportunities for their youth, including their unemployed youth, as well as a collaboration between national and local CT agencies to detect those who engage in violent extremism, and applying due process in court trial proceedings. (Sageman, 2008, pp. 164-177)

CVE measures need to undermine the legitimacy, credibility and appeal of violent extremists, for instance, by highlighting their involvement in criminality; explaining how judiciary systems can be used to reduce grievances within a community; ensuring that polarizing social, political, or other issues are contained. (Horgan, 2013, p. 159)

The sequencing and prioritization of CVE measures are crucial along lines of early prevention, at-risk prevention, and promoting disengagement from violent extremism, with de-radicalization at the early phases of an individual’s trajectory into violent extremism being the preferable option. Measuring effectiveness of such sequencing is difficult in the short-term, so a longitudinal approach is required to assess change over time. (Bjorgo and Horgan, (Eds.), 2008, p. 248; Canada, Public Safety, 2018, p. 27; Jackson, Rhoades, Reimer, Lander, Costello, and Beagley, 2019, p. 50; Koehler, 2017, p. 294; United States Institute of Peace, 2019)

Effective CVE intervention measures will result in a decreased level of vulnerability to the influence of violent extremism among targeted communities. (Holmer, Bauman, and Aryaeinejad, 2018, p. 18) Impact evaluations need to focus across individual projects to consider their larger context in which they are implemented. (Holmer, Bauman, and Aryaeinejad, 2018, p. 18) Outcome assessments need to account for disengagement, reintegration, and after-care as “an end in itself.” (Hwang, 2018, p. 184)
Effective CVE measures are dependent on the quality of their programs in terms of staff selection and training in implementing these programs. (Bjorgo and Horgan, 2008, pp. 252-253; Koehler, 2017, p. 291)

There is a consensus in the literature that a country’s local communities are crucial in CVE intervention effectiveness. One reason is that it is at this level that individual radicalization takes place. Karnavian (2015, pp. 234-237) points out that CVE programs at the community level need to recognize that radicalization pathways might differ from individual to individual, so it is important for them to understand and identify signs of violent extremism and their associated risks by individuals and counter them with appropriate measures. (Beaghley, Helmus, Matthews, Ramchand, Stebbins, Kadlec, and Brown, 2017, p. 20) It needs to be noted that it is also at a local community level that early signs of terrorist activities can be identified for appropriate pre-emptive measures, if possible.

To be effective at preventing the spread of violent extremism, therefore, CVE interventions need to adopt a “mosaic of engagement” approach at the community level. This requires effectiveness in providing sufficient funding; defining the criteria for programmatic success, including sequencing of a program’s phases; information sharing on programs’ status; selecting appropriate local partners, including public-private partnerships, with community engagement based on the notion of mutual responsibility, and an overall focus on sustainability in terms of programmatic continuity. (Jackson, Rhoades, Reimer, Lander, Costello, and Beaghley, 2019; Jerard and Nasir, (Eds.), 2015; Kenney, 2018, p. 235; Mullins, 2016; Southers, 2013, pp. 104-115)

Also, to be effective at the local level, CVE interventions need to be coordinated with local law enforcement in ways that promote community resilience. (Jerard and Nasir, (Eds.), 2015) Another approach recommends that CVE and CT measures be implemented separately at the local level because otherwise they might result in “tainted policies with unclear ends and unquantifiable outcomes.” (McGlynn and McDaid, 2019, pp. 156-157).

**Components of CVE Interventions**

As indicated in the introduction, the end-states of both CT and CVE programs are to bring about the termination of terrorism through CT’s ‘hard’ and CVE’s ‘soft’ intervention measures. The end-states of CVE’s ‘soft’ measures, which begin with the formulation of effective counter-narratives, are to make it possible to de-radicalize violent extremists to enable them to disengage from terrorism, resulting in their subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

**Counter-Narratives**

In one approach, four components of strategic narratives are presented: meaning, identity, content, and structure (MICS). Cumulatively, these elements are intended to “weaponize” such counter-narratives against extremist adversaries in order to degrade and disorient the way their audiences interpret extremist messages. The end-goal is to enable counter-narratives to “control the battlefield and force your adversary to respond, not the other way around.” (Maan and Cobaugh, 2018, pp. 23, 34) In a comparable approach, to be effective, counter-narratives need to be formulated from an inside out perspective, with the adversaries’ culture, context, and ideas understood from their perspectives. (Morris, 2017, p. 119) Highlighting the hypocrisy of terrorists can undermine group cohesion. (Clarke and Newman, 2006) Counter-narratives need to target an extremist movement’s ideological center-of-gravity for maximum effect. (Davis, Larson, Haldeman, Oguz, and Rana, 2012, pp. 156-158; Maan and Cobaugh, 2018, pp. 23, 34, 49; Sinai, 2017; Soufan, 2017, pp. 297-300)

It is important to select effective spokesmen to represent counter-narrative campaigns. These include peaceful members of communities that extremists seek to influence, rehabilitated former extremists, including defectors. (Bjorgo and Horgan, 2008, p. 248; Sageman, 2008, pp. 164-177, Sinai, 2017; Soufan, 2017, pp. 297-300; Speckhard and Yayla, 2016, p. 15)

De-Radicalization

De-radicalization is the second phase of a CVE campaign. Once counter-narrative messages prove effective in persuading extremists to moderate their views, it will be possible for de-radicalization interventions to be implemented. These involve understanding the nature of the extremist ideology that requires counter-action, the active and passive interventions required to mitigate its impact among adherents, and the levels of such interventions, whether directed at leaders and then “top-down” with de-radicalized leaders influencing their followers to de-radicalize as well. (Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin, (Eds.), 2011, p. 140; Koehler, 2017, p. 291; McDonald, 2018, p. 2018) Specifically, effective de-radicalization has to address individuals’ feelings and emotions “such as fear, hope, anxiety and desire” that make it possible for them to decide to disengage” from extremist ideologies. (McDonald, 2018, p. 189)

Disengagement

Disengagement should be the third phase focused on in a CVE campaign. Several authors point to disengagement as involving behavioral changes away from engaging in violent extremist activities, while de-radicalization involves changes in attitudes and beliefs away from violent extremism. Changes in attitudes and beliefs are especially crucial because they are necessary to reduce the likelihood of someone's re-engagement in terrorism. At the same time, it should also be expected that some extremist attitudes are expected to persist, but in a non-violent behavioral manifestation. (Clubb, 2017, p. 5; Koomen and Van Der Pliight, 2016, p. 234)

Disengagement measures need to be targeted at the individual, organizational, and collective (e.g., social movement) levels, such as leaders and members. This is important because such measures need to overcome the possibility of those deciding to disengage being “rejected and despised” by their comrades, including facing retribution by them. (Bjorgo and Horgan, 2008, p. 247; Clubb, 2017, p. 5; Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin, editors, 2011, p. 139) Even after an extremist group might disengage from violence, however, if a minority of violent dissident elements persists within it, they also need to be addressed and engaged with through effective disengagement strategies. (Horgan, 2013, p. 159)

Specifically, effective disengagement consists of a combination of psychological, relational, and strategic factors in affecting changes in violent extremists. It also involves disillusionment by such individuals regarding violent extremism, a rational assessment of whether the costs of remaining in a violent group outweigh potential benefits of leaving it, the presence of an alternative social network of family, friends, and mentors they
can turn to; as well as a shift in their priorities toward seeking gainful employment and family life. (Bjorgo and Horgan, 2008, pp. 247-253; Hwang, 2018, p. 8).

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation, the fourth component of a CVE program, seeks to reintegrates former extremists into society. It generally involves rehabilitating previously incarcerated terrorists. It is recommended that community-based rehabilitation programs partner with government agencies and businesses in making it possible to reintegrate into society. Some of the modes of rehabilitation involve religious, psychological, vocational training, and creative arts, while also providing them with funds and accommodations for daily living. (Angell and Gunaratna, 2012, pp. 351-358; Vertigans, 2011, p. 142)

Reintegration

Reintegration into society is the fifth and last component in CVE programs. It requires a holistic approach that enables the rehabilitated former terrorists to rejoin their families, local communities, and other components of society, to become fully functioning citizens. (Marsden, 2017, p. 126).

Future Research Directions

In assessing the effectiveness of CVE intervention programs, several research directions are recommended. One approach recommends utilizing a longitudinal methodology to examine the effectiveness of sequencing in CVE measures, beginning in an Early Phase (identifying at-risk individuals), a Middle Phase (referral and intervention), and a Late Phase (recidivism reduction). (Jackson, Rhoades, Reimer, lander, Costello, and Beaghley, 2019; Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin, (Eds.), 2011, p. 143; Malet, 2017) In assessing the effectiveness of CVE programs, according to Bos (2018, p. 296), researchers need to focus on the impact of the tipping points that exacerbate radicalization and those that occur at the beginning of the de-radicalization process. Similarly, hypotheses might test how CVE campaigns can look for prior historical waves of protest movements as well as "uncertainty-producing changes" in society to identify how new extremist movements might emerge, and the strategic choices they make in how to challenge their state. (Beck, 2015, p. 151; Berger, 2018; and Bosi, Demetriou, and Malthaner, (Eds.), 2014, p. 17)

In another component of CVE intervention measures of effectiveness, Bjorgo and Horgan (Eds.), 2008, pp. 249-250) suggest that the factors involved in effectiveness of disengagement programs need to be researched in terms of how they are context-specific, movement-specific, and time-specific.

Finally, research on Measures of Effectiveness in CVE interventions needs to account for public opinion surveys to measure the degree of public support for governments’ CVE (and CT) measures. (Silke, (Ed.), 2011, p. 15)

To upgrade researchers’ knowledge on the components of CVE effectiveness, it is suggested by a Canadian government agency and academic researchers to establish an archival knowledge base that focuses on key research topics, such as validated and actionable early warning indicators of radicalization to violence, best practices in CVE, including appropriate stakeholders and audiences that can be shared among government practitioners and academic researchers. (Canada, Public Safety, 2018, p. 24; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, p. 289).
**Conclusions**

To reach an understanding of measures of effectiveness in counter-terrorism and in countering violent extremism interventions several gaps in our knowledge need to be addressed to enable them to respond in an agile manner to the continuously changing threat environment. One finding is the continuing need for consensus-based definitions of terrorism and a common understanding of the nature of extremism and violent extremism, so that the response measures are applied uniformly. Similarly, it is recommended that common metrics on measures of effectiveness are agreed upon - both qualitative and quantitative. Another finding is that certain concepts from social science, such as David Easton's notion of process and outcome objectives, are highly applicable when it comes to diagnosing the phases that CT and CVE intervention measures need to address for assessing long-term campaign effectiveness. Interestingly, Easton's notion is applied by several of the literature's authors, although they do not explicitly cite it. Also pertinent is the need to formulate realistic assessments on the nature of the terrorist threat that needs to be countered, especially in order not to overreact to it.

What emerges from the findings of this literature survey is that overall, effective response measures consist of a mix of 'hard' and 'soft' intervention measures. In CT interventions, the formulation of realistic threat assessments and metrics of effectiveness are required in terms of a campaign's desired end-states in the processes and outcomes that need to be addressed. Appropriate response measures need to be implemented in the military, intelligence, law enforcement, judicial, and other relevant areas at both domestic and international levels.

In CVE interventions, the literature highlights the importance of appropriately sequencing such campaigns, for instance, with effective conciliatory programs that address a conflict's root causes, followed by programs on counter-narratives, de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of former violent extremists into society. A significant gap highlighted is the limited availability of data on programmatic effectiveness of CVE programs around the world, especially in terms of empirical data, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of such programs.

Finally, a valuable research area that requires additional focus is what is termed “termination of terrorism” studies, with the components involved in resolving terrorist rebellions needing to be incorporated into CT and CVE programs. It is here that the discipline of conflict resolution studies can be highly useful in providing insights on the measures required to resolve conflicts, especially those that are protracted, including the components involved in the post-conflict phase, such as the need to effectively manage the demobilization and reintegration of former fighters into society.

**Acknowledgments**

The author would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Jeffrey Fuller and Tiffany Seal in preparing this literature review. For the larger report, of which this RN is a summary, Mr. Fuller developed algorithms, which he operationalized to generate findings visualized in graphs and tables. Similarly, Ms. Seal was instrumental in shaping the larger report as well as this Research Note.

Jeffrey Fuller is President of Security Risk, Inc., in Northern Virginia, and Tiffany Seal has an M.S. in Government Analytics from Johns Hopkins University’s Advanced Academic Programs.

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Notes


Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid

Few topics in the field of terrorism research have seen a faster growth than radicalisation- and counter-radicalisation studies. There has been considerable government funding, based on the correct notion that preventing radicalisation is much cheaper and more cost-effective than countering terrorism which stands at the end of a radicalisation trajectory. Yet individual pathways of radicalisation have been manifold, almost as much so as individual trajectories into ordinary and organised crime. It has been said that all history is biography. This also applies to many of those who become jihadists. Generalisations are difficult to make and preventing radicalisation is therefore anything but easy. Dirk Baehr, the author of the doctoral dissertation (University of Cologne) reviewed here, looked at the life stories of eight young men and one woman, the majority of them belonging to the so-called Berlin group who radicalised between 2006 and 2010. They were convicted to prison sentences between 2010 and 2016 by German courts for involvement in or support for jihadist terrorist groups. A careful study of court documents (and selected interviews) was the main source of information for the author but he matched or compared what he found there with findings from other sources and other cases in and outside Germany. The result is a well-researched and well-written study that sketches radicalisation processes in Germany between 2006 and 2013, with a special focus on the role of the Internet.

In the first two chapters, the author exposes all the simplistic explanations that can be found among German politicians and media as well as some researchers whose preoccupation with immigration and integration issues, the debate about the place of Islam in German society, or narrow security concerns stand in the way of a broader and more objective assessment of the factors involved in radicalisation. Dirk Baehr shows that the nature of the public terrorism discourse, shaped by the authorities, the media and some ‘experts’, often involuntarily plays into the hands of Salafist recruiters. The author challenges some of the widespread notions (e.g., that those Germans who radicalised and became jihadists were already strongly religious before they joined a jihadist group or were poorly integrated into German society). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that “The Salafist environment can be seen as a kind of incubator for the jihadist movements” (p.111). The author’s discussion of alleged and empirically proven radicalisation factors in German and in other Western diasporas is of exceptional quality and clears the ground for his own in-depth investigation into the radicalisation of members of the so-called the Berlin Group as well as a few others.

Dr. Baehr’s central research questions were: “How are jihadists in Germany getting radicalised” and “What are the main causes for the radicalisation processes?” (p.321). He identified complex, multi-dimensional factors but concentrated on exploring these six:

1. Moral indignation related to strongly emotionalised key events transmitted by media;
2. Psychological dispositions towards a negative development of personality and receptiveness for extremist movements as a result of deficient and/or conflictual socialisation within the family;
3. Perceptions of relative deprivation and a resulting feeling of insufficient (personal) recognition;
4. (Personal) crises about meaning (of one’s life), identity crises;
5. Recruitment by a charismatic leadership figure into (terroristic) groups and the group dynamics promoting radicalisation;
6. Attraction of Internet propaganda and the development of virtual communities resulting as a consequence (pp.323-324).
Some of these factors (e.g., family problems) turned out to be stronger predictors of radicalisation than others (e.g., relative deprivation); the terrorist group became a family substitute for several of those described in this study. For the majority of them, the Internet played a very important role in the radicalisation process. The author develops a six-phase model for online radicalisation, breaking it down into (i) a search- and exploration phase, (ii) an indignation phase; (iii) an interaction [by Internet] phase, (iv) a confirmation and persuasion phase, (v) a joining and networking phase, and, finally (vi), a supporter phase. (p.336)

At the end of his exploration, the author concludes that “The path towards the jihad can be viewed as a dynamic ongoing process passing through several phases, which is influenced by situational, individual-psychological, social, group-dynamic and ideological factors conveyed by the Internet that interact with one another to influence the individual” (p.339).

In the view of this reviewer, this dissertation is a painstaking and nuanced analysis of a complex reality that can serve as an example of radicalisation research at its best as its findings can be applied to examining the processes of involvement with jihadism in other cases.

Dirk Baehr is a Berlin-based political scientist with a research focus on Salafism, terrorism and radicalisation.

*About the Reviewer: Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'*. 
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 20 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

So many books are published on terrorism and counterterrorism-related subjects that it is difficult to catch up on a large backlog of books received for review. In order to reduce this backlog, this column consists of capsule Tables of Contents of 20 books; among these are also several books published less recently, but still meriting attention. Some of the new books will be reviewed in future issues of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ as stand-alone reviews.


Table of Contents: Settlers and Conflict Over Contested Territories; the Decisive Path of State Indecisiveness: Israeli Settlers in the West Bank in Comparative Perspective; Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara: Colonists or Fifth Column?; Settlement, Sovereignty, and Social Engineering: Fascist Settlement Policy Between Nation and Empire; The Indonesian Settlement Project in East Timor; Settlers and State-Building: The Kirkuk Case; Settlers, Immigrants, Colonists: The Three Layers of Settler-Induced Conflict in Sri Lanka; Settlers, Mobilization, and Displacement in Cyprus: Antinomies of Ethnic Conflict and Immigration Politics; Conclusion: The Political Dynamics of Settlement Projects: The Central State-Settler-Native Triangle.


Table of Contents: Introduction: Speakable/Unspeakable: The Rhetoric of Terrorism; “A Deed Without a Name: ”Macbeth, the Gunpowder Plot, and Terrorism; Terrorism in the Nineteenth Century: From the French Revolution to the Stevensons, Greer, James, Conrad, and the Rossetti Sisters; When Terrorism becomes Speakable: Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers and the Literature of the Troubles; Israel/Palestine: Unspeakability in John le Carré’s The Little Drummer Girl, Steven Spielberg’s Munich, and Mohammed Moulessehoul [Yasmina Khadra]’s The Attack; “Why Do They Hate Us?”: Updike, Hamid, DeLillo; Epilogue: Where Do We Go from Here? Nadeem Aslam, Amy Waldman, and Jodi Picoult.


Table of Contents: Introduction; A Theory of Organizational Resilience; Hypotheses on Leadership Decapitation; Is Leadership Targeting Effective?; Hamas: Bureaucracy, Social Services, and Local Support; the Shining Path: The Organization and Support of a Left-Wing Group; Al-Qaeda: Religious Ideology and Organizational Resilience; Conclusion; Appendix.


Table of Contents: Introduction; Determinants of the Death Hierarchy; How to Identify Variations in Risk Transfer; Risking One’s Own Soldiers in Jenin and Basra; Passive Force Protection in Iraq and Gaza; Strategic Transfer of Risk in the Kosovo War; Tactical Transfer of Risk in Fallujah and Gaza; Re-Risking One’s Own Soldiers in the Surge in Iraq and Afghanistan; Conclusion.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I: Examining Maritime Violence; Maritime Terrorism: An Evolving Threat; Terrorist Targeting; Armed Maritime Crime; Part II: Riding the Storm; Integrated Strategies Against Maritime Violence; Assessing Maritime Governance; Global Port Security; Maritime Domain Awareness; The Role of Institutional Leadership; The Maritime Legal Framework; Managing Legal Framework; Managing Maritime Incidents; Part III: Case Studies; Defeating the Sea Tigers of LTTE; Suppressing Piracy in the Strait of Malacca; Maritime Violence in the Sulu Sea; Maritime Crime in the Gulf of Guinea; Yemen: The Case for a Coast Guard; Conclusion.


Table of Contents: Introduction; Is Law Dead?; Timeslip: Invasion of the Crimea, Collapse of the League of Nations; the Nuremberg Avant-Garde Moment; Cold War Jus ad Bellum: Law of Force vs. Rule of Law; Nuremberg Renaissance: The 1990s; The Crime of Aggression: From Rome to Kampala; Judging Wars; Sci-fi Warfare; You're Under Arrest, Mr. President; Activation.

Radicalization and Religious Extremism


Table of Contents: Chronology; Preface; Race and the Imagined Community; The Racism of the Radical Right; Muslim Origins and Destinations; Framing Muslims; Islamophobia as New Racism; Islamism Redux; Multicultural Radicalisms; Far-Right Versus Islamist Extremism; Plugged into the Rage; Vanquishing False Idols; Tomorrow Belongs to Those …; The Postcolonial Subject’s Discontent; Fear and Loathing at the End of History; In Conclusion; Epilogue: Rumi’s Corner.


Table of Contents: Religion as a Springboard for Violence; Buddhist Extremism; Christian Extremism; Hindu Extremism; Islamic Extremism; Jewish Extremism; Sikh Extremism; When Religion Kills.

Afghanistan, Jihadism, al Qaida, ISIS and the Taliban


Table of Contents: Introduction; The Collapse of the Emirate and the Early Regrouping, 2002-4; The Apogaeum of the Quetta Shura, 2005-9; The Emergence of Alternative Centres of Power to Quetta; The Crisis of the Quetta Shura 2009-13; The Taliban’s Tactical Adaptation; Organisational Adaptation; The Troubled Comeback of the Quetta Shura 2014-; Conclusion: The Impossible Centralisation of an Anti-Centralist Movement; Epilogue.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I: Culture and Conflict: From Theory to Methodology; Incorporating Cultural Intelligence into Joint Intelligence: Cultural Intelligence and Ethnographic Intelligence Theory; The Use of Evolutionary Theory in Modelling Culture and Cultural Conflict; Employing Data Fusion in Cultural Analysis and COIN in Tribal Social Systems; Part II: Culture and Conflict: From Methodology to Practice: Lessons From Afghanistan; Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization; Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern Afghanistan; The Durand Line: Tribal Politics and Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations; The Manoeuvre Company in Afghanistan: Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level; Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost Province, Afghanistan: Information Operations at Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost in 2008; Implementing a Balanced Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northern Afghanistan, May 2007-July 2008; Conclusion.


Table of Contents: Prologue: Between Seasons; Part I: Inheritance of Thorns; Part II: Gone Girls; Part III: Over and Out; Part IV: Citizens of the Abode of Islam; Part V: Love, Mourn, Repeat; Epilogue. - The book’s five parts profile and trace the evolution of militant activities of selected European women, who had joined ISIS from around 2007 to 2017.


Table of Contents: Prologue; Secularity and the War of the Gods; The Veil and the War of the Gods; The Veil as Membrane; Filiation and Affiliation; Conversion and Initiation; Apocalypse; Hashish and Assassins; Terror; Abandoned Children are Political Beings; The Foreigners of Migrant Children; Generations; Epilogue.


Table of Contents: Introduction; Timeline; Childhood and Teenage years; Family; Conversion to Islam; Terrorist Connections I: Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Others; Rise as Al-Qaeda’s Translator, U.S. Interpreter and Online Jihadist Extraordinaire; Emergence of As-Sahab: Videos Released between 2004-14; The Abbottabad Letters: Providing Proof of Adam Gadahn’s Importance to Al-Qaeda and its Leadership; Terrorist Connections II: Samir Khan and Inspire Magazine – 2010-13; the U.S. Government Case Against Adam Gadahn; Adam’s Familly React to His Joining Al-Qaeda; Adam Gadahn: Captured or Killed? Or Conspiracy?; Conclusion; Epilogue: Second Edition of AQIS Resurgence Magazine Features Posthumously Released In-Depth Interview with Adam Gadahn; Appendix.

Africa


Table of Contents: The Evolving Landscape of African Insurgencies; Radicalized Youth: Oppositional Poses and Positions; Gendered Dynamics of Armed Insurgencies; Secessionist Conflicts and New States; Central African Republic: Rebellion and International Intervention; Democratic Republic of Congo: The Democratization of Militarized Politics; Kenya: Al Shabaab’s Regional Campaign; Mali: Islam, Arms, and Money; Nigeria: The Adaptability of the Boko Haram Rebellion; Somalia: Al Shabaab and the Accidental Jihadists; South Sudan: Violence as Politics; Uganda: The Longevity of the Lord’s Resistance Army; Africa’s Insurgents in Comparative Perspective.
United Kingdom


Table of Contents: Introduction; Fish Through a Desert; Points of No Return; Law and Disorder; the Year of Civil Resistance; Roads Not Taken; the Broad Front; War by Other Means; Down a Few Rungs; Endgame; Epilogue: Towards the Republic?


Table of Contents: Introduction; The Historical Context; ‘The Rules of the Game are Changing’: From 9/11 to 7/7; Terrorism in the UK; ‘It Turned Out Wrongly’: Counter-terrorism, Part 1; Losing ‘Hearts and Minds’: Counter-terrorism, Part 2; Conclusion: 7/7s not 9/11s.

United States


Table of Contents: Introduction; 9/11 and the Early Seeds of Irregular Warfare; The Philippines and the War on Terror in Sub-Saharan Africa; Terrorism and the “Great Game” in Georgia and the Caspian Basin; Irregular Warfare at the Pentagon, 2004-2008; State, USAID, and the Interagency Mobilization; Irregular Warfare with Restraint: The Obama Years; Conclusion.

*Table of Contents:* The US Intelligence Enterprise; Emergence of a Domestically Oriented Intelligence Enterprise; Crisis and Competition; The Vision of the FBI After 9/11; Reorganizing the Bureau; The FBI’s Human Capital Issues; The Intelligence Enterprise at the Department of Homeland Security; DHS Intelligence Analysis; The Roles of Other Agencies; Federally Driven Fusion; Fusion and Confusion at the Subfederal Level; Lessons Observed (if Not Learned).

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Bibliography: Terrorism Prevention

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2019-9]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on terrorism prevention. It focuses on recent publications (up to November 2019) and should not be considered as exhaustive. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, terrorism prevention, preventive measures, prevention programs, PREVENT

NB: All websites were last visited on 17.11.2019. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this list.

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Note
Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites, or author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of preprints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).

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Bibliography: Terrorism by Country – Mali
Compiled and selected by David Teiner

Abstract

This bibliography contains books, edited volumes, theses, journal articles, book chapters, grey literature, bibliographies and other useful resources on terrorism affecting Mali. It covers the activities of the numerous terrorist and insurgent groups in the country and the attempts to fight these by national and international actors. Most of the included literature was published since the Malian crisis in 2012. Earlier publications analyzing political, social, economic, or religious developments, that help to understand dynamics of the present conflict, are also included. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of terrorism studies.

Keywords: Mali, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, Ansar Dine, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, JNIM, GSIM, Mouvement national pour la liberation de l'Azawad, MLNA

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Note for the Reader Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).

About the Compiler: David Teiner, is a graduate student of Political Science and Sociology at Trier University. He wrote his bachelor’s thesis about al-Shabaab’s revenue collection. In his latest works, he analyzed the change in ISIS’s media strategy between 2014 and 2018 and investigated efficiency deficits in the coordination between international forces trying to stabilize the Malian state and combating terrorist and insurgent groups. David is currently working on a project to illuminate the interdependent relationship between terrorism and organized crime in Mexico and Central America. E-mail: david.teiner@gmx.de.
Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Compiled and selected by Berto Jongman

Most of the items included below became available online between October and December 2019. They are categorised under the following headings (some of these also have sub-headings, not listed here):

1. Non-Religious Terrorism
2. Religious Terrorism
3. Other Groups and Organisations
4. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
5. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
6. Radicalisation and Extremism
7. Counterterrorism - General
8. Counterterrorism: Strategies, Tactics and Operations
9. Prevention, Preparedness, and Resilience Studies
10. State Repression, Civil War and Clandestine Warfare
11. Intelligence
12. Cyber Operations
13. Risk and Threat Assessments, Forecasts and Analytic Studies
14. Also Worth Reading

1. Non-Religious Terrorism


2. Religious Terrorism

2.1. Al Qaeda and Affiliates


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4. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics


5. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism

5.1. Criminal Groups

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5.2. Hate Crimes, Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, Xenophobia


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About the Compiler: Berto Jongman is Associate Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He is a former senior Military Intelligence Analyst and currently serves as International Consultant on CBRN issues. A sociologist by training, he has also worked for civilian research institutes in Sweden and the Netherlands. Drs. Jongman was the recipient of the Golden Candle Award for his World Conflict & Human Rights Maps, published by PIOOM. He is editor of the volume 'Contemporary Genocides' (1996) and has also contributed to various editions of 'Political Terrorism', the award-winning handbook of terrorism research, edited by Alex P. Schmid.
Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events  (December 2019 – March 2020)

Compiled by Reinier Bergema

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming academic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events that are directly or indirectly relevant to the readers of Perspectives on Terrorism. The calendar includes academic and (inter-) governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, civil society events and educational programs. The listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.

We encourage readers to contact the journal’s Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema, and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. Reinier Bergema can be reached at <r.bergema@icct.nl> or via Twitter: @reinierbergema.

December 2019

COE-DAT CT Lessons Learned
NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)
3-4 December, Ankara, Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Global Counter Terrorism Summit: Evolving Security Through Innovation
International Security Expo
3-4 December, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @ISE_Expo

Multi-Agency Meeting RAN Exit-RVT: Restorative Justice
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
3-4 December, Dublin, Ireland
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Breakfast Briefing: Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking:
Learning the Lessons of the Past Fifteen Years
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
4 December, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org
Confronting the Culture of Hate and Extremism

*European Foundation for Democracy*

4 December, Brussels, Belgium

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@efdbrussels](#)

Balkans & Black Sea Cooperation Forum 2019

*Clingendael Institute*

4-6 December, Athens, Greece

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@clingendaelorg](#)

Iran’s Proxy Wars and the American Response: A Weak Reaction to a Brilliant Strategy

*Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*

5 December, Ramat Gan, Israel

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@BESA_Center](#)

Confronting Criminal/Terrorist Threats. The Reshaping of Non-State Actors

*NATO Defense College*

9-10 December, Rome, Italy

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@NATOFoundation](#)

Bellingcat OSINT Workshop

*Bellingcat*

9-13 December, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@bellingcat](#)

Seminar: Crisis Management in Terrorism

*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*

9-13 December, Ankara, Turkey

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: n/a


*Chatham House, International Crisis Group & Al-Sharq Forum*

10 December, London, United Kingdom
Schieffer Series: The Syria Withdrawal and Next Steps
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
10 December, Washington (DC), United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @csis

U.S. Influence in the Mediterranean: Why it still Matters
Hudson Institute
10 December, Washington (DC), United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @HudsonInstitute

7th Annual Release of the Global Terrorism Index
United States Institute of Peace
10 December, Washington (DC), United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @USIP

Tech Against Terrorism and GIFCT Tech Workshop in London
Tech Against Terrorism & Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism
10-11 December, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @techvsterrorism

White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
11 December, Haverford (PA), United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @fpri

Safeguarding Refugees from being Recruited and Radicalized
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)
11 December, Rome, Italy
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope
Iran's Deadly Repression and the U.S. Response

*Hudson Institute*

11 December, Washington (DC), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@HudsonInstitute](#)

The Future of the al-Shabaab Conflict: Time to Rethink

*International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*

11 December, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IISS_org](#)

The Bushmaster: From Concept to Combat

*Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)*

12 December, Canberra, Australia

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ASPI_org](#)

Jamestown's Thirteenth Annual Terrorism Conference

*The Jamestown Foundation*

12 December, Washington (DC), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@JamestownTweets](#)

Breakfast Seminar: Street Versus System – The Protest Wave in the Middle East

*Norwegian Institute for International Affairs*

12 December, Oslo, Norway

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@nupinytt](#)

Climate Crisis & Truth Decay: The Global Threats of Our Time

*Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center*

12 December, Cambridge (MA), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@BelferCenter](#)

Bigotry and Hate: Local and Global Perspectives

*Center for Research on Extremism*

12 December, Oslo, Norway
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Terrorist Offenders

*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*

12-13 December, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

Transitional Justice and Fair Trials for Mali’s Terrorism Cases

*Institute for Security Studies Africa*

13 December, Bamako, Mali

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@issafrica](#)

Asia Transnational Threats Forum: Climate Change in Asia

*Brookings Institute*

16 December, Washington (DC), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@BrookingsInst](#)

The Horn of Africa and the Gulf States: Strategic Engagements and Red Sea Geopolitics

*Chatham House*

16 December, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ChathamHouse](#)

America’s Longest War: The State of Affairs in Afghanistan

*Brookings Institute*

16 December, Washington (DC), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@BrookingsInst](#)

OSCE-wide Expert Seminar on Promoting Resilience of “Soft” Targets against Terrorist Attacks through Public-Private Partnerships

*Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*

16-17 December, Vienna, Austria

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@OSCE](#)
The War in Syria in 2019: Winners, Losers and Shifting Alliances

*Institute for National Security Studies*

18 December, Tel Aviv, Israel

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@inssisrael](#)

**January 2020**

The Global Counterterrorism Fight Since 2017

*Institute of World Politics*

14 January, Washington (DC), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@theIWP](#)

Jonathan Hall QC: UK Terrorism Legislation

*Henry Jackson Society*

22 January, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@HJS_Org](#)

Free to be Extreme

*Henry Jackson Society*

23 January, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@HJS_Org](#)

A Diplomatic Counterrevolution: The Transformation of the U.S.–Middle East Alliance System in the 1970s

*Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center*

23 January, Cambridge (MA), United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@BelferCenter](#)

Breakfast Briefing: What Works (and What Doesn't) in Efforts to Prevent or Counter Violent Extremism?

*Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)*

24 January, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RUSI_org](#)
Professor Azar Gat on Has War been Declining: Why and Where?

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

27 January, London, United Kingdom

Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

February 2020

Edlis Neeson Great Decisions: Red Sea Security

The Aspen Institute

6 February, Aspen (CO), United States

Website: visit | Twitter: @aspeninstitute

Homeland Security Symposium & Expo

Christopher Newport University

13 February, Newport News (VA), United States

Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Defector Militias as Tools of Social Fragmentation: Evidence from Ba'thist Iraq and Sudan

Center for International Security and Cooperation

18 February, Stanford (CA), United States

Website: visit | Twitter: @FSIStanford

March 2020

Security and Defence 2020: A New Era of Strategic Competition

Chatham House

12 March, London, United Kingdom

Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

Breakfast Briefing: UK Security Policy after Brexit

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

18 March, London, United Kingdom

Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org
Acknowledgement: Special thank goes out to Alex Schmid and Berto Jongman for their suggestions and contributions to this conference calendar.

About the Compiler: Reinier Bergema is a Research Fellow and Project Manager at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) and an Assistant Editor at Perspectives on Terrorism. His research interests include, inter alia, Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters and terrorist threat levels across the EU.
**About Perspectives on Terrorism**

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at URL: [https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism](https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism).

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Team, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

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