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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XIV, Issue 3 (June 2020) of *Perspectives on Terrorism* (ISSN 2334-3745). Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), Vienna, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University’s Campus in The Hague. All past and recent issues are available online at URL: [https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism](https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism).

Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is indexed by JSTOR, SCOPUS, and GoogleScholar. Now in its fourteenth year, it has over 9,000 registered subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence, Resources and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

This issue begins with a research article by Jesse J. Norris examining four dimensions of idiosyncrasy among terrorists: idiosyncratic ideologies, tactics, strategic thinking, and motives. Next, Aleksandar Pašagić explores the contrasting scholarly views on using counterterrorism as a rationale for transnational interventions into failed and fragile states. An article by Iztok Prezelj & Klemen Kocjancic looks at how a country with no publicly known terrorist group (Slovenia) still has instances of recruiting and training local foreign fighters, the deportation of extremists, and even a foiled terrorist attack. And in the final research article, Emma Ylitalo-James argues that a ‘suspect community’ is formed at the initiation of conflict (through the reactions of opposing factions, combined with public out-group perceptions of threat), and not in response to legislation dealing with conflict.

Our Research Notes section begins with an overview of how COVID-19 might affect the state of contemporary terrorism, by Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson. Then Katalin Pethő-Kiss identifies strategies for addressing the security challenges faced by Christian places of worship. Vincent A. Auger explores the question of whether right-wing violence might constitute a fifth global wave (drawing on David Rapoport’s concept of “waves of terrorism”). And in the final research note, Benjamin Lee and Kim Knott examine whether the far-right digital milieu reveals examples of reciprocal radicalisation—the theory that extremist organisations are connected and feed on one another’s rhetoric and actions to justify violent escalation.

In a special Policy Note, Jason A. Bakas argues that we need more robust models and metrics for counterterrorism threat analysis than currently used by a number of Western governments whose approaches he studied.

Our Resources section opens with a bibliography compiled by Judith Tinnes with books, articles, theses as well as grey literature on the intersections of children, youth and terrorism. And a second bibliography, also compiled by Judith Tinnes, addresses Internet-driven right-wing terrorism. Joshua Sinai, PoT’s book reviews editor, presents 17 books on terrorism and counter-terrorism, and book reviews are provided by Ahmet S. Yayla and José Pedro Zúquete. Finally, Berto Jongman’s regular survey of new web-based resources on terrorism and related subjects is followed by Reinier Bergema’s overview of recent and upcoming conferences and workshops on terrorism and related subjects.

This issue has been prepared by the principal editors of our journal, Alex Schmid and James Forest, with the assistance of Associate Editors Jeffrey Kaplan and Leah Farrall. The technical online launch of this journal issue has, as usual, been in the hands of Associate Editor for IT, Christine Boelema Robertus, while Editorial Assistant Jodi Moore contributed significantly with editing and proofreading.
Articles

Idiosyncratic Terrorism: Disaggregating an Undertheorized Concept

by Jesse J. Norris

Abstract

It is widely recognized that some terrorism is idiosyncratic, and indeed, some define lone-actor terrorism as inherently idiosyncratic. Yet the notion of idiosyncratic terrorism remains undefined and undertheorized. What exactly does it mean for terrorists to be idiosyncratic, and why does it matter? To disaggregate and further develop this undertheorized concept, this article identifies four dimensions of idiosyncrasy among terrorists, each of which can be divided into subtypes: idiosyncratic ideologies, tactics, strategic thinking, and motives. Empirical examples of each are provided for both lone-actor and group-based terrorism. In addition, five case studies of idiosyncratic terrorism are presented. Potential implications for further theoretical and empirical inquiries, and for counterterrorism policy, are explored.

Keywords: Terrorism theory, ideology, idiosyncrasy, tactics, lone-actor terrorism, group-based terrorism

Introduction

Terrorism researchers often remark, typically in passing, that a particular terrorist, terrorist group or terrorist attack is idiosyncratic.[1] Lone-actor terrorists, in particular, are frequently described as idiosyncratic in some way.[2] Yet what is meant by the term “idiosyncratic” varies widely, is rarely defined, and has not yet been subject to extended theoretical elaboration or empirical examination. What exactly does it mean for terrorists to be idiosyncratic, and why does it matter, in terms of terrorism theory and counterterrorism policy? This article’s preliminary answers to these questions help transcend the dichotomy between lone-actor and group-based terrorism, while developing conceptual building blocks useful for generating new hypotheses and developing terrorism theory.

This article identifies four dimensions of idiosyncrasy: idiosyncratic ideology, idiosyncratic motives, idiosyncratic tactics, and idiosyncratic strategic thinking. Each is also divided into distinct subtypes. This conceptual development helps correct misconceptions about idiosyncratic terrorism, such as the idea that it primarily applies to lone wolves and is mainly associated with mental illness.

More broadly, this article argues that idiosyncratic terrorism should not be written off as impossible to understand, as “black swan occurrences,” but should be taken seriously and examined in depth by researchers and practitioners alike.[3] Idiosyncrasy, in all its dimensions, is important both for analyzing the nature of modern terrorism and for devising effective counterterrorism measures. Moreover, clarifying terms and developing typologies are critical endeavors that can drive empirical agendas and enable theory building. After years of debates about lone wolves, it may be useful to take terrorism theory in a new direction, focused on characteristics of terrorism rather than the number of perpetrators involved.[4]

The importance of understanding idiosyncratic terrorism extends to policy as well, potentially informing counterterrorism practices from plot detection to deradicalization initiatives. In particular, this study’s highlighting of the bizarre beliefs, unusual motives, odd tactics, and hopelessly naïve strategic thinking of many terrorists could be helpful in preventing or reversing radicalization. This parallels Lankford’s attempts to delegitimize terrorism by arguing that group terrorists are often suicidal or mentally ill.[5]

The significance of idiosyncratic terrorism is illustrated by the fact that even the most bizarre, seemingly half-
baked ideology can motivate mass murders that inspire numerous copycats. The example of Elliot Rodger, whose manifesto preposterously contended that there is something inherently wrong with all women and they therefore deserve to die, is a disturbing case in point. His attack, which killed six in 2014, inspired several massacres, resulting in about 50 deaths so far. As argued below, strange ideologies such as Rodger’s represent only one of four dimensions of idiosyncrasy: some terrorists espouse typical ideologies but are idiosyncratic in other respects.

After reviewing relevant literature, this article defines idiosyncratic terrorism, its four dimensions, and their sub-categories, while presenting examples of each for both lone-actor and group-based terrorism. In addition, five case studies are presented to provide further insight about idiosyncratic terrorism. The conclusion outlines several implications of idiosyncratic terrorism for future empirical work and counterterrorism policy.

**Previous Literature on Idiosyncratic Terrorism**

Researchers often mention that certain terrorists are idiosyncratic, but this term is typically undefined and its usage varies widely. For example, some observe that lone terrorists tend to have idiosyncratic ideologies, in terms of their substantive beliefs, while others label ideologies as idiosyncratic because they combine personal and political motives.[6] As described below, these are best understood as two separate dimensions of idiosyncrasy: ideological and motivational.

The term idiosyncratic has been used in several other ways that are not relevant to this article’s argument. For example, Bakker and de Graaf describe lone wolves as “by definition, idiosyncratic,” but by that they mean simply that the lone wolf category contains diverse phenomena.[7] By contrast, this article focuses on “idiosyncrasy” in the sense of strange or unusual characteristics, as clarified with more specificity below.

An early terrorism definition by Schmid and Jongman defined terrorism as acts committed for “idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons,” thus including mass attacks by non-ideological psychotics.[8] Consistent with the trend toward defining terrorism as ideological, this sense of idiosyncratic terrorism is excluded from this study.

Indeed, contemporary studies often exclude attackers driven solely by psychological problems.[9] Yet when some ideology is present among psychologically disturbed offenders, there is a divergence of opinion. Turchie and Puckett argue that for true lone wolves, the primary objective is ideological, even if they have more personal motivations as well.[10] This article follows Spaaij’s more inclusive terrorism definition, which only requires that a “broader political, ideological or religious cause… informs” the attack.[11]

Few studies have analyzed idiosyncratic terrorism in depth. Jeffrey Simon describes idiosyncratic lone wolves as terrorists whose “severe personality and psychological issues” really “explain their actions,” not the cause they adopted.[12] Simon found that idiosyncratic terrorists tend to be single-issue terrorists, and are more dangerous when the perpetrator, like the Unabomber, is highly intelligent and lacks remorse.[13] Departing from Simon’s framework, this article understands idiosyncratic terrorism not as a particular category of lone terrorists, but rather as characteristic shared by many lone and group terrorists.

Marc Sageman has briefly analyzed some idiosyncratic terrorists. Sageman identifies Russian nihilists as idiosyncratic, and observes that “mental disorder was a major contributor to” their violence.[14] Sageman notes that the “complete scorn for society” shared by French illegalists, Aum Shinrikyo and the Rajneeshees explains their “unprovoked violence.”[15]

Jeffrey Kaplan has documented idiosyncratic features in several terrorist groups.[16] Kaplan defined “idiosyncratic sectarians” as type of white supremacist “whose structure more nearly approximates a cult… characterized by a single all-powerful charismatic leader… than a political or religious movement.”[17] In the 1990s, Hoffman proposed that “idiosyncratic millenarian movements” may pose a greater threat than traditional terrorists.[18] Going further, building on Rapoport’s four-wave theory of terrorism, Kaplan proposed a Fifth
Wave, based on utopian movements endeavoring to create a “lost ‘Golden Age’ or an entirely new world in a single generation.”[19] Examples include Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Janjaweed, and ISIS.

**Four Dimensions of Terrorist Idiosyncrasy**

Idiosyncrasy can be defined as an aspect of a terrorist perpetrator or attack that is unique, unusual, or unexpected, given the type of terrorism and time period. Terrorism that is somewhat innovative or creative is not idiosyncratic unless it is a significant departure from the norm or the common sense of the time. Idiosyncratic terrorism, in turn, can be defined as a violent attack motivated in some way by ideology, and which is idiosyncratic in at least one dimension. Some terrorists may only be idiosyncratic in one way, while others are idiosyncratic across all dimensions. Idiosyncrasy is not a binary, either/or concept, but a matter of degree: for each dimension, terrorists can range from not idiosyncratic at all to highly idiosyncratic.

These definitions are broad enough to encompass various meanings of idiosyncrasy, while avoiding inappropriate breadth by clarifying that a trait shared by most terrorists cannot be idiosyncratic, and that non-ideological violence would not qualify either. Table 1 provides examples of each dimension and its subtypes for both lone-actor and group-based terrorists, each of which are described below.

**Table 1: Dimensions and Subdimensions of Idiosyncratic Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Subdimension</th>
<th>Lone Actor Example</th>
<th>Dyad/Group Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Novel</td>
<td>Elliot Rodger</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>Andrew Joseph Stack III</td>
<td>DC Snipers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Paul Ciancia</td>
<td>Long Island UFO Plot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal/Political</td>
<td>Chris Dorner</td>
<td>Bundy family standoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opportunistic/Impulsive</td>
<td>Joshua Cartwright</td>
<td>Joseph &amp; Jerry Kane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Novel or rare</td>
<td>James Lee</td>
<td>Rajneeshees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faux/simulated attacks</td>
<td>Jaromír Balda</td>
<td>PNFE*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic thinking</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>David Copeland</td>
<td>ISIS (Islamic State)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Wishful thinking</td>
<td>Brendon Tarrant</td>
<td>Galleanists</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Delusional</td>
<td>Pekka-Eric Auvinen</td>
<td>Manson Family</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen

**Idiosyncratic Ideologies**

While ideology has been called “the most elusive concept in… social science,” it can be understood broadly as a set of normative beliefs about the world—the way it is and the way it should be.[20] When these beliefs are unusual or strange, the ideology is idiosyncratic. Ideologies can be idiosyncratic in two principal ways: by being novel and unusual, or by unconventionally fusing extant ideologies. Examples of novel ideologies include the “Incel” (“involuntary celibate”) ideology elaborated by Elliot Rodger, and Aum Shinrikyo’s doomsday prophecies. Idiosyncratic ideologies are not unique to disturbed individuals or obscure cults. As outlined in a case study below, ISIS is idiosyncratic in several respects.[21]

An example of hybrid ideologies includes the D.C. Snipers, who killed 17 people. Their ideology combined various influences, including the Nation of Islam, black nationalism, the film “The Matrix,” and Eastern religion. Andrew Joseph Stack III, who flew a plane into an IRS building, is a lone-actor example, since his manifesto (like those of anti-immigrant terrorists Brenton Tarrant and Patrick Crusius) mixed left- and right-wing themes. Terrorists’ ideological hybridization can be understood in terms of “cultic milieu” theory, which depicts a “generally supportive cultic milieu” that “is continually giving birth to new cults,” as seekers float between different nodes in the milieu and innovate beliefs.[22]

While lone terrorists are probably more likely to have idiosyncratic ideologies, such ideologies appear to be
frequent among group-based terrorists as well. For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an African group known for relying on kidnapped child soldiers, integrates tribal nationalism, Christianity, and its leader’s religious visions. [23] Terrorism perpetrated by small groups (such as the Symbionese Liberation Army and the White Panther Party (see case studies below) have also involved idiosyncratic ideologies.

When perpetrators’ beliefs are so bizarre that they resemble an assemblage of delusions rather than an ideology, it is a fair question whether their behavior qualifies as terrorism at all. The question of where to draw the line need not be resolved here. Yet mental disorders are not inherently disqualifying. One might assume John Ford and Joseph Mazzuchelli’s scheme to use radium to poison Long Island officials (who, they believed, hid evidence of a UFO crash) arose solely from delusional thinking. However, the belief that authorities are concealing UFO evidence has many adherents, and can be understood as an ideology.

Idiosyncratic Motives

Motives and ideologies are often conflated, but should be analytically separated. As noted above, ideology describes a normative perspective for interpreting the world. Motives, by contrast, refer to specific motivations behind the attack, which may relate to ideology in any number of ways. For example, instead of simply wanting to intimidate people into acceding to their ideological demands (the assumption behind the US definition of terrorism), some terrorists’ motives may be to express the ideology, to implement it, or to publicize it. [24] From Timothy McVeigh’s writings, he apparently saw his attack as pure revenge for Waco and Ruby Ridge, rather than an attempt to coerce officials to adopt particular policies. This motive is not necessarily idiosyncratic, though it is somewhat at odds with terrorism’s US legal definition. To the extent that the motives behind an attack are unusual, strange, or unexpected, the motives are idiosyncratic.

Many cases of idiosyncratic motives involve mixing personal and political motivations. One type of mixed motives is psychologically influenced mixed motives, in which the perpetrator intends the attack to advance an ideology, but simultaneously has a mental-illness-related motive. For example, a suicidal individual might decide to commit suicide in a way that will express their ideology. As Adam Lankford has argued, this may be true for many suicide terrorists. [25] Paul Ciancia’s right-wing attack on airport security officers is another example. In addition, psychotic delusions or paranoia can motivate some attacks, along with an ideology. The UFO plot noted above provides one example (the main defendant was committed to an institution).

A second subtype can be termed personal-political mixed motives. These terrorists seek to express their ideology, but have additional objectives like personal vengeance. Christopher Dorner’s manifesto suggests his 2013 attacks on police officers were meant primarily as personal revenge, while also indicating a desire to raise awareness about racism and police brutality. [26] Todd Shepard, who hoped his murder of a police officer would spark a revolution, was also avenging his girlfriend’s killing by police. The Bundy family standoff in Nevada, involving an assortment of armed anti-government extremists, was motivated by their desire to intimidate authorities into returning confiscated cattle (a personal economic motive), in addition to their quixotic ambition to end federal control over grazing land. Moreover, Chechen female suicide bombers were largely motivated by recruits’ desires to avenge murdered relatives, consistent with Chechen culture’s “strong norm of revenge,” though jihadi ideology also played a role. [27] While mixtures of personal and political motives are widely believed to characterize lone wolves, they may frequently appear among group terrorists as well.

A third subtype includes terrorists with opportunistic/impulsive mixed motives. Some US far-right extremists who killed police—including Joshua Cartwright and Richard Poplawski—did so in reaction to police visits regarding domestic disputes. [28] While they were likely influenced by their ideologies, it is possible their main motive was suicide or anger about a domestic argument. In fact, many far-right attacks involve personal motivations—such as killing police to avoid arrest—in addition to ideological motives. [29] These attacks often appear unplanned and impulsive, as in the cases of “sovereign citizens” (like Joe and Jerry Kane) who shoot officers during traffic stops. Absent manifests or other evidence, perpetrators’ motives are often unclear. Some murders by extremists might lack any ideological motivation, but as Singh suggests, “Violence is never totally idiosyncratic; it always says or expresses something.” [30]
Idiosyncratic Tactics

Sometimes, terrorists’ ideologies may not be idiosyncratic, but their choice of tactics is decidedly strange. Idiosyncratic tactics can be defined as terrorist actions that are unusual or unexpected, given the time period and the terrorism type. Thus, using a tactic associated with another era or a different variety of terrorism would be idiosyncratic. Idiosyncratic tactics can be further divided into at least two categories: novel or rare tactics and faux or simulated attacks.

As an example of novel or rare tactics, James Lee, like many environmentalists, was deeply concerned about overpopulation and wildlife preservation. Yet his tactic for addressing these issues was somewhat bizarre: he took hostages at the Discovery Channel headquarters, in an attempt to force them to broadcast his views.[31] This was a tactic highly unusual for terrorists in general, at least in the current era, and unheard of for radical environmentalists.

In another example, Luke Helder wrote a manifesto discussing such diverse concepts as astral projection, marijuana legalization, and excessive government regulation.[32] Aside from being an example of a hybrid ideology, his tactic was particularly unique. He placed pipe bombs in mailboxes, arranged in several locations to make a “smiley face” on the map. It was also unexpected to use any tactic to promote astral projection, a New Age belief already probably shared by millions of people.

The largest act of bioterrorism in US history provides another example. The Rajneeshee cult’s attempt to win a local election by placing salmonella in numerous restaurants’ salad bars, thus disabling non-cult voters, is unique in modern terrorism. The victims survived, but the threat of mass casualties was real. Rajneeshee adherents later plotted to murder a federal prosecutor—a more conventional tactic, which underscores the threat idiosyncratic terrorists pose.[33]

Another subtype involves faux (false flag) or simulated terrorist attacks, meant to be perceived as an attack by a hated group. Such tactics are idiosyncratic, since they are quite rare, and are motivated by the atypical objective of tricking the government into oppressing those believed to be responsible. For example, anti-immigrant extremist Jaromír Balda disabled trains in a simulated jihadi attack near Prague.[34] In the 1990s, a neo-Nazi group (Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen) claiming to be a (nonexistent) militant Jewish organization attacked Arab targets, hoping to instigate Jewish-Arab conflict.[35]

A final possible subdimension, which is excluded from Table 1 due to definitional uncertainty, involves unclaimed attacks. While such attacks, which undermine terrorism’s basic communicative function, may seem inherently idiosyncratic, research demonstrates that many terrorist attacks are actually unclaimed, often for strategic reasons.[36] Yet in some circumstances, perpetrators’ failure to take responsibility may well be idiosyncratic. The Unabomber mailed bombs over a period of 17 years before publicly communicating his motives—a perplexing strategy for changing society through violence. Moreover, Joseph Paul Franklin, who once belonged to the cult-like American Nazi Party, committed numerous racially motivated murders, but never publicized his motives. Kaplan thus describes this as “failed terrorism.”[37] Nevertheless, Franklin was the model for the main protagonist in The Turner Diaries, which inspired McVeigh and other far-right terrorists.

Idiosyncratic Strategic Thinking

Idiosyncratic strategic thinking includes terrorists’ unusual expectations about the causal effects of their attacks. To a degree, it is normal for terrorists to be unjustifiably optimistic about the chances their violence will have its desired effects. After all, research demonstrates that terrorists nearly always fail to achieve their strategic goals.[38] Yet any causal expectations that would appear, to an ordinary person, to be extremely unrealistic or unusual can be reasonably described as idiosyncratic, even if this means a significant proportion of all terrorists are idiosyncratic. (A trait shared by the majority of terrorists, by contrast, should not be considered idiosyncratic).
Maynard argues that many atrocities (such as genocide) are influenced by a “future-oriented moral fallacy” in which the “known moral harms in the present—the deaths of victims” are “outweighed by massive future goods which have not been discounted for their uncertainty.”[39] This “extraordinarily permissive logic” involves a “consequentialist calculus” in which “the confident assertion of huge benefits multiplied into the infinite future” justifies mass murder.[40] While previous research has noted the role of such consequentialist reasoning in political violence, these unrealistic causal expectations have rarely been analyzed by terrorism researchers.[41]

Abrahms and Lula demonstrate that one reason for terrorists’ excessive optimism is that terrorists make invalid historical analogies, especially to successful guerrilla campaigns, and incorrectly predict that terrorism against civilians will also succeed.[42] For example, Osama bin Laden appears to have believed the 9/11 attacks would prompt the US to exit the Middle East, similar to how such attacks succeeded in ending American intervention in Lebanon and Somalia.

Yet this cannot explain all terrorists’ unrealistic beliefs about their success. A century earlier, many anarchists thought assassinating politicians would spark a total revolution against capitalism and the state, despite any historical precedent for such a causal sequence, and despite the fact that they soon had considerable evidence assassinations had no such effect. Such magical thinking about the causal power of violence also characterizes the work of some radical philosophers, such as Georges Sorel.[43]

There are three main types of idiosyncratic strategic thinking: religious (based on unusual religious beliefs), wishful thinking (resulting from the desire to believe their goals are attainable), and delusional (based on a distorted understanding of reality).

First, some are based on religious beliefs, such as ISIS’s conviction that terrorism will spark a ground war against the West that will usher in the apocalypse, or Aum Shinrikyo’s doomsday prophecies. David Copeland, who believed he had been chosen by God to commit bomb attacks that would trigger a race war in the UK, is a lone-actor example, though he could also illustrate delusional thinking.[44]

Second, wishful thinking explains many terrorists’ idiosyncratic strategic thinking. Psychological studies have shown that the optimism bias—the tendency to overestimate one’s likelihood of success—is pervasive among ordinary people.[45] Yet wishful thinking should be even stronger among radicals. Given their desire for dramatic social change, to avoid hopelessness they have every incentive to believe victory is within grasp and achievable through some concrete action. Among nonreligious terrorists, this subtype may be most common. The idea that a single massacre will somehow usher in a massive race war—seemingly a common neo-Nazi belief, and the specific motivation behind Dylann Roof’s mass shooting—is a prominent example.[46]

The third subtype, delusional strategic thinking, involves evident influences from mental illness. One possible example is Pekka-Eric Auvinen, who implausibly saw his school shooting as the harbinger of an international social-Darwinist revolution by “intelligent people” against everyone else.[47] (Though most school shootings are nonideological, studies show that some have strong ideological motives and thus qualify as terrorism).[48] The iconic serial killer Charles Manson represents an even clearer example of this subtype. Manson and his followers were terrorists, because their murders were meant to trigger an apocalyptic race war.[49] Manson believed in an incredible causal sequence: his group’s killings of whites would be perceived as being committed by blacks, thus prompting reprisal killings of blacks by whites, which would lead to racist and non-racist whites killing each other until whites were virtually eliminated. This, in turn, would somehow allow Manson’s cult to rule society. (Manson later claimed that this was untrue and his group was instead focused on justice for “ATWA” (Air, Trees, Water, and Animals), but this appears to be an attempt at personal reinvention).

One might think that such fanciful thinking about causality would be confined to those, like Manson, who were clearly out of touch with reality. However, New Zealand mosque attacker Brenton Tarrant, who shows no sign of psychosis, appeared to believe the most fantastical chain of events would result from his shooting: it would somehow cause the US, thousands of miles away, to adopt such severe gun control policies that right-wing extremists would rise up, starting a civil war in which they would ultimately triumph.[50] While Tarrant’s ideology, which resembled Breivik’s, was not highly idiosyncratic, his strategic thinking surely was.
In the case of anti-government extremists Jerad and Amanda Miller, who killed two officers and a civilian in Las Vegas in 2014, there was nothing particularly unusual about their ideology, motive, or tactics. The only idiosyncratic element was their strategic thinking—they seemed to believe that their attack would spark an anti-government revolution. Their writings do not provide insight into why they believed such an unlikely result would follow. Another dyad, the D.C. Snipers, should have realized it was impossible to leverage their shootings to extort millions from the government to finance a utopian community in Canada, as they hoped. Either psychological disturbance, wishful thinking, or both could explain such cases. As suggested above, a group example of wishful thinking could include the US-based Galleinist anarchists of the interwar period, who quite implausibly believed that assassinations and bombings would trigger a total revolution.

Stephen Paddock, the Las Vegas mass murderer who killed 58 in 2017, may have been inspired by idiosyncratic cause-and-effect reasoning. Investigations revealed he was a classic right-wing extremist, obsessed with gun ownership rights, conspiracy theories, and the sieges at Waco and Ruby Ridge.[51] While his motivation is technically unknown, some information points toward an ideological motivation with idiosyncratic strategic thinking. Paddock said shortly before the shooting that “Somebody has to wake up the American public and get them to arm themselves,” adding ominously that, “Sometimes sacrifices have to be made.”[52] An epic mass shooting, in his mind, might have been just the thing to accomplish this task.

As another example, Anders Breivik believed his more moderate fellow travelers would be persecuted due to his attack and radicalize in response.[53] There is no indication this occurred, and it is hard to see why this would seem more likely than any number of other alternative causal sequences. The narcissistic Breivik probably believed himself to be playing three-dimensional chess, so to speak, when in reality he was simply being foolish and deceiving himself.

Highlighting the fact that terrorists often have seemingly delusional expectations about their attacks' causal impacts may dissuade radicalized individuals from committing attacks, or otherwise aid in deradicalization. Since terrorism is above all “a perception game,” shifting the framing of terrorists from stealthy “lone wolves” or brilliant “masterminds” to hopelessly unrealistic and naïve dupes may have a salutary effect.[54] Even deeply radicalized individuals may rethink their involvement upon realizing that likeminded terrorists often have indefensibly bizarre expectations regarding the effects of their attacks.

**Case Studies of Idiosyncratic Terrorism**

Five brief case studies, which encompass various ideological motivations, are described here to provide further insight on the nature of idiosyncratic terrorism. This parallels Spaaij's approach in his influential article on the “enigma of lone wolf terrorism,” which used five diverse case studies to illustrate “the main features and patterns” of a broad terrorism category.[55] For each case study, perpetrators are evaluated for idiosyncrasies in each of the four dimensions. The likely sources of their idiosyncrasies are discussed as well. Results are summarized in Table 2.

**The White Panther Party (1967/68–70)**

The White Panther Party (WPP) was a New Left group linked to at least two bombings. The WPP's ideology was idiosyncratic in that it attempted to meld the ideas of Black Panther Party (whose program the WPP endorsed in its manifesto) with a more radical, anarchistic ideology opposed to capitalism and the state. It espoused a puerile anarchism (“Everything is free for everybody. Money sucks. Leaders suck”), while awkwardly fashioning sex, drugs, and rock-n-roll into a political program (“Our program of rock and roll, dope and f***ing in the streets...”).

Moreover, their manifesto was laced with drug-fueled, surrealistic stream-of-consciousness statements, like “We are LSD driven total maniacs of the universe” and “a generation of visionary maniac white mother****er country dope fiend rock and roll freaks who are ready to get down and kick out the jams — ALL THE JAMS — break everything loose and free everybody from their very real and imaginary prisons.” Despite similarities
with groups like the Yippies, the WPP were unique in their imagined alliance with the Black Panthers and their advocacy of terrorism. (“But we will use guns if we have to—we will do anything—if we have to. We have no illusions”). In both respects, they presaged the Weather Underground, which was founded in 1969. WPP members were charged with bombing a CIA recruiting station in 1968, and with firebombing an army draft office in 1970. The WPP’s tactics, motives, and strategic thinking do not appear idiosyncratic.

The source of the WPP’s idiosyncratic ideology seems to be psychedelic drugs. In fact, WPP founder John Sinclair later attributed the rise of revolutionary 1960s activism to LSD. He said the drug prompted “a messianic feeling of love, of brotherhood,” a “tremendously inspiring” feeling that “this would alter everything,” and they “were going to take over the world.”[56] He added, “This was the general belief. It was the LSD…Acid was amping everything up, driving everything into greater and greater frenzy…We thought at the time that as a result of our LSD-inspired activities great things would happen. And, of course, it didn’t.”[57]

**Symbionese Liberation Army (1973–1975)**

The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) was a short-lived, but high-profile, terrorist group, known above all for kidnapping heiress Patricia Hearst. Like some contemporaries, the SLA was inspired by Maoism and anti-imperialism. Yet its ideology contained several peculiar elements likely arising from its leader Donald DeFreeze’s mental illness. For example, the SLA’s first major action, assassinating Marcus Foster, a black school superintendent, arose from DeFreeze’s paranoid, unsubstantiated belief that Foster was a CIA agent.[58] Other violent radicals never accepted the Foster assassination, which baffled them. Given the lack of any evidence for their suspicions, this qualifies as an idiosyncratic tactic.

Their ideology featured delusional conspiracy theories, such as their belief that authorities were planning on murdering millions of Americans in the immediate future. As one communique stated, “warn black and poor people that they are about to murdered down to the last man, woman, and child” by the “corporate state.”[59] Even individuals who later joined the SLA complained that the group’s publicly communicated ideology had made no sense.

In the same audio message, DeFreeze declared, “All corporate enemies of the people will be shot on sight at any time and at any place. This order is permanent, until… all enemy forces have either surrendered or been destroyed.”[60] This clearly directed sympathizers to immediately kill any policemen or other government official. Indeed, members were obsessed with killing police, often daydreaming about high-casualty shootouts. Before a bank robbery, one member “rub[bed] his hands together” excitedly, saying “Oh, I hope they come…I want to kill some pigs… yes, I want to kill some pigs.”[61] Their fervent desire to murder all their enemies was highly unusual for militants of the time.

The Hearst kidnapping was also idiosyncratic, since atypically, they had no plan for negotiating her release. Their demand that Hearst’s father donate millions of dollars in “quality food” to the poor was conceived as a mere prelude to the “real” negotiations, which never transpired. They may have hoped to exchange Hearst for imprisoned members, but this idea went nowhere.

Their strategic thinking was idiosyncratic as well. Members were overjoyed after releasing one communiqué, since they “truly believed, as they repeatedly told each other, that surely this message” would “rally the people to the SLA cause.”[62] (Their statement “declared revolutionary war” against the “fascist military-corporate state” and invited “robbers, pimps… drug addicts[and] prostitutes” to join them)[63] Oddly enough, they expected their bank robbery to “rally the people to our side…the oppressed masses would be heartened to join in the fight… The revolution, led by the SLA, was on its way.”[64] Perhaps most strangely, DeFreeze “really believed that the government… would soon declare martial law” in response to the SLA, and then “blacks and poor people would rise up” and “spark the people’s revolution.”[65]

The group’s atmosphere was cult-like, centered around DeFreeze, who was revered as a prophet despite his near-constant drinking, his strange pronouncements, and his periodic groping of female members.[66] For example, DeFreeze once proclaimed, in a “subdued, mystical tone of voice” that “I really am a prophet. I am
here on earth to lead the people.”[67] DeFreeze was known as Cinque Mtume (“Fifth Prophet”), the “General Field Marshal” of the “United Federated Forces of the Symbionese Liberation Army.” Perhaps because the SLA’s white members believed only black or other “Third World” people could lead the revolution, they accepted him as their absolute leader, following his whims without question.

Apart from assassinating Foster and kidnapping (and sexually assaulting) Hearst, the SLA’s major crimes included bank robberies, which caused the death of one customer, and several bombings. After training for “search and destroy missions” to “shoot down and kill policemen” in Los Angeles, most members died during a shootout with police.[68] The remaining few returned to San Francisco, where they committed bombings, and released a communiqué lauding DeFreeze as a “beautiful Black genius, revolutionary warrior”, and imploring “White Amerikkkans” to ignore the “oinking” of the “cringing pigs” and join the “war of the flea” against the “ruling class and all its pig agents.”[69] They were arrested months later.

The main source of the SLA’s idiosyncrasies was probably its leader’s mental illness. A pre-SLA probation report described DeFreeze as a “a schizoid personality with strong schizophrenic potential” and “a fascination with firearms and explosives.”[70] This example illustrates that it is not only lone wolves who are influenced by mental illness. The presence of a charismatic leader can also contribute to a group’s eccentricities.

**Atomwaffen Division (2015–Present)**

This neo-Nazi network has cells in the US and several European countries. Members have been involved in several murders and terrorist plots. Atomwaffen’s ideology is extremely bizarre even by far-right standards. Guided by neo-Nazi James Mason, it espouses a syncretistic mix of Nazi ideology and occult beliefs, including the near-worship of Charles Manson. The group’s influences include the neo-Nazi Satanic group Order of the Nine Angles, which encourages human sacrifice.

Though Nazi occultism has a long history,[71] Atomwaffen’s ideology merits the idiosyncratic label, as any group revering a serial-killer cult leader and fashioning its own religion borrowing from Hinduism and black magic is certainly bizarre. For example, this quotation is from one Atomwaffen-linked group:

> “Through the Racial Holy War, the Last Battalion consisting of Charles Manson, George Lincoln Rockwell and other Aryan heroes, and the New Reich shall return to Earth… achieving Endsieg and Total Aryan Victory. Kalki shall bring us out of the Kali Yuga and into the Satya Yuga, and all race traitors and race defilers shall be burned in Holy Fire under Kalki's wrathful gaze.”[72]

The reference to Kalki, a Hindu apocalyptic figure, reflects the influence of Savitri Devi, who deified Hitler as an avatar of Vishnu and reinterpreted Kalki as Hitler-like. In Internet “memes,” members describe themselves as “Agents of Kalki” and proclaim that “Soldiers of God Never Die”, accompanied by the “black sun” symbol of Nazi esotericism.

Members are fervent adherents of accelerationism, the idea—promoted by Mason’s book *Siege*—that racist violence can destabilize society and ignite a race war. This “magical thinking,” as Kaplan puts it, qualifies as idiosyncratic strategic thinking.[73] Described as “a long string of essays celebrating murder and chaos in the name of white supremacy,” *Siege* is reportedly required reading for Atomwaffen members, who regard it as “something akin to divine revelation.”[74] Mason, a convicted pedophile, was a marginal figure in the neo-Nazi cultic milieu before Atomwaffen rediscovered his teachings.

Six deaths have been tied to Atomwaffen so far. One member murdered a gay Jewish college student, an act praised by other members. Another member, Nicholas Giampa, killed his girlfriend’s parents after they disapproved of their relationship—an idiosyncratic mixed-motive attack, assuming ideology played a role. Members released at least two “memes” celebrating Giampa’s murders. Member Timothy Wilson plotted to blow up a hospital, before dying in a shootout with the FBI.[75]

Strangely enough, another member, Devon Arthurs, converted to Islam, describing himself as a “Salafi National Socialist”, and murdered two roommates (also Atomwaffen members). He told police he killed them because...
they taunted him for his faith, and to send a message to those who disrespect Islam, while also claiming he prevented his roommates’ terrorist attacks. Leaving aside the question of whether this counts as terrorism, or the perhaps thornier question of how to categorize it, this illustrates the unexpected ideological combinations and unpredictable pathways to violence among idiosyncratic terrorists. Ironically, Brandon Russell, their cell’s leader (another roommate), had celebrated jihadi violence as a model for Atomwaffen.

Some potential attacks by members appear to have been narrowly thwarted. Russell was found with bomb-making components, including radioactive elements, and was later arrested with semiautomatic weapons, body armor, and a thousand rounds of ammunition. When members Aiden Bruce-Uumbaugh and Kaleb Cole were arrested, they were armed, wearing tactical gear and had thousands of bullets. Authorities believe their arrest prevented an imminent mass shooting.

Several other members were suspected of preparing for attacks. To illustrate, member Jarrett Smith, a US Army soldier obsessed with “anti-cosmic” Satanism, was arrested on explosives charges after plotting assassinations. [76] Three members planning a mass shooting were arrested for weapon offenses and for manufacturing the hallucinogen DMT. They are not the only members enamored of psychedelics. Another member, Andrew Thomasberg, calling himself a “psychedelic Nazi,” claimed “There’s nothing more Aryan than entheogenic drug use.” Thomasberg revered far-right terrorists as “saints” and was planning an attack before his arrest.[77] In 2020, the FBI simultaneously arrested several senior members in various states for “swatting” threats against journalists, among other charges.

Members of the Atomwaffen affiliates Feuerkrieg Division and Sonnenkrieg Division carried out a bombing in Lithuania, and were arrested for planning attacks and other terrorist offenses in Latvia, the UK, and elsewhere. One member, described by a UK judge as a “deeply entrenched neo-Nazi with an interest in Satanism and occult practices”, was arrested for possessing bomb-making manuals, and had been planning an attack.[78] Members were also investigated for raping a female member and carving swastikas and occult symbols into her skin.[79]

The primary source of Atomwaffen’s idiosyncrasies (which include idiosyncratic ideology, motives, and strategic thinking) is neo-Nazi esotericism. Some of its idiosyncratic features, such as apocalypticism, may indicate a greater risk of violence than can be found in other far-right groups.

Incel Terrorism (2014 – Present)

The Incel movement is a virulently misogynistic Internet subculture that has led to about 50 homicide deaths since its founding. While the term “involuntary celibate” arose in the 1990s and had no violent connotation, Elliot Rodger turned it into a terrorist ideology rooted in the bizarre idea that women were fundamentally flawed and deserved death.

In his book-length manifesto, Rodger described his rationale for a massacre of women, his so-called “Day of Retribution.” Since women’s rejection of him is a “declaration of war,” he declares a war against women that “will result in their complete and utter annihilation,” causing a “blow” to his “enemies… so catastrophic it will redefine the very essence of human nature.[80] He also fantasized about torturing and killing “good-looking men” who have “pleasurable sex lives while I’ve had to suffer.”[81]

Rodger displayed clear signs of narcissism, with messianic, nearly apocalyptic features:

I am Elliot Rodger… Magnificent, glorious, supreme, eminent…Divine! I am the closest thing there is to a living god. Humanity is a disgusting, depraved, and evil species. It is my purpose to punish them all. I will purify the world of everything that is wrong with it.[82]

In his “ultimate and perfect ideology of… a fair and pure world,” all women should be “quarantined” in “concentration camps,” where he could “gleefully watch them die,” though some would be kept alive and artificially inseminated to perpetuate humanity.[83]

On his “Day of Retribution,” Rodger stabbed three college students to death, shot and killed two sorority
members and one male college student, and attempted to run people over. He committed suicide afterwards, as announced and planned in his manifesto.

An Internet subculture of “Incels” subsequently formed in which Rodger was lauded as a “saint.” Several related murders ensued. These include Christopher Harper-Mercer’s mass shooting in Oregon in 2015, which killed nine people; a murder by Sheldon Bentley in Canada in 2016; William Atchison’s double murder in New Mexico in 2017; Scott Beierle’s 2018 murder of two women in a Florida yoga studio; and Nicholas Cruz’s murder of 17 people in Florida in 2018. In an Internet post, Cruz stated that “Elliot Rodger will not be forgotten,” and Beierle posted numerous videos with Incel content. Moreover, Alek Minassian killed 10 pedestrians in a 2018 vehicle attack in Toronto, after tweeting, “the Incel Rebellion has already begun” and “We will overthrow all the Chads and Stacys!”—that is, popular, sexually active men and women. He continued: “All hail the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger!” In 2019, two Incel-motivated mass shootings, by Christopher Cleary and Bryan Clyde, were thwarted by authorities.

While some perpetrators had several ideological influences (for example, Harper-Mercer’s manifesto emphasizes Satanism and racism), Incel ideology was the primary motive in Minassian’s and Beierle’s attacks. Personal/political or psychological mixed motives appear typical of Incel attackers. Rodger’s mental disorders, possibly including psychosis, psychopathy and narcissism, presumably explain the emergence of this ideology.[84]

Islamic State (ISIS) (2014–Present)

Some may be reluctant to accept the categorization of ISIS as idiosyncratic because jihadi ideology is widespread, or due to the group’s historic successes. Yet success is by no means mutually exclusive with idiosyncrasies. (The Rajneeshee cult, which was surely idiosyncratic, had thousands of followers at its peak) Moreover, although ISIS shares beliefs with other jihadists, its ideology is idiosyncratic in several important respects.

First, ISIS took the doctrine of takfir, or excommunication, to the furthest possible extreme, so that essentially, any Muslim who is not an ISIS member or supporter could be killed on the spot. Indeed, there have been reports of ISIS summarily executing people during traffic stops because they were suspected of being Shiites. This is a dramatic departure from Al Qaeda, which applied takfir only against the Saudi government, and refrained from violence against minority Islamic sects. Moreover, the doctrine of takfir has been “seldom used in Islamic history.”[85] In effect, ISIS took a doctrine with no practical application for most of history, and interpreted it to justify killing nearly anyone in the world.

ISIS’s second idiosyncrasy relates to its heavy reliance on Dhahirism, an obscure school of Islamic jurisprudence considered so rare many Muslims believed it to be extinct.[86] Third, ISIS’s “unilateral, contested declaration of a caliphate” is unthinkable in traditional Islam.[87] Fourth, ISIS’s apocalyptic focus is highly unique even for jihadists. Members truly believe their current wave of violence will somehow trigger the end of the world.[88] (As noted above, this qualifies as idiosyncratic strategic thinking).

Fifth, as Kaplan and Costa observe, their apocalyptic fervor predictably unleashed antinomian currents “freeing them from the normal constraints of Islamic law and simple human decency.”[89] This wide-ranging abrogation of Islamic law includes not only a “literal declaration of the genocide of all Muslims… save for those who follow the teachings of Al-Baghdadi”, but also “forced conversion, sexual servitude… and mass executions.”[90]

Perhaps because of ISIS’s unique acts of brutality (which themselves qualify as idiosyncratic tactics), ISIS attracted many foreign fighters and lone wolves with psychological mixed motives, who were suicidal or delusional.[91] ISIS thus appears idiosyncratic across all four dimensions.
Table 2. Case Studies of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Terrorism Type</th>
<th>Dimensions of Idiosyncrasy</th>
<th>Source of Idiosyncrasies</th>
<th>Fatalities Victims (+Perpetrators)</th>
<th>Other Terrorist Offenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Panther Party</td>
<td>Group-based</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Psychedelic drugs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbionese Liberation Army</td>
<td>Group-based</td>
<td>Ideology, Tactics, Strategic Thinking</td>
<td>Mental illness of leader</td>
<td>2 (+6)</td>
<td>Bombings and robberies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomwaffen Division</td>
<td>Group-based, Lone-actor</td>
<td>Ideology, Motive, Strategic Thinking</td>
<td>Occult influences</td>
<td>5 (+1)</td>
<td>Bombings and murder plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Incel” Terrorism</td>
<td>Lone-actor</td>
<td>Ideology, Motive</td>
<td>Mental illness of founder</td>
<td>47 (+4)</td>
<td>Mass murder plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State (ISIS)</td>
<td>Group-based, Lone-actor</td>
<td>Ideology, Tactics, Motives, Strategic Thinking</td>
<td>Apocalyptic antinomianism</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
<td>Rape, slavery, torture, genocide</td>
</tr>
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Conclusions from the Case Studies

Three preliminary conclusions emerge from the case studies. First, although mental illness is sometimes the primary influence, idiosyncrasy has other sources as well, including odd religious innovations and drug use. In addition to the role of hallucinogens in the WPP and Atomwaffen, further examples include Aum Shinrikyo’s manufacturing of LSD (often given to members surreptitiously) and Charles Manson’s obsessive psychedelic use. Moreover, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, an LSD cult, paid the Weather Underground $25,000 to free psychedelic promoter Timothy Leary from prison. Leary subsequently released a pro-terrorist manifesto, saying, “Arm yourself and shoot to live... To shoot a genocidal robot policeman in the defense of life is a sacred act.”[92] Other factors, such as exceptional creativity, eccentric personalities, or subclinical psychopathic or psychotic traits (which have been shown to predict radical beliefs), also probably generate idiosyncrasies.[93]

Second, mental illness can be a primary influence on group terrorism, as illustrated by the SLA. Another example is the New World Liberation Front (NWLF). Perhaps the most prolific terrorist cell in US history, the NWLF committed 70 bombings against corporate and government targets in the mid-1970s, while releasing communiques about social programs, feminism, and even Jewish conspiracies—an idiosyncratic topic for far-left terrorists, to be sure. The cell consisted of Ronald Huffman and his girlfriend Maureen Minton (who ran a marijuana farm together), and possibly others as well. After years of bombings, Huffman murdered Minton with an axe, allegedly believing her to be possessed by a “demon dog,” and for some reason removed part of her brain, which was in his possession when he was arrested hours later.[94] The NWLF often praised the SLA, and the SLA carried out a bombing in its name.

Third, a cultish atmosphere and apocalyptic orientation may often be found among idiosyncratic terrorists, as in Kaplan’s Fifth Wave terrorism, but this is not always the case. Idiosyncratic features are also present in groups without these characteristics, such as the WPP and Incels.

Conclusion: The Importance of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

As argued above, idiosyncrasy can be understood as a characteristic of terrorism that exists in four dimensions, each of which has recognizable subtypes. This preliminary theorization, which should be refined through future research, advances terrorism studies by showing that an aspect of terrorism commonly seen as unexplainable can in fact be analytically disaggregated, with several implications for research and policy.
Implications for Future Research and Theoretical Development

Typologies are valued for their potential to “discover new relationships…to generate hypotheses,” to spur “the development of theories, and to identify areas for investigation”[95] This article contributes toward these goals by shedding light on the relationship between charisma, mental illness, drugs and violence; suggesting several potential hypotheses; facilitating theory-building by providing conceptual building blocks applicable to group and solo terrorists alike; and identifying idiosyncrasy in all its dimensions as a new area for empirical investigation and theoretical development.

Based on the examples and case studies above, preliminary generalizations about idiosyncratic terrorism, which can be developed into more specific hypotheses for future research, include the following:

1) idiosyncrasies are frequently found among group-based terrorists, even if lone terrorists are more likely to be idiosyncratic;
2) idiosyncratic group-based terrorists often have charismatic leadership and/or apocalyptic beliefs;
3) idiosyncratic terrorism can be influenced by mental illness, although other factors, such as drug use or eccentric personalities, also generate idiosyncrasies;
4) idiosyncratic terrorism may often involve the coercion of participants (through kidnapping, death threats, or other means), as in the cases of ISIS, the LRA, the SLA, and Aum Shinrikyo, and;  
5) solo attacks (such as Rodger’s) sometimes inspire numerous copycats attacks, even when the ideology is extremely bizarre.

Future research can test and further refine these generalizations. For example, previous research on charisma and terrorism found that violence tends to arise in response to a breakdown in charismatic authority.[96] However, this does not appear to explain all cases involving charismatic leaders, such as that of the SLA. Further research should document other pathways toward violence by idiosyncratic terrorists. For example, studies of opportunistic/impulsive motives might identify risk factors predicting which extremists are likely to attack. Moreover, terrorism researchers could explore the copycat effect, which is likely more dangerous when ideology provides an additional motivation beyond mere mimetic mirroring. Notably, copycat attacks can evolve in unanticipated directions: Breivik’s massacre inspired Tarrant’s mosque attack, which in turn was the direct inspiration for a deadly shooting at a Poway, California synagogue. Strangely, the Poway attacker was motivated by Christian anti-Semitism, while neither Breivik nor Tarrant identified as religious Christians or targeted Jews.[97]

Policy Implications of Idiosyncratic Terrorism

Potential policy implications of idiosyncratic terrorism, phrased as tentative predictions, include the following:

1) publicizing information about terrorists’ frequent idiosyncrasies, such as odd beliefs and hopelessly naïve strategic thinking, may help prevent or reverse radicalization;
2) monitoring online subcultures, and face-to-face cult-like groups, for emerging idiosyncratic terrorist ideologies or tactics, and preemptively removing (when possible) websites where antisocial ideologies are hatched and spread, can prevent idiosyncratic terrorism;
3) blocking the publication of attackers’ manifestos, or monitoring the Internet for discussions of past attacks to identify potential attackers, may help prevent copycats; and
4) incorporating idiosyncratic strategic thinking into risk assessments may help predict violence by radicalized individuals.

The first implication can be seen as building upon and broadening Lankford’s argument that publicizing terrorists’ mental illness could decrease support for terrorism, as the concept of idiosyncrasy encompasses far more than mental illness. Since “push factors”—in particular, disillusionment with terrorist leaders and
tactics—tend to be the dominant factor influencing deradicalization, highlighting terrorists’ bizarre ideas and patently ridiculous strategic thinking could be a promising strategy for counter-messaging efforts.[98]

From Loneness to Strangeness: Towards a Reorientation of Terrorism Studies

Building on recent arguments that the “lone wolf” concept should be abandoned due to the rareness of true isolation and stealth,[99] perhaps a reorientation away from the concept of lone-wolf terrorism toward the concept of idiosyncrasy in its various dimensions may be a more productive direction for Terrorism Studies. The research and theoretical focus on lone-wolf terrorism encourages misconceptions about terrorism, such as the idea that idiosyncrasy is synonymous with lone wolves or mental illness. Such a reorientation should also sidestep unresolvable debates on how isolated or uniquely dangerous solo terrorists allegedly are.

Indeed, the features that are said to make lone wolves so dangerous—their unpredictability, their potential interest in weapons of mass destruction, and their creativity—apply equally to group terrorists with idiosyncratic features. It is not only their “loneness” that makes lone terrorists dangerous; it is to a large degree their strangeness. But this quality can often be found in dyads or groups, and is not perpetually inscrutable—rather, it can be further understood through quantitative and qualitative investigation.

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Failed States and Terrorism: Justifiability of Transnational Interventions from a Counterterrorism Perspective
by Aleksandar Pašagić

Abstract
Failed states as a global security risk have occupied an important place in international politics for over two decades, but it was the added threat of terrorism since 2001 that made them appear even more menacing and opened the door for external interventions, ostensibly for the purpose of counterterrorism. The failed state – terrorism link has often been accepted and acted upon without the in-depth critical examination it warrants, considering the implications for both the international community and the states labeled as failed. Through presentation and analysis of contrasting scholarly opinions on the issue, this paper argues for a high degree of caution when using counterterrorism as a rationale for transnational interventions into failed and fragile states.

Keywords: failed states, fragile states, weak states, terrorism, interventionism, counterterrorism

Failed States as a Challenge to Global Security

Although the idea of failed states was not new in 2001, the events of September 11 pushed them up the ladder of global security concerns, as they were widely perceived to be sources of terrorism risk.[1] The US National Security Strategy from 2002 onward regularly cites weak and failing states as sources of a broad spectrum of threats, with the 2002 Strategy specifically mentioning Afghanistan as a prime example.[2] Former Director of the CIA and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in 2010 that the most serious terrorist threats to the security of the United States are likely to originate from failing states and that dealing with such states presents “the main security challenge of our time.”[3] The idea of failed states as sources of terrorism also features in European strategic thought. The 2003 European Security Strategy cites terrorism as one of the “obvious threats” that can be associated with state failure;[4] the Strategy from 2010 stresses the need for special attention to weak and failed states to prevent them from becoming hubs of organized crime or terrorism.[5]

The failed state – terrorism connection appears intuitively plausible,[6] which may be one of the reasons facilitating its acceptance without a more thorough questioning. While this often occurs in the media and politics,[7] it is also not uncommon to find scholarly works that take as given the notion of weak and failed states posing a serious terrorism-related risk to global security, and continue to build on that premise.[8]

This article presents arguments commonly used to prove that failed states indeed are a terrorism risk, as well as those pointing to the contrary. It highlights a cross section of academic studies on the relationship between terrorism and state failure, and proceeds to offer possible explanations for their often conflicting conclusions. The data indicating that “fixing” failed states does not appear to be an optimal counterterrorism approach is elaborated on; this is followed by the critique of securitizing state failure through the threat of terrorism for the purpose of allowing external actors to use exceptional measures, closing with the conclusion that terrorism should not be used to rally additional support for interventions into failed states.

Perspective I: Why Failed States Present a Terrorism Threat

Putting aside for the moment the complexities arising from the process of lumping together vastly different states under the failed state label,[9] there appear to be a number of reasons why state failure should indeed create an environment both attractive to international terrorist groups and susceptible to terrorism from within. As far as international terrorist organizations are concerned, the most commonly quoted risk associated with failed states is that they provide a form of sanctuary—a territory outside of the influence of legitimate
government where such organizations can function with impunity. This makes it possible for them to set up bases for planning and rehearsing attacks,[10] as well as training camps. The porosity of borders that often accompanies state failure facilitates transnational activities,[11] thus increasing the risk of exporting terrorists and weapons needed to commit acts of terrorism.

The rationale behind failed states as a permissive environment for domestic terrorism appears even more compelling, as factors contributing to state failure largely overlap with those commonly considered to be root causes of terrorism. Human insecurity conditions play an important role in creating dissent[12] and provide terrorist recruiters with a pool of young men, often unemployed, in conditions of poverty or close to it, disillusioned by the failure of government to provide for their basic needs. With high levels of corruption being an important indicator of state failure, citizens may resort to acts of terrorism to bring about regime change.[13] As law enforcement capacity is weak or nonexistent, terrorists can use drug trafficking or smuggling as sources of income.[14] State failure is often compounded with ethnic conflict, some sort of a rebellion or an outright civil war, possibly including actors from neighboring states or representatives of the international community. Globally, there is a strong connection between terrorism and civil war,[15] with terrorism being the dominant tactic of rebel groups fighting democratic governments[16]. Ongoing civil conflict degrades official security capabilities, opens up attractive targets and increases the flow of refugees.[17] Weapons are usually readily available in such conditions, and the range of tactics considered acceptable can easily include acts of terrorism against a civilian population and whatever government institutions may still be functioning. Terrorism may also be employed against foreign or international representatives within the failed state if they are viewed as the cause or a contributor to the condition the state is in. Failed states undergoing internal conflict can also serve as testing grounds for new terrorist tactics and provide on-the-job training for local terrorists,[18] both of which can potentially be exported later to be used against other states. Some areas of weak and failed states may be inaccessible to outsiders due to ethnic homogeneity,[19] creating a safe haven for local terrorist groups.

Perspective II: Why Failed States Do Not Present a Terrorism Threat

On the other hand, there are equally compelling arguments against the failed state – terrorism connection. International terrorist organizations may find it prohibitively difficult to operate in fully failed or “collapsed” states due to a number of reasons, and face many of the problems any organization intent on functioning in such an environment would encounter. The presence of fewer foreigners in failed states makes foreign terrorists more conspicuous and limits their ability to infiltrate local population for purposes of hiding or committing attacks; they are also more exposed to direct counterterrorism action by international actors as the problems associated with violation of state sovereignty are lessened by the failed status of the state.[20] This fact, coupled with the threat of violence from indigenous groups contesting for power and the likelihood of betrayal from poverty-plagued sectors of the population, forces terrorist organizations to devote considerable resources to ensure their own survival and security.[21] While borders of failed states with immediate neighbors might be more porous in some cases, being a citizen of a failed state or having been registered as visiting one makes it more difficult to cross international borders, thus limiting the options of perpetrating an act of international terrorism. Efficient financing of terrorist operations requires at least some functioning financial infrastructure for the transfer of funds, and conditions of general state failure make many of the standard fundraising activities almost impossible.[22] Economic and human security variables, often mentioned as root causes of terrorism, have in fact shown little effect on increasing susceptibility of local populations to adopting terrorist methods or joining terrorist organizations.[23] While armed groups in civil wars do use terrorist tactics in an attempt to improve their effectiveness,[24] they appear to be detrimental to such groups in the long term as they diminish their capacity for negotiation.[25]

The problems inherent to operating in failed states lead a number of authors to conclude that it is in fact weak states, instead of fully failed ones, that present the most significant risk of terrorism; it is the transition periods, especially from authoritarian regimes to democracy, coupled with violent political instability, that are most critical.[26] In addition, weak states are sometimes ruled by power structures that are corrupt, sympathetic...
or tolerant of the terrorist cause, making it possible for terrorist organizations to operate, using existing infrastructures and without dedicating major resources to protecting their own security.[27] On the other hand, when weak state structures are opposed to terrorist organizations, they themselves become the most common target of terrorism, thus also increasing the number and likelihood of attacks.[28] Finally, it has to be taken into consideration that the state-centric perspective in general is becoming increasingly outdated when dealing with international terrorist organizations that demonstrate ever-diminishing dependency on territory for the planning or execution of their operations.[29]

Contrasting Opinions in Scholarly Works

A number of scholars have undertaken qualitative analyses of the relationship between failed states and terrorism, and there does not appear to be a clear set of conclusions all authors can agree on. Analyzing the data on 19 states in the Middle East and North Africa from 1972 to 2003, Piazza concluded that state failure is a “consistent positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured or how terrorist attacks are sorted.”[30] He reinforced that claim in his 2008 article where a sample of 197 countries are tested from 1973 to 2003 to show that states experiencing intense failure are more likely to both be targeted by terrorists and to export terrorism to other countries.[31] Tikuisis analyzed the relationship between states on the 2006 and 2007 Failed State Index and incidents of fatal terrorist attacks and arrived at the conclusion that the link between weak states and fatal terrorism is unquestionable.[32] Newman made the argument that state weakness is only relevant in relation to terrorism when the nominal government is not tolerant of the terrorist organization operating within its borders. He used several different indexes of state failure to show that while the most destructive terrorist organizations indeed are located in weak or failed states, this cannot be explained by the conditions of weakness or failure since most weak or failed states do not exhibit significant terrorist activity.[33] A statistical analysis of fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa concluded that factors such as the lack of security, corrupt state authority, lack of essential public goods, and the inability to protect private property significantly increased the likelihood of citizens supporting the use of political violence; but it also failed to show that ungoverned territory, or the absence of the state, leads to increase in political violence.[34] In fact, it has been argued that the prioritization of the need to exert positive control over territory leads to approaches that are more military in nature, which in turn can cause a downward spiral of state failure.[35] Coggins analyzed the 1999–2008 period and generally concluded that counterterrorism efforts in failed states should concentrate on those experiencing violent political instability rather than those failing due to human security or state capacity issues.[36] Hehir paired foreign terrorist organizations with data from the Failed State Index to show that out of the top 20 most failed states in 2006 only Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan exhibited a notable presence of foreign terrorist organizations, while 13 states in that group contained none; also, out of 31 states that contained more than one foreign terrorist organization, only 3 appeared in the top 20 of the 2006 Failed State Index.[37] A quantitative analysis of 2008 using terrorism data from the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, University of Maryland) center and the Failed State Index by Plummer voiced the opinion that root causes of terrorism, as well as those of state failure, were complex, and other factors, country history being one of them, needed to be taken into consideration when attempting to establish a relationship between state failure and terrorism,[38] or we risk employing a wide range of policies based on “anecdotal evidence or isolated examples.”[39]

Accounting for Differences in Conclusions

A persistent problem when attempting to establish a link between state failure and terrorism is the question of what exactly qualifies a state as failed. This issue is made additionally problematic by the introduction of failure modifiers; a state may also be labeled weak, fragile, failing or collapsed. Such choice of words implicitly suggests a kind of a continuum of failure. However, as state failure is a complex phenomenon made up of a number of indicators, but most often ultimately presented as a single score, the usefulness of comparing states according to their ranking in any of the available failure indexes is questionable. The Fragile States Index (formerly Failed
States Index) combines social, political and economic indicators to create a list of countries categorized under “Very High Alert” on the negative to “Very Sustainable” on the positive end of the spectrum, again suggesting a continuum of fragility.[40] This kind of simplification can be problematic when used for drawing conclusions about state failure and terrorism, as most failed states vary significantly with regard to levels of terrorism.[41] The variations in definitions of terrorism, itself a contentious point, create additional points of divergence.

A very cursory comparison of the Fragile States Index (FSI) and START’s Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for the year 2013 immediately highlights some of the problems that occur when attempting to relate fragility and exposure to terrorism, especially in a linear fashion. The country with the worst FSI score was South Sudan, while it took 20th place on the GTI, and even that is somewhat misleading as its GTI score was almost half the score of Iraq, the state most affected by terrorism in 2013. India was ranked 6th on the GTI, with Philippines, Thailand and Russia taking places from 9 to 11, respectively; the same countries ranked 81st, 52nd, 80th and 85th on the FSI.[42] Of course, the FSI and the GTI are far from being the only sources used for quantitative research on the relationship between failed states and terrorism, and the choice of the source may have some influence on the conclusions, along with the choice of what to focus on when performing the research and how to weigh and present the results. In 2013, Thailand suffered 332 recorded incidents of terrorism, while Nigeria suffered 303; but when the numbers of total fatalities are compared, the ratio is 131 in Thailand as opposed to 1,826 in Nigeria, thus creating a significantly different impression of the actual impact on terrorism on those two countries.[43] It is left to the author to decide what indicators he/she will use, and this decision can be another subject of contention. For example, Tikuisis criticized Newman’s choice to use the presence of major terrorist groups in a given country when analyzing its connection to terrorism and opted for occurrences of fatal terrorism incidents in that country as a better indicator.[44] Because of such divergencies, it is essential to place studies on the relationship between weak states and terrorism in proper context.

The relationship between terrorism and war is one important example of a potential risk of drawing the wrong conclusions. A state experiencing civil war, ethnic conflict, armed revolution or violent political instability is likely to suffer acts of terrorism used as a tactical tool.[45] Approximately 72 percent of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2012 occurred within countries during periods of major conflict.[46] At the same time, such states are also likely to be categorized as failed, either because of the violence itself or because of the combination of violence and other commonly used indicators. However, if that violence is not clearly named as the principal source of terrorism, there is a risk of coming to a conclusion that all forms of state failure increase the risk of terrorism.

“Fixing” Failed States in Order to Counter Terrorism

How do attempts to “fix” failed states relate to counterterrorism? Existing data suggests that using nation-building as the principal counterterrorism tool may be not only ineffective, but also counterproductive. The idea that a hitherto fragile state can be made unappealing to terrorist organizations by transforming it into a liberal democracy, either by physical intervention or through a strong external influence on local actors, is not supported by evidence, and many such efforts have proven to be problematic at best.

If counterterrorism is the only or principal motive for action, costly and complex nation-building undertakings seem to be an excessive waste of resources, even under the assumption that such an approach will eventually accomplish the stated objective. Direct action taken against terrorists has shown to be significantly more effective,[47] and such operations are usually made simpler by the absence of a fully sovereign state. The unilateral action by the US during the 2011 Operation Neptune Spear caused tensions in the US-Pakistan relations because Pakistan perceived its sovereignty to be violated.[48] On the other hand, counterterrorism operations in failed states, especially within ungoverned territories, such as the US-targeted assassination of Al Qaeda ringleader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in southern Somalia, carry little risk of significant political complications.[49]

Furthermore, as it has been mentioned previously, transitional periods from conditions of failure or
Authoritarian regimes to democracy have shown to be particularly prone to violence, including terrorism. Fukuyama admitted that the problem with weak states is insufficient local demand for change and conceded that in many cases interventions have made the situation worse.[50] This risk appears particularly high with large-scale interventions, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when the ensuing power vacuum facilitated internal violent struggles with heavy use of terrorist tactics. There are, however, indicators that state-strengthening can be a potentially effective counterterrorism approach in specific situations when existing government structures are genuinely committed to and engaged in counterterrorism efforts and the threat of terrorism is obvious, but there is a lack of operational capacity.[51]

Also, existing data indicate that, from a purely practical standpoint, cultivating liberal democratic regimes is perhaps not the optimal course of action if counterterrorism is indeed the main objective of intervention. Such regimes have proven to be more vulnerable to terrorism because of internal constraints on the scope of available counterterrorism tools and present a generally more permissive environment.[52] It seems that authoritarian states are in fact better equipped to deal with terrorism.[53] Major terrorist groups gravitate towards weak states with a better human rights record and economic performance.[54] Piazza’s analysis of 19 states in the MENA region suggested that regimes that are more dictatorial are more resilient to terrorism than those demonstrating greater liberalism.[55] His research on a wider set of countries also concluded that transnational terrorism is more likely to occur in, and be produced by, newer regimes and by economically more developed countries with higher standards of living and literacy rates.[56] This, of course, is not meant to suggest that cultivation of or support for dictatorships is in any way justifiable for counterterrorism (or any other) purposes.

Another unintended—although not entirely unexpected—side effect of interventions into failed states for purposes of counterterrorism may in fact be an increased risk of terrorism at home. It seems that the very tendency of democracies to get involved in issues of other states, particularly conflicts, increases the risk of acts of terrorism being perpetrated against the intervening country.[57] This is mostly because intervention in a conflict usually results in at least one side taking offence. And international partnerships against terrorism may be double-edged swords: a military alliance with the US increased a country’s transnational terrorism incidence rate by 179%.[58] Interventions are also used by terrorists as a tool for recruitment and as a justification for attacks, as can be seen in the document attributed to Osama bin Laden where Somalia is used as an example of the West attacking a Muslim land, thus supplying the cause for retaliation/defense.[59] This would suggest that refraining from interventions into failed states experiencing violent conflict might actually be a reasonable policy for many developed countries in terms of terrorism prevention.

At the same time, it does appear that terrorism and state failure are mutually reinforcing phenomena. The presence of violent non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, has a snowball effect on state fragility; as a state sinks deeper into failure, the number and influence of such groups tend to increase.[60] A large number of refugees and high youth unemployment—common indicators of state fragility—create an environment conducive to terrorism,[61] while terrorism reinforces state failure by making “wars more difficult to resolve and more likely to recur.”[62] State fragility in post-invasion Iraq was arguably a key factor enabling the creation of what would later become the Islamic State,[63] and the Islamic State has in turn become a key contributor to the perpetuation of that fragility.

Failed States, Counterterrorism and Interventionism

As securitization of states labeled as failed takes place in politics and the media, an increasing number of authors question not only the underlying assumptions, many of which have already been demonstrated as problematic, but also the political motives of those doing the labeling. A major critique aimed at using the failed state label is that it conflates being a failure and merely being different from what is envisaged as an ideal—“the classic European state.”[64] This view of what states should look and function like is supported by what Verhoeven calls “the Orthodox Failed States Narrative”—the idea that failed states present an unwanted by-product of globalization and an obstacle in the path of the liberal democratic order working towards global
peace. State failure diagnosis is generally based on a Realist framework: the state is about power, and failure is the lack of power to exert control, be it over territory, population or instruments of coercion.[65] Non-standard states make the international system uncomfortable, as it does not know how to deal with such entities.[66] The failed state label, and the sometimes occurring term “collapsed state” even more so, seem to suggest that the phenomenon in question is of local origin; it implicitly assumes that there is no blame to be assigned to external actors.[67] It also isolates the failed state and removes its decision-making autonomy, rendering it dependent on “functioning” states,[68] thereby providing a level of credibility to an outside intervention as a potential remedy.

Examples of Afghanistan and Somalia are sometimes used to illustrate the flexibility with which the failed state label is applied, as well as potential implications. Ever since the 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan has played a central role in the War on Terrorism—failed state discourse.[69] Some authors consider Afghanistan under the Taliban both a failed state and a threat to the US, though admitting that it was a rarity as such.[70] However, others question exactly to what extent that held true in practice, given that the US government conducted business-related discussions with the Taliban almost until the 2001 attacks.[71] This highlights the issue of “failed” versus “different” states, and brings to the fore the idea that the use of the failed state label may in fact be primarily based on whether the state in question is perceived as a threat to Western security and interests.[72] In Somalia, the failed state rhetoric “became actionable” with the emergence of a unifying Islamic force, the Union of Islamic Courts, an actor that in fact made some progress towards establishing order. Yet it has been suggested that, because the emerging order in Somalia resembled Afghanistan under the Taliban in the eyes of the US, its status was elevated to that of a threat to international security.[73]

When presented as an international security threat, failed states are usually mentioned as potential breeding grounds or sanctuaries for transnational terrorist organizations. If such reasoning is accepted by the public, a specific failed state (or failed states in general) can be securitized to the point where an intervention, including a preventative one, is perceived as a legitimate act of self-defense.[74] This is made easier by the fact that the War on Terror is already securitized by the media.[75] The threat of terrorism can be used to securitize the concept of state failure, which can then be applied to states deviating from the expected standard, effectively providing the tool for instant securitization, as the securitizing agent is spared from having to make the “failure as a security threat” move for every particular instance of state failure. This is additionally facilitated by the broadness of the failure concept that allows for a very arbitrary application. As the failed states—terrorism connection becomes more intuitively accepted by the broader public, it becomes possible to expand the range of potential candidates for intervention to entire regions, even continents; Abrahamsen argues that the entire continent of Africa is becoming increasingly securitized in Western political speech.[76] Many post-colonial states have always fit the broad definition of failure: their governments were never fully in control of their territory, had no monopoly on violence, they have failed to provide economic security for their citizens and sometimes threatened the security of neighboring countries, but were not labelled as failed until it suited the international community.[77] Such examples make it difficult not to raise the question whether the application of a failed state label is sometimes merely a pretext to generate support for foreign interventions.[78]

The majority of fatalities and injuries from acts of terrorism are not a result of transnational terrorist operations carried out by actors arriving from failed states[79]—it is states of origin that suffer most. In 2013 Iraq accounted for 35.4% of all deaths by terrorism in that year, followed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria, for a cumulative total of 82% or 14,722 lives in that year.[80] For comparison, over the same time period the total number of fatalities due to acts of terrorism in the European Union was seven.[81] Much of the terrorism in weak states remains confined to their territory and is perpetrated by organizations motivated by grievances of local origin, such as FARC in Colombia.[82] Additionally, international terrorists do not come predominantly or even significantly from failed states,[83] and it should be noted that recent developments have turned the threat of transnational terrorism around—Western countries exported more terrorists to Syria and Iraq than vice versa.[84] This also can be framed as a threat with roots in the failed states themselves: it is the failed state that is the source of radicalization aimed at citizens of more stable countries, providing them with skills and experience that could at a later time be used against their country of origin. Therefore, it could be argued that,
once successfully securitized, failed states can be shown as threatening instead of being threatened even in situations when the direction of terrorism flow is clearly reversed.

**Conclusion**

Due caution should be exercised when presenting either counterterrorism as an additional benefit of state-building or the inverse in an attempt to garner additional support for an intervention into a state labeled as failed. As discussed, counterterrorism and state-building do not necessarily go hand in hand, and the optimal effort to achieve one objective might quite possibly be to the detriment of the other. Placing countries in the context of experiencing failure as a terrorism risk does little to contribute to the solving of their development problems, and may make their situation worse for a number of reasons, not least of which is providing external and internal actors with access to means normally considered unacceptable.[85] The securitized status of failed states leaves them vulnerable not only to presumably well-intentioned international interventions gone wrong but, as was the case with Somalia, to exploitation of that status by their immediate neighbors: Ethiopia used the situation in Somalia to gain support for military intervention and accompanying actions that did little to make Somalia a more secure or stable state.[86]

State failure is a complex issue, and broad generalizations of the relationship between it and terrorism should be avoided, not least because of the policy implications that necessarily follow. The War on Terror in the context of state failure can appear to be one of the “candidates for control of the developing world”,[87] given that it allows the use of selective sovereignty violations for purposes of counterterrorism or terrorism prevention.[88] Because it may appear tempting, policy-wise, to uncritically invoke the threat of terrorism to gain access to options that would otherwise be inaccessible in dealing with certain states, it is to be expected that state failure will continue to be conflated with terrorism risk, both in the media and in strategic documents (though the wording itself will likely be somewhat less decisive than the one used in the first decade of the War on Terror, as more experts continue to voice their concern and additional data highlighting the problems with generalizations on failed states and terrorism come to the fore). But even if questionable ethics behind such approaches are not taken into consideration, available data and experience suggests a much higher degree of caution should be exercised when dealing with the subject of state failure and terrorism than has been the case this far.

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**Notes**


A Broad Spectrum of Signs of Islamist Radicalisation and Extremism in a Country without a Single Terrorist Attack: The Case of Slovenia

by Iztok Prezelj & Klemen Kocjancic

Abstract

Studies in radicalisation, extremism and terrorism generally focus on the most visible and dangerous groups or attacks, frequently leaving smaller cases overlooked. This article looks at the case of one country that has no publicly known terrorist group and has not experienced a single terrorist attack (Slovenia) and shows that this ‘non-case’ is actually an example of a very broad spectrum of basic and supportive forms of Islamist extremism. The article identifies and studies instances of the transit of foreign Islamists, their finances and arms, provides examples of local foreign fighters and their return, identifies NGOs with radical agendas and attempts at recruitment, as well as threats made to local authorities, training under the cover of a social event, the deportation of extremists, and a foiled terrorist attack. Most of these indicators are linked to Jihadi and Islamist sources of power based in Bosnia. Overlooking and underestimating cases like Slovenia could have serious consequences in terms of prevention and preparedness.

Keywords: Islamist radicalisation, extremism, jihadism, recruitment, terrorism, foreign fighters, training, foiled attack, Slovenia, Balkans

Introduction

The goal of this article is to explore the forms and the spectrum of Islamist radicalisation faced by an EU member state that has not had a single successful terrorist attack on its soil and where no officially recognised terrorist group is actively working against the country. Researchers and analysts normally study cases with the most visible problems (terrorism and radicalisation in our case), yet it sometimes makes sense to look at—and perhaps learn also from—cases where the problem is less apparent.

Why is such an approach relevant? The existing literature generally focuses on big and better-known terrorist attacks or countries associated with a confirmed and long-standing threat by terrorist and radical groups. Academic and policy communities are thus learning from the worst examples, while forgetting that they might only represent the extreme edge of the overall problem. There is a gap in the literature with respect to less-developed cases and smaller European countries that do not have terrorist groups or large-scale terrorist attacks. This gap is problematic because the threat brought by Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is a global phenomenon that is able to migrate from places with tougher counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism measures to places with fewer obstacles. Such a shift has already been seen with organised criminal groups in Europe (for example from Italy to Slovenia). Another problem is that such countries might be less prepared to face threats from Islamist terrorism and thereby become the weakest link in a preventive chain of measures.

The risk of terrorism and radicalisation is unevenly spread across Europe. Our overview of all Europol’s TE-SAT reports between 2007 and 2019 suggests they chiefly concentrate on countries with significant numbers of successful, failed or foiled terrorist attacks, such as France, the UK, Spain and also countries with smaller yet still considerable numbers like Ireland, Germany, Greece, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Slovenia is clearly one of the countries mentioned the least in the TE-SAT reports, it is mostly associated with zeros in tables, while two reports do not even mention it at all (TE-SAT 2012 and TE-SAT 2013).[1]. However, this does not mean that Islamist radicalisation is not present or increasing in Slovenia. It does exist. If this seemingly ‘non-case’ is actually a case and this can be proven, then we have a problem with counterterrorism. In this article, we argue that the spectrum of Islamist radicalisation and related activities can be surprisingly broad.
in a state without a single active Islamist terrorist group or a completed terrorist attack. For countries with a fully developed extremist and terrorist threat, one could expect numerous indicators such as the existence of organised terrorist groups, terrorist attacks on people and infrastructure, kidnappings or hostage-takings, the manufacture, possession, transport, supply or use of explosives and weapons, including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, the release of dangerous substances, or illegal data interference and seizures of aircraft, ships or other forms of transport. One could also expect instances of recruitment for terrorism, providing and receiving training, travelling and organising travelling for the purpose of terrorism (e.g. foreign fighters), public provocations to commit a terrorist offence, financing of extremist and terrorist activities and other support activities.\[2\] In addition, mature radicalisation towards the use of violence may be anticipated to include several cases of individuals or groups undergoing the complex process of transforming their beliefs, feelings and behaviours, \[3\] examples of dangerous converts to Islam and of aggressive civilian Islamists who make political arguments to impose their radical vision on the political regime and society.\[4\] The whole situation becomes even more complicated with indicators of foreign fighters returning to their home countries.\[5\]

In order to assess the example of Slovenia, we used the case study method while also strongly relying on media analysis. The following methodological steps were used in the article's empirical part. First, we conducted a pilot scan of various national media sources and created an initial list of cases of Islamist radicalisation (such as those associated with the aforementioned indicators). This list was sent to the Slovenian Criminal Police Directorate and its Counterterrorism and Extreme Violence Section for confirmation or to suggest other cases. The final list of cases was reduced to basic key words, such as the names of key actors, events and institutions that were used as search words in the database of the Slovenian Press Agency (STA) and two national newspapers—Delo and Dnevnik. In most cases, other media were also searched.

We analysed all cases with respect to the following variables (if feasible due to the specific nature of cases): 1. Radicalisation actors (identification of individuals or groups in the process of radicalisation); 2. Description of key events that indicate radicalisation, including the time framework (chronology); 3. Goals of actors; 4. The content of radicalisation (description of the transformation of perceptions, norms, deeds/actions); 5. Contacts of the radicalising/radicalised actor with other relevant actors in the home country or abroad; 6. The broader social context of radicalisation (does the case reflect broader polarisation in society, anything relevant for understanding the case).

**Terrorist Threats and Islamist Radicalisation in an ‘Overlooked’ Country**

Some countries are not only ignored by scholars writing on terrorism and extremism, but are obviously also largely ignored by Islamist terrorists and extremists. Slovenia is such a country. This is not surprising; the terrorist threat in general and more specifically the Islamist terrorist threat has developed unevenly across Europe. While serious terrorist attacks have taken place in some European countries and other indicators have been rising, Slovenia has not been mentioned much in international political and media circles. The country has only seen bizarre situations like the European parliamentary debate on Slovenia’s accession to the EU during 2003 and 2004 when one Spanish MEP stressed that Slovenia could not become a member whilst it appeared to be harbouring elements of the ETA terrorist organisation. A well-established, successful Slovenian food producer called “Eta” had started selling goods in the EU market and the Spanish were unable to digest this name. Accordingly, the company Eta was forced to change the brand name of all products to “Natureta” before Slovenia joined the EU in 2004.\[6\]

The official terrorist threat level in Slovenia has always been low, with the general security situation in the country since its independence in 1991 being very stable. Slovenia’s national security strategies suggest the biggest threat to national security in the 1990s was military in nature (due to unresolved national, political, military and economic problems among the states of former Yugoslavia, potential retaliatory attempts to restore borders and the revival of crises in wider Europe).\[7\] The perception then shifted to ‘new’ and ‘dynamic’ non-military threats and risks. After 2000, decision-makers perceived military threats in South-East Europe (SEE)
as only indirectly affecting Slovenian national security. In 2010, a broad spectrum of nonmilitary threats, such as climate change, terrorism and challenges to public safety etc., was well recognised by the government, whereas hybrid threats related to Russia are stressed in a recently adopted document. Crime levels have always been low in Slovenia relative to other countries. Consequently, the public has also never seen terrorism as a great threat. In fact, public opinion polls conducted by the University of Ljubljana before and after 9/11 show that the Slovenian public regarded terrorism as one of the smallest threats, somewhere close to the military threat from other states.

As suggested by the above text, Slovenia is not simply overlooked by analysts, but even by terrorists themselves. One question arises: why has there been no terrorism (terrorist groups and attacks) in Slovenia? First, some terrorism is associated with colonial and post-colonial relations, like is the case with the UK and France. Slovenia has neither been a coloniser nor been violently colonised, for example by the Austro-Hungarian empire. Secondly, the country is ethnically and religiously relatively homogenous. According to the last census from 2002, the population consists of 83.04% Slovenes, 1.98% Serbians, 1.81% Croatians, 0.53% Muslims, etc. In terms of religious composition, 69.1% of the population was Catholic, 1.1% Evangelical, 0.6% Orthodox Christian and 0.6% Muslim. Interreligious relations mostly occur without any serious conflicts. The Muslim minority in Slovenia has never been considerable. Bosniak immigrants are regarded as relatively moderate Muslims due to the impact of the former socialist Yugoslavia. The influx of Muslim migrants into Europe in recent years also reveals that upon arriving they mostly do not want to remain in Slovenia and wish to move on to other Western countries. At last, but not at least, Slovenia is not really exposed in any conflict with a Muslim country abroad (although it has soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq). Al Qaeda and ISIS have had more attractive targets in Europe than Slovenia.

Still, our careful examination of several smaller events shows the country is in fact not any kind of safe harbour protected from Islamist and other extremists. After Slovenia achieved its independence in 1991, some plans were uncovered of the Yugoslav People's Army to conduct a few terrorist attacks on the electrical infrastructure with the aim to create instability in Slovenia as a pretext for some retaliatory military intervention in Slovenia. Our overview of Europol TE-SAT reports finds Slovenia being mentioned a couple of times. It was mentioned as a potential logistical base for Islamist terrorists (together with Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Finland) and as a transit country for terrorists trying to enter EU countries (along with Romania and Estonia). With the emergence of the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria, Slovenia was mentioned (together with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, BiH, Serbia, Bulgaria, Italy and Greece) as a popular land route for fighters going from the EU to Turkey. A branch of the Sharia 4 movement was reported to exist in Slovenia (also in Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Slovenia was also mentioned in relation to two arrested terrorist suspects in 2018 and two court verdicts (one in 2015, the other in 2016). Europol also mentioned Slovenia in terms of a new trend of converting marginalised individuals from the Roma community, although it was believed the Roma's main motivation has been financial (they were allegedly given money to convert).

This all suggests that Slovenia might not be that different from other smaller European countries. It is necessary to place this case in the context of other smaller European countries. Europe in general was the target of terrorists of Muslim origin in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. the attack by Black September on Israeli athletes at the Summer Olympic Games in 1972 in Munich or Libya’s state-sponsored terrorism in 1988 by exploding a bomb on Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie). A series of Islamist terrorist bomb attacks was launched in 1995 in the French capital of Paris by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Al Qaeda’s attack on 11 September 2001 in the United States was followed by deadly attacks in Spain (the 2004 Madrid train bombing that caused 193 deaths) and in the United Kingdom (the 2005 London bombings that killed 52 people). After the Islamic State was established in Syria and Iraq, a new wave of Islamist terrorism swept over Europe: France, the UK, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Spain, and Turkey were, among others, targeted. As a result, most Islamist terrorism-related studies have considered these countries and not other European countries facing a lower level of threat, such as the Czech Republic and Finland. In Bulgaria, which has the highest share of Muslims among all European Union countries, research has focused on the threat brought by religious extremism, based
on “ideas of Islamization, which come straight from Turkey.”[19] The lack of Islamist extremism in Bulgaria is also connected to both the absence of factors like a colonial past and high immigration as well as the successful integration of Bulgarian Muslims into the mainly Orthodox Christian society.[20] Nevertheless, there was a case of 13 imams preaching radical Islam in illegal mosques.[21] On the other hand, some smaller countries in South-East Europe face quite substantial radicalisation. Bosnia was exposed to a strong wave of radicalisation during and especially after the war in the 1990s.[22] Kosovo witnessed a considerable number of radicals travelling as foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. The local literature has largely focused on the problem of foreign fighters and the drivers of violent extremism.[23]

Immigration appeared as a very important factor in studies of radicalisation and terrorism, especially following the Syria-induced migration crisis of 2015. In Norway, a study was conducted on a typology of Jihadi militant networks, entailing five different archetypes: “militant exiles”, “diasporic support networks”, “militant visitors”, “attack cells” and “homegrown extremists”.[24] Homegrown terrorism and extremism also became a popular research subject when more and more European-born Muslims accepted the Jihadi ideology and became radicalised. For example, the Danish Ministry of Justice identified both background factors (Muslim identity crisis, discrimination and deprivation, segregation and parallel society, lack of Muslim public debate on terrorism), and trigger factors (foreign policy, myth of Jihadism and activism, a charismatic leader or advisor) which, combined with opportunity factors (social media, prisons, mosques, schools and other establishments), had led to radicalisation in Denmark. This could then lead to further radicalisation abroad and exacerbate the problem of European “foreign fighters”.[25] Converts to Islam (also to Islamism or Islamist radicalism) are a special group of homegrown terrorists. Belgian and Dutch research suggests that their converts were all in their teens or twenties, came from lower- or lower-middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds with a low or medium level of education, combined with a problematic childhood and adolescence, the use of alcohol and drugs and some involvement with criminal activity.[26] After the decline/defeat of the Islamic State, Europe has had to deal with the major security problem of returning foreign fighters and how to treat them, which de-radicalisation programmes to use, etc.[27] Some research has also attempted to differentiate violent and nonviolent Salafism, as in the case of the Netherlands, and examined the connection between terrorists and diasporas.[28] In other countries (like Portugal), the presence of Jihadists without specific terrorist activities was detected, etc.[29] All signs from the Slovenian case, however weak they might be, should, directly or indirectly, relate to the European context described above.

**The Spectrum of Islamist Radicalisation and Extremism in Slovenia**

In the empirical part of our research, we were looking for all indicators of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism (as described in the introduction) in Slovenia. We established that the forms of Islamist radicalisation and extremism and associated activities in Slovenia arise from it being: (1) a transit country for foreign Islamists, their finances and arms; (2) a place for the radicalisation of certain Slovenian citizens and their departure for Syria, including their return; (3) a place in which some NGOs are active in defending, promoting and supporting extremist Islam(ism) and introducing Sharia law into Slovenia; (4) an area where members of the Roma minority have been recruited for Jihad; (5) a place of unattributed threats to a local mayor to force him to build a mosque and convert to Islam; (6) a place where social events were likely used as a cover for the training of Islamists; (7) an area in which an attempted terrorist attack in the capital city was foiled; and (8) a country from where Islamist extremists have been deported. All of these forms are reflected in relatively weak indicators that were collected by the authors of this article. These indicators appeared in isolation and we seek to connect them here to provide a more comprehensive overview of the situation facing the country.

**A Transit Country for Islamists, Funding and Arms**

Terrorist groups fulfil their transnational agenda by moving people, money and weapons across land, air and maritime borders. Slovenia has been used as a transit country by various Islamist groups in this regard.
After 9-11, Slovenian authorities arrested a suspected terrorist travelling from France to the Balkans.[30] In November 2016, during a routine check on a train, Slovenian police came across three people without identification documents. The three men provided false information and it was later revealed that all three had been involved in terrorist activities in France and that European warrants for them had been issued. According to French media, the three men were on their way to Syria. Perhaps the best-known case came with the migrant crisis in 2015. In early September 2016, CNN reported that at least four Islamic state attackers in the Paris attacks in 2015 had travelled along the Balkan route to Austria.[31] In late September 2016, the president of the Slovenian parliamentary committee on intelligence and security services confirmed that during the mass migration crisis (in 2015) eight terrorists had crossed Slovenian territory. Two of them were directly involved in the 2015 Paris attacks, while others were arrested in Austria or Germany.[32] Subsequently, the European Union adopted more resolute measures to manage the migration flows.[33]

On 21 October 2010, Slovenian police officers in Dobrovnik encountered two foreign citizens (a 25-year-old man and a 24-year-old woman) dressed in typical Muslim clothes and without any identification documents. They were detained and escorted to the police station where it was revealed they were both German citizens and that a European search warrant had been issued for the man. He was Gabriel Kruse, a German professional soldier who had converted to Islam just before his planned departure on a German mission in Afghanistan. Kruse was sought for his involvement in recruiting for terrorist organisations. He was brought before a judge who ordered him to be detained for 30 days, while the woman (who had a machete in her possession) was released and directed to leave for Austria. On 26 October 2010, this woman was once again spotted in Slovenia. During the ensuing police procedure, she attacked police officers with an axe and damaged a police vehicle. She was arrested and put in prison. During these two encounters, both were wearing traditional Muslim garb and had a Quran in their possession. The man was later turned over to German authorities. In July 2012, Slovenian police again arrested the same woman and the following week also the man. While being arrested, Kruse attacked several police officers with a knife. The Slovenian police had been informed of their presence in Slovenia by the Austrian police, which was investigating a string of robberies/burglaries in Austria. The pair had been hiding in forests in Slovenia while trying to obtain funds to travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina where they wished to join a Salafi group. This couple was using Slovenia as a transit and logistical space on their way to Bosnia. Their movement was obviously financed from burglaries and robberies. This case did not receive much media attention.[34]

Slovenia has been used as a transit country for supplies of weapons and explosives, especially after the end of the Balkan wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia. It was initially believed that the explosives used in the two largest terrorist attacks in Europe (Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005) had a Balkan origin and, knowing the modus operandi of the Balkan smuggling route, it was likely they were smuggled through Slovenia.[35] Yet these hypotheses were later rejected by investigators in both cases. It was, however, confirmed based on their serial numbers that the M-70 rifles used in the November 2015 Paris attack had been smuggled from Slovenia (or from Bosnia or Macedonia via Slovenia) and that weapons and some ammunition used in the Charlie Hebdo attack came from Croatia, Republika Srpska and Serbia.[36]

Slovenia has also been used as a transit country for financial transactions. In October 2001, Slovenian media reported that a Tunisian citizen Shafik Ayadi had received US $500,000 in April 1996 in a private bank account set up with SAB Banka in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The money originated from Salem bin Mahfuz, a representative of the International Islamic Relief Organisation, and his bank account with the Slovenian bank SKB. Ayadi was running an organisation called Moafak, which was actually a front company for Osama bin Laden. Ayadi was put on the list of persons and companies with frozen assets in the UK and the USA for having alleged connections with Al Qaida.[37] In March 2015, the Slovenian police in Maribor found an excavator that had been stolen on 20 February in Croatia and then transported to Slovenia. Two suspects, caught by the Croatian police, admitted they were planning to sell the excavator “in the area controlled by the Islamic State extremists.”[38]

Between 2008 and 2010, another case, most likely connected with the financing of terrorism, occurred in Slovenia. In December 2008, an Iranian businessman with ties to Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts opened a
bank account with Slovenia's largest bank (NLB). Soon, large sums of money started to arrive in this account (up to 50 transfers per day); monthly deposits reached up to EUR 70 million and, by the end of 2010, up to EUR 900 million. In March 2009, bank employees notified their superiors of suspicious transactions and several foreign banks started to decline money transfers from this NLB account. It was only in December 2010 that NLB shut the account down after the central bank (Bank of Slovenia) demanded immediate action due to a suspicion of money laundering and financing of terrorism. The money in the NLB account came from two Iranian banks (via another Iranian company) which at the time were both already under a US and EU embargo, while the money was sent on to over 9,000 accounts around the world. A special parliamentary investigation committee found that this could have not taken place without the knowledge of certain high-level officials in Slovenia. One interpretation was that in this way somebody had been supporting terrorism.[39]

**Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq**

The number of Slovenian foreign fighters in Syria was small in comparison with other, larger European countries. It is believed that around 10 people from Slovenia have fought for ISIS. Some basic elements of their stories are provided below. Slovenian foreign fighters were connected to a recruiting network based in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 24 September 2014, Slovenian media reported that the police had carried out two search operations on properties in Ljubljana and Vrhnika. The subject of the search warrants was Bostjan Skubic, one of several Slovenian citizens who had joined Islamist extremists in the fight in Syria. The police found and seized automatic weapons, ammunition and a rocket launcher. While Skubic was charged with the illegal possessions of weapons, he was released. The media later reported that the cause of the searches in Slovenia was Operation Damascus in Bosnia and Herzegovina that led to the arrest of Bilal Bosnic, one of the main recruiters and ideological heads of Islamist extremism in the area of former Yugoslavia. Among the seized evidence, Bosnian police had discovered information related to Skubic, which was turned over to the Slovenian police. Reporters also noted that the Slovenian Security and Intelligence Agency (SOVA) was monitoring around 15 people at that time, including Slovenian converts to Islam and Slovenian citizens with roots in the former Yugoslavia.[40]

Another reason for the search warrants was that Skubic was an employee of the Fenolit chemical factory located in Breg pri Borovnici. It was here that police officers from Vrhnika handcuffed him and searched his automobile. The search then continued in the neighbourhood, where they seized a rocket launcher. Under a pillow they also found two envelopes containing a significant sum of money. While searching his garden shed, an automatic assault rifle and six full magazines were discovered. He apparently gave the excuse that he had bought the weapon several years before when the black market was awash with cheap weapons from the Balkan wars.[41]

On the next day the media reported that, along with two previously identified Slovenian foreign fighters (Skubic and Rok Zavbi), at least three others (Jure Korelec, Rok Sogoric and Matevz Cvetkovic) had been recruited by or through Bosniak Bilal Bosnic. An important role in their recruitment was also supposedly played by Senad Celakovic, who frequently visited Slovenia. Celakovic was apparently subordinated to Nusret Imamovic, who had a supervisory role over the recruiting.[42]

On 29 September, Zavbi denied that he had fought on the side of Islamic State extremists and claimed that he went to Syria “with the intention of helping as a medic in the resistance against the cruel regime of Syrian president Bashar al Assad.” At that time, he was an unemployed medical technician. He also stated that he had travelled to Syria at his own expense and on his own initiative and that he had not been recruited by Bosnic. He claimed he had met Bosnic “coincidentally, as a tourist” while visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was in Syria between June and September 2013 and then left the country due to disagreements and fighting among the rebel groups: “The thing became somewhat too ridiculous”, he added.[43]

On 30 September 2014, the media reported on the first Slovenian casualty during the war in Syria and Iraq.
A 29-year-old Slovenian convert, Jure Korelec from Zgornja Senica near Medvode, had been killed while fighting alongside Islamist extremists. After his conversion, he apparently used the name Yusuf (Slovenian: Jusuf). Three years before his death, Korelec had left home and limited all contacts with his family and friends. Reporters discovered that in July 2013 Korelec and four other Slovenian Islamist extremists had left Slovenia for Syria through Turkey. The group comprised Korelec, Rok Zavbi, Bostjan Skubic, Rok Sogoric and Matevz Cvetkovic. The four others came home after one month in Syria. Sogoric told media 24ur.com that he had only been once in Syria (in 2012) after he had converted and had never fought.[44] Another media company reported that Sogoric had established the Nur Foundation for Culture, Education and Training from Ljubljana, which strongly supported the ideology of the Islamic State.[45]

Reporters also claimed that their departure had been arranged by Nusret Imamovic from Bosnia and Herzegovina, considered to be one of the most dangerous foreign fighters and recruiters for Islamist terrorist groups. Imamovic was in the position to assign to which Islamist groups Slovenians would be included. At first, the Slovenian group was sent to the Al Nusra Front but was then relocated to the Islamic State. Korelec was involved in fighting for the Syrian city of Raqqa, where Dora Bilic (a Muslim woman from Zagreb, Croatia) was seriously wounded and Fatima Mahmutovic (a Muslim woman from BiH) was killed.[46] The case of Jure Korelec shows that he was searching for a new meaning in life after considerable problems with (unrequited) love. He found it in Islam. Where exactly the radicalisation occurred is unknown. However, the speed of his radicalisation was surprising because in the course of one year he found and accepted a new religion, was radicalised and died while fighting for an Islamist terrorist organisation.

In October 2014, Zavbi gave a long interview for the weekly magazine Mladina. He stated: “I fought in Syria. If this had been revealed last September, when I returned, I would be a hero, a freedom fighter. Now I’m a terrorist. I’m being connected to the Islamic State.” While raised as a Christian, he had converted to Islam in 2011. His interest in world events increased and he then decided to travel to Syria to help Muslims: “Wherever there is Islam, it’s better.” He still claimed that he and Skubic had left for Syria on their own and established their own contacts with the rebels. During the entire interview, he defended the ideology of the Islamic State. He confirmed he had been given a weapon in Syria and that he had fought: “Of course I got a weapon, of course I fought and shot. I also completed basic training.” He declared that all groups had committed atrocities (mass killings): “Killings are done by everyone, the Geneva conventions aren’t followed, prisoners aren’t left to live.” In September, he and Skubic decided to return home. He claimed he had no contacts with his former colleagues (fighters), except immediately after returning to Slovenia.[47]

In May 2015, reporters obtained a photograph of Zavbi and Skubic dressed in military camouflage and each holding an automatic rifle. This was sufficient proof that both had been armed and had fought on the battlefield for the Islamic State. In early 2016, Skubic pleaded guilty and was sentenced.[48] On 6 May 2016, Zavbi was arrested by the Slovenian police in Ljubljana at a halal butcher shop where he had been working after returning from Syria. Italian authorities issued a European arrest warrant for him because investigators had proven that Zavbi had been communicating with Bosnic before, during and after the Syrian adventure.[49]

The website Kamnik.info reported that the 26-year-old Zavbi had grown up in an atheist family in the village of Psajnovica near Tuhijska dolina. He was not particularly sociable; after vocational high school he studied in Jesenice (a place in Slovenia with a large immigrant community from the Balkans). It was here that he began to lose his way and started to associate with radical Islamists. His family was surprised by the speed of his conversion and the fact he was socialising with “weird and suspicious people from the circle of religious extremists.”[50] He left for Syria without telling his family. After coming back, he lived at home and occasionally travelled abroad for a few days. He did not share the destinations of his trips with anyone. In April 2018, he was married but only under Islamic law in an unregistered Islamic prayer room located somewhere in Ljubljana. He had been introduced to his wife Mirza (from BiH) only one month before the wedding; they had only met in person three times.[51]

Despite objecting to the extradition, the Slovenian authorities turned him over to Italy where he was charged with the recruitment of fighters for the Islamic State. While waiting for the trial, he revealed that Bosnic trusted
him and had convinced him to go to Syria. He stated that in October 2012 he had begun to attend Islamist meetings, including some in the home of Nusret Imamovic, a leader of the Al Nusra Front. He also revealed that he had been in contact with Admir Abduloadi, a driver for Bosnic and Imamovic during their travels in Italy. Abduloadi also served as an intermediary for people wanting to go to Syria. Upon returning from Syria, he was once again contacted by Bosnic who sent him to the Italian province of Belluno. There he trained two fighters (Ismar Mesinovic and Minfer Karamalski) who later left for Syria; Mesinovic was killed in 2014, while Karamalski's whereabouts are unknown.[52]

On 11 April 2017, Zavbi was sent to prison for three years and four months by a court in Venice for recruiting fighters for the Islamic State. He was convicted alongside a 39-year-old Macedonian citizen, Ajhan Veapi, for the same crime. In March 2018, an appeals court reduced Zavbi’s sentence to two years, two months and 12 days because he had pleaded guilty and distanced himself from his actions. On 25 July 2018, he was released from prison and immediately expelled to Slovenia.[53] One day later, he and his father became involved in a physical conflict in front of their house with reporters from Planet TV who were trying to report on his return.

The above cases confirm that the network of Bosniak Bilal Bosnic was important in the process of radicalisation and recruitment. This network was chiefly composed of Bosniak extremists recruiting for different Islamist organisations in the countries of former Yugoslavia and other countries with a larger concentration of Muslims (Italy and Austria). Their main goal was to provide new recruits for the Islamic State and Al Nusra to fight in Syria or Iraq, while an auxiliary goal was to have returned fighters give training to new recruits. It is obvious that Korelec had converted to Islam prior to leaving for Syria due to “unrequited love”. Before leaving, he trained with Bilal Bosnic in Buzim and then left for Syria via Turkey. Similar drivers (unrequited love, rejection by a woman) and unemployment were established for Zavbi, who had become radicalised after meeting local Islamist extremists.

Activities of certain NGOs to Promote and Support Extremism

Several Slovenian media reports have covered the activities of some societies or NGOs that were promoting the introduction of sharia law in Slovenia, defending and promoting radical Islam, while not being affiliated with recognised Islamist religious groups. The most mentioned NGOs were El Iman and Ensarud-Din, which organised preaching by people “with personal connections with people in the Balkans who promoted violence against the West.”[54] These reports mostly refer to a network of Islamists existing between Austria and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These societies mostly operate(-d) in Jesenice in North Slovenia (close to the Austrian border) and in Ljubljana, the capital city. While their official purpose was to promote Islam and Arabic culture, the media linked them to the support and promotion of Islamist terrorism. How precisely they were operating was not revealed, but we may assume they have acted as a gatekeeper for the possible recruitment of extremists. Connections were documented between these organisations and known terrorists or terrorist supporters in Bosnia, Austria, and Italy. The most important is once again the connection with Husein Bilal Bosnic, who was convicted in BiH for publicly promoting terrorist activities and recruiting for a terrorist organisation. In January 2011, Bosnic was invited to Ljubljana to give a sermon upon the opening of an Islamic prayer room. Bosnic is considered one of the leaders, if not the highest leader, of an extreme Wahhabi community based in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[55]

The third-mentioned NGO was the Nur Society whose declared task is to inform the public about Arabic culture and the problems facing Muslims. Through their members, all three NGOs were connected to several (alleged) terrorist activities (foreign fighters, the ‘picnic of radicals’—see below). For example, Rok Sogoric, one of the founders of the Nur Society, had been fighting in Syria.

1. In November 2015, Bilal Bosnic was found guilty by a Bosnian court of several terrorism-related activities: promoting jihad, recruiting Bosnians to join and fight for the Islamic State in Syria and organising their trips to Syria (or Iraq). The court also found that at least six of Bosnic’s recruits from Bosnia had already died, while altogether at least 97 had left to fight. Bosnic, who was a musician in his early life and has four wives and 18 children, was sentenced to seven years in prison (while the prosecution wanted the maximum 20-year sentence). During the trial, it was revealed (by a former Bosnian foreign fighter in the ranks of the IS) that Bosnic was the only one who could approve a person to be sent to the battlefield. He financed his activities with money received from Arab countries (Spaic 2015).
Finally, Europol reported on the existence of a branch of the Sharia4 movement in Slovenia in 2012, 2013 and 2014.[56] The only publicly known case involving this movement concerns the desecration of a Catholic chapel at Smarna Gora hill, a popular hiking destination near Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. In early January 2017, three sides of the small chapel had writings in Arabic script, plus two more Latin-script messages, written on them: “Sharia 4 Slovenia” and “Allahu Akhbar”. [57]

**The Recruitment of Roma**

Europol released a report stating that the Slovenian police had “noted a new trend of attempted radicalisation of members of the Roma community.”[58] Indeed, a very unusual recruiting attempt was being conducted by Islamist radicals. Some members of the Roma community in north-eastern Slovenia were being paid by some Islamist extremists to convert to Islam and join the jihad. The very few Slovenian media reports that exist on this do not reveal who the recruiters were. However, it is clear that they were targeting the most vulnerable ethnic minority (Roma) in Slovenia who live in difficult economic and social circumstances. The recruiters may have wanted to exploit either their Slovenian (EU) passport that allows them unrestrained movement within the EU or their criminal ties. This attempt may be associated with a more general trend of increasing recruitment for the Islamic State's purposes in Europe.[59]

**Threats to the Local Authorities**

Since there is in Slovenia no terrorist group active against the government, we also do not know about any terrorist threats. However, some threats did emerge in a small provincial town. In 2015 and 2016, Bojan Kontic, the mayor of the Slovenian town of Velenje received three threatening letters. An anonymous writer (or writers) had sent the letters from Italy. All these letters contained a demand to build a mosque in Velenje with a 35-metre-high minaret and required that the mayor convert to Islam or otherwise be killed. The writer also stated that Slovenia would become an Islamic state in ten to 15 years. The letters were sent during the peak of the Islamic State's power in Syria and Iraq.[60] All of these letters were turned over to the police and Kontic did not view them as any real threat. The police investigation did not discover the culprit(s).

This case may be attributed to the forceful Islamisation and conversion to Islam that became a standard operating procedure for the Islamic State. It might also be connected to a large influx of foreign Muslims (particularly from Albania and Macedonia) in Velenje. As an industrial town, Velenje traditionally had an immigrant population, especially miners from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the past ten years, a considerable number of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia have settled there. This group does not integrate well in terms of learning the Slovenian language, causing extra pressure on the local authorities, kindergartens, schools and health institutions. In 2018, the mayor wrote a letter to the president of Slovenia, the prime minister and the president of the parliament in which he stressed the town's serious social, political and economic situation.[61]

**A ‘Picnic’ as a Possible Cover for Training**

In 2016, Slovenian media reported that on 19 April 2014 several radical Islamist extremists had met for a ‘picnic’ at the Korant Sport Centre in the village of Dol near Ljubljana. It was said that Salafist extremists had also come from the Austrian cities of Vienna and Graz. The centre was supposedly booked by the El Iman Society for the promotion of Islamic culture in Slovenia, which later denied having any connection with the ‘picnic’.

Media reports described the attendees as: Selman Omerovic, a friend with several members of the El Iman Society and the brother of Mirsad Omerovic (also known as Abu Tejma from Sandjak, BiH, a known recruiter of jihadists in Europe with contacts with Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and Bilal Bosnic), Halil Kasimoglu, Selman Tajroski, Arif Ademovski, Suad Racevic, members of the Durkan Islamic society from Graz, the Islamic theologian Alim Hasangic (from the Slovenian town of Jesenice). Salafists from Germany, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Austria
were also present, including women and children. According to the manager of the Korant Sport Centre, about 60–70 people were present, and this was just one of several such meetings. He stated that he had several times rented this property out to large Muslim groups and had no problems with them.[62]

This may have only been a meeting of a large group of Muslims to celebrate their children’s birthdays with accompanying sports activities. However, as the Austrian newspaper Die Presse argued, this was likely a cover for covert ideological and shooting training of Islamist extremists in Slovenia.[63] Accordingly, the attendees used weapons hidden in the nearby woods and restricted uninvited people’s access to the property. The Austrian investigators intercepted the phone conversation of one attendee who talked about using weapons at the ‘picnic’. The Austrian authorities had their attention drawn to this event when persons under surveillance started moving in three vehicles towards Slovenia.

Europol claimed in one report that Islamic State terrorists do not only conduct training in Syria, but also across the European Union and in the Balkans.[64] Such a ‘picnic’ may have been a cover for terrorist training. Die Presse also stated that this event had links with Wahhabis operating from the notorious Bosnian village of Gornja Maoca.

The Slovenian public was surprised to discover that foreign media were the first to report on this ‘picnic’ based on a story from Austrian intelligence service sources. The Slovenian parliamentary committee on intelligence and security services met and discussed the event and the committee president stated that the Slovenian police had not received any information or had not confirmed terrorist activities at the ‘picnic’. [65]

**Foiled Terrorist Attack in the Capital City of Ljubljana (The Lone Wolf Brljafa)**

On 25 January 2018, the Slovenian border police at the Dragonja border crossing on the Slovenian-Croatian border searched an incoming bus. During their search, they found a black leather belt with tubular rolls and a large knife in the possession of one person. They arrested a 21-year-old Croatian citizen named Loris Brljafa. He claimed that the belt contained explosives. The police later found that this was untrue and that he had been travelling to the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana where he planned to attack local targets. The prosecutor charged him with attempting to threaten the population in the capital city using the belt and large knife. On 17 July 2018, he was found guilty of travelling abroad with the intention to commit terrorist activity and sent to prison for three years and two months and subsequently expelled from Slovenia for another three years.

With the help of Croatian authorities, his home, computer and phone were searched. The investigation showed he had converted to Islam after being quite a pious Christian, was religiously radicalised while following extremist propaganda online and that he considered himself to be an Islamic State follower. His online searches had focused on different extremist groups and on how to make a bomb; he also possessed access codes for terrorist websites. In Ljubljana, he had planned to attack several embassies (American, German and British), the parliament and the governmental palace. He had also looked at the webpages of several weapons stores in Ljubljana. In court, his attorney pointed out that the explosive belt/vest was not real and that Brljafa’s main intention was merely to gain attention.

Brljafa was a loner with several personal problems. His father revealed that before the attack Loris had changed significantly, distancing himself from society and spending most of his time online and praying. The police inquiry showed that he had no connections with other extremists and was thus considered to be a ‘lone wolf’ attacker. He was planning to commit a terrorist attack in Ljubljana in the name of the Islamic State. While searching his home, they also found extremist literature, a black flag of the Islamic State, a green prayer rug and an Arab-Bosnian dictionary.[66]

This attempted attack may have been linked to the Islamic State’s calls to its followers to carry out terrorist attacks at home (e.g. outside of Syria and Iraq). Despite this being the first case of such criminal activity by an Islamist extremist in Slovenia, it is surprising that the related media reporting was very limited.
Deportation of Three Islamist Extremists

On 14 March 2019, three citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were expelled from Slovenia for a period of five years. All three held a permanent residency permit in Slovenia and were working as long-haul truck drivers for two Slovenian companies. The police and Slovenia's external intelligence service (SOVA), using information also obtained through international exchange, confirmed that all three were actively supporting religiously motivated violent extremism and terrorism, and intended to use violence to achieve their political, religious and ideological goals. They had been in contact with people convicted for terrorist activities and with some men who had fought in Syria and Iraq. Two of them even visited Bilal Bosnic in prison. Bosnic had sent a letter, smuggled out of prison by a supporter, to all three containing explicit instructions regarding their activities among supporters in Slovenia. The Slovenian police became aware of this group's activities in 2017 and 2018. After their residency permits were cancelled in December 2018, they appealed and managed to delay the procedure for some time but were eventually deported.

Two brothers Selvir (37) and Nelvir Durakovic (40) along with Selim Ljubijankic (39) were at first employed by the same truck company, but in 2017 Ljubijankic took a job at another company. At the time of his arrest, he had been unemployed. All three had enforced an extremist ideology in their families, they had told their wives and children “not to respect Slovenian law” or else they would be killed without hesitation by having their throats cut. One of them announced to his son that he was looking forward to the day when they would kill unbelievers together.[67]

Their tasks in Slovenia included collecting financial support for imprisoned Islamists and their families and acting as couriers between Bosnic and his followers in Slovenia. SOVA described this group as a “typical, outwardly inactive cell, that uses covert communication.”[68]

This example once again confirmed that Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to an ideological and logistical core of Islamist radicalisation in both South-East Europe and Central Europe. Their expulsion also reveals a problem with the current system of issuing work and residency permits for foreigners who come from countries with a strong Islamist extremist presence.

Conclusion

This article has shown that what might at first blush be seen as a non-case of radicalisation and extremism can actually be regarded as a case. Our argument that the spectrum of Islamist radicalisation and related activities can be surprisingly broad in a state without a single active Islamist terrorist group or without a single terrorist attack is confirmed in this article. The forms of Islamist radicalisation and extremism identified above are very wide and range from transfers of people, weapons and money, foreign fighters, dangerous NGOs, recruitment, training, threats through to an attempted attack. All of this happened while Slovenia never raised its official terrorism threat level above the minimum (small threat). All of this also occurred without affecting the opinion of a public that does not perceive terrorism as a pressing threat. The fact is that the country has already faced certain basic forms (e.g. attempted attack, foreign fighters, threats) and supportive forms of Islamist terrorism such as recruitment, training and the transfer of people, money and arms. If we compare this with the full scope of possible Islamist threat expressions described in the introduction to this article, the unusually high number of indicators present in a country without any previous terrorist attack becomes obvious. Indicators not observed in Slovenia are: the existence of a terrorist group acting against the government or its people and infrastructure, a successful terrorist attack, instances of illegal data interference, examples of aggressive political Islamists openly arguing in the political process for changes to the political and democratic regime. No case related to smuggling, possessing or producing radiological, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was found either.

It should be stressed that in this case of weak radicalisation the primary stimulus is not located in the country. It comes from abroad, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia is geopolitically on the path between
Bosnia and other European sources of Jihadi thought from Austria (Vienna) and Northern Italy (Milano). The radicalisation of Muslim communities in the Balkans (especially Sarajevo) and in Vienna and Milano more or less affects radicalisation in Slovenia. It would appear that for these sources of power Slovenia is as an interesting transit country that will increasingly appear on their agenda. It is a place to meet and not draw too much attention of the authorities, an area to hide, a space for recruitment and one where their agenda will become increasingly clear through threats and other forms of realisation. Most of our cases show that Slovenia is more like a logistical space for Islamist groups in support for their more relevant goals in key battlefields like the Middle East and Western Europe. This corresponds with the Plan Balkan 2020 publicised by Al-Qaeda, where the Western Balkans was described as a logistical hub for spreading terrorism into Western Europe. This means that here one should expect more indicators related to training, financing and supplying than attacks. [69] Respectively, Slovenia has been a pool for the recruitment of foreign fighters and certain individuals from the most vulnerable ethnic group, a transit country for weapons, people and money, a place for meetings and the training of Islamists from neighbouring countries and a venue for debate and the relatively narrow promotion of Islamist ideas within certain small NGOs. Even the threats to the local community identified above were sent from Italy and the self-radicalised individual who tried to carry out an attack in Slovenia came from Croatia. Gravitation towards sources of Islamist power in Bosnia is also confirmed by the indicator of instructions being given by Bilal Bosnic from his prison cell on how to operate and collect money.

The broader picture in the Western Balkans suggests that these Slovenian examples might be connected with the Muslim Brotherhood, a pan-Islamic religious, social and political movement. It should be remembered that members of the Muslim Brotherhood fought in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that some Muslims from Kosovo and Albania might have links with the Brotherhood. Yet we did not find any direct links with the Muslim Brotherhood for the cases identified in this article. After no direct contacts could be found, we focused on the key organiser of recruitment for ISIS and Al Nusra in Slovenia, Bilal Bosnic from Bosnia, and his potential links. No contacts were detected for him, also after checking numerous media records and the 2015 verdict against him.

The question arises: how does political Islam spread in an environment like Slovenia? Political Islam as a way of articulating political positions about the transformation of society and politics according to Islamic principles is not present in the country's open political scene. No political parties are openly calling for Islamisation, the rule of Sharia law, etc. However, our results suggest that these ideas may in fact be found in closed circles of certain smaller non-governmental organisations or in the minds of some individuals, and could act as a compass for future actions, perhaps waiting for a window of opportunity to evolve. Such ideas appear to spread in these circles by means of Internet use as general radical ideas are published on relevant websites and by reading and following radical foreign websites and media, travelling abroad or hosting foreign preachers.

Cases like Slovenia should not be overlooked by international counterterrorist authorities and by the academic community. The modest presence of radicals and extremists in a country like Slovenia has led to milder control mechanisms and less attention from the authorities. This can turn out to be counterproductive. Most threats are easier to identify when plotters are not working under the radar. The weakest links in the international surveillance net have already been exploited by Islamist extremists who will no doubt continue to do so in the future.

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Notes


[9] Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti RS (2010), Uradni list, no. 27, April 2nd.


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Suspect Community: A Product of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts or a Product of Conflict Dynamics?

by Emma Ylitalo-James

Abstract

The 'suspect community' theory, first introduced by Paddy Hillyard, claims that the British Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 in its operation was responsible for producing discrimination against the communities of Northern Ireland during "The Troubles". This theory has subsequently been applied to Muslim communities in the UK in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 (New York and Washington) and 7/7 (London Transport System) by Islamist terrorists. This article presents an alternative theory on the emergence of suspect communities, arguing that a suspect community is formed at the initiation of conflict and not in response to legislation dealing with conflict. In this alternative framework, the initiation of conflict and the reactions of opposing factions, combined with public outgroup perceptions of threat, create the suspect community. This alternative theory draws on psychosocial theories, including group perception of threat, social and group identity theory and out-group paranoia. The article suggests an altered starting point and offers a process to potentially reduce public bias and therefore radicalisation and recruitment at the community level.

Keywords: suspect community, group threat, terrorism, conflict, prejudice, Northern Ireland

Introduction

The suspect community—a group of people under suspicion from members of the wider society—has been a historical phenomenon for centuries wherever conflict has been in existence.[1] The creation of a suspect community or any group which poses an apparent threat to society, its dominant structure or the governing body is not a new phenomenon—although a specific theory of the suspect community was introduced only in 1993 by Paddy Hillyard.[2] The original theory suggested that the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions Act) 1973 and subsequent British Prevention of Terrorism Acts (to be referred to as PTA) were responsible for the discrimination against Irish and Northern Irish communities, particularly in mainland Britain and at border crossings, causing infringements of the civil liberties of those at the receiving end. The PTA was initiated four years after the escalation of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland and has since been updated in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.[3] It was claimed that the introduction of the PTA and its counterterrorism measures, including stop and search, increased suspicion toward the Irish community and was ultimately responsible for the creation of a suspect community—a community experiencing discrimination and distrust from the side of the authorities and the general public.[4]

Pantazis and Pemberton[5] have argued that British PTA legislation, intended to counter terrorist activity, has increased radicalisation and led to recruitment into terrorist groups in the Muslim population in the United Kingdom and had historically done the same in Northern Ireland. It is certainly plausible that PTA legislation may create both sympathy toward, and stigmatisation of certain segments of the community.[6] However, the identification of contributing factors behind the creation of a suspect community, may be worthy of reexamination, based on an alternative theory. This is the purpose of this article.

During conflict and in the presence of a perceived threat, a number of psychological, behavioural and psychosocial processes occur on an individual and a group level.[7] It is suggested here that these reactions primarily emanate from the actions of the source of the perceived threat, creating suspicion and ultimately a 'suspect' group—the suspect community. This theory, an alternative to Hillyard's original theory, rests on perceived threat and identity formation in the population causing suspicion, with the government's safeguarding policy in the form of anti-terrorism legislation being a secondary contributing factor only.
The theory of the suspect community in its accepted form has linked the formation of a suspect community to the introduction of counterterrorist protocols. The hypothesis from the research presented here suggests that the suspect community is created at the community conflict and perception of threat levels, not as a consequence of counterterrorism legislation. It is also suggested that the psychosocial group dynamics which create responsive behaviour to a perception of threat are partially responsible for the growth and support of extremist ideals as well as the perpetuation of a conflict. In short, the notion ‘they blew people up’ contributes more to the creation of a suspicion of a community than legislation devised to safeguard the population from extremists emanating from that community.

**Suspect Community Theory**

The established theory suggests the suspect community is instigated from PTA legislation which then causes suspicion through targeting of those communities via emergency legislation and the implementation of counterterrorism measures. The original theory has been carried from the Northern Irish conflict into current concerns about Muslim extremist terrorism on the UK mainland.[8]

One of the elements Hillyard's theory raised is the dual judicial system used in the conflict in Northern Ireland. He alleged it caused resentment and alienation of the higher risk community and suspicion from the side of the general public. This thesis was supported by case studies presented by Hickman[9] and Heath-Kelly.[10] One point not raised in the literature is that there are other dual judicial systems in place in British law enforcement, like in the case of sex offenders listing and the Serious Crime Act 2015[11] relating to gang crimes. These examples include special provisions and restrictions under the judicial system, such as stop and search, powers of seizure and, in the case of sex offenders, loss of civil liberties, i.e. restrictions in the freedom of movement. [12] Hillyard's theory would suggest that these measures meant for sex offenders and gang members also create a suspect community based on official scrutiny, surveillance and reporting in the media. However, this is clearly not the case. It is therefore the thesis of this article that the acts of the offenders themselves create concern among the public toward those individuals, not the existence of a dual judicial system.

Additionally, through PTA legislation, there are concurrent risk assessments concerning individuals, groups and communities, representative of their potential terrorist threat. This singles out individuals with those characteristics. This has created for some, a segregation and air of suspicion towards those from the North and from the Republic of Ireland.[13] This particularly affected those living and travelling between mainland Britain, which was the basis of the theory. This was also transposed to the resident Muslim community of the UK.[14]

Although Hillyard's theory is widely accepted and has been transferred to current extremist terrorist threats, there has been opposition to the theory from Steven Greer.[15] Greer raises the important point that the suspect community begins formation from intimidation into conformity by the majority in that divided community, not at the level of the state. Greer's suggestion of this has led to an alternative causal theory of creation of suspicion through a threat perception at a psychosocial level within community conflict[16].

**Alternative Causal Theory**

The alternative causal theory at this point addresses the question: what makes a group of people sharing similar traits of religion, physicality and origin an apparent threat? This cannot be solely due to legislation as there has to be a perception of potential threat based on actions of that group. Ultimately, the legislation is in place due to the actions of political violent extremist groups against government and society. The alternative causal theory is structured upon the psychological and behavioural aspects of group dynamics in the perception of, and reaction to a real or perceived threat. These elements are drawn together from classic experimental and theoretical research in psychology to create a suggested alternative theory.
Creation of the Suspect Community Traversing the Macro to Micro

On a simplistic level, terrorism hinges on a majority population which appears to have controlling power over a minority which in turn has grievances. This results in conflict and terrorist activities, as discussed by Martha Crenshaw.[17] The suspect community originates from behaviour of perceiving to be a ‘suspect’ within inter community conflict, and follows a process of group dynamics and the formation of prejudice and discrimination[18] and how the group or community responds. The social impact on the communities associated with those terrorist groups can be profound, from deteriorating inter-community relations to global stigma.[19] This is particularly pertinent for those who have discernible characteristics, like physical attributes or accents. The implications for those associated with the communities committing terrorist acts are far-reaching, as Hillyard has pointed out.

Although the PTA instigated security measures on the border crossings between mainland Britain and the North and South of Ireland, the repercussions of Northern and Southern Irish community memberships produced stigmatisation.[20] Hickman et al discuss the suspectification of those of Irish and Muslim backgrounds in England. For those of Irish backgrounds the pinnacle was experienced during the main IRA bombing campaigns in England from 1972 to 1996.

On a macro level, the community experienced prejudice from the mainland Britain community on the basis of fear and anxiety in a response to the sustained threat of further violence, discussed in Stephan and Stephan's 2012 book "Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination".[21] Stephan and Stephan introduced integrated threat theory which is a major component in this work because of its applicability from micro to macro levels. Although the PTA had policies for policing, counterterrorism intelligence gathering, surveillance and practical operational standpoints, the prejudice felt toward the Irish community was on a societal level. Hickman et al describe this in the context of perceived suspicion from the general public toward the Irish community.

On a meso platform, with that being the physical movement of persons between ports, airports and border crossings, encountering systematic scrutiny at security checkpoints is not something specific to the crossings from the island of Ireland to mainland Britain. As Hillyard points out, individuals being from an area of potential threat are singled out as ‘not normal’, with additional scrutiny. Within Northern Ireland, legal vehicle checkpoints operated by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now Police Service Northern Ireland), Ulster Defence Regiment and the Army were a normal part of daily life. The use of Northern Ireland photographic driving licenses and carrying of other identification was standard with security forces operating checkpoints for intelligence gathering, disruption of potential attacks or making random checks.[22] Normalisation and acceptance of random security scrutiny for a majority of the population of Northern Ireland during the troubles would have already included much of the community within the parameters of intergroup threat theory[23] (discussed later in the article) through real and symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes. Previous situations at borders and country security check points within Northern Ireland were likely to create normative appropriateness[24] from the perspective of the traveller, in the selection of individuals to be stopped and questioned.

The suspicion of opposing factions and intergroup conflict within Northern Ireland itself[25], highlight the integrative threat theory of Stephan and Stephan[26] at the micro level. These divisions were intensified from historical, ideological and subsequently geographical social experience[27] and further divided into sub-level suspect communities. These were not only between nationalist and loyalist factions, but intergroups conflicts within those factions, for instance, between the UDA and UVF and the Provisional IRA and INLA. This is discussed in key research by Neil Ferguson and Shelley McKeown Jones which brings the argument of categorisation of others within social identity theory to the fore and underpins the applicability of the two theoretical models.
Interlinking Theories

Theoretical models combine to provide a new vision on the emergence of suspect communities and the dominant drivers for their creation. Such models have previously been applied to Northern Ireland and, to some degree, also to mainland United Kingdom. The theories outlined below provide an interlocking, layered framework which suggests suspect community creation happens predominantly on a psychosocial platform rather than primarily a political one.

The Imagined Suspect Community—Perception

Perception of what is ‘suspect’ or a threat is based on a set of criteria defined by previous actions, by race, religion, physical attributes, education or by social values.[28] It is augmented after each encounter, representation or event, building a notion of potential threat[29]. There are two issues raised in the perception criteria of the suspect community. First is the marginalisation and therefore possible loss of participation in democratic processes either at an inter-community or at a political level. Second, and more relevant, is the misidentification of suspects from either a sectarian territory level[30], or from a counterterrorism security measures level.[31] This also applies to the general population and the misidentification of suspects.

The concept of the imagined suspect community was put forward by Marie Breen-Smith as a progression from Hillyard’s theory of the suspect community. This is the construction of the out-group beyond the real or experienced involvement and to a degree, stereotyping. The theory ties in with Benedict Anderson and Stephan and Stephan's models.[32] To identify what an ‘other’ is, in terms of security, as Ronnis Lipshutz stated, it must be known what the ‘conditions of insecurity’ are.[33]

Media has also contributed to the construction of an imagined community. From the Northern Irish perspective, media coverage of the conflict coupled with terrorist attacks in the mainland of Great Britain from members of the Provisional IRA, had already created an imagined and suspect community of the Catholic Northern Irish. [34] In the current climate, Breen-Smith claimed that after the attacks of 9/11 and its coverage in the media Muslim communities became the ‘suspect’ or ‘other’ community.

The Group Belief

Belief systems are the fundamental combining factor for a group, from one community to an entire nation. Based on those beliefs, the formulation of the ‘other’ or the outside group is the demarcation of difference and the point where discrimination, stemming from natural group dynamic behaviour, occurs.[35]

In order to compose a “collective truth” and to make sense of the world individually, a series of cognitive templates is developed to interpret and respond to external events and expectations, becoming organised beliefs. [36] Those beliefs, if upheld, become ingrained and habituated[37] but can hold distortions based on (mis-) perception and prior experience. Unless challenged, they can cause bias and misrepresentation of individuals, groups and situations. Unless the challenge is enough to reform those beliefs, it will be disregarded or reframed to be consistent with the current perception.

Group beliefs are purported to be based on a collective truth experienced by other group members.[38] It is also deemed as essential that the collective core beliefs, or cognitive templates, on a group basis are shared and make sense of the socially shared cognition.[39] In a situation of conflict or threat, this becomes a powerful determinant of reaction and ties into the ‘imagined’ community of Anderson[40] and Breen-Smith.[41] The problem with this response is that it is based on a certain worldview rather than on objective reality.[42] This can cause discrimination, potential conflict escalation and reinforcement of beliefs.

During the Northern Ireland conflict, there was little challenge to the belief system of potential threat through the UK media. Mostly negative reporting in the form of media coverage of terrorist attacks and atrocities in Northern Ireland was in line with the collective experience of attacks in England itself. Therefore, no juxtaposing viewpoint was available to the public to challenge the common view portrayed in the British media through reporting of events.[43]
Social and Group Identity Theory

Social identity theory in the case of discrimination, hostility, conflict and terrorism, is the assigning of a category of ourselves to a specific group which is in line with our own personal, social and cultural identity. This also begins the formation of who is friend and foe, based on our individual categorisation and who we consider our own in-group or out-group. This also supports feelings of safety and security on an individual and group level, defining what is normal and abnormal behaviour. There is a clear boundary between the in-group and the out-group, making the out-group the ‘suspect’ in terms of conflict.

As Tajfel’s and Turner’s social identity theory suggests, a self-categorisation process occurs to distinguish between groups which are identified with. The depersonalisation process which categorises people and their distinguishable attributes removes the human and individual aspect of a person and assigns them to a specific group. This is relevant in the context of being ‘suspect’, as in a conflict environment it is the self and others categorisation which determines whether a person belongs to an opposing or threat group. In terms of conflict, personal, social and cultural identification theory are the bedrock of group choice. Depersonalisation and ascribed prototypicality to unknown individuals saves time in the situation of potential threat (also referred to as heuristics). These prototypes, described by Hogg, are part of the depersonalisation and categorisation process and give the attributes of an unknown individual or group a ‘not like me and therefore must be in the opposing faction’, protection response. In terms of individual and group protection, a clear definition of the morality and righteousness of the group is established.

In terms of social identity theory, as Hogg previously noted, “Groups only exist in relation to other groups, they derive their descriptive and evaluative properties, and thus their social meaning, in relation to these other groups.” Behaviour as an in-group member or as a ‘suspect’ is derived from events at the inception of the conflict. External factors linked to authorities, law and legislation become secondary, if having any effect at all as the perception of a suspect community has already been formed.

Although each conflict has its own specific characteristics, each warring faction will consist of members who identify with the cause. The same can be said of what we believe we are defending or protecting. Therefore, with regard to personal, social and cultural identity, the combination augments our behaviour toward our in-group and its protection. Cairns et al. suggest that out-group derogation with in-group favouritism tend to mainly occur in situations where there is extreme conflict. This supports the argument from Ferguson and McKeown Jones that during lower levels of sectarian conflict and instability, lower levels of in-group bias exist. This argument could also be transposed to that of mainland Britain during periods of instability and increased threat perception of those potentially perceived as the out-group or as communities representing potential terrorist threat as experienced by Irish and Muslim communities.

The combination of personal, social and cultural identity, as proposed by Schwartz, produces a strong momentum towards the group over the individual. As each group must legitimise its actions, a clear understanding of the boundaries and ‘morality’ has to be established, particularly if the group is in conflict, or believes itself to be in conflict with others.

In terms of the conflict within Northern Ireland, clear demarcation between factions were not only ideologically driven, but geographical dispersal and isolation of groups further heightened in-group favouritism and cohesion. Ferguson and McKeown Jones make the point that prior research shows in-group identification as an explanation for paramilitary organisation membership along with in-group pride as antecedent factors. These factors alone suggest that social identity and categorisation of self and others plays a potentially larger part in creation of a suspect community from groups associated with potential threat, through to national identity.
**In-Group Behaviour and the Perception of Threat**

The perception of threat to a group can induce changes to group behaviour and attitude.[58] It produces vulnerability within the group and challenges their worldview, beliefs and values, while possibly enhancing group cohesion. The perception of threat, or the projection of hostility from an out-group not only affects the group but also causes individual re-examination of self-definition and categorisation to reaffirm commitment to that group.[59]

In the research of Ryan King[60] on group threat theory, prejudice was seen to be higher against those groups which were perceived to be the greatest threat, where the perceived minority group is relatively large and where there is competition for resources. Within this group threat theory, the ‘dominant group’ is considered as the majority or largest group. In Northern Ireland, whilst the Protestants in the North were a majority, the Catholic minority in the North saw themselves as ‘Irish’ and therefore part of the large, predominantly Catholic population of the Republic of Ireland (the south) with the ideal of a united Ireland, thus the majority. [61] Within this theory it is suggested that both Protestant and the Catholic community saw themselves as the majority and both behaved as such, both with according reactions of a dominant group.[62]

As King stipulates, the dominant group will fear that the minority group will throw existing structures and arrangements into disarray. Increase or strengthening of the minority will also induce further hostility towards the perceived minority group.[63]

Stephan and Stephan[64] used the model of intergroup threat theory, that of symbolic and realistic threat, to predict levels of intergroup conflict and prejudice. They made the distinction between emotion and evaluation in the perception of threat leading to prejudice, conflict and warfare. They included the emotional factors as that of ‘hatred’ or ‘disdain’ and evaluative factors as disapproval based on criteria from information of the activity of the group. Combining the two elements constructs a powerful determinant for distortion of threat which consistently contributes to the ‘suspect’, ‘other’ or ‘them’ faction. Combined with the criteria of social identity theory and group threat theory there is a compelling argument that communities viewed as representative of terrorist groups, or out-groups, could foremost be viewed with suspicion by majority in-groups.

If this is applied to communities which represent a threat, in this instance those from Northern and Southern Ireland as well as Muslim communities in current day terms, prejudice and perceived threat would be a relatively logical progression.

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**Out-Group Paranoia—Being One of the Suspect Communities**

Roderick Kramer[65] developed the theory of Out-group Paranoia from the psychosocial relationship between groups of distrust. Paranoid cognition between groups was developed from the understanding that cognitions of suspicion, mistrust and making personal attributions about the behaviour or intent of others[66] are relatively commonplace for individuals in their daily lives.[67] Kramer drew together the theories and the conclusion that individuals are more likely to experience paranoid cognitions when under apparent scrutiny or feeling self-conscious and applied it to group behaviour. The theory centres on the role of trust between groups and the apparition of negative intent and judgement against those who are thought to be scrutinisers.

Drawing on the research of Breen-Smith[68], Hogg[69] and Eidelson[70] already discussed above, the state of being under observation, particularly in conflict, security and counter terrorism situations is likely to bring about a feeling of being ‘being scrutinised’ or ‘self-consciousness’. This occurs even if a group or an individual is innocent of any negative intent. This makes it more likely to distrust or experience cognitive paranoia, forming realistic, symbolic or both, manifestations of distrust and conspiracy or ‘sinister attribution error’[71], ascribing ulterior motives. The importance of this relates not only to Northern Ireland and other conflicts, but also to the current relationship with the Muslim community in the United Kingdom. Although two distinctly different situations, the out-group paranoia theory also gives understanding of the dynamics of the building conflict between British Muslim and non-Muslim population. This is particularly relevant when members
of a community which would be deemed as suspect are singled out within public or official interaction and associated reactions.

**Public Reaction to Terrorist Attacks—the Public, Risk and Suspects**

Rubin et al.\[72\], conducted a survey in the seven-month period after the London bombings in July 2005. The results were similar to those seen in Fischoff et al.’s study\[73\] on post 9/11 impacts in that a long stress response and concern over safety and the possibility of another attack were identified as present. Previous research had suggested that individuals’ heightened stress and perception of threat after a major incident subsides after an initial two- to three-month period.\[74\] Repeated media reporting of incidents as in the case of Northern Ireland for those in the UK mainland and exposure to daily incidents within Northern Ireland perpetuated public awareness and reinforced historical incidents of violence and terrorism towards the public, both realistic and symbolic. In the same scenario, continuing global terrorist events involving Muslim extremist organisations have been broadcast. If the same theories are applied, they create the same ‘suspicion’ and cognitive paranoia towards that out-group of Muslim extremists, which extends to all those who are within the ‘symbolic’ and ‘categorised’ section of the community before new counterterrorism legislation is applied. This relates back to the categorisation mentioned by Ferguson and McKeown Jones under the social identity aspect of the model.

**The Argument of the Hillyard Theory in Recruitment and Radicalisation**

The relevance of radicalisation to this work is the relationship of conflict and distrust (suspicion) at the opposing faction level. There has been suggestion that current counterterrorism legislation alienates the general communities from which violent extremists emanate.\[75\] The PTA special powers have been questioned as whether they are in part responsible for the alienation of a specific community as being under suspicion and therefore at additional risk of radicalisation.

As Greer\[76\] noted, the PTA 2000 is there to criminalise proscribed terrorist organisations, across all conflicts and those directly associated and involved with them. This in itself does not marginalise and alienate the entire community. The powers under the Act also cover, as Greer states, money laundering and baggage screening at airports for all passengers. This, as Greer notes, effectively means passengers and financial institutions are under suspicion, are stopped and searched and have their finances investigated. At present there is no evidence of financial institution members being drawn to extremism nor having bags searched at an airport being a catalyst for individual passengers to become radicalised.

Although in Northern Ireland recruitment took place predominantly on the ground, based on experiences of injustice and loss\[77\] amongst other pathways, today’s injustice has become more ‘global’. As John Horgan pointed out, one of the potential contributing factors of radicalisation is identification with injustice which currently is accessible on a global scale.\[78\] Accessing written text and supporting broadcasts of insurgent and terrorist organisations is freely available on the Internet. Horgan provided examples of European Muslims who have become involved with violence due to identification with Palestinian victims of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iraq war and Indian repression in Kashmir. In John Horgan’s research there is little, if any, suggestion of a feeling of being ‘suspect’ from counterterrorism legislation, and he lists contributory factors as being the result of dissatisfaction with current circumstances, displacement or disenfranchisement. The mechanisms of radicalisation are complex and diverse and at this juncture, until further direct empirical evidence is secured, the argument will continue to proceed as a matter of theoretical debate.
Northern Ireland and Terrorist Events—Communication and Contact

In the case of terrorism, during conflict or post event, a risk communication procedure presented by Sheppard et al.[79], becomes of paramount importance when dealing with potential mass panic. They suggest the use a communication management conduit to increase informed decision-making, reducing fear, anxiety and confusion in the case of a major terrorist attack. Two points raised by them feed directly into this hypothesis on a smaller scale: that of ‘dread risk’ and ‘unknown risk’.[80] Scaling it down to national level terrorism and creation of suspect communities, these two points are poignant, not only as a contributory condition, but also as an intervention.

The risk management from the government in the event of a mass attack has suggested guidelines in three overall areas. Clear and direct instruction to assist with decision-making, enough information to familiarise the public with the facts of the incident without bias and to allay incorrect risk perception and alertness including in regard to protective measures. Interestingly, here is a possible intervention which could be developed at this level to combat increased discrimination and provide an opportunity for public involvement in counterterrorism. This could reduce many of the issues discussed regarding conflict and suspect community. This would utilise integrated contact hypothesis, discussed by Hewstone and Swart[81] found to be effective in Northern Ireland on an interpersonal level rather than on a group platform to stunt or regress the categorisation process and group division. However, as Hewstone and Swart noted, “it remains a challenge for contact as an intervention to prove equally effective for both groups” as members of disadvantaged groups have weaker results with this method as Pettigrew and Tropp concluded based on a meta-analysis of 515 contact studies.[82]

Combining these approaches with social programs and transparent governmental press briefings could be an effective alternative pathway from the current theory of Hillyard’s. A clear media process to highlight the differentiation and consequences for individuals subject to suspect community prejudice by the public may be able to increase awareness and reduce bias. This combines with expectation management of those within the suspect communities exposed to counterterrorism procedures and a protocol of post engagement explanation and support.

Discussion

The suggested causal theory states the suspect community originates from the perception of being a ‘suspect’ within inter community or national conflict, rising from a process of identity and group dynamics, influenced by external multifarious factors. It also suggests the creation of that initial ‘suspect’ or risk community arises from the process and experience of actual conflict or violent events, which threaten the lives of a wider section of society.[83] As Lewin[84] noted, each group becomes suspect to the other. According to the proposed theoretical model, this happens in stages.

The first stage involves competing ideologies, incorporating elements from the group threat theory of Ryan King.[85] King’s research showed the level of prejudice was higher against minority groups perceived to be gathering momentum. The role of social identity and categorisation falls within this initial stage, leading to a division of self and others.

The second stage, once the groups are formed, is based on past and recent actions and their repercussions. Kramer’s theory of out-group paranoia[86] plays a distinctive part in this second stage of suspect community formation. When individuals and groups are under threat or pressure, due to anxiety they tend to overestimate the level of threat, also supporting the out-group paranoia theory. Distrust through events, history, and media reporting can either be a compounding driving factor for increased hostilities, or a catalyst opportunity for the innocent members of the ‘suspect community’ to distance and separate their identity from that of the extremists. At this point, according to Sheriff[87], the categorisation of the high-risk group as a threat has already occurred.

In the third stage of distrust and the suspect community enters the discussion of the PTA on communities
which would be considered higher risk from a counterterrorism perspective by the authorities. A number of investigators have used Hillyard’s theory (Hickman[88], Pantazis[89], Breen-Smith[90]) to draw comparison with current day UK legislation, namely the PTA 2000, with the terrorist threat of extremist Muslim factions. Hillyard made succinct arguments regarding the difference in the judicial system and special powers and claimed that the Irish community was criminalised by the state due to these powers, and a causal sequence led to the UK’s general population manifesting racism.

Terrorist incidents provoke fear in the community[91] and among the wider population. It would appear, according to mass response in the Rubin et al. report of the July 2005 bombings, that the general population post attack will assimilate the categories of higher risk individuals from the perspective of their own personal safety. Therefore, it is hard to assert at this level that only the Prevention of Terrorism Acts of 1974 and 2000 and their subsequent amendments are a major causal factor for the creation of the suspect community or the main contributing factor to radicalisation in the UK.

The importance of an alternative theory dialogue lies with the opportunity of an intervention point on correct identification of suspect community creation in the form of contact hypothesis[92] and using risk communication strategy to implement it.[93] Using community initiatives already in place with a focus on exposure and inclusion to create contact, there may be an opportunity to involve the suspect communities in the counterterrorism process. This could lead to a reduction in anxiety and via that, possibly reduce prejudice. Further research would be critical in the implementation and design of the strategy, but the potential of this approach is worth considering.

**Conclusion**

The actions of terrorism involve atrocities that even the rules of war would not excuse. Sectarian conflict, as in the case of Northern Ireland, affects the human rights and civil liberties of those living amongst it and betrays the right to life of its ordinary citizens. The fine balance of integration of a counterterrorism protocol and infringement of civil liberties of those living in or travelling between the affected areas has been an ongoing area of controversy and argument. It has concerned those it affects and those actioning or coordinating the protocols at policing, legal and political level, ever since the introduction of the Special Powers Act (1922) and subsequent PTSs.

Within the suggestions of Hillyard’s theory asserting that PTA process threatens the rights of individuals suspected of terrorist activities and those associated with the higher-risk communities, there is no mention of the State’s responsibility that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’ under Section 1, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Without these protective mechanisms, even greater civil liberties may be removed without true safeguarding of the citizens of the state under threat. As with most civil rights issues connected with counterterrorism, the problem of security outweighing legality requires continual and crucial reassessment.

Although this article focuses on the creation of the suspect community from wider societal aspects, there is a two-way conduit of prejudice from communities experiencing suspicion. The application of the same theoretical models mentioned in the work applied to the suspect community of imagined and real threat, out-group paranoia and perception of threat can be applied to the wider society and precipitate withdrawal, self-enforced isolation and marginalisation.

Exposure and personal interaction from a contact hypothesis strategy, particularly outlined by Ferguson and McKeown Jones, in unison with risk communication strategy from community through societal levels could be an effective way forward. Expectation management of what may be experienced due to the PTA 2000 processes may provide greater understanding toward those perceived higher-risk communities. Post attack risk communication strategies could deliver this which may increase the possibility of enhanced cooperation between communities, aiding counterterrorism initiatives. Cross community individual involvement in this
process may provide opportunity at this point for negotiation, readdressing elements of the legislation and inclusion of the communities. This process hinges upon the support of the community and the clear message at state level that the prevention of terrorism acts serves to preserve the rights of its citizens, even if they are challenged.

When incorporating the notion of the suspect community as Hillyard projects it into government counterterrorism strategies only at state level, there is the danger of decreased protection for UK society from a reduction of special powers.

Although mistakes were made in some areas of the PTA as pointed out by Hillyard, the Northern Ireland conflict gave an opportunity to assess the legislative and judicial system used. It is inevitable that people associated with a high-risk section of the population will come under scrutiny and judgement, particularly under counterterrorism strategies. The possibility of application of risk communication as suggested by Sheppard et al. in combination with the PTA legislation should be conducted within the Muslim community and post-conflict study of Northern Ireland communities. It is suggested this work may afford opportunity for reexamination and opening of a new discussion of this complex subject.

There must be a level of acceptance that in times of threat there will be those who are caught up in the fight to combat that which threatens our very lives. Dropping our sights away from the state level to how a suspect community is formed may afford options to understanding how to regain the support of a nation whilst still upholding its security and protection.

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**Notes**


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Research Notes

Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and Potential Impacts
by Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson

Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic presents both challenges and opportunities for terrorists. While the hazards of the disease and disruptions to society inhibit some of their operations, by their very nature as asymmetric adversaries, terrorists tend to adapt quickly and exploit conditions of uncertainty and instability to further their goals. This Research Note provides a preliminary overview of how COVID-19 might affect the state of contemporary terrorism. In so doing, it introduces and discusses 10 different ways that the pandemic could impact the terrorism landscape in the short, medium and long term. These range from terrorists leveraging an increased susceptibility to radicalization and inciting a rise in anti-government attitudes, to engaging in pro-social activities and even reconsidering the utility of bioterrorism. Acknowledging the publication of this Research Note in the midst of the pandemic and its necessarily speculative nature in the absence of historical precedent, the discussion nonetheless seeks to draw attention to several possible pathways along which terrorism might evolve in response to COVID-19 and its attendant societal effects.

Keywords: CBRN, pandemic; COVID-19; radicalization; bioterrorism; emerging threats

Introduction
As the SARS-CoV-2 virus spread inexorably across the globe in the early months of 2020, the pandemic it generated has caused unprecedented disruption to the connected, just-in-time world of the early 21st century. Politicians appear bereft of answers, the global economy has become moribund while common people the world over have been subjected to lockdowns, social distancing and an interruption in the normal routines of life. When it comes to terrorism, as much as some would like to paint terrorists as some type of aberrant “other”, the truth is that they are spawned from and almost always reside, or at least operate in, our societies. Insofar as they form part—albeit a violent, extremist and unlawful part—of our societies, terrorist individuals and groups, just like everyone else, will thus necessarily be affected by the pandemic and the general social disruption it has wrought. At the same time, by their very nature as asymmetric adversaries, terrorists tend to be markedly adaptive actors, seeking to leverage any vulnerabilities they perceive in their environment. They have often proven particularly adept at exploiting conditions of uncertainty and instability to further their goals. It can be expected, therefore, that the more strategic and tactically adroit amongst today’s terrorist adversaries will attempt to gain whatever advantage they can from the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential obstacles and opportunities presented to terrorists by the pandemic are thus worthy of careful and prompt consideration. This is especially pertinent given the possibility that COVID-19 is likely to have second-order effects, in addition to immediate impacts, on global affairs.

This Research Note seeks to provide a preliminary overview of how COVID-19 might affect the state of contemporary terrorism, with the acknowledgment that we are still in the midst of the pandemic and additional consequences might yet emerge. The first thing to realize in this regard is that to a large extent we are in uncharted territory. The last time the world experienced a pandemic as global and consequential as the one caused by COVID-19 was during the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic (often erroneously referred to as the “Spanish Flu”). At that time, several decades before the so-called “modern” age of terrorism, the United States in particular did witness a rise in attacks by anarchist followers of Luigi Galleani, culminating in the devastating Wall Street bombing of September 16, 1920.[1] However, the increased spate of bombings had begun before the pandemic and was more closely linked to opposition to the First World War, making any direct causal connection to
the pandemic tenuous at best.\[2\] The 1918–1919 pandemic is, however, associated with a number of broader sociopolitical changes, several of which are potentially relevant to the current discussion and will be addressed below.

The historical record therefore does not offer much in the way of direct guidance and, in the absence of extensive empirical evidence, we are forced to rely mostly on inference. Our assertions can be informed, however, by our existing understanding of terrorist psychology and ideology, past terrorist conduct in (somewhat) comparable situations, and the relatively few observations of terrorist behavior that have come to light so far during the pandemic. Nevertheless, our analysis must necessarily tend towards the speculative, at least until sufficient time has passed to robustly test our arguments with observed data.

Before proceeding, we return to the idea that the general social upheaval caused by the pandemic will affect the vast majority of terrorists to some degree. With the possible exception of a small number of completely isolated extremists (mostly associated with fringe millenarian groups or guerrillas based in remote locations[3]), most terrorist organizations and networks will be just as susceptible to infection by COVID-19 and just as disrupted by general social distancing measures and interruptions in supply chains and transportation systems as the rest of the world.[4] The risk of infection by COVID-19 may very well not deter a terrorist attack in its final operational phases—suicide bombers, for example, would not be expected to be overly concerned about getting sick on their way to blow themselves up. Yet, most other elements of terrorist networks, from trainers and quartermasters to ideologues and commanders, will in the vast majority of cases be reluctant to expose themselves unnecessarily to infection, if not due to the innate human psychological aversion to contamination and a regard for their own mortality[5], then for the operational challenges that having multiple ill cadre would pose. In any event, shutdowns, lockdowns and other social distancing measures will tend to inhibit numerous aspects of terrorist operations, from the movement of operatives within and across borders, to the acquisition of vehicles, weapons and equipment.[6] This diminution in the organizational functions of terrorist groups likely extends to at least some, albeit lesser, degree to violent extremist individuals, since even their more limited machinations invariably require a certain amount of travel and logistical activities in the broader society.[7]

In short, the pandemic arguably increases the overall “friction” of terrorist operations, with the extent to which this occurs dependent on the levels of disruption and official control in the location where the terrorists are operating.[8] This argument holds equally for all types of terrorists, from jihadist networks and racial supremacist militias to idiosyncratic misanthropes and hyper-nationalist paramilitaries. That being said, the COVID-19 pandemic does present terrorists with a number of opportunities for expanding, or at least adapting, their activities, both violent and otherwise, and in certain circumstances might even act as a stimulus to action. What follows is an initial attempt to categorize and enumerate the various ways in which the pandemic and its sociopolitical consequences might shape the terrorism landscape in both the short term and beyond. Given the popular predilection for lists, we present a “Top 10” of the most significant potential impacts, although we offer these in no particular rank order of relevance or likelihood.

**Effects of COVID-19**

1. **Terrorists Engaging in Pro-Social Activities**

Terrorist groups often seek and obtain some degree of legitimacy by engaging in social welfare and other activities, especially in areas of poor governance. Even if only temporarily or cynically, larger terrorist organizations with specific constituencies appear to view the pandemic as an opportunity to broaden their support—and hence recruitment and funding—in the long term. While most terrorist groups lack the resources to mount full-scale medical responses, even modest efforts can serve to garner positive attention to these organizations and highlight the inadequacies of the local government. Amongst jihadists, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have offered to provide essential services and assistance to people affected by
COVID-19 in Pakistan.\[9\] In neighboring Afghanistan, the Taliban, which aspires to governance and controls substantial territory, has promised safe passage to healthcare workers crossing their territory, engaged in their own public health information campaign to counter the virus, and reportedly provided some healthcare services.\[10\] Perhaps the most active efforts have been made by (the not coincidentally most well-resourced) Shi’ite Hizb‘allah in Lebanon, which has sought to contrast itself with the dysfunction of the broader Lebanese state by allegedly deploying 1,500 doctors, 3,000 nurses and paramedics, 20,000 more activists, as well as more than 100 emergency vehicles to handle COVID-19 and disinfect public spaces.\[11\] These groups clearly see the propaganda value of such efforts, for example, when an encrypted channel run by the Iba news network channel which is linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham uses images and videos to champion HTS’s social distancing and other alleged efforts to address COVID-19.\[12\] Although most prevalent amongst jihadists, pro-social activities have also been seen amongst other extremist milieus. While the appropriateness of labeling such actors as terrorists is debatable, anarchist networks in the United States have organized free food distribution and mutual aid efforts to help address the social disruption caused by the pandemic.\[13\] These kinds of pro-social activities have thus far been conspicuous by their absence, however, among terrorists espousing far right ideologies.

2. Increased Susceptibility to Radicalization

The pandemic has resulted in widespread and extended dislocation and disruption to daily lives, in which many people have lost their jobs, or loved ones who provided for them, and are afraid for themselves and their futures.\[14\] This in turn can lead to low-level underlying psychological symptoms, ranging from increased anxiety to mild paranoia, which are likely to worsen the longer the disruptions continue and can in turn lead to new or resurgent self-destructive behaviors like domestic abuse or substance abuse.\[15\] Significantly, these uncertainties and psychological setbacks arguably make a greater number of people more susceptible to radicalizing narratives that seek to scapegoat various “others” and promise simple solutions.\[16\] There is a fair amount of evidence that radicalization is facilitated by actual or perceived personal losses\[17\], frustrations\[18\] and reminders of death\[19\], all of which can be associated with the pandemic. At the same time, with more people spending more time online, there are more opportunities for extremists to engage with their purported constituencies.\[20\]

The disruptions and stresses arising from the pandemic thus provide fertile ground for radicalization and extremist propaganda. We have already seen examples of terrorist organizations exploiting the pandemic to directly bolster their recruitment efforts. ISIS has used hashtags related to COVID-19 to redirect Internet users to its jihadist propaganda\[21\], while in Turkey the same group is reportedly focusing its recruitment efforts particularly on migrants from Turkmenistan who have become unemployed as a result of the pandemic.\[22\]

Then there are the widespread attempts by various extremists, including terrorists, to prey on the uncertainties, anxieties and disruptions caused by the pandemic—as well as a newly captive online audience—in order to feed into and, they hope, broaden the appeal of their narratives. Sunni jihadists have either claimed that COVID-19 is a plot by Islam’s enemies, or like al-Qa’ida and ISIS, have painted COVID-19 as an example of Allah’s wrath against the corrupt and the nonbelievers that can only be stopped by increased adherence to the “true” Islam.\[23\] Pro-ISIS groups have also reportedly heightened efforts to disseminate propaganda material specifically in the English language to target vulnerable populations under lockdown orders in the West.\[24\] In a recent online publication specifically targeting the “Western World”, al-Qaeda has sought to encourage conversions to Islam during isolation periods and stay-at-home orders.\[25\]

At the same time, among the far right, there have been numerous attempts to scapegoat the ostensible “other” for the virus, whether this be the Chinese, the Jews or immigrants in general, often explicitly associating these groups with pestilence and filth in tropes reminiscent of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda from the 1930s.\[26\] The stigmatization of foreigners as bringers of disease was also witnessed during the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic\[27\] and has been repeated during the current one.\[28\] Several COVID-19 specific memes, such as “corona-chan”, have also become popular on far right online discussion forums.\[29\]
The result of this noxious combination of an uncertain, anxious populace and eager, opportunistic extremists is an observed increase in activity on online extremist platforms. For example, encrypted channels on Telegram associated with far-right ideology groups have seen a large growth in users. One white supremacist channel in particular has seen an 800% increase in users during COVID-19, while other similar right-wing ideology channels grew by more than 6,000 users in the month of March alone.[30] Following the implementation of lockdown and social distancing measures in the United States, far-right content and engagement online had increased by 13% and reached a 21% increase in engagement levels 10 days after the lockdown measures began.[31] Far-right extremist groups are not alone in seeing this expeditious growth in their online user base, with ISIS and jihadi channels seeing a similar massive increase in online activity.[32] Attempts by extremist groups to intensify their social media efforts are so prevalent that even U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres acknowledged the phenomenon on April 27, 2020, noting that these groups intend to disseminate their hateful rhetoric to recruit young people in particular.[33]

One particularly pernicious aspect of the lockdowns associated with COVID-19 is that at the same time as socially distanced, anxious individuals might be becoming more susceptible to radicalization, the isolation from others and alienation from normal social intercourse itself means that there is a lower chance that behaviors associated with radicalization will be noticed by others who might otherwise be able to intervene. A senior British counterterrorism official has cited this as a reason why referrals to the United Kingdom’s Prevent program have fallen since the country began its lockdown.[34]

3. A Rise in Anti-Government Attitudes

Dissatisfaction with government responses to COVID-19, exacerbated by conspiracy theories peddled by a range of parties, is likely to accentuate existing levels of frustration and stoke anti-government extremism in particular. The first leg of this argument is based upon the generally reactive, often haphazard and sometimes blatantly incompetent response of governments around the world to the pandemic.[35] This has no doubt undermined public confidence in ruling regimes and, in places with already poor governance, has likely served only to erode the government’s legitimacy even further. It is interesting to note that recent preliminary findings have discovered a link between areas most affected by the influenza pandemic of 1918–1919 and increased support for the Nazis in Germany in subsequent elections in the early 1930s.[36]

The second leg on which this notion rests lies in how those extremists whose ideology is particularly hostile to the state have pounced on government missteps to exacerbate levels of popular frustration, which, as noted above, is often associated with aggression. Extremists are doing this using a maelstrom of disinformation and conspiracy theories.[37] There has been a particularly colorful array of such theories stemming from far right extremists in North America and Europe, with supporters of the mysterious online activist group QAnon asserting that China, Bill Gates, Big Pharma or others are responsible for creating the coronavirus (sometimes involving an obscure chemical called adrenochrome) and that anti-COVID-19 measures are a plot by the “Deep State”. In the United Kingdom, a prominent theory amongst the far right (and some on the far left) is that 5G transmission towers are somehow responsible for spreading COVID-19.[39] These types of anti-government conspiracy theories are not limited to the far right—many on the far left of the political spectrum spin theories about how government responses to the virus, and potentially the virus itself, are merely facades for protecting or further empowering corporate elites and their authoritarian government allies.[40] Such conspiracy-mongering is not harmless—even if it does not result in new recruits for recognized terrorist groups, it can still mobilize extremist fellow travelers. This was demonstrated when, in early April 2020, train engineer Eduardo Moreno purposely derailed a train in hopes of crashing it into the U.S. Navy Hospital Ship Mercy, which was docked at the Port of Los Angeles. Moreno claimed that he wanted to draw attention to a COVID-19-related conspiracy, possible one espoused by some QAnon activists that Mercy was taking COVID-19 victims to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.[41]

The final leg supporting an argument about the rise of anti-government extremism in the wake of COVID-19 references the recently witnessed pointed opposition to the expansion of the state into everyday life via
lockdowns and other restrictive measures. The atmosphere has become more heated following the killing of the African-American George Floyd by a policeman in Minnesota, which has set off large demonstrations around the world, despite the coronavirus restrictions on public gatherings. The opposition of those with anti-government animus is likely made more acute when the government response includes mobilizing large numbers of people in uniform; in this regard, the deployment of the National Guard in several states in the USA can be expected to particularly inflame anti-government extremists. Here is one instance where the present echoes the past—during the 1918 influenza pandemic, an Anti-Mask League was formed in the United States, which organized large public protests and reportedly even led some opponents of enforced mask-wearing to attempt the bombing of a public official.[42] During the current pandemic, so-called Liberate activists have protested widely in the United States against local or state shutdown orders, with one person espousing anti-government animus arrested for threatening to kill New Mexico's governor and another for allegedly threatening to blow up the Orlando Police Department's headquarters, both over the coronavirus restrictions.[43] Opposition to coronavirus restrictions also seems to be stimulating emerging strands of far-right extremism, such as the burgeoning "boogaloo" movement. Similar opposition has occurred in Europe.[44] This overall dynamic of increased opposition to the state might intensify as the economic repercussions of the pandemic persist over longer periods of time and the governments in many states fail to relinquish the enhanced emergency powers they granted themselves during the pandemic.[45]

4. Inspiration for Apocalyptic-Millenarian Extremists

Rather than merely looking for opportunities to turn the pandemic to their advantage, a small percentage of terrorists might actually be inspired by the spread of the virus and the death and disruption that it has left in its wake. Among groups whose ideologies have a distinct apocalyptic or millenarian flavor, there are both those who believe that they must merely passively prepare for the end and that no other actions on their part are necessary, as well as the more dangerous sort who believe that when the time is right they must act to facilitate or even initiate their version of Armageddon in order to secure salvation. These latter types, typified by groups like Aum Shinrikyo and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, might regard the current global pandemic as a portent of the prophesied end times or perhaps a sign of their deity's wider displeasure with humanity. The pandemic, which is evocative of biblical plagues and divine punishments, might then act as a catalyst for these groups to initiate whatever long-term plans they have been hatching, some of which might include violence against the public.[46] Within the current terrorist context, besides the stereotypical cults that might have flown under the radar,[47] other candidates for being galvanized into action by COVID-19 are the most extreme elements of the radical environmentalist movement[48] and jihadists like ISIS, whose worldview contains strains of millenarianism.[49]

5. Terrorists Working from Home

With widespread stay-at-home orders and extended disruption to normal societal operations, terrorists (just like many of us) may be forced to operate from the confines of their own homes. Working with what they may have available, and leveraging the currently augmented population of Internet users, we have already noted increased propaganda efforts by extremists online. Beyond the uptick in the production and dissemination of propaganda materials and enhanced recruitment efforts, however, terrorists might also utilize their "downtime" to plan and coordinate future attacks. While there is no direct evidence of this occurring, it is plausible that committed radicals will eschew binge-watching the latest Netflix series in favor of conducting any operational preparations that they are able to. In today's data-saturated environment, this could include a wide array of electronic ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) activities, from evaluating potential targets using Google Earth, and combing message boards to identify gaps in a target's defenses to establishing Dark Web channels by which to procure illicit materials that can be used in weapons. Such activities carry some risk of detection or infiltration by authorities, but at the very least terrorists could utilize the time to improve their technical and other skills, for example, by taking online chemistry or electronics courses to assist with bomb-
making. Although the number of past attempts of terrorists attempting to launch high-impact cyberattacks has been limited, the pandemic may also allow operational cadre to enhance their cyberattack abilities or even to attempt attacks against targets of opportunity. Cybercrime has escalated in general during the pandemic[50], with a significant increase in attempted ransomware attacks against critical response infrastructure like hospitals and other medical services.[51] Rather than hold vital systems hostage for money, enterprising terrorists could seek to disable or otherwise disrupt these systems and thus exacerbate the health impact of the pandemic.

6. Establishing Bioterrorism as a Viable Tactic

Much has been written about terrorist calculations for engaging in bioterrorism[52], with the general consensus among experts being that only a relatively small subset of terrorists is willing and able to do so.[53] Within the terrorist calculus, however, at least part of the motivation to pursue biological agents as weapons is based on the consequences that such weapons are likely to have. These, in turn, are influenced to a large degree by the vulnerability of the target society to infectious diseases in general.[54] The inability of even highly developed countries to stop the spread of the virus and the often incoherent and delayed responses of authorities at all levels have exposed the myriad weaknesses present in global public health systems. Such outcomes will not go unnoticed by terrorist groups, who will remember these impacts when seeking new means to achieve their goals. It must be remembered that a key strategy of terrorism is to inflict psychological damage on populations as a means of coercion, usually through physical harm or the threat thereof. The societal disruption, economic damage, and deaths caused by COVID-19 are a perfect script for the theatre of terrorism.

It is thus logical that for many terrorists, wherever their prior calculations for bioterrorism had ended up, the vulnerabilities highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic have shifted these towards the more attractive end of the scale.[55] For those terrorists who were near but not quite at the tipping point where they would actively pursue bioterrorism, the pandemic might push them across the Rubicon. At the same time, the indiscriminate nature of COVID-19, and the fact that it is affecting everyone irrespective of religion, ethnicity or citizenship, might give other terrorists that only target specific populations pause, at least when it comes to utilizing contagious pathogens. The potential increase in the likelihood of bioterrorism might therefore be restricted to the more generally misanthropic terrorists or those espousing more transcendental ideologies.

7. Weaponizing COVID-19

While the majority of past cases of terrorists and other violent non-state actors attempting to use biological agents to cause harm have involved noncontagious agents, like Bacillus anthracis and various biological toxins, there have been roughly a dozen cases involving contagious pathogens according to the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-state Actors (POICN) Database.[56] Among the more prominent of these figure plots by R.I.S.E., a small group who planned to use Salmonella typhi in 1972 as part of a plot to destroy the world and repopulate it[57], as well as the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, which attempted to collect Ebola virus samples in Zaire during its “African Salvation Tour” in 1992.[58] In 1995, white supremacist Larry Wayne Harris ordered vials of Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of bubonic and pneumonic plague,[59] and in 2014 a laptop of a Tunisian linked to ISIS indicated an interest in weaponizing the same agent.[60] Recent studies have suggested that intentionally disseminating dangerous pathogens by using one person to infect others is certainly possible for perpetrators who are less concerned with their own safety.[61] It is therefore not out of the question—particularly since it is so infectious and samples are readily accessible—that terrorists might be drawn to considering using the SARS-CoV-2 virus as a weapon.

There are three possible scenarios in this regard. First, there are low-level threats of actual spreading of the virus with little to no premeditation, usually as part of an emotional outburst or idiosyncratic behavior. There have been multiple cases in the United States, as well as reports from the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Australia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere of individuals claiming to have coronavirus intentionally and coughing
or spitting on other people, licking products in stores, and similar behavior.[62] While not rising to the level of behavior that academics generally attach to the term terrorism, at least in the United States some of these have been prosecuted as cases of terrorism.[63]

The second scenario involves using the virus as part of a planned attack on specific ideological targets. In this regard, the virus itself provides a relatively quick and easy way for terrorists to engage in “bioterrorism,” since they can merely become infected and then purposely spread the virus. There have indeed been calls amongst white nationalists and jihadists to do just this. Far-right groups using Telegram in the United States have encouraged those of their followers who contract COVID-19 to spread the disease to law enforcement, non-Whites and Jews, e.g., by spreading saliva on door handles at FBI offices[64] or synagogues.[65] At the most repugnant end of this spectrum are calls to use COVID-19 against the Jews in what a sick joke of far-right activists termed “Holocough”.[66] There have also been indicators among jihadists of similar tactics, such as ISIS-linked networks in Indonesia reportedly calling on “infected followers to spread the coronavirus to law enforcement officials”[67] and the arrest in Tunisia on April 16, 2020 of an alleged Islamist for plotting to spread COVID-19 among security forces.[68]

The third scenario consists of perpetrators intentionally spreading the coronavirus in an indiscriminate manner in order to prolong or reignite the pandemic on a large scale. At the moment, with the virus established in almost every country worldwide, carrying through on such threats is unlikely to make an overwhelming difference on the ground, although it could exacerbate infection rates in areas with low current exposure or sideline some first responders. The main benefit for a terrorist group attempting such an act would thus be largely rhetorical for now, and even this would be in some doubt as in many cases it would be difficult to verify that the terrorists claiming the attack had actually carried it out as opposed to a natural social spreading of the disease. It is important to note, however, that if current efforts to control the pandemic are successful and within a few months the first wave subsides, the majority of the population will still be susceptible to the virus and it will be relatively easy for extremists or other malcontents to initiate a second wave. Therefore, the actions of terrorists in this regard become far more salient after the first wave of COVID-19 passes. Thankfully, the window for launching such an attack is relatively small, as once a reliable vaccine is developed, this avenue of bioterrorism is no longer viable.

8. Conventional Attacks during the Pandemic

Aside from areas of high instability, where the pandemic might provide attack opportunities because it draws away security forces, many terrorists in more developed parts of the world will likely conclude that pandemic times are not the best time to launch a major attack. In addition to the operational friction noted above, there are strategic disincentives when the attention of the world is fixed firmly on the disease: it will be that much more difficult to achieve a large publicity footprint.[69] After all, no politically motivated terrorist group worth its salt wants to be relegated to the ninth or tenth headline in a news feed. At the same time, most traditional targets of high civilian concentration, such as airports, subways and entertainment venues, are more or less deserted, making it more advantageous for those terrorists seeking mass casualties to wait until the shutdowns and restrictions have been lifted. Even then, it might be some time before the number of people frequenting many soft targets like transportation hubs will recover to pre-pandemic levels.

There is one glaring exception, however, when it comes to medical facilities. These and related places where victims of the coronavirus are being treated can provide both a concentration of casualties and high levels of publicity were they to be attacked. This was ostensibly the case with Timothy Wilson, a white nationalist and anti-government extremist who was killed in Missouri on March 24, 2020 after apparently planning to attack a local hospital.[70] He had reportedly already been plotting an attack, but changed his target and his timing following the outbreak of COVID-19, because the medical center apparently “offered more casualties”[71] Therefore, wherever the pandemic continues to result in large numbers of victims being treated in health care facilities, particular attention should be paid to these venues.
While these arguments might hold for mass-casualty operations, they are less applicable to smaller-scale terrorist attacks, often carried out by so-called “lone wolves”. Jihadists have called upon their followers to exploit the disruptions caused by the pandemic to launch attacks in the West.[72] Isolated examples of such small-scale attacks have occurred, including, for example, the stabbing of several people on April 4, 2020 and the injuring of three police officers by deliberate vehicle ramming on April 27, 2020 both in France and both perpetrated by alleged jihadists.[73]

9. Less-Secure Facilities

COVID-19 will likely have an adverse effect on the security of many facilities. While those guarding high-value targets in the West (such as government buildings) are usually designated as essential personnel and remain on post during the pandemic, in other cases facilities might be left less secure than during normal undertakings. This could be the result of limited operations, personnel being quarantined or falling ill, a psychologically distracted workforce, or even, simply, reduced foot traffic by passersby. In addition to its implications for crime and other malfeasance, this situation might have at least three consequences for terrorism.

First, with respect to carrying out attacks, although many areas operating with minimal personnel or visitors might make less attractive targets for terrorists seeking a high body count, for those terrorists who specifically seek fewer or no casualties (such as most animal rights extremists) or who have a penchant for symbolic targets like national monuments or sacred spaces, the lower levels of security and general disruption might provide them with increased opportunities to carry out a successful attack.

Second, enterprising terrorists might see lower facility security as an opportunity to acquire materials from locations where they might otherwise not take the risk. Facilities of concern for theft during the pandemic include weapons storage areas, chemical plants, and facilities that store nuclear, radiological or other hazardous materials. At the same time, even legitimate purchases might become less risky for terrorists. For example, a store clerk that ordinarily would notice and report an individual attempting to purchase large quantities of peroxide, might miss such an attempt when they are anxious about their own exposure, and where every customer is purchasing larger quantities of everyday items. Terrorists might realize this and make more attempts now than at other times to purchase or steal raw materials that could be used to produce IEDs or other weapons.

Third, is the security of prisons and other detention areas. In its *al-Naba* newsletter on March 19, 2020, ISIS encouraged its followers “to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to free ‘Muslim prisoners,’” including its members in Syrian prisons and detention camps.[74] It might not be much of a coincidence, then, that at Gwheran Prison in northeastern Syria, there was a massive riot on March 30, 2020 during which several ISIS fighters escaped.[75]

10. CT Distractions

Counterterrorism personnel are not immune to the physical or psychological effects and the social disruption caused by the pandemic. At all levels, from intelligence analysts to law enforcement, counterterrorism personnel have the potential, like any individual, to fall ill from the virus or experience its attendant psychological anxieties and frustrations. At the very least, the ongoing situation will reduce capabilities and introduce friction into the counterterrorism process (e.g., with analysts teleworking or suffering personal stresses), thus making it more likely that a crucial warning indicator or piece of intelligence could fall through the cracks.

Potentially even more detrimental at a systemic level is that dealing with COVID-19 might draw resources away from counterterrorism operations both at home and abroad, as personnel, money and other resources are diverted to help combat the virus. We are already seeing potential ramifications of counterterrorism distractions on an international scale, as large terrorist networks seek to exploit the gaps that COVID-19 has opened on security. In the Horn of Africa, U.S. forces had declared a public health emergency in late April,
steering international cooperation meetings originally intended for counterterrorism focus to combat al-Shabaab into an effort against the presumably coming disease.[76] Also adjusting to the newest threat on the horizon, INTERPOL has recently shifted its terrorism monitoring operations to a remote effort while some French troops have been pulled back from West Africa, leaving the Sahel region more susceptible to attacks and radicalization campaigns from regional affiliates of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and especially Boko Haram.[77] Iraq has also suffered by the withdrawal of troops from several European countries as security attention and efforts are redirected to combat the spreading of disease.[78]

Capitalizing on this distraction, multiple terrorist groups, and in particular ISIS, have explicitly called upon their followers to carry out attacks on vulnerable opponents who have increasingly focused attention on COVID-19. An expansion in ISIS-affiliated attacks across several continents was recorded following the publication of the Islamic State’s March 19, 2020 edition of al-Naba, in which the group encouraged taking advantage of the disruption caused by the coronavirus.[79] The month of April alone saw 110 incidents across Iraq, the highest recorded figure of incidents since December 2019, as ISIS and other groups sought to target vulnerable security forces.[80] Of note within this context is the report of a specific upsurge in attacks in Iraq following the implementation of a long-term curfew.[81]

With the ongoing spread of the virus across the globe and the potential for a second and even third wave, national and international coordination on counterterrorism might only be weakened over time. The extent to which these immediate strains on counterterrorism activities will persist or intensify will depend on the duration and extent of the progress of the disease. What is perhaps more problematic is that the long-term economic damage brought about by the pandemic might curtail available resources to devote to counterterrorism for several years. Governments that have seen their coffers emptied and their gross national product dwindle will face difficult choices with respect to where they spend their diminished revenues and—notwithstanding a genuine commitment to counterterrorism—might be forced into feeding their population and reinvigorating their economies at the expense of defense spending, including funding for counterterrorism. Moreover, recovery from the pandemic might suck all the proverbial air out of government policy for some time, leaving an attention deficit that hampers interagency and international collaboration on counterterrorism.

Conclusions

A useful way to assess the various impacts and potential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the terrorism landscape is to parse them out temporally. In other words, to distinguish between those impacts that are likely to be felt only in the short term during the current initial outbreak (likely not more than two to three months from the time of writing), those likely to operate in the medium term (between the conclusion of the first wave and the achievement of widespread immunity to the virus, likely at the earliest by spring 2021), and those that are likely to manifest or persist into the longer term (up to several years from the time COVID-19 is conquered).

With respect to those effects that will largely be limited to the short term, these include all of the factors that are directly related to the lockdowns and other restrictions put in place to reduce the contagion. First, the diminution in terrorist capability and desire to launch large-scale attacks on many densely populated soft targets will only persist while these targets are sparsely populated—as soon as the restrictions are lifted and normal activities resume, both the friction and the disincentives will evaporate. On the positive side, from the point of view of the counterterrorists, the added attractiveness of medical facilities as targets and the opportunities to exploit lower security at certain facilities will also diminish. Some of the stresses underlying an increased susceptibility to radicalization and the more trenchant opposition to government measures will also decrease, as will several of the more direct distraction of security forces and diversion of counterterrorism resources. It should be noted, however, that should there be a resurgence in the pandemic, with additional waves with high numbers of infections, then all of these short-term effects will recur—and in terms of the psychological and anti-government effects, these might even intensify.

As discussed above, the greatest danger from terrorists utilizing COVID-19 itself as a weapon will arise in the
medium term, after the first wave is over. Several of the other factors are likely to continue to have an impact in the medium term, although perhaps not as acutely as before. In particular, the economic fallout of the pandemic might only begin to become clear once the initial crisis period has passed and will continue to cause psychological stress and potentially anger against the government even when people can leave their homes and return to more quotidian pursuits. Thus, some heightened susceptibility to radicalization and anti-government attitudes will carry over into the medium term. For similar economic reasons, counterterrorism forces the world over might also face shortfalls in resources during this period. Moreover, any apocalyptic-millenarian groups that have been stirred by the pandemic might begin to activate their doomsday scripts during this period.

It is during the longer term, however, that the pandemic is likely to have its greatest impact on the threat of terrorism, for this is when many of the second-order effects of COVID-19 will begin to unfold. It is during the years following the end of the pandemic, during what many project will be a lengthy economic stagnation and recovery period, that the gains made through current terrorist efforts to radicalize, recruit and engage in pro-social activities are likely to bear fruit. Large numbers of disillusioned and unemployed people, especially youth, are often a boon for terrorist groups and the operational consequences of increased recruitment and radicalization are likely to be felt then. It is also during this period that any terrorist group which has discovered increased utility in the notion of biological agents as weapons is likely to put its newfound interest to the test. Lastly, there is the danger that counterterrorism might fall lower on the agenda of many governments just as these COVID-19-induced threats are manifesting.

Therefore, just as was the case with the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic, it is the structural changes resulting from the pandemic that are likely to have the most significant effects on the future of terrorism.

While much of this discussion has been speculative, it should at the very least serve to place some of the potential effects of COVID-19 on the radar and in a broader context. It is crucial that despite a possible decrease in resources or attention, counterterrorism agencies the world over keep a sharp lookout for indicators that any of these systemic risks are emerging.

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Notes


[3] Past examples of such groups are the Rajneeshees, the Covenant, Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, and certain remote factions of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or Sendero Luminoso. Current examples might include some factions of AQIM and Boko Haram.


[6] Although the facts are not entirely clear, a potential real-world example of this can be seen in the arrest of Muhammad Masood, a Pakistani doctor, on March 19, 2020 for attempting to provide material support to ISIS. He had originally intended to travel to Syria via Amman, Jordan, but after Jordan closed its borders due to COVID-19, he was forced to find an alternate travel route, which apparently allowed law enforcement to set a trap for him by dangling the prospect of passage on a cargo ship from Los Angeles to Syria. See Department of Justice, 'Pakistani Doctor Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIS', (PRN 20-330) March 19, 2020; URL: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pakistani-doctor-charged-attempting-provide-material-support-isis.

[7] There have been some instances of attacks by radical individuals under lockdown conditions, such as the stabbing by a suspected jihadist of seven people in Romans-sur-Isère, France on April 4, 2020. See Marone, Francesco, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism in a “Time of Pandemic”', *Italian Institute for International Political Studies*, May 15, 2020; URL: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/terrorism-and-counterterrorism-time-pandemic-26165.

[8] Especially where such controls are weak, terrorists might still enjoy at least moderate freedom of action (as discussed later in the text).


[37] This should not discount the role played by state actors in spreading disinformation about the virus, although this is not the focus of the present discussion. See Schaub, Heiko, ‘The Role of State-Supported Disinformation in the Wake of COVID-19’, PRI O Blogs, June 9, 2020; URL: https://blogs.prio.org/2020/06/the-role-of-state-supported-disinformation-in-the-wake-of-covid-19/, but the focus here is on non-state extremists.

[38] Broderick, Ryan, ‘QAnon Supporters And Anti-Vaxxers Are Spreading A Hoax That Bill Gates Created The Coronavirus’, BuzzFeed News, January 23, 2020; URL: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatethis/qanon-supporters-and-anti-vaxxers-are-spreading-a-hoax-that-


[40] See, for example, the blog ’The Plague and The Fire’, URL: https://plagueandfire.noblogs.org/en/


[45] Loadenthal, Michael, op. cit.


[47] In the early 1990s, despite Aum Shinrikyo’s international activities involving efforts to develop CBRN weapons, its unprecedented resources and its virulent anti-Americanism, the cult was “not on anybody’s radar screen”. See Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Minority Staff), ‘Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo’, October 31, 1995: p. 91.

[49] Abdul Basit maintains that the COVID-19 pandemic “feeds into the apocalyptic, end-of-time narratives of ISIS” (Basit, Abdul, op. cit., p. 8.). As an example of associated fantastical thinking, Abubakar Shekau, one of the leaders of Boko Haram, has declared that true believers are protected from the virus and, consequently, he has denounced efforts to combat the virus. See Campbell, John, ‘Boko Haram's Shekau Labels Anti-COVID-19 Measures an Attack on Islam in Nigeria,’ Council on Foreign Relations, April 17, 2020; URL: https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-shekau-labels-anti-covid-19-measures-attack-islam-nigeria.


[55] Silke, Andrew, op. cit.


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[69] Although we discussed this idea as early as April 16, 2020, it was subsequently echoed by Silke, Andrew, op. cit.


[77] Ibid.


[79] Silke, Andrew, op. cit.


Countering Terrorist Acts against Christian Places of Worship
by Katalin Pethő-Kiss

Abstract
Christian places of worship have been recurring targets for violent non-state actors since at least the late 1990s. To reach a realistic understanding of this threat this Research Note has scrutinized a sample of 26 attacks, looking at nine parameters. Important lessons can be drawn from incidents by looking at mortality rates, weapons used, perpetrator motivations, preventative and reactive measures taken—including spontaneous defensive actions taken by victims or bystanders. The objective of this Research Note is to identify specific security challenges Christian communities face. Suggestions are made on how to enhance existing security arrangements and how to arrive at a more effective security regime.

Keywords: Christian places of worship, soft targets, target hardening, religion

Introduction
Places of worship long and widely considered sacrosanct, have become attractive targets for terrorists. Between 1998 and 2019 there were 30 terrorist attacks targeting synagogues,[1] 482 on Muslim mosques,[2] seven on Hindu temples[3] and 70 on Christian churches.[4] These acts of violence offer excellent opportunities to inflict fear and cause a number of civilian casualties. As soft targets[5] religious sites with their spacious layouts,[6] have vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited. As places with a large concentration of people but with limited protective measures in place,[7] houses of worship can provide significant chances to maximize casualties without the need for sophisticated planning and preparation. Additionally, attacks directed at houses of worship receive wide media coverage, which is often the main objective of terrorists. By examining the circumstances of violent acts on Christian churches, this Research Note aims to achieve a better understanding of the threat.

With this in mind, this Research Note quantitatively assesses a number of attacks on Christian places of worship that occurred between 1998 and 2019. Violent acts targeting individual religious leaders remain outside the scope of this exploration. Information from the Global Terrorism Database (University of Maryland) has been used to select cases. The main factor in selecting the examined 26 incidents was the availability of detailed-enough information. No geographic restrictions[8] have been set for this Research Note. In an effort to better understand the modus operandi of the perpetrators, the incidents were examined along nine dimensions, one of these being the number of people killed.

Number of Fatalities
The first graph represents the number of fatalities in attacks on Christian houses of worship. When examining the graph, the most apparent peak refers to the coordinated Islamic terrorist suicide bombings in Sri Lanka at Easter time in April 2019, whereby 150 persons died at two Christian churches.

The number of victims varies according to several factors, including the level of sophistication of the attack and prior surveillance, which can lead to a substantial increase in the number of casualties. Sequencing bomb explosions, for instance, increases the level of fatalities. Ideology underpinning such violent acts also determines how fatal an attack can be. Certain extremist groups content themselves with setting churches on fire while others seek to kill worshippers.
The graph below provides a comparison between the number of fatalities in attacks on houses of worship and those on a better-hardened target, namely police stations.[9] As can be seen, in 2009 the mortality rate in plots against police stations increased dramatically. There may be various reasons for this. Firstly, this peak coincides with the operational surge of Boko Haram (BH) and Tehrik-i-Taliban (TiP) in Nigeria and Pakistan. Both groups were highly active between 2011 and 2015[10] and police stations were one of their primary targets. Secondly, in most of these attacks the blast happened outside the police facilities (in front of the building or targeting mobile police convoys), substantially diminishing the effect associated with the hardened nature of such places. And thirdly, plots against police personnel have become highly attractive for various terrorist groups that want to project an image of strength. In addition, undermining the capabilities of law enforcement agencies increases feelings of public insecurity.

Modus operandi, ideological background and the timing of incidents all play a role in determining the level of fatalities, with Easter and Christmas being times requiring enhanced preparedness.

**Typology of Attacks on Christian Sites**

The first chart below distinguishes between attacks outside Christian religious sites (outdoor) and incidents where perpetrators managed to force their way into a church (indoor). As the bar chart illustrates, outdoor strikes make up the overwhelming majority of incidents. This indicates that most perpetrators tend to opt for safer ways to attack by staying outside the place of worship, reducing the risk of being caught. It is less common for an attacker to enter a church and confront the target audience at close quarters (e.g. with a bladed weapon).[11]
The next chart differentiates attacks on religious sites based on the perpetrators’ modus operandi. Bombing was the most common practice. Various operational benefits of explosive devices explain this trend. Firstly, it meets extremists’ operational objectives of drawing public attention, inducing fear and at the same time causing mass casualties. Secondly, when deploying an IED controlled from a distance, perpetrators can ignore the risks associated with entering the church. This does not apply for suicide bombings.[12] At the opposite end of lethality are arson attacks.[13] All three arson incidents in the sample occurred in Northern Ireland and were committed in pursuit of loyalist (Protestant) objectives.[14]

Attacks inside a church were driven by a range of presumed motives, including personal thirst for revenge, rage (a sudden wave of emotions) or mental disorder. The latter was the case in St. Lucia, where the sanity of the assailants were questioned in the subsequent criminal proceedings.[15] The assailant attacking churchgoers with a sword in Yogyakarta turned out to be a lone wolf, who was striving to prove his commitment to jihadist ideology after failing to become a member of ISIL.[16]

What emerges is that terrorists tend to prefer outdoor attacks. Therefore, the surrounding environment of places of worship need to be integrated as well in security plans for religious sites. Since bombing was predominantly chosen in the incidents analysed, it is highly advisable to raise the awareness of staff and congregations regarding suspicious objects placed in or near churches and develop protocols for handling such incidents.

### Weapons Used in the Attacks

Explosive devices are designed to destroy or damage structures and incapacitate people.[17] Due to the difficulty to obtain military explosives, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have become the weapon of choice for most terrorists. A wide variety of ingredients for the construction of IEDs are available. The commercial availability of dual-use products, together with practical instructions on the Internet on how to construct explosive devices substantially increase the prevalence of more or less primitive IEDs. Using an IED in an attack offers various operational advantages for the offenders, including staying at some distance from the target while having remote control of the device and its timing. In the following graph, a separate column has been created for pipe bombs, as it is much easier to construct this type of IED. It indicates also that the perpetrator has a low level of operational expertise. A fragmentation grenade is thrown by hand and therefore requires greater closeness to the target audience.[18] Assaults involving firearms and bladed weapons were committed only in three out of the 26 investigated incidents. As indicated above, Protestant extremists in Northern Ireland were responsible for all three church arson incidents.[19] Their targeting clearly reflected the focus of their wrath.[20]
The weapons used in incidents reflect on both their technical capabilities and their ideologies. A better understanding of arms acquisition constitutes an elemental factor in any risk assessment process. Taking into consideration that IEDs were deployed in the vast majority of the 26 incidents examined, there is an obvious need for training on detecting such devices. Signs left behind by the perpetrator can be identified with developed observation skills.[21] Advanced detection techniques can assist in the identification of offenders despite camouflage attempts. Pre-operational surveillance actions are usually crucial for perpetrators; at the same time, these can be noticeable for observant churches’ staff.

**Perpetrators and Their Motivations**

Religious extremist ideologies motivated the majority of cases in our sample. In 14 out of the 26 incidents, a designated Islamic terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack. Islamic extremists not belonging to a proscribed terrorist organization were the perpetrators in two other plots.[22] Other religious extremist ideologies inspired only a very small number of attacks. While Protestants[23] used intentional violence in three incidents, Hindu extremists and Rastas were responsible for one each.

It is notable here that in roughly 15% of the incidents perpetrators remain unknown. In these four cases there were no fatalities and the damage to the churches caused by the blasts was minor.[24]

In the vast majority of the examined cases, the cause that motivated the terrorists was related to their ideological and/or political objectives. Targeting Christian places of worship reflected sectarian violence,[25] Irish nationalism,[26] Hindu extremism[27] and Islamic terrorism[28] as well as extremist ideologists of sects.[29]

There were, however, four cases when an individual claim—outside, or only partly related to a terrorist organization’s political or ideological objective—provided the rationale for a plot. In these instances, special claims (a demand for the release of jailed comrades,[30] perpetrators’ beliefs,[31] a search for a hiding suspect[32] or an extortion demand[33]) constituted the reason for the acts. In the remaining two cases, lone actors’ idiosyncratic claims[34] explain their motivation.

To better understand the risk posed by violent extremist groups, it is of great importance to know more about the ideological objectives used to justify their actions. Exploring their ideological perspectives can help to better evaluate certain rogue entities and determine the associated risk. Risk is contextual[35] and ideological doctrines are essential components of this context. At the same time, scrutinizing prior attacks allows for a
more accurate prediction of likely future violence, for a better identification of plausible attack scenarios as well as for the development of more effective countermeasures.

**Preventative Measures Taken**

In the cases under consideration here, preventative actions were given particular attention only when there had been prior attacks on the same church or when there was a warning of an impending threat that had been communicated in advance. It is also notable, however, that in a considerable number of cases—regardless of a prior warning signal or of advance intelligence—no preventive measures were taken to tighten security.

As the information in the chart below demonstrates, two-thirds of preventative measures put in place were physical security-related actions (installed grilles, padlocks, reinforced glasses, barriers, having police patrolling at the entrance of the church.) There were only two incidents when the immediate threat of an attack induced preparatory acts by the targeted congregation. In one of these cases priests took up 24/7 watch positions so that they could immediately alarm authorities in case of an impending attack and in the other case, church services were rescheduled to outmanoeuvre the potential assailants.

Preventative measures serve to deter, detect or delay potential attacks. A proactive security concept should not only involve physical security arrangements but also human vigilance. Preventative instruments and mechanisms should be integrated into the security system around religious sites.

**Reactive Measures Taken**

Reactive actions can be examined with an eye on two aspects: temporal scope and personal scope. Half of the response measures taken were meant to have only a short-term impact. Evacuating target churches, intensifying security with targeted patrols and imposing 24-hour curfews and bag searches were the most common initiatives taken after an attack. Their aim was to reduce the chance of a second blast, manage the crisis situation and thereby diminish other, potential harmful consequences; but they were not intended to involve new security arrangements.
It was exceptional for medium-term impact measures to be introduced. In the three cases where this occurred, the ultimate goal of the initiatives was to control the tense local situation, but not to address the root causes of the phenomenon. Cancelling religious events[44] served to diminish the short-term risk of a confrontation. Importantly, these measures did not intend to strategically address the threat of a similar attack occurring in the future.

Another observation is that only the most recent incidents (2015–2019) induced national-level strategic responses to attacks against Christian communities. Efforts aiming to tighten the security of churches,[45] exploring ways to increase public safety during services,[46] articulating the need to address radicalization,[47] programs for firearm control[48] and imposing immigration restrictions to prevent the entry of foreign terrorist elements[49]—all these intended to address the threat from a broader perspective.

Reactive measures were imposed in 15 out of the 26 examined incidents. As the table below indicates, most frequently local security agencies were the addressees of these responsive actions.

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<th>Incident number</th>
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<td>Local security agencies</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Local Christian community</td>
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From the above it follows that not only preventive measures, but also the response to acts of violence should be addressed in emergency security plans. Such arrangements ought to be determined in accordance with the outcome of periodic risk assessments. The effectiveness of crisis management operations can be enhanced by having protocols for communication with emergency services in place. These should be refreshed and updated by regular joint exercises with local law enforcement entities to reduce the reaction time.

### Spontaneous Self-Defence by Victims and Bystanders

Spontaneous self-defence actions by victims or bystanders were noted in only four out of the 26 incidents. Obviously, an attacker’s modus operandi substantially determines whether there is any chance for such reactions. In case of a remotely controlled explosion, for instance, it is highly unlikely that the injured victim or bystander can intervene in a meaningful way. In two of the cases investigated, people at the crime scene attempted to
bring the set fires under control.[50] In another incident, victims took actions to defend themselves and their family members when an assailant equipped with a sword was attacking people in the St. Lidwina Catholic Church, in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.[51] Only in one case did bystanders confront attackers to restrain them.[52]

Community outreach programs can increase situational awareness among the public. Once members of a congregation or other local residents have received training on applicable protocols in case of a terrorist attack, the fear and panic that such incidents aim to induce will be arguably less.

**Conclusion**

This Research Note has sought to bring a better understanding to the threat posed by violent non-state actors to Christian houses of worship. By analysing 26 incidents, some countermeasures can be suggested.

In an effort to harden the soft-target nature of religious sites, a first step is to develop and cultivate a security-oriented mindset.[53] To be able to develop a sound security plan, a risk-based approach is needed.[54] The development of a comprehensive threat landscape exploration[55] is a prerequisite for the identification and prioritization of risks. To do so, information and intelligence from various sources should be brought together. Stakeholder partnerships and lessons learned from past incidents are of paramount importance. Any threat analysis should keep pace with the evolving nature of threats and with new risks linked to emerging technologies.[56] Therefore, risks should be reassessed periodically, especially with regard to high-profile religious events (Easter, Christmas). Ultimately, risk management must be based on the results of consecutive rounds of risk assessments.

Idiosyncrasies of a place of worship need to be taken into account when designing a security system. In line with this, concentric circles of defence[57] are to be created to find a delicate balance between the inherently open nature of such places and the need for an enhanced level of security.[58] Applying a combination of multiple security measures in a defence-in-depth model[59] ensures that an attacker who manages to penetrate one layer of defence may still be intercepted by a subsequent layer. Gathering intelligence from all sources is a first step. Engaging in proactive security measures such as installing surveillance cameras and having security officers in place constitutes a second defensive layer. Bearing in mind that most of the attacks on Christian places of worship occurred outside the churches, the direct environment of places of worship must be given particular attention.

Identifying and locating suspicious activities and objects through detection forms the third defensive layer. Taking into account that bombing has been the most common mode of operation, teaching personnel how to recognize and handle a suspected explosive device is vital. In the same vein, it is important to establish appropriate physical security measures to prevent the planting of an explosive device. For instance, trash bins on the premises should be kept locked, parked cars should be kept at a safe distance, and plants and trees should be trimmed to make the placing of explosives more difficult.[60] Similarly, assuming that perpetrators...
engage in preoperational surveillance operations, an efficient CCTV system ought to be in place.

Defensive layers ought to make an intruder’s entry more difficult and, to the extent that these are visible, also act as a deterrent since these give the appearance of a secured facility. Since in a traditional religious service all worshippers face the altar, it is necessary to ensure that the entrance in their back is always under surveillance. Innovations provided by new and emerging technologies[61] should be applied in target-hardening efforts. It is, however, not enough to install an integrated security system; its operation should be regularly maintained and fine-tuned in line with changing threat levels. It must also be kept in mind that physical security measures require well-trained staff who are able to operate technical defence mechanisms professionally.[62] Implementing extensive security measures, however, presumes the availability of a corresponding financial budget. To reduce budgetary constraints,[63] there is a need to find appropriate funding for maintaining and upgrading security measures.[64] This can be addressed, at least in part, with the mobilization of volunteers as in the ‘Church Watch Programs’[65] designed to improve a congregation’s safety and security.[66]

Additional active security measures need to be in place should the first layers of defence fail to prevent or deter attacks on a church. Security plans should entail actions not only to thwart a plot but also to minimize the potential consequences of a completed attack. In line with this, action plans should define the role of the emergency response team, and involve procedures for evacuating the building as well as for crisis communication with the respective authorities. And lastly, a well-structured training program should raise security personnel’s and churchgoers’ awareness on the features of any newly adopted security strategy.[67]

Unfortunately, in many cases perpetrators are unlikely to encounter much resistance. This is because, on one hand, places of worship generally do not have the capacity to strike back on attackers[68] and, on the other hand, government agencies will rarely have the capacity to ensure the constant security for all places of worship.[69] With this in mind, the protection of Christian places of worship is a “shared responsibility”.[70] Developing strong, collaborative working relationships among all stakeholders can reduce the risk of an attack.[71]

Regular consulting between operators of religious sites and local police will enhance security.[72] Organizing joint training sessions and engaging in scenario-based exercises (including red teaming)[73] can equip the security personnel of religious sites with relevant skills, gauge their crisis readiness and help identify existing operational gaps in their security systems. To resolve budgetary constraints for upgrading existing security arrangements, building liaisons with law enforcement agencies can also provide information for religious sites on grants they might be eligible for. Establishing communication channels with emergency services can considerably improve timely reporting of an attack. Local police can improve crisis management capabilities by gaining familiarity with the in-house security arrangements of local religious communities.[74] It is, however, of great importance to emphasize that measures taken by private entities to tighten the security of soft targets should complement and never substitute official security arrangements by law enforcement agencies.[75]

Involving the public in efforts to enhance security is another building block to enhance security. For this, the observational skills and the security consciousness of the public in general and the churchgoers in particular need to be developed.[76] Community outreach programs and initiatives encouraging greater engagement of churchgoers can ensure a better situational awareness as well as inform individuals on protocols on how to promptly report noticed suspicious activities.[77] Accordingly, besides staying vigilant it is also important to embed the habit of “say something if you see something.”[78] It is important to stress that enhancing a culture of security awareness[79] should not make people fearful and paranoid, but should make them resilient. Being prepared and trained to handle a terrorist attack on a religious institution should in the end decrease the panic an attack can trigger.

In addition, one should broaden the scope of public-private partnerships with other religious communities. Inter-faith dialogue between the top of religious hierarchies can also contribute to building trust between Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus and other religions, thereby reducing polarization at the bottom. The necessity of strengthening the security features of places of worship has already been stressed by leaders of various faith communities. Several public safety programs[80] seek to prevent violent attacks on places of worship. Therefore, it is highly advisable to consult with other religious communities and learn about their
protection efforts and the challenges they face.

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Notes


[4] Attack occurred in United Kingdom, Yemen, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pakistan, Italy, Philippines, India, St. Lucia, Bangladesh, Venezuela, Iraq, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, United States, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Jamaica, Latvia, Turkey, Nepal, Australia, Chile, and Sri Lanka. Sources for this information: The Global Terrorism Database (START, University of Maryland) and 'Sri Lanka attacks: Easter Sunday bombing marked one year on,' BBC, 21 April 2020, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52357200


[9] Religious sites are only one type of soft targets, therefore to be able to compare fatality rates of plots against soft and hardened targets, a specific type of a so-called hardened spot (police station) has been chosen for the analysis. To ensure a consistent comparison between incidents on houses of worship and police-related facilities, the same basic criteria have been used for both types of targets during the same time period (1998–2018) in the same countries (Central African Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) committed against government, military and police targets by the same perpetrator groups (Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF), International Solidarity, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
(ISIL), Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Union for Peace in Central Africa (UPC). The Global Terrorism Database (START, University of Maryland) provided the incident data for this analysis.


[31] ‘St. Lucia Church Assailants Contend They Were Fighting Corruption,’ The Washington Post, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/02/st-lucia-church-assailants-contend-they-were-fighting-corruption/181fb5a9-738c-4b28-9949-78d1e27ada9c/
CAIN Web Service, 'A Draft Chronology of the Conflict'; URL: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch01.htm


[71] An outstanding example of such collaboration is the SAFE Washington concept where Jewish agencies and law enforcement cooperate closely; URL: https://www.safewashington.com/


[73] Yang, Calvin (2020) 'New programme to prepare religious groups to handle crisis, including teaching members of first-aid


Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave?

By Vincent A. Auger

Abstract

Violence committed by individuals and groups inspired by far-right ideologies is increasingly seen as a transnational threat. There is an urgent need to better understand why this type of terrorism has become more frequent and how far-right groups operate within and across borders. One promising avenue of analysis is the concept of “waves of terrorism,” pioneered by David C. Rapoport. Rapoport argued that the emergence of distinctive types of terrorist activity in different historical periods could be explained by new underlying political and ideological forces. Rapoport identified four “waves” of terrorist activity since the late 19th century. Does right-wing violence constitute a fifth global wave? This research note evaluates the utility of the “waves of terrorism” argument for understanding right-wing terrorism.

Keywords: right-wing terrorism, white supremacism, waves of terrorism, David C. Rapoport

In March 2019, a gunman in New Zealand livestreamed his attack on two mosques, during which he killed 50 people. The killer was Australian, and his “manifesto” explaining his actions referenced a Norwegian neo-Nazi and European ideologues who fear the extinction of the white race. In August 2019, a man in El Paso, Texas killed 22 people in a Walmart, allegedly to stop a “Hispanic invasion” of the United States. Two months later, an anti-Semite livestreamed his attempt to attack a synagogue in Halle, Germany; failing to gain entrance to the place of worship, he randomly killed two pedestrians. And in February 2020, a right-wing extremist killed nine in a shooting rampage in Hanau, Germany.

These incidents, horrific as they are individually, are part of a broader pattern—a significant growth in far-right terrorism (especially white supremacist/nationalist terror) in recent years, across Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. According to an analysis by the Institute for Economics and Peace, there has been a surge in far-right terror incidents since 2010, with a 320% increase between 2014 and 2018.[1]

Jihadist attacks continue to kill more people in Europe, but right-wing extremists in Europe and the U.S. have conducted more attacks and there has been a significant increase in deaths attributed to far-right terror since 2010.[2] An analysis by the group New America shows a sharp increase in far-right terrorism within the United States beginning in 2009–10, with far-right terrorists responsible for more deaths than jihadists since 2008. [3]

In early February 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified that “racially/ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs)” are “the top threat we face from domestic violent extremists.” after the Hanau attack, the German justice minister declared that “Far-right terror is the biggest threat to our democracy right now.”[4]

Might this increase in right-wing violence indicate the emergence of a new “wave” of terrorism, as David C. Rapoport defined it almost 20 years ago? Can we use Rapoport’s criteria to evaluate the evolving nature of, and prospects for, far-right terror? This paper will first discuss Rapoport’s theory of waves of terrorism. The paper will then examine whether the recent surge in far-right terrorism fits Rapoport’s concept of a terrorist wave.

Rapoport’s Wave Theory of Terrorism

Rapoport contends that “modern” terrorism began in the late nineteenth century and has distinctive characteristics. He asserts that “time and the changing character of the international political context…gives terrorism a cyclical character.”[5] He termed this a “wave,” defined as

a cycle of activity in a given time period—a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a
common predominant energy.\[6\]

For Rapoport, that “energy” takes the form of an ideology that gains special preeminence, triggered by “unanticipated international political transformations” that expose vulnerabilities in the existing order or that appear to create opportunities for radical change.\[7\] Rapoport does not argue that every group inspired by this energy pursues the exact same goals; rather, he suggests that “local aims are common in all waves, but the crucial fact is that other states are simultaneously experiencing similar activities.”\[8\] When that ideology can no longer generate the formation of new organizations, the wave dissipates. Rapoport suggests that waves last “approximately a generation,” about 40 years.\[9\]

Rapoport identifies four waves of modern terrorism. The “anarchist” wave began in the 1870s, spurred by democratic and egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution, and lasted until the beginning of the First World War. This was followed by an “anti-colonial”/nationalist wave that embraced the post–World War I ideal of national self-determination; according to Rapoport, this wave was dominant from the 1920s through the 1960s. A “leftist” wave, inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology and reaction against the Vietnam War, lasted from the 1960s until the 1980s. Finally, since 1979, a “religious” wave of terrorism has existed, initiated by several developments in the Muslim world, especially the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Rapoport argued that this religious wave is merely the latest phase of modern terrorism, and that he expects that a new wave will eventually emerge:

> The world of politics always produces large issues to stimulate terrorists who regularly invent new ways to deal with them. What makes the pattern so interesting and frightening is that the issues emerge unexpectedly—or, at least, no one has been able to anticipate their tragic course.\[10\]

While Rapoport did not speculate about the nature of the next wave of terror, other scholars have offered ideas of what it might look like. D. K. Gupta suggests that if a fifth wave arrives, it “should exhibit a collective consciousness based on ethno-nationalism, religious identity, or economic class. In all probability it would contain elements of all three.”\[11\] Jeffrey Kaplan suggested that the fifth wave would be composed of ethnic utopians trying to remake their societies, following the example of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge.\[12\] Jeffrey Simon asserts that no single ideology will dominate a fifth wave, but instead a “Technological Wave” will emerge, characterized by “lone operators” using the internet, cyber tools, and weapons of mass destruction to wreak havoc.\[13\] More recently, Honig and Yahel argue that “terrorist semi-states” that control territory but continue to launch terrorist attacks internationally (such as the Islamic State) may be the next wave.\[14\]

While each of these suggestions is plausible, right-wing terror should also be considered as a possible fifth wave, given the recent surge in far-right violence. Does far-right terrorism meet Rapoport’s criteria for this new wave? Is there a clear expansion in that type of terrorism? Is it transnational in character? Is it motivated by an ideology which is identifiable and distinct? Does it differ from earlier forms of right-wing terror? Is it distinguishable from the fourth, religious wave of terrorism?

**Defining Right-Wing Terrorism**

What is right-wing terrorism? There are many definitions of the far-right, and scholars have offered a variety of ways of thinking about this form of terror. The Institute for Economics & Peace provides a useful summary of the major components of the far-right:

> ‘Far-right’ refers to a political ideology that is centred on one or more of the following elements: strident nationalism (usually racial or exclusivist in some fashion), fascism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration, chauvinism, nativism, and xenophobia.\[15\]

Given these disparate elements, Daniel Byman suggests that “right-wing terrorism should be seen as a label of convenience that lumps together various causes.”\[16\] Daniel Koehler also agrees that right-wing extremism is best viewed as a “family of ideologies.”\[17\] Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal identify three “families”
of far-right political movements (cultural nationalists, ethnic nationalists, and racial nationalists), while acknowledging that some groups or individuals may embrace more than one of these identities.[18] Perhaps the most useful summary of these ways of understanding far-right terrorism comes from Koehler:

> the term right-wing extremism covers a broad range of ideologies that essentially see violence as a legitimate tool to combat a political and ethnic ‘enemy’ (including individuals with different culture, religion, nationality or sexual orientation) seen as a threat to the (sic) own race or nation.[19]

Within this right-wing ideological stew, recent data suggest that white supremacists are particularly dangerous.[20] Bjørgo and Ravndal argue that “adherents of racial nationalism, such as neo-Nazis, fascists and white supremacists, figure high among perpetrators of extreme-right violence” and that “racial enemies” were the target of a majority of deadly attacks in Russia and Western Europe.[21] A recent report from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) indicates that 65% of far-right extremists in the U.S. between 1948–2018 espoused a white supremacist ideology.[22] During the period 2009–2018, white supremacists were responsible for 76% of far-right extremist killings in the United States, while anti-government extremists were responsible for 19%.[23] An analysis by START found that white supremacists were responsible for 71.4% of “ideologically motivated homicides committed by Far-Right Extremists” between 2010–2018, with that percentage increasing to 84% for the 2015–2018 timeframe.[24] Parkin, Freilich and Chermak similarly find that white supremacists committed 75% of far-right homicides in 2017.[25]

Finally, it is important to note methodological difficulties in the study of right-wing terrorism. Most databases attempt to discern a dominant ideological orientation of a particular attacker, and to differentiate between hate crimes and terrorism.[26] Since analysts may use different criteria for making these determinations, this inevitably leads to differences in specific numbers of attacks and perpetrators in different studies; however, what is notable is that the basic trends and rough percentages of attacks carried out by far-right extremists are consistent across most studies.[27]

**Right-Wing Terror: A Fifth Wave?**

Does recent right-wing terror constitute a fifth wave of terrorism? Rapoport himself was unconvinced. Writing in 2016, he responded to critiques that he did not account sufficiently for right-wing terrorism:

> How do Right-Wing groups fit into the wave process? Right-Wing groups have been present in every wave. Usually...they fight against wave groups. U.S. Christian groups are part of the Religious Wave. [28]

Rapoport’s argument suggests that rather than a new wave, there are two alternative (although somewhat contradictory) ways to characterize right-wing terrorism: modern right-wing terror is really part of the fourth, religious wave of terrorism; or that it is merely a continuation of long-standing right-wing groups (and that those groups engage in what might be called “non-wave” or “counter-wave” types of terrorism).

To assess these alternatives, it is first necessary to discuss whether right-wing terror has the required characteristics of a wave. Then the argument that right-wing terror is part of the fourth wave will be evaluated. Finally, the contention that modern right-wing terror is simply a continuation of earlier, “non-wave” far-right violence is analyzed.

**A new wave?**

Does right-wing terrorism meet Rapoport’s criteria for a wave? Has there been an expansion of activity? Is there an identifiable cause of this expansion? Does this terrorism have an international character? Does it have a “common predominant energy” or ideology? The evidence supports the argument that right-wing terror does meet the criteria for a wave.
An expansion of activity: As discussed earlier, almost all measures of far-right terrorism show a significant increase in violent incidents over the past 10–15 years, although the number of right-wing attacks resulting in fatalities has fluctuated.[29] Koehler, for example, documents a sharp rise in right-wing attacks against refugees and mosques in Germany from 2013–15.[30] The data also indicate more organizing and recruiting activities by the far-right, especially using social media, during this period.[31]

A triggering cause: The “unanticipated international political transformation” that has triggered the rise in far-right violence in North America, Western Europe and Australia is the rise in right-wing and populist political movements and concern about rising levels of immigration.[32] Koehler argues convincingly that the Syrian refugee crisis sharply increased violence in Europe since 2012 against immigrants.[33] Two European officials who supported liberal immigration and asylum policies were assassinated. Jo Cox, a Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom, was murdered in June 2016 by a white supremacist who considered Cox a “collaborator” bringing non-whites to Britain.[34] Three years later an official in Germany, Walter Luebcke, was killed by a neo-Nazi opposed to German immigration policies.[35] In Australia, a combination of the perception of increased numbers of Muslim immigrants and the spread of European white supremacist ideology has played an important role.[36] The rise of right-wing political movements and political leaders has provided “mainstreaming” for right-wing views, encouraging extremists to believe that violence would be more acceptable and less risky.[37]

Political developments in the U.S. may also have played a significant role in the recent rise in right-wing terrorism. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned in April 2009 that the election of Barack Obama and the economic recession were being used by right-wing groups in the U.S. to increase their recruiting and propaganda activity.[38] Eight years later, the election of Donald Trump was welcomed by many white supremacists in the U.S. as validation of their worldview.[39] Some—such as the terrorist who attacked a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, in response to “the Hispanic invasion of Texas”—consciously echoed the president’s anti-immigrant rhetoric.[40] In Europe also, the election of Trump was seen by some on the far-right as part of a global movement in support of their views.[41]

An international character: The recent expansion of right-wing terrorism is clearly transnational in nature. The fact that there are variations in frequency of attacks, in the nature of the targets or in the specific tactics used in different areas of the world is not significant in determining the transnational nature of the wave; as Rapoport argued, “local aims are common in all waves, but the crucial fact is that other states are simultaneously experiencing similar activities.”[42]

There is little doubt that many right-wing terrorists see themselves as engaged in a transnational struggle. Far-right terrorists invoke predecessors in other countries in justification of their own actions. Anders Breivik, whose 2011 attack in Norway killed 77, is cited as an inspiration by many white supremacists around the world.[43] Crawford and Keen point out that the perpetrator of the Hanau terrorist attack posted a YouTube video in English, specifically addressing an American audience, demonstrating his “intentions to reach a global audience.”[44] Caniglia, Winkler and Metais argue that the attacks in Halle and Hanau were inspired by the attacks in New Zealand and El Paso and that they “signal a global interrelation between far-right extremists’ behavior” and are evidence of “a world-wide, rapidly expanding network of far-right, neo-Nazi, and white supremacy extremists.”[45] Analysts also point to the involvement of some far-right “foreign fighters” in the Ukraine as further evidence of the transnational nature of the movement.[46]

A “common predominant energy”: As Bruce Hoffman pointed out in 1982, right-wing extremists have long been motivated by a hatred of liberal democracy and a desire to create a state “based on authoritarian rule, intense nationalism, and racial purity.”[47] While this goal is still important, in recent years it has been supplemented by the perception of a mortal threat: the impending “great replacement” or genocide of the white race. This is a belief that “white people are at risk of being wiped out through migration, miscegenation or violence.”[48] Western elites (often characterized as globalizers and/or Jews) are seen as complicit in this genocide by promoting increased immigration and multiculturalism.[49] These ideas have been referenced by several recent far-right terrorists in the “manifestos” that they posted just before they conducted their attacks.
Far-right ideology also offers a solution to the danger of “white genocide.” The use of violence is intended to intimidate enemies and to stop immigration, but more broadly it is intended to “awaken” the white race to the danger it faces. The ultimate goal is to provoke a resolution to the crisis: a race war, leading to an ethnically pure white/Aryan homeland.

Part of the religious wave?

Rapoport argued that right-wing terror—or at least terror conducted by “U.S. Christian groups”—is part of the religious wave. But how should we distinguish between “religious” and nonreligious terror groups? While many types of groups have a particular religious tradition as part of their ethnic or racial identity (including second wave groups such as the Irgun or the Irish Republican Army), Heather Gregg has convincingly argued that truly religious groups have unique goals—instigating the apocalypse, creating a theocracy, or cleansing a territory of other religions—that are not shared by nonreligious groups.[50] Similarly, Jones et. al. define religious terrorism as “violence in support of a faith-based belief system.”[51] The relevant question is whether modern far-right terrorists are “religious terrorists” in this sense.

Religious ideology was certainly important for many American right-wing groups in the past. Studies by Bruce Hoffman and Kathleen Belew clearly demonstrated the importance of Christian theology for many far-right groups in the United States from the 1970s and 1990s, including militias, the Christian Patriot and Christian Identity movements, and the Aryan Nations.[52] Religious justification for violence may still be important for some on the far-right today.

But even if Christian theology was central to the ideology of the far-right in America (it was never as important for many European far-right groups), that is not necessarily the case today. Paul Jackson argues that some neo-Nazis now view Christianity as “outdated and irrelevant” to their movement.[53] Hoffman suggests that the far-right in the U.S. is changing, and is less focused on Christian theology or identity. He quotes an analyst of these groups: “The neo-Nazi types of the late 1980s to 2000 are being replaced by Nationalists concerned about immigration—and they are wearing suits and square-rimmed glasses rather than combat boots and red suspenders.”[54] Other studies also suggest that as far-right groups internationalize their operations, “a melding of agendas from different communities” occurs, leading to less salience for Christian Identity theology. [55] Perhaps reflecting this evolution, in detailed discussions of how to define right-wing terror, neither Jones nor Freilich identify modern right-wing terrorists as religious in nature.[56]

Many on the far-right continue to use Christian language and symbols (such as references to the Crusades), but this history is appropriated mostly for recruiting and propaganda purposes.[57] For many on the far-right, Christianity is certainly part of their ethnic or racial identity, just as Catholicism and Protestantism are crucial to the identity of Northern Irish Republicans and Loyalists. But just as the IRA are not considered religious terrorists, neither should modern right-wing extremists.

Finally, the fact that the fourth wave may still be underway does not disqualify right-wing terror from consideration as a distinct wave. Rapoport’s discussion of waves implied that each wave would follow its predecessor in succession, but the empirical analysis by Rasler and Thompson demonstrates that waves often overlap. They show that the third (leftist) wave was completely coincident with both the final 25 years of the second (anti-colonial/nationalist) wave and the first 15 years of the fourth (religious) wave, and that the second and fourth waves also had considerable overlap.[58] It is therefore perfectly consistent with Rapoport’s wave framework that a fifth wave may have begun during the fourth wave.

Non-wave terrorism?

Is far-right terrorism “non-wave”—a form of terror that exists outside the wave framework but has been “present in every wave”, according to Rapoport? This would suggest that modern right-wing terror is not a new phenomenon, is little different than it was in the past, and cannot be considered a wave.
It is indisputable that far-right terrorists have been active in Europe, North America and Australia for many decades. Rapoport points to the Ku Klux Klan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Transnational neo-Nazi groups have been active since at least the 1960s.[59] From 1990–99, white supremacists were responsible for 78% of far-right ideologically motivated homicides in the U.S., and they killed as almost many people in that decade (79) as they did from 2000–18 (87) (many more if the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing is included). [60] European right-wing terror has also been motivated by anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic ideas well before 2009; in 1980, far-right extremists were responsible for mass casualty attacks in Bologna, Munich and Paris. [61]

But to dismiss right-wing terror as unchanged, and therefore incapable of having wave characteristics, is to ignore some important developments in the nature of far-right terrorism in the past decade. Two issues deserve attention: changes in the way violence is used, and the new role of social media in transnational right-wing networks.

With notable exceptions such as Bologna and Oklahoma City, right-wing terrorism in the past was “high frequency but low intensity”: there were many incidents but few fatalities.[62] Koehler observed that right-wing terror attacks “usually do not attempt to inflict indiscriminate mass casualties.”[63] He also noted that far-right terrorists rarely claimed credit for their attacks or explain their motives, suggesting that in the eyes of the perpetrators “right-wing attacks are often self-explanatory.”[64]

But recently, far-right terrorists have conducted or attempted more mass casualty attacks, setting “a novel standard for a new generation of extreme right terrorists.”[65] Perpetrators have also made a point of posting lengthy “manifestos” on the internet and even livestreaming their attacks to a global audience. Explanations for these frightening developments vary. Some analysts suggest that right-wing terrorists are emulating the methods of jihadist groups, while Crawford and Keen suggest that this new “gamification of mass violence” frames “terrorism as a competitive act” and “incentivize(s) violence as a way of generating subcultural status” among other far-right extremists.[66]

Social media and new technology are transforming the far-right in other ways. While use of the internet among right-wing extremists has existed for decades, social media may be qualitatively altering their self-identity and activities.[67] Hoffman argues that “the threat is evolving rapidly” as social media platforms “unite disparate, disgruntled individuals in an ideologically more cohesive echo chamber.”[68] In this context, “online platforms serve as nonstop, virtual white supremacist rallies where coordination can happen in real time, regardless of location.”[69] Koehler suggests that this facilitates “hive” terrorism, “committed by a spontaneously formed crowd that quickly disbands after the incident” (perhaps the terrorist equivalent of “flash mobs”).[70] More broadly, social media helps to enhance the perception of a global far-right movement with a unified purpose, so that a “challenge previously thought to be predominantly local is acquiring a transnational character.”[71]

Patterns of far-right terror in Europe and the U.S. provide some support for this conclusion. Consider the following graph, from the Institute for Economics & Peace:[72]
The data show that there were significant numbers of far-right terrorist incidents in both Western Europe and the U.S. from the 1970s to the 1990s. It is also clear that the timing and frequency of far-right terror differed in the two regions, with European incidents peaking considerably earlier than those in the U.S. These patterns are consistent with the idea that far-right terrorism was based on local factors, operating in the background of “wave terrorism.”

But the data from 2005–2018 seem to tell a different story. During this period, far-right terrorist activities in the U.S. and Western Europe have moved into synchronization. Might this be evidence of an emerging wave and a change from earlier patterns of far-right violence? It would be consistent with the evidence that white supremacist and other far-right groups in America and Europe are responding to similar concerns about immigration and white “replacement,” and that they are sharing their ideas and plans internationally. While these data are not definitive, they support the argument that a new wave of terrorism exists.

**Conclusion**

Considerable evidence and analysis support an argument that a fifth, far-right wave of global terrorism may be underway. What developments would weaken this argument? If far-right terror around the globe develops a more explicit religious character, that would support an alternative analysis that right-wing violence is part of the fourth wave. Similarly, if right-wing terrorism declines sharply even as immigration issues persist, that might indicate that the surge in far-right violence is a transient phenomenon based on local political conditions rather than a transnational wave. Future research should continue to examine evidence supporting the idea of a fifth wave, while also looking for those indicators that might disprove the argument.

If this argument is correct, however, governments will need to rethink how they deal with transnational right-wing terrorism. Many of the law enforcement and intelligence tools used against jihadism must be redirected towards right-wing terror, and states must share information and resources across borders in the face of a persistent transnational threat. For if this is a fifth wave, we may be dealing with an enhanced threat from right-wing terror for many years to come.

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Notes


[17] Daniel Koehler, ‘German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the “Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)”—DTG Project,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 8:5 (October 2014), pp. 50-51. Also


[26] For a useful discussion, see Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Jeff Gruenewald, William S. Parkin and Brent R. Klein, 'Patterns of Fatal Extreme-Right Crime in the United States,' *Perspectives on Terrorism* 12:6 (December 2018); Jacob Aasland Ravndal, 'Right-wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset,' *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10:3 (June 2016); ADL Center on Extremism (2019), op. cit. pp. 13-20; Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit. pp. 5-8


[29] For example, see Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit., pp. 7-8; Jones et. al, op. cit.


[51] Jones et. al., op. cit., p. 3.


[53] Paul Jackson, Transnational Neo-Nazism in the USA, United Kingdom, and Australia, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, February 2020, p. 15. URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/jackson%20-%20Transnational%20neo%20Nazi%20in%20the%20USA%2C%20United%20Kingdom%20and%20Australia.pdf


[55] Quote is from Byman, op. cit.; also see ADL Center on Extremism, Hate Beyond Borders: The Internationalization of White Supremacy (2019), accessed 20 December 2019. URL: https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/hate-beyond-borders-the-internationalization-of-white-supremacy; and ADL Center on Extremism, New Hate and Old, op. cit.

[56] Jones et. al., op. cit., p. 3; Freilich et. al., op. cit., p. 39.


[60] START (2018), op. cit.; also see William Parkin et. al., op. cit. Interestingly, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 (which killed 168 people) is usually excluded from these numbers, just as the September 11 attacks are often excluded from many statistics concerning jihadist terror in the U.S. In both cases, the justification for the exclusion is based on the somewhat unique and disproportionate nature of those events, as Parkin et. al. discuss.


[64] Koehler (2016), ibid, p. 98; also see Koehler (2014), op. cit., p. 56.

[65] Bjørgo and Ravndal, op. cit., p. 2.

[66] Crawford and Keen, op. cit., p. 4.


[69] Lewis, op. cit., p. 7.


[71] Caniglia et. al., op. cit., p. 1.

More Grist to the Mill? Reciprocal Radicalisation and Reactions to Terrorism in the Far-Right Digital Milieu

by Benjamin Lee and Kim Knott

Abstract

Reciprocal radicalisation is the theory that extremist organisations are connected and feed on one another’s rhetoric and actions to justify violent escalation. Recent empirical work has suggested that reciprocal radicalisation is a good deal more subtle than is often assumed, and is nuanced by organisational, social and political context. This study seeks to apply the theory of reciprocal radicalisation to the far-right digital milieu, an online space conceptualised as underpinning the varying physical manifestations of the far-right. Based on a qualitative thematic analysis of user posts in three far-right web forums, the study concludes that responses to ideologically opposed terrorism within the far-right milieu are often at odds with the assumed radicalising effects of terrorist attacks. While responses were not uniform, for many users in the far-right digital milieu, jihadist terrorism was an obvious and expected result of the wider failures of politics and society. Although there were some calls for violent reprisal, they were juxtaposed by non-violent responses which interpreted jihadist terror as a consequence and sign of societal decadence and political weakness around issues of migration and rights.

Keywords: far-right extremism, radicalisation, right-wing terrorism

Introduction

Extremism is frequently presented as a two-sided coin; extreme beliefs and actions in one group fuel a corresponding extremism in another. Recent work on reciprocal radicalisation and cumulative extremism has pointed out that relationships between extremists are often complex, and there has been a call for more conceptual clarity when discussing reciprocal radicalisation. Recent research suggests that greater attention should be paid to the wider political and social context, and to the various channels connecting opposing groups.[1]

Existing conceptions of the far-right tend to focus on named groups and hierarchical organisations at a time when far-right activism has increasingly manifested online. Although far-right groups and movements represent a core security challenge, this analysis suggests that the role of larger organisations in the far-right has changed. [2] Much far-right activism now takes place online over a series of digital platforms conceptualised loosely as a digital milieu. Rather than understanding supporters of the far-right as affiliated to specific groups or ideologies, we conceptualise far-right activism as more autonomous and fluid, with activists free to graze on a variety of ideologies and narratives offered digitally. Physical mobilisations represent the outward manifestation of a much larger and more inclusive digital space. So, while the reactions of groups and movements to ideological opponents are still of significance, there is an open question about how such opponents are understood and targeted in less organised digital spaces. The central research question of this analysis is, how do users in the far-right digital milieu react to terror attacks by militant jihadists?

We provide a qualitative thematic analysis of responses on three platforms representing differing factions within the far-right digital milieu.

- The Right Stuff Forum, an alt-right affiliated forum linked to the website and podcast host therightstuff.biz
- Gates of Vienna, an influential blog within counter jihadism
- Stormfront, a well-established white supremacist forum

Data is drawn from a series of terror attacks in the United Kingdom in 2017. These attacks were perpetrated by individuals belonging to religious and ethnic minorities to which the far-right is assumed to be hostile. Attacks were also indiscriminate and included victims who conformed to in-groups that the far-right claims to
represent (although these were defined differently in each space).

- 22 March 2017, Westminster attack
- 22 May 2017, Manchester Arena bombing
- 3 June 2017, attack in the London Bridge area

Analysis shows responses in far-right digital spaces to jihadist attacks were mixed. Rather than the explicit calls for escalation and matched violence that might have been anticipated in a fully two-directional relationship between far-right and jihadist extremism, commentators quickly integrated terror attacks into wider preestablished narratives that focused heavily on criticism of both the government and societal actors deemed to be weak in the face of threats from minorities. This is better explained by the older theory of split delegitimization than it is by reciprocal radicalisation.[3] This supports wider analyses that have begun to question the assumed links between extremisms.

**Reciprocal Radicalisation: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence**

The starting point for this analysis is the assumption that different forms of extremism, in this case jihadism and far-right extremism, are connected to one another and mirror actions on the opposing side. Reciprocal radicalisation has been identified by many names[4], including cumulative extremism[5], cumulative radicalisation[6], tit-for-tat radicalisation[7], co-radicalization[8], and interactive escalation.[9] The term reciprocal radicalisation is used here as it has become the preferred term for policy makers and featured briefly in the UK Government's 2015 counter-extremism strategy[10] as well as in the press.[11]

The original observation that led to the concept of cumulative extremism stemmed from Roger Eatwell's analysis of the 2001 riots in Northern England through the lens of the 2005 terrorist attack on London.[12] Among a list of issues he believed were leading to increased ethnic tensions, Eatwell noted the impact of 'extremist animosities fuelling each other':[13] Centring on Bradford, Eatwell suggested that the presence of far-right groups, including the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front, contributed to the formation of new forms of 'racial identity politics'. The theory was that the far-right's attempts at mobilisation in the area, centring on the Muslim other and in particular the statements of extremist preachers such as Abu Hamza, contributed to the violence.[14] On the other side, the BNP is identified as serving as a scapegoat for Muslim leaders, allowing them to avoid asking harder questions about the support for violence within their own community. These developments on both sides, Eatwell argued, contributed to a wider clash of civilisations narrative.

Likewise, the idea of escalations between competing extremist groups had been identified by other researchers in different contexts. Sprinzak's[15] analysis of the Israeli radical right for example included a description of the Jewish Underground's reactions to a series of Arab terror attacks, describing an 'outcry for revenge'.[16] The Jewish Underground went on to attack Arab mayors, a Muslim college in Hebron, and attempted to blow up five Arab buses.[17] In the realm of social movement theory, countermovements, including cases such as the pro-life movement in the US, are interpreted as arising in response to the perceived legislative successes of their opponents.[18] Countermovements are seen as issue-focused; they make competing claims on the state and seek coverage from the media.[19] A similar relational and dynamic approach explicitly grounded in social movement theory, from Alimi et al., has argued that radicalisation is about more than the risk factors associated with groups and emerges where the 'relational context' is supportive.[20] Work from 2017 has also demonstrated the need for nuance and context, where seemingly minor conflicts and frictions drive a broader radicalisation. Even minor brushes with the state, individuals or, in the context of reciprocal radicalisation, opposing groups, can contribute to the wider process of radicalisation.[21]

However, it was Eatwell's (2006) observation that caught the imagination of researchers. Goodwin[22] applied his thesis to the emergence of the English Defence League (EDL), a counter-jihad inspired street group that emerged following protest activities by the Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun.[23] Goodwin's account is explicit that the formation of the EDL in response constituted cumulative extremism. This is at odds somewhat with
Eatwell's original description of cumulative extremism in the context of violent clashes, seemingly expanding the concept to include the foundation of an organisation. This expansion of reciprocal radicalisation theory to encompass not only behaviour but organisational change was noted by Bartlett and Birdwell.[24] In support of this, they highlighted statements by the UK Prime Minister in response to the murder of Drummer Lee-Rigby, footage of the killers at an anti-EDL protest, as well as a separate foiled 2012 plot to attack an EDL rally.[25] Among the recommendations offered by Bartlett and Birdwell was to further develop the concept of reciprocal radicalisation by differentiating between increasing support for a group and escalation of tactics within already-established groups.

An intervention by Busher and Macklin called for specificity in the analysis of reciprocal radicalisation.[26] They walked back Eatwell's original idea, reframing it as focussing on 'interactional dynamics', but suggesting that more specificity was needed to explain why interactions between extremists very often did not result in any observable escalation. For Busher and Macklin, cumulative extremism relied too heavily on an isolated explanation, and their proposals served to root escalations in social, political and temporal contexts. Of particular interest in this study is the question of coupling between movements. Busher and Macklin noted that opposing movements can be coupled asymmetrically, and that they may not mirror one another directly but may instead remain within their own fixed repertoires of action. The push towards conceptualising reciprocal radicalisation as a more dynamic process influenced by the wider political and social context was further emphasised in a follow-up analysis by Busher and Macklin.[27]

The empirical evidence for reciprocal radicalisation has been mixed. The case for it has included a heavily reported connection between terror attacks and hate-crime against minorities.[28] Likewise, the manifestos of far-right terrorists have in some cases explicitly referenced violence by opposed groups.[29] Other studies have looked explicitly at the relationships between groups and movements, most notably the interlinkage between jihadists and the far-right. Holbrook analysed the English-language discourses of Islamists and the far-right, raising concerns that the militancy present in jihadist activism might work to shame far-right activists unable to match their ferocity.[30] Ebner's wide-ranging analysis of different forms of extremism argues that Neo-Nazism and Salafism are ideologically two sides of the same coin and notes references to one another's ideologues in rhetoric and the propensity of various outrages from both sides to act as recruiting sergeants in what Ebner calls a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'.[31]

By way of counterevidence, Macklin and Busher offered a historical analysis of mobilisations between fascists and anti-fascists over four distinct periods in the UK.[32] They noted the missing 'spirals of violence', suggesting that repertoires of action are relatively fixed, and that broader movement strategies, intra-movement dynamics, the state, and movement cultures, all factor into how movements respond to one another. In the case of the four waves identified by Macklin and Busher, violence occurred in short-lived spikes as opposed to perpetually escalating spirals. Carter took Northern Ireland as a historical example of movement-countermovement relationship in a situation in which movements were closely connected to wider sectarian interests within Northern Irish society.[33] While the fascist-anti-fascist mobilisations more commonly used as evidence of cumulative extremism provided a useful case study, neither movement commanded significant support from the wider community, as was the case in Northern Ireland.[34]

Taking the evidence together, the resulting picture is somewhat unclear. In some cases, extremist groups and actors undoubtedly see themselves as taking revenge for the outrages of ideological opponents. However, these connections have been seen to vary depending on the wider organisational, political and social contexts. In the case of fascist and anti-fascist mobilisations for example, groups have been largely unwilling to move away from their already-established patterns of behaviour. What follows identifies a new organisational context for the far-right and sets up the analysis that follows as a test, or more accurately an exploration, of reciprocal radicalisation theory in the context of a far-right digital milieu.

**The Far-Right Digital Milieu**

The far-right digital milieu as conceptualised here is a digital space that acts as a repository of far-right ideas and narratives, as well as providing a site of connections between a range of far-right factions. Although factions
may be ideologically differentiated, they are envisaged as sharing a dislike of both alien out-groups and the society and politics that is perceived to harbour them. Differing factions also share a distrust of mainstream social and political values they see as unfriendly towards shared far-right ideals. This paper seeks to identify the reactions in the far-right milieu to ideologically-opposed violence, and to test these against the expectations of the reciprocal radicalisation framework.

There has been a tendency to understand the far-right as a series of discrete organisations. An established traditional account of the far-right in the UK, for example, categorised organisations by their attitudes to political power.[35] The far-right was composed of distinctive coteries with little interest in political power, leagues and pressure groups seeking to exert indirect influence, and formally constituted parties that sought to contest elections. However, beneath these formal structures has always operated a more nebulous ‘milieu’ composed of influential figures and their audiences, often interacting through journals and interpersonal connections.[36]

Extreme and radical right authors, such as Louis Beam, argued that organisations would always be vulnerable to attack from outside and infiltration from within.[37] Academia too has continued to develop accounts of far-right organisation that portray it as increasingly flexible, fluid and hard to pin down.[38] Virchow[39] used the example of German neo-Nazi groups to put forward the idea of groupuscular organisation: many niche groups coordinated through informal contacts and shared sources of information.[40] More recent analysis of street groups has also drawn attention to informal modes of organisation and lack of hierarchy.[41] Explicit violence has also pointed to the limited role for organisations in explaining terrorism originating from the extreme right. Reviews of extreme-right attacks have often noted the increasing prevalence of so-called lone actors.[42]

Although formal organisations and physical mobilisations persist in the extreme and radical right, they have been joined by a fast-growing and more accessible network of influencers and activists online. Conceptualised here as the far-right digital milieu, this space encompasses the internet,[43] the world wide web[44] and social media.[45] Where the far-right presence has been removed from social media, there has been significant evidence of it organising on privacy-centric applications such as Discord or establishing new platforms such as Gab and Voat.

The concept of the digital milieu is intended to sit alongside hierarchical organisations, not replace them as a venue for far-right activism. However, the concept of a digital milieu better reflects the diminished role of organisation and the increased fluidity within the far-right. It draws in part on the idea of the radical milieu from terrorism studies as a space adjacent to terrorist movements where participation is possible without formal group membership, for example for the distribution of propaganda.[46] The radical milieu, as conceptualised by Waldmann and others, is probably too narrowly drawn, however, to encompass the entirety of far-right activism as it is deals explicitly with terrorism. In addition, it is based on an assumption that all actors are pulling in the same direction, which again is difficult to identify in the highly factionalised contemporary far-right.

A more fitting description comes from the work of Colin Campbell, specifically his conceptualisation of the cultic milieu. While the concept of a cultic milieu has been used as the basis for accounts of neo-Nazi occultism and the overlapping organisations of the US far-right, it also serves as a good basis for understanding the current far-right digital milieu.[47] Campbell observed a world of new religious movements and esoterica in which organisations were constantly emerging and collapsing and in which, for the most part, members showed a willingness to engage with one another and entertain their ideas. Where organisations did emerge, there was little expectation of loyalty from followers (except in revelatory cults). The common core, Campbell observed, was heterodoxy and opposition to mainstream thought, as well as a shared ideological commitment to seeking truth.[48] Similarly, the far-right digital milieu contains a range of ideological positions encompassing both the radical and the extreme. While some of these positions are incompatible, for example neo-Nazism and counter-jihadism, they have a shared dislike of the ‘liberal’ establishment as well as minority groups. Although anti-Semitism is a clear point of fracture, content critical of left-wing politics or Muslims for example may be well received in both factions. The resulting picture is one conceived here as the far-right digital milieu, composed of platforms, actors and mobilisations.
• The milieu is distributed across a range of **platforms**. This may include social media but can also include conventional websites and other platforms. Where discourse is too extreme for social media, actors will typically seek to move to other platforms.[49]

• Influencers are **actors** who seek to build a following within the milieu, frequently by creating content in the form of text, videos, or other items. In contrast, most rank and file actors within the milieu are passive, either reacting and sharing original content created by others, or consuming content without interacting.

• Where conditions are conducive, the far-right digital milieu may give rise to physical **mobilisations**. These can be collective e.g. street protests, political campaigning, and they can also be individual such as stickering campaigns and lone direct-action including violence.

Identifying the contemporary far-right as a digital milieus highlights five features of relevance to an analysis of reciprocal radicalisation. First, the digital milieu is potentially limitless in **size**. While physical mobilisations are limited by cost and geography, there are no such limits in the digital space. Any and all activists can potentially involve themselves in any and all areas of the milieu. Second, following directly from the scale of the milieu is the well-documented lack of respect for **geographic boundaries** in various manifestations of the far-right.[50] Ironically for ideologies built on nationalism, physical location within the milieu is often irrelevant. In the case of reciprocal radicalisation, which has its origins in local contests between groups, analysis needs to consider that activists may be contributing who are not even on the same continent.

Third, while physical participation is both costly in resources and risky for activists seeking to limit public exposure, activism within the digital milieu is relatively cheap and **low risk**. Activists can participate anonymously and largely free from the risk of reprisals for their actions or statements. Fourthly, the milieu is an **information space** (rather than a physical ‘meat space’) and so verifiable responses will likely be limited to rhetoric only, although the influence of the digital milieu on individuals and groups is an open question. Finally, the milieu is **inclusive**, allowing any would-be influencers to ‘have a go’ either through contributions on social media, forums, or discrete websites. While very few attain the dominant status of sites, such as The Right Stuff, Daily Stormer and Geller Report, these are simply the most visible superstructures of an enormous reservoir of potential influencers with their own platforms. In the context of interactive platforms such as web forums in particular, this means a single narrative strand is often difficult to extract from posts reacting to an event. While previous analysis has tended to focus on organisational responses, responses in a digital milieu are likely to be less coherent.

Overall, this creates an expectation that reciprocal radicalisation trends in the far-right digital milieu are likely to be harder to analyse than those identified in distinct groups and movements. Analysis is limited largely to communication rather than behavioural data and will need to accommodate a range of potential responses from a geographically and ideologically diverse population. However, taking this approach also prevents the problem of focusing solely on those relationships and reactions arising from discrete organisations, and thus missing a large component of contemporary far-right activism.

**Data and Methods**

To recap, reciprocal radicalisation embodies the idea that different forms of extremism will escalate their behaviours and rhetoric based on the actions of opposed groups. However, the empirical evidence thus far suggests that any analysis needs to take into account the broader context in which groups are operating. In this paper we look to a broader scale than organised groups or movements. Based on our conceptualisation of the far-right digital milieu, reactions to opposing extremist groups are expected to be less coherent, less inhibited by immediate risk, and to come from a wider range of geographical settings. What this paper now seeks to do is to analyse the reactions to oppositional extremist violence within the far-right milieu in the hope of understanding how well these reactions match up to the reciprocal radicalisation thesis.
Operationalising this requires focusing on the trends underpinning reciprocal radicalisation. The following framework was based in part on Benford and Snow's approach to frame analysis in social movement theory but adapted to fit the specific context of reciprocal radicalisation.[51] It was further developed on the basis of a pilot analysis of the data. The framework is in three parts, consisting of blame, victimisation and response.

- **Blame:** The primary consideration here is the way in which terrorism is characterised and who is held responsible for it. If the far-right digital milieu is in part motivated by responding to the actions of militant jihadists then we would expect a recognition within the milieu that militant jihadists are responsible for an attack and constitute a specific and recognisable opponent.

- **Victimisation:** A second analytical consideration is how activists within the milieu describe and interpret the victims of a terror attack. This factor has not yet been discussed explicitly in the reciprocal radicalisation literature. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that reciprocal radicalisation is in-part related to how victims are perceived. Sympathy with victims can be interpreted as an appropriate motivation and justification for a response. This question is thought to be particularly relevant to activists within the far-right, many of whom believe some sections of Western societies to be decadent, or culpable for terrorism in other ways, for example through support for immigration.

- **Response:** Lastly, the analysis seeks to capture discussion of potential responses to terror attacks. In the context of reciprocal radicalisation the main issue of interest here is discussions of violent responses and escalation. However, other forms of response and non-response will also be considered.

To be clear a qualitative and exploratory approach has been taken to the available data, with these themes being identified in the pilot phase and applied thereafter. The intention here has been to develop a better understanding of how the mechanics of reciprocal radicalisation play out in the far-right digital milieu. The aim of the paper has not been to produce a census of extreme-right views online, nor to identify a single dominant trend within a specific forum. Given our conceptualisation of the far-right digital milieu above, complex and conflicting views are to be expected.

This research focused specifically on comment data provided on three far-right, English language websites and forums in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. The sites were chosen on the basis of their prominence within contrasting factions of the milieu. We selected sites that were widely perceived as influential or important by activists themselves. This is not intended to be a comprehensive or systematic survey of far-right web presences.

**Table 1: Case selection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Faction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gates of Vienna</td>
<td><a href="http://gatesofvienna.net/">http://gatesofvienna.net/</a></td>
<td>Counter Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Right Stuff Forum</td>
<td><a href="https://forum.therightstuff.biz/category/82/news-current-events">https://forum.therightstuff.biz/category/82/news-current-events</a></td>
<td>Alt-Right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Jihadist terror attacks in the UK 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 March 2017</td>
<td>Westminster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 2017</td>
<td>Manchester Arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 June 2017</td>
<td>London Bridge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview of the Data

The comment data were rich and dense, but also messy. Responses to different attacks varied widely in scale. Gates of Vienna (GoV) is published as a blog and users can interact in the form of a comment. GoV tended to make multiple posts following an attack as a result of which the conversation in the comment section was diffused over different posts. In this case, the analysis was based on the first four posts dealing with an attack. Responses in both Stormfront (SF) and The Right Stuff Forum (TRSF), both organised as web forums, tended to coalesce around single large threads. In each case the largest thread was included in the analysis.

Table 3: Responses to posts on UK terror attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gates of Vienna (first four posts only)</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stormfront</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Right Stuff</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3 shows, SF was the most prolific of the sites, publishing 1,903 comments across the three events. GoV featured far fewer user comments, perhaps reflecting its organisation as a blog. TRSF was the most erratic of the forums. At the time of data collection, the comments relating to the Westminster attack were unavailable. The Manchester bombing generated an extensive discussion thread, while the London Bridge attack discussion was cursory. It is unclear if this was discussed in more depth on another part of the forum. The Manchester bombing, which took place immediately following a concert by Ariana Grande, generated the greatest reaction across all three sites. Looking at the discussion the merger of Jihadist violence with popular culture seemed to create a particularly powerful reaction.

Before turning to the analysis, it is important to stress the theoretical aspect of this case selection. The three sites are interpreted as distinct but not unified factions within the far-right digital milieu. They do not represent coherent movements or organisations, and the analysis does not seek to identify a definitive position on the blame for the attacks or what should be done as a consequence. Rather, this analysis aims to highlight the reasoning on display within these spaces and to suggest general trends.

In this vein, there are some headline trends on display in the data. First, users returned to threads multiple times. This was particularly so where significant new information came to light. On SF, several users emerged as key figures responding multiple times across the different attacks. This confirms previous observation of SF that argued for considering the site as a digital community.[52] However, it is also the case that individual users may post under multiple names. This means that the size of the datasets cannot be equated to the number of individual users posting; it is possible that relatively few users may be creating a large amount of material.[53]

Secondly, there were a large number of links to material on other sites. This included links to extremist media, for example commentary produced by influential figures within the far-right milieu. Where threads were
being updated in real time there was a much greater reliance on regular media. Despite the critical approach to the ‘mainstream media’ in the milieu, content in the milieu continues to be reliant on information made available through mainstream reporting that cannot be accomplished by smaller radical media producers. This coincides with previous observations of the role of extremist online networks in curating regular media content for supporters.[54]

Third, distinctive voices were on display in each of the spaces analysed. These coincided with the broader character of each faction. GoV, as a counter-jihadist blog, reflected a focus on civic values and a broader appeal for respectability and legitimacy.[55] TRSF reflected the more playful and outrageous tendencies of the alt-right, alongside posts more clearly intended to shock and demonstrate the user's edginess.[54] SF, as the oldest and seemingly largest space analysed, reflected a more traditional right-wing extremism. There was comparably greater emphasis on biological race in both TRSF and SF compared to GoV's more cultural take. Likewise, attempts to link violent Islamist terrorism to a Jewish conspiracy were absent from GoV, but present on both TRSF and SF.[56]

Lastly, discussions paid very little attention to geography. Although usernames often suggested a specific location (e.g. HailBritain) there was no way to confirm the locations of users posting. This is significant in the context of the far-right digital milieu, further supporting the idea that, despite the emphasis on nationalism inherent in far-right activism, the online space has fostered a more inclusive form of right-wing extremism that places greater emphasis on shared ethnicity (SF, TRSF) or culture (GoV) than nation states.

The following analysis reports findings based on the three aspects of reciprocal radicalisation developed above: the assignation of blame for terror attacks, the position of the victims of terror attacks, and attitudes towards future action.

**Blame**

Terrorism is calculated to produce an emotive response from target audiences.[57] Within the framework of reciprocal radicalisation, terrorist action can be viewed as one potentially escalatory pathway between extremist groups and individuals. For this to be the case, terrorist violence needs to be clearly linked to a target outgroup. For this relationship to hold true, then responses to jihadist terrorism on the far right need to be clearly linked to the perpetrating groups or those they claim to represent. In the case of IS-inspired terrorism, this was expected to manifest in attributing blame to both jihadist groups and generalised references to the Muslim population. In practice, the data showed blame attributed to a wide array of actors. These included Muslims as a group but also extended to wider society (including victims of attacks) and political leadership. Within these categories, as illustrated below, there were further degrees of nuance. There was relatively little discussion of named opposition groups.

**The Muslim Other**

Given the framing of much far-right activity as anti-Muslim, it is no surprise that the blame for terror attacks was attributed to Muslims as a group or Islam as a religion. This was demonstrated in several instances, often beginning with speculation before an attacker's identity was formally known:

‘… I don't mean ‘islamists’ or ‘radical moslems’, let’s be honest here, the problem is islam—plain, ordinary islam.’

:Peter35 GoV 23/5/2017

‘Ah, just the muslims, expressing their love for us with their weekly terrorist attack. When they are not raping our children, they are killing them.’

TenDollarBill SF 3/6/2017
The more alt-right orientated TRSF chose to make a joke out of the perceived routine nature of Islamist terror attacks. TRSF was notable for allowing users to embed images in their responses. User Wilhelm posted a commonly used image meme in the aftermath of the Manchester attack. The image was a still from the television show South Park with the caption ‘Let’s not jump to conclusions… Aaaand it’s Muslims.’ Another post on TRSF linked to a 44-second YouTube video composed entirely of British conspiracy theorist Paul Joseph Watson, repeating the phrase ‘imagine my shock.’ [58]

**Political Elites**

While the assumed identity of the attackers was enough to link terrorism to the presence of Muslims for most users, some also sought to suggest that jihadist violence was evidence of some deeper problem. These explanations existed along a spectrum, encompassing the simple incompetence of the political elites tasked with security at one end, and outright conspiracy at the other.

‘Oh dear….What will the Muslim brotherhood mayor of Londistan have to say.’

*Last Call, GoV, 22/3/17*

‘Unhinged violence like this results when traitorous politicians allow a flood of Third World scum to displace the native Whites.’

*PrairieSister, SF, 22/3/18*

‘Jew supremacists are behind these attacks and blame the Muslims. Ariana Grande is a Jew puppet. Look up “Ariana Grande Satanist”. The Satanic Jews that control Hollywood own her. She always dates negros to help push White genocide.’

*AmericaFree, SF, 22/5/2017*

‘Theresa May is a traitor. She’s not stupid, she’s not mistaken, she’s not unwilling to admit she was wrong — she’s a traitor. May is a traitor and a member of the traitor class. Not the ruling class, the traitor class. The awash in Saudi money traitor class. Which has a death grip on the levers of power in Great Britain and a near death grip on the levers of power here in the States.’

*Ricpic, GoV, 5/6/17*

**Society**

Blame for jihadist terrorism was also directed at society more generally. This manifested as claims that society was in some way either stupid or degenerate and thereby responsible for the terrorism visited upon it.

‘Britons are still at the flowers and tea candles stage of awareness.’

*Col. B. Bunny, GoV, 7/6/17*

‘Just go back to your football and kebabs. I just saw two white morons interviewed by some CNN gimp, and all these morons could do was try to be funny and giggle like brain-dead retards. They don’t even care.’

*Multiculturalism Sux, SF, 3/6/17*

In some cases, the failure of societies to recognise and deal with terrorism was interpreted as an inherent longing for societal collapse.

‘I sometimes go on the prepper forums and realise they are all wanting it to happen. Especially in Britain, this life of an overbearing Nanny who wants you to watch your football and reality TV, drink
your beer and shut up. People are longing for a collapse.’

Edgyshitlord, TRSF, 26/5/2017

**Victimisation**

A further consideration suggested by reciprocal radicalisation theory is the attitude to victims. The actions of an opposed group are implicitly assumed to harm individuals an extremist group perceives as part of its constituency. However, responses addressing the victims online varied dramatically.

In a small number of posts, commentators expressed sympathy with the victims, in some cases specifically noting that the victims could potentially have been someone close to them.

‘My heart and prayers go out to my fellow brothers and sisters in Manchester, UK. This was a concert full of young girls. These are our daughters!!!’

SPYDERcat, SF, 22/5/17

‘Meanwhile my heart goes out to all the victims, their family and friends. God bless them all.’

Disenfranchised, GoV, 23/3/17

‘I feel extremely bad for the cop who was knifed to death.’

Simon Legree, SF, 22/3/17

However, also present were narratives which suggested that the victims of terrorism were in some way responsible. Hubris (excessive pride or self-confidence) was a dominant theme in several posts. Where victims could be linked to wider narratives of societal failure this tendency was more acute. This placed much greater distance between commentators and victims, suggesting that the deaths and injuries of latter did not impact the former.

In the case of the Westminster attack, several commentators seized on the fact that the location of the attack was presumably targeting politicians as evidence of multicultural policies coming back to haunt their instigators. No variation in political positions was acknowledged, all political figures were grouped into the same class.

‘How terrible. I hope all them politicians are OK :p’

Lizardman, SF, 22/3/17

‘I don't have any sympathy for liberal politicians. They are getting what they deserve (cultural enrichment).’

Ssvanguard, SF, 22/3/17

The politics and ethnicity of Ariana Grande became a particular focus with some commentators. This was also extended to the victims present at the Manchester concert. This is a similar mechanism to that used to distance the space from the politicians and elites of Westminster.

‘So, an arena, chock full of globalists.marxists, was bombed by the same Islamic fundamentalists they sponsor... the irony! I am having a hard time finding sympathy for the dead and injured concert goers, the promoters, and the performers. All of them promote white genocide! ☠’

Beowulf, SF, 22/5/17

In addition to directly blaming victims for the attacks, some went further, welcoming jihadist violence as good for their wider political agenda.
‘This shit needs to happen every day. Every country in Europe needs this happening every day. Fastest way to wake them normies up.’[59]

Wilhelm, TRSF, 23/5/17

In this instance these arguments were directly contested by other commentators arguing that accusing the concertgoers of promoting white genocide could not be supported. The tendency to blame instead of sympathize with the victims generated overt friction within these online spaces. Where users made these arguments there were often others expressing criticism. This was either on the grounds that the conclusions being reached about the attitudes of the victims were unsupported, or that blaming the victims in this way would make the wider far-right seem uncaring.

‘I don’t think you saying ‘Good’ will attract Britons to WN[white nationalism], even if they get woken up by this event.’

Last Patrol, SF, 22/3/17

‘Your comment is either from a sick soul or one that has been defeated and is desperately lashing back. Those were our people, children nonetheless targeted, and someone could feel even a hint of glee or complete indifference?’

Kaspar Hauser, SF, 22/5/17

**Response**

In keeping with the distributed organisation of the milieu, suggested responses were diverse. Equally, the overall contents of the thread were far more orientated towards assigning blame for the attacks than proposing any course of action to prevent further attacks. Although caution is advised in identifying systematic trends in this way, there was a distinction between how the different user groups proposed reacting to the attack. These included indirect calls for violence against both ethnic minorities and political elites.

**Violent Responses**

At the most extreme, some commentators openly advocated violence in response to the attacks. This was consistent to some degree with the concept of reciprocal radicalisation, with violence by one group or side driving a violent response from the other. One user referenced a future holocaust. This was probably the most overtly violent response identified in the material as it advocated for genocide of non-Whites and those of mixed race. Potentially this post only managed to survive moderation on the site as it was buried partway through a post that included an embedded music video and accompanying song lyrics.

‘The coming non white and mixed white Holocaust will be glorious and it is coming despite all the defeatist moaning on these sites.’

DeadBonesRising, SF, 22/3/17

DeadBonesRising also uses the post to critique what they see as ‘defeatist moaning’ by other users, suggesting that other responses expressing frustration at the apparent inability of societies to protect themselves were weak.

Another post made on GoV in the aftermath of the London Bridge attack made a specific reference to the assassination of politicians and journalists out of frustration at their treachery. This represents a different advocacy of violence from calls to target ethnic and religious minorities. The framing of the threat in the form of a question distances the author from an explicit call to violence while leaving open the possibility that
they would endorse such actions.

‘When will citizen groups begin assassinating their traitor politicians? After 1 more attack, 2 more? At some point British politicians will be knifed & shot & mowed down by citizens fed up with the traitor class. Journalists may also be targeted for their deliberate lies.’

Stephen Carter, GoV, 5/6/17

Other references appeared to be slightly more veiled, including one user referring to ‘Crusades 2.0’ in an apparent threat against Muslims, and others suggesting that violent attacks were building towards wider violence, though it was left unclear as to whom such violence would be directed.

‘We are getting close to The Crusades 2.0. Keep pushing muzzies.’

beast9, SF, 23/3/17

‘I do honestly think that there IS a way out in the longer term but I would add that there is no pathway that I can foresee at this point that is peaceful, pleasant or benign.’

Watching and waiting, GoV, 5/6/17

‘Fire will meet fire! No amount of Liberals that love them and protect them will stop it.’

BulldogRevolver, SF, 22/3/17

Less clear is the following post on Gates of Vienna:

‘We need to create list, database of these writers of these[epithet] newspapers who are still putting out this marxist garbage and covering for islam. And the editors who allow it to go to print.’

Zhukov, GoV, 23/3/17

This user advocated for creating a list of enemies, although the purpose is unclear. The creation of such lists has been a common tactic in the far-right space.[60]

Where violence was referenced or even explicitly advocated, it was done in an indirect way. There is little in the analysis of the threads that can be construed as evidence of specific actions to be undertaken. Instead, posting remained vague. It is not clear whether there was an understanding among users that such planning should be kept off public forums, which is likely, or if such planning is simply not extant in the digital spaces examined.

Nonviolent Responses

As well as indirectly advocating violence, nonviolent courses of action were discussed. Many of these involved the kind of nonviolent organising typically associated with campaign groups. One thread on Stormfront raised the possibility of using the coverage of the Westminster attack as a way of generating publicity.

‘Whatever, do what you like, I’m just pointing out that it is an opportunity to get some live coverage without getting censored. If you go now, everyone will see you, if you wait, no one will.’

time will tell, SF, 22/3/17

Another post talked in more general terms about organising for the future.

‘This youngest generation - generation Z? - the one coming up right now, these are the ones who understand all of this for what it is. If I had a nickel for every one I’ve spoken to about the invasion, and who understood perfectly, I’d be a wealthy woman.’

Roo, SF, 22/3/17
However, despite the widespread condemnation of political elites, there was a distinct undercurrent in many proposed responses that assumed a role for law enforcement, the justice system and the state, although the advocated responses were extremely draconian and could be considered a form of structural violence.

‘Start deporting them back to their muslim paradise until you are back to being the Great Britain I once knew, about how many years ago — at least 20 or 30 or more years ago.’

Maria_dee, GoV, 23/3/2017

‘Most Moslems are coloured, deportation, based on inclined to be terrorist religion should take place, instead of picking on Poles or division with Scott’s.’

Pagonis, SF, 22/3/17

‘Westerners must now hold politicians, muslim groups, new media, and pro-immigration groups directly responsible for these murders. And criminal lawsuits are a good way to start.’

marsouin, GoV, 22/3/17

This is an acute contrast with the more overtly violent rhetoric, suggesting that hope remains for an orderly response to the problems identified by the far-right. This may illustrate a distinction between those who wish to violently overthrow the current order and impose a new political solution (extremists), and those who retain a belief in a longer term and potentially more peaceful political transition, albeit one with far-reaching and potentially violent outcomes that include mass deportations and restrictions to individual rights (radicals).

Conclusions

This research note has taken the concept of reciprocal radicalisation and attempted to apply it to unorganised digital spaces rather than organised and coordinated movements. As a consequence of focusing on the digital milieu, there are some limitations to the conclusions we can draw. While the general push of reciprocal radicalisation research has been the need for greater contextualization and precision, the far-right digital milieu effectively decontextualizes far-right activism, limiting it to the information space. While the incidents of interest all took place in the UK, the far-right response captured here is global, albeit exclusively English-speaking. Likewise, activity in the far-right milieu also has temporal implications. While coherent groups and movements can be expected to develop reasonably consistent narratives over time, the data analysed here is a product of a particular configuration of users on the three sites who have potentially never interacted before and may never interact again. Had the configuration of users been different then the response may also have differed.

For the same reasons the data can be read in different ways. While there is evidence here to support the idea of some contributors using violent rhetoric against Muslims as a result of the attacks, there are contradictory stories also present in the data. Based on the attribution of blame, the positioning of victims, and the proposed solutions, there is less here to suggest that the users are likely to deepen their commitment or escalate their activities against their ideological opponents. Instead, the data indicate that the result of many thousands of words and posts is to incorporate incoming information about jihadist violence into preexisting narratives. There were subtle differences in narratives depending on the site. TRSF was noticeably more irreverent, SF more race-focused, and GoV attempted to emphasise a clash of cultures with less focus on race. Despite this, the three sites shared, along with the far-right digital milieu as a whole, a profound disconnection with the current social and political settlements in Europe and North America. Immigration, and Muslim immigration particularly, constitutes a grievance, as does the broader decline in the morality and vitality of the Western/White world.

The blame for attacks was variously attributed to a generalised Muslim other, political elites, and/or a wider sickness in society. Commentators generally did not view terrorist attacks as strategic and linked to the aims of jihadist groups or movements. This gave rise to the situation where the attackers and their goals were almost
completely ignored, subsumed under race and religion. In the minds of many, their actions were autonomous and inevitable rather than in service of a strategic goal. For activists within the far-right digital milieu it was both natural and inevitable that Muslims should hate them. It is in the field of blame that the instrumental reconfiguring of terror attacks to fit pre-existing worldviews is most evident. The actions of small groups of jihadi terrorists are quickly linked both to a political elite that is seen as either incompetent or actively pursuing policies designed to persecute the groups on behalf of which the far-right claims to speak. In some cases, this link is extended to encompass the entirety of the society from which the far-right feels disconnected.

The position of victims was also highly contested. Although some sympathy was on display, in many cases commentators took steps to distance themselves from victims, either by sidelining them or creating narratives in which their victimisation was somehow seen as hubristic. In either case, refusing to accept the victim of terrorism as one of their own further distances the far-right space from the retaliatory logic of reciprocal radicalisation. If the victims are not one of us, then no response is required.

Although some posts offered solutions, a great many posts were seeking to attribute blame. They revealed contrasting approaches, most notably between those advocating for violence and those advocating for legal change (but outside existing norms around human rights). Where violence was advocated it was against either generalised ethnic or religious groups, or against treacherous political leaders. Specific retaliation against groups was not explicitly advocated, although some of the posts could certainly be read as a ratchetting up of general tensions.

The methodological limitations of this study mean that we must remain cautious. This is a relatively deep dive into a small range of threads and should not be viewed as a comprehensive description of how specific online forums reacted to the attacks. Despite limitations arising from our approach, what we can say is that the far-right digital milieu does not behave as predicted by the reciprocal radicalisation thesis. Blame, victimisation and responses were all at odds with the revenge mechanics of reciprocal radicalisation. For these users at least, Jihadist terror attacks represented more grist to an existing mill rather than a stimulus for new courses of action. Seemingly few in these spaces required any further evidence for the hostility of ‘Islam’ or the need to extrapolate the actions of a small group to that of a wider population. Even more surprising was how little blame was attributed directly to the terrorists themselves. Blame instead quickly shifted to a series of targets that were consistent with deeper concerns held by those within the far-right milieu over the current political and social settlement in many Western countries. That Muslims engage in terrorism is taken as self-evident; the real crimes, in the eyes of the far-right digital milieu, are that political leaders and wider society either do not see the obvious truth of this or are somehow implicated in deliberately perpetuating terrorism. While activity within the milieu is by definition rhetorical only, it follows that any radical actions that might arise from this are just as likely, if not more so, to target political leadership as religious and ethnic minorities.

While the theoretical basis of this paper is the concept of reciprocal radicalisation, the results point to an older theoretical account of far-right terrorism. The theory of split delegitimization argues that right-wing terrorism is distinct as it targets primarily ‘non-ruling groups’ theorised as alien and hostile. Right-wing groups were theorised to expect silence or complicity from regimes.[61] However, this approach also highlighted how some groups had come to see the regime as co-opted by non-ruling groups and thereby making the regime, and those complicit with it, legitimate targets.[62] Based on the data analysed here, users of all three sites had closed the ‘legitimation gap’ to varying degrees. While the reciprocal radicalisation thesis presents the far-right and jihadi extremists as coupled enemies, in these far-right digital contexts analysis suggests that jihadist extremism is often taken as symptomatic of the greater threat presented by weak or complicit regimes.

This research has attempted to expand the concept of reciprocal radicalisation to take into consideration the wider digital milieu that forms the background context to more formal organisations. While other analyses have concentrated on organisations and movements, this research acknowledges the extent to which, for the far-right, organisation has become more digitally focused and autonomous, and traditional organisations have been hollowed out. Despite expanding the concept of reciprocal radicalisation, the findings support existing evidence from researchers that questions the explanatory validity of reciprocal radicalisation. In keeping with
Macklin and Busher’s[63] historical analysis of fascist and anti-fascist mobilisations, the evidence here suggests that, in the context of the digital milieu, violent action can be taken as a sign of business as usual as opposed to a need to change existing repertoires of action.

On future research, a number of possibilities present themselves. Macklin and Busher’s conclusions and suggestions remain untested in a range of settings and contexts. Most recently the debate around the risks posed by ‘incel’ culture raised the prospect of an extremist mindset seemingly disconnected entirely from traditional enemies and focused instead on both women and society more generally.[64] Understanding the relationships between this space and other extremist groups, as well as the wider social context, is an urgent research project. Likewise, this research has touched only a small section of the extreme-right space online. Looking ahead, accelerationist groups and channels, including the Siege Culture scene, may provide an interesting test case for reciprocal radicalisation, in particular given the tendency of such actors to co-opt to some degree the signs and symbols of Jihadism.[65] Lastly, more work remains to be done on the idea of the far-right milieu itself. Despite the widely acknowledged trends of increasing digital activism and the ‘post-organisational’ far-right, much research and policy remains firmly fixed on organisational models that are decreasing in relevance.[66] While the ‘groupusculation’ of the extreme-right movement has been widely acknowledged, the connective tissue that holds these grouplets together is inescapably digital.[67] As Campbell called for a greater focus on the milieu that supported the rapid cycle of cult formation and collapse, so too is there a need for a focus on the digital milieu underpinning emerging extreme-right groupuscules.[68]

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Notes:


[14] Hamza (often spelled Hamsa) is currently serving life without parole in the United States after being extradited from the UK on terror changes in 2012.


[16] The Jewish Underground was a messianic terror group that emerged from the radical right organisation Gush Emunim beginning in 1978 following the Camp David Accords.


[23] The counter jihad is a far-right faction characterised primarily by a belief that Europe and the US are at risk of Islamisation. They are distinct from white supremacy and other forms of ethnonationalism in that they reject racial nationalism in favour of cultural markers of belonging, often subsumed under the heading of Judeo-Christian values. See: Benjamin Lee ‘Why We fight: Understanding the Counter-Jihad Movement,’ *Religion Compass,* vol. 10 no. 10, (2016), 257-265.


[25] Drummer Lee-Rigby was attacked and murdered in a Woolwich street by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale on 22 May 2013. Adebolajo and Adebowale attempted to behead Rigby and told passers-by that the attack was revenge for UK armed forces’ attacks against Muslims. In June 2012 Omar Mohammed Khan, Mohammed Hasseen, Anzal Hussain, Mohammed Saud, Zohaib Ahmed and Jewel Uddin travelled to an EDL rally in Dewsbury. The rally ended early and the attackers returned to Birmingham. They were stopped on the M1 for having no car insurance. A subsequent search of the car uncovered homemade explosives, shotguns, knives and a statement describing a ‘day of retaliation’.


[27] Joel Busher and Graham Macklin, ‘Understanding “Reciprocal Radicalisation” as a Component of Wider Conflict Dynamics,’ (Radicalisation Research, 2018)


[29] The manifesto released by the Christchurch attacker Brenton Tarrant referenced the death of Ebba Akerlund, an 11-year-old killed in a 2017 Islamist terror attack in Stockholm.


[34] Alexander Carter, 2016, op. cit. 10.


[40] See also: Roger Griffin, 2003, op. cit.


[43] ‘When Hate Went Online,’ accessed July 26, 2019, URL: https://www.researchforprogress.us/topic/34691/when-hate-went-online/. The term far-right is used here to include activists opposed to democratic methods (extreme-right) and those willing to work towards far-right goals within democratic structures (radical-right). See: Jacob Ravndal and Tore Bjørgo, ‘Investigating Terrorism from the Extreme Right: A Review of Past and Present Research,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, vol 12, no. 6, (2018).


Estimates from the Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC), a US-based anti-hate advocacy group, suggest that as of 2015 Stormfront had 300,000 users accounts registered, although far fewer of these were actively posting (SPLC n.d.). SPLC also noted that as no account is required to access most of the material on SF, the numbers reading the forums may be far higher.

Benjamin Lee, 2015, op. cit.


Alex Schmid, ‘The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism,’ Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 6 no. 2 (2012).

'Paul Joseph Watson “Well Imagine My Shock” Compilation,' accessed July 26, 2019, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72KbeqN7pZ4

Normie is a term used to refer to political unengaged whites by the alt-right

The website ‘redwatch’ seemingly carried on from a printed newsletter linked to far-right terror group Combat18 of the same name. Other far-right spaces have given birth to ‘campus watch,’ an initiative of the Middle East Forum, a thinktank linked to Daniel Pipes, which maintains lists of trustworthy and untrustworthy academics. A recent push by the German right-wing AfD encouraged schoolchildren to inform on teacher bias, and, although these calls are not inherently violent, they feed into a well-established right-wing trope of the ‘day of the rope,’ a point when scores will be settled against political opponents. This event-- mass murder of political opponents-- is described in detail in the far-right novel The Turner Diaries, but has also featured more obliquely in a 2010 speech by UK far-right activist Paul Weston that included the line: 'You will appear before a Nuremberg-style court, and you will be tried for treason, and you will be tried for crimes against humanity, and for the first time in a very long time you will be answerable to us!'


Graham Macklin and Joel Busher, 2015, op. cit.

Alex DiBranco, ‘Male Supremacist Terrorism as a Rising Threat,’ accessed June 2, 2020, URL: https://icct.nl/publication/male-supremacist-terrorism-as-a-rising-threat/


Colin Campbell, 2002, op. cit.
Policy Notes

‘Remodelling:’ The Need for More Robust Models and Metrics for Counterterrorism Threat Analysis

by Jason A. Bakas

Abstract

In this Policy Note the author addresses shortcomings found in many current proprietary counterterrorism threat assessment tools used by government agencies. In addition, he provides evidence which makes a strong case for the adoption of a Structured Professional Judgment methodology, to be used as the basis of future proprietary or in-house terrorist threat assessments within law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Keywords: actuarial, counterterrorism, intelligence agency, law enforcement, structured professional judgment, terrorist threat assessment, validity

Introduction

Terrorism threat assessments are important tools used throughout law enforcement and intelligence agencies internationally. These assessments are designed to evaluate the threat specific terrorist groups and lone actors pose. The models are necessary for counterterrorism (CT) agencies to be able to minimize poor judgments in the form of both false positives - that is identifying individuals or groups as a terrorist threat, when in fact they are not intending to engage in terrorist acts - and false negatives - where individuals or groups who are intending to commit acts of terrorism are not considered dangerous, which may result in a terrorist attack being committed. In many cases, organizations responsible for CT develop their own proprietary threat assessments. This is often done to ensure the threat assessment fulfils the operational needs related to a counterterrorism organization's abilities. However, there are some critical issues that have been identified with regards to many of these in-house terrorist threat assessments. These issues are not only theoretical, but have been witnessed by the author of this Policy Note as critical flaws in a number of proprietary CT threat assessments internationally.

Questionable Validity

One of the main concerns found with many proprietary threat assessments is questionable validity. A critical process in evaluating the effectiveness of any threat assessment metric or model, is to evaluate it for both reliability and validity. These frameworks are used to determine if an assessment instrument is actually measuring what it claims to be measuring, and that the resulting judgements that come from employing the assessment instrument accurately reflect the outcomes of what is meant to be assessed. To paraphrase renowned researchers and assessment developers Douglas and Kropp - without evidence of reliability and validity, a threat assessment instrument is valueless.[1] This author has found that rigorous tests of validity and reliability are rarely conducted or reported. This widespread tendency to under report - or not conduct - tests of validity and reliability leaves many proprietary CT threat assessments in a precarious situation. It begs the question: Is it simply under-reporting or hidden invalidity? We just don't know. When encountering these proprietary threat instruments, the author would enquire about how the assessment was developed, its validity and how the validity was tested. These questions would be directed to the sub-units or research divisions which created the assessments. In almost all cases, the question of appropriate constructs and validation testing was not answered, or poorly answered. This leaves it unclear how these metrics were developed; how indicators were defined; the degree of efficacy the assessment has; or if the metric is based on robust empirical or theoretical evidence.
Further, in many cases where CT agencies did conduct testing on their proprietary threat assessment models, researchers placed an over-reliance on Cronbach’s α, as the sole source of evidence demonstrating validity and reliability. The problem here is that these assessments may seem to demonstrate strong structural validity on the surface, but when subjected to more rigorous tests beyond Cronbach’s α, they may have significant shortcomings. These more rigorous tests include examining for scores across time with Test-Retest Reliability; or the structure of the latent constructs with Confirmatory Factor Analysis; or Measurement Invariance for an assessment's equivalence across populations; or calculating Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient, Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance, or Intraclass Coefficient for inter-rater reliability. Very few of the CT assessments seen by this author were examined with any of these more advanced methods. This raises some serious questions – the first being: why not?

You Don’t Know, What You Don’t Know

The answer to a lack of testing might come from a 2017 study conducted by Flake and colleagues, which found that tests of structural validity, such as measurement invariance, are poorly understood and infrequently conducted in many scholarly works within social and personality measurement psychology (the structure of psychometrics are very similar to threat assessments, they are both latent variable models).[2] Moreover, Flake and colleagues study found many of these same scholarly works rarely reported rigorous methodologies for testing validity or these lacked appropriate validation testing completely. In addition, a 2008 study by Aiken and colleagues, found that measurement and test theory is often ignored in doctoral level graduate studies within psychology and that only a minority of doctoral students know how to apply the methods of reliability testing correctly.[3] Thus, if many doctorate level academic researchers lack this knowledge, we can make the inference that many practitioner researchers may also lack the knowledge in measurement and Classical Test Theory. However, this is a poor excuse. Practitioner researchers and their instruments should be held to the highest standard. Lives are depending on them getting it right.

The Issues with Actuarial Metrics as Terrorist Threat Tools

The lack of proper reliability, and validity (weather it be based on a lack of knowledge or otherwise) brings to light a much larger issue regarding the efficacy of many proprietary CT threat assessments. Because many organizations don’t test - or don’t know how to properly test their assessments - we can not see whether there are some fundamental problematic issues that are underlying the construction of these metrics. The vast majority of these proprietary threat assessments witnessed by the author (almost all), are what can be defined as actuarial models – they are latent variable models that employ the use of a ‘check list’ system of fixed numerically weighted indicators.[4] These indicators are scored, using statistical formulas to calculate and conclude a predictive threat score on a numerical scale, or as a predictive percentage. The advantages of actuarial metrics include their ability to allow objectivity in decision-making and a high inter-rater reliability across evaluators. However, in this author’s opinion, there are some critical limitations which make actuarial metrics highly problematic for terrorist threat assessment. This is especially the case when they are constructed by researchers who themselves have a poor understanding of measurement - and test-theory. The main issue here is the tool’s generalizability across terrorist actors. Actuarial applications for assessing terrorist threats lack strong invariance. They may work well for a specific type of terrorist actor or group who remain static, as unchangeable entities - but they do not work so well when applied to a spectrum of terrorist individuals, or groups of individuals; or the same terrorist individuals or groups of individuals in different contexts or settings; or over time. Such a statement is admittedly controversial and may raise more than a few eye brows – but as explained below in further detail, this should become more evident.
Poor Linguistic Invariance

There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, and equally hundreds of scholarly works which discuss the various definitional issues of terrorism. For example, in 2011 Easson and Schmid identified 260 definitions of terrorism that hold a level of validity in describing this phenomenon.[5] Some researchers and analysts hold that terrorism must be motivated by ideology, while others state it can (also) be motivated by personal or vicarious revenge, or other idiosyncratic incentives.[6] Many other examples of disagreement exist, e.g. regarding racialization or extremism. The same definitional disagreement issues are found within government and CT organizations, which makes sharing intelligence data sometimes potentially problematic. This issue becomes even more complicated when it comes to additional definitional issues, such as those surrounding ‘lone wolf’ or ‘lone actor’ terrorism. For example, some agencies include in their monitoring individuals with severe mental illness who are inspired or directed to engage in attacks on behalf of an extremist movement. Others exclude these, because mental illness-related lethal violence is considered to be ‘mass murder’ and not terrorism, even if it is linked to a larger extremist movement. The boundaries of terrorism are inevitably fuzzy, and if we do not have a precise way of defining terrorism - then we really do not know what exactly is - or should be - considered a threat indicator for terrorism. Because of this, we do not know the extent to which an actuarial model includes all the right elements, and excludes all the irrelevant elements. This issue becomes more problematic when assigning weights or numerical values to these indicators.

Questionable Indicators

In relation to questionable concepts, and the notion of what exactly is - or should be - considered a threat indicator for terrorism, the author has found that many threat assessment instruments incorporate empirically questionable indicators – indicators that may have been found to be related to threats in some isolated cases, but are not necessarily applicable across most individuals or groups of terrorists. Within academia, the issue of a lack of robust generalizable indicators to terrorism propensity is rooted in low base-rates.[7] Base-rates are statistics used to describe the percentage of a population that demonstrates some characteristic. The issue of low base-rates in scholarly works can be the result of a relatively small body of empirical data, which stems from the obvious challenges of academics having access to – and being able to publish – operational terrorist data acquired from CT organizations. Despite CT organizations housing a large body of empirical data (which is acquired in the course of their investigations) – we do not really know if concepts found in the ‘in-house data’ used to develop indicators are truly generalizable. This is due to a couple of reasons. The first being, the type, scope and quality of data collected. If we look at the way the UK’s Metropolitan Police has collected data on suspected gang members, we can see how datasets held by law enforcement organizations could be problematic.[8] A May 2020 report by Amnesty International found that the Metropolitan Police’s Gangs Matrix - a database of suspected gang members in London designed to be used by police to prevent serious gang violence – had collected data in a “chaotic, inconsistent” manner and was “not fit for [its] purpose”. Reports state that the threshold for data collection was “very low” with “no clear guidance or criteria, and wide discretion for police officers and partner agencies”. If this same problematic issue exists also within CT organizations, there would likely be challenges in effectively operationalizing data. The second issue, as previously stated, is a lack of appropriate construct and validation testing. Because we have seen an indicator’s relevance in a limited number of ‘N’ cases – does this mean it is relevant across a spectrum of most terrorist actors? We don’t know – and without proper testing we cannot make claims about the generalizability of indicators with a high level of confidence. Moreover, because terrorist investigations and terrorist groups or individuals are nuanced in situational and dynamic contexts, it raises the question – assuming we had well collected data, what are the chances of finding robust generalizable indicators, that would be efficacious, when applied in actuarial models?

By definition, an indicator must vary systematically with changes in the latent construct - it must increase or decrease monotonically with that latent construct. In other words, when higher or lower scores are observed on the indicator, this must be related to an increase or decrease in the latent construct’s values. However, many of the indicators found by this author in proprietary threat assessments have been shown to not be generalizable within
the academic literature – and, as stated, there is no evidence to suggest they have demonstrated generalizability in ‘in-house’ CT datasets. For example, the author has seen “time spent consuming violent extremist media” as a threat indicator on more than one nationally used terrorist threat assessment. However, those who are found to be both consumers and producers of violent extremist media are not necessarily on a trajectory for engaging in terrorism violence.[11] The same can be said for radicalization. “The degree or severity of radicalization” was found to be present in many proprietary actuarial threat assessments, but it has been well documented that holding an extremist or radical ideology does not necessarily put an individual on a trajectory for engaging in terrorism violence. In fact, most persons who hold an extremist ideology do not themselves engage in violence. [12] Moreover, not everyone who engages in violence, in the name of a terrorist group or movement, holds an extremist or radical ideology.[13] Therefore, the best evidence available demonstrates that indicators such as extremist media consumption and radicalization, do not necessarily vary monotonically with the construct of interest - which in our case is the threat of engaging in a terrorist attack. Thus, models that use this type of indicators are making an indirect inference. If we do not have accurate threat indicators, how can we expect to predict or measure the threat of terrorism? This begs the question: why are we selecting imperfect indicators for assessments and mechanically apply them the same way every time?

While all types of assessment instruments are reliant on the assumption of validity generalization from population data to an individual - this is especially the case in actuarial models, because these have a great assumption burden, due to the fact that they function mathematically or algorithmically.[14] Thus, for actuarial models to be efficacious we need probability statistics (i.e. base-rates) of a sufficient breadth of quality and quantity. But is this realistic? As stated, each terrorist investigation and terrorist group or individual is nuanced in situational and dynamic contexts. The weight of indicators may need to be based upon case-specific details. Actuarial fixed weighted indicators calculated with an algorithm are not going to be able to account for this. As a consequence, in some cases they may pay too much attention to certain indicators and not enough (or ignore) to other indicators. Because it is mathematical or algorithmic, the process of how threat predictions were made cannot be reviewed – we just have to trust the algorithm. It is highly problematic to use imperfect fixed weighted indicators to make threat predictions in cases where we know a dynamic mixture of nuance, situation and context matter. On top of this, we cannot check the process to make sure it is accounting for and evaluating the most important factors. We are just blindly trusting the assessment even though we know indicators may be flawed - that’s like trusting your wrist watch, when it doesn’t tell time all that well and when time might be changing.

**Poor Measurement Invariance**

The issue of poor generalizability of indicators, brings to light the issue of assessment measurement invariance. Measurement invariance is a scaled capacity to measure the same construct in a comparable way across populations or across contexts. In other words, it is the degree of generalizability of an evaluation. Outside of terrorism, this is often tested to see if an assessment or metric is well represented across different genders or cultures. The question of measurement invariance (assuming concepts are defined in a consistent manner) can be answered by applying statistical evaluations, such as the application of Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis. However, the vast majority of actuarial proprietary CT threat assessments encountered by this author were unable to demonstrate strong measurement invariance - yet each assessment claimed it. Again, this widespread tendency to not demonstrate - or not conduct – appropriate testing leaves many proprietary threat assessments in a precarious situation, leaving us with the question: do they really work the way they say they work?

Issues related to linguistic invariance and questionable indicators, create inherent problematic issues with measurement invariance. This is especially the case in actuarial models, as stated previously, since these models hold a great assumption burden, due to the fact that they function statistically.[15] If an assessment developer uses a small population data set of a specific terrorist type or sub-type as his or her representative sample, we are likely to see qualities of validity and reliability only hold in relation to the given test population. The
generalizability to other terrorist populations, or even the same terrorist population were changes occur, is questionable. What's true for jihadists might not be true for white nationalists, ethnic secessionists, or even for a different jihadist group. If this lack of generalizability was related to genders or cultures, these assessments would be seen as biased towards a gender or cultural majority. In its application to terrorism, this is still a bias, but bias towards the specific terrorist type or sub-type sample used in the development of a measurement instrument. In many cases assessment developers in CT organizations are not testing the relation between test scores and criterion variables or outcomes, to see if they are consistent across groups, using large samples. They are simply just assuming strong invariance. These assessments are then rolled out with false confidence, which may lead to an intelligence or security agency adopting and implementing a potentially flawed assessment.

**Simpson’s Paradox**

Another, and most problematic issue with the use of actuarial metrics for proprietary threat assessment is Simpson’s paradox. This is a phenomenon in which individual trends appear in different groups of data but disappears or reverses when these groups are combined. For example, assuming the indicators are accurate, if we apply a high trending threat group of individuals – ’Jihadi Group A’ (who are consistent with the data set majority used in development) - to a threat assessment, we would likely see a relationship were the greater the presence or degree of indicators, the greater the threat outcome. If we also plotted a high – yet low trending threat group of individuals – ’Jihadi Group B’, on its own, we see a trend in the opposite direction. However, if we do not separate the groups, we would see the regression line in the direction of ’Jihadi Group A’. Therefore, a CT agency would consider individuals in ’Jihadi Group B’ as moving towards a high threat direction, when in fact it is not (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1:](image)

We might even see a positive trend (high threat) in both groups when they are separate, but when the groups are combined, we see a negative trend; resulting in a low threat (see Figure 2).[16]
We can see from this, that in many cases actuarial threat metrics do not always demonstrate an accurate threat picture. The issue is, we need to know when to break down our terrorist populations into groups. However, this author has encountered many proprietary threat metrics that are meant to be used as universal for all terrorists - or for all terrorists of a specific subtype. So why would a CT analyst identify distinct factors and collect for group differences if they are told they do not need to? It is important to note, that no test model is capable of perfectly capturing the theoretical variables of interest and that some degree of error is unavoidable, but this can be accounted for with proper statistical test analysis. The issue here is with Systematic Error sometimes called Statistical Bias – it is bias built into the test. This is not a question of inaccurate intelligence leading to a faulty threat picture, as is often claimed. Rather it is the reliance on threat assessment instruments that have not been properly developed or evaluated before they are rolled out for application.

One Solution may be Adopting an SPJ Approach

The Structured Professional Judgment or SPJ method of assessment has been used in medical practice and psychology for decades. In fact, in recent years a handful of these SPJ psychometric violence assessments have been designed by academics for use in evaluating terrorism violence – primarily to be utilized in correctional settings.[17] Despite this trend, in all the in-house developed CT threat assessments this author has seen, few used the SPJ approach.

Like actuarial metrics, the SPJ model provides assessors with a structured ‘check list’ of indicators that are rooted in strong empirical or theoretical evidence. However, it differs as this ‘check list’ does not hold the same level of rigidity. Rather, the list of indicators functions as a set of systematic guidelines for evaluating the outcome construct - in our case terrorism threat. The SPJ methodology ‘unlocks’ the indicators from fixed numerically weighted rankings and allows the evaluator (in our case a CT analyst or case officer) to attribute the presence and relevance of indicators - through interpreting and appreciating information related to the threat propensity of the individual or group under investigation. Therefore, unlike actuarial metrics, which may pay too much attention to certain indicators and not enough or altogether ignore other indicators, the SPJ method allows the evaluator the flexibility to take into account situational and contextual factors, while still
being guided in decision-making with a structured approach.

As a result of this flexibility, the SPJ method mitigates against issues discussed as problematical in this Policy Note, such as poor invariance and test bias. Further, these SPJ models are not predictive but rather probabilistic, and thus attribute the presence or degree of indicators to an increased level of threat, not a determinate level of threat. As mentioned before, SPJ tools have been used in physicians’ medical assessments for years. For example, while conducting a health check-up, if a doctor were to find a patient to have (i) hypertension (ii) be a smoker; (iii) suffer from obesity; (iv) have a family history of heart disease and (v) have diabetes - that physician would be able to conclude that the patient has an increased probability for cardiovascular failure-related death (i.e. all the major indicators are present). However, if only one or two of those indicators are present (lets say hypertension and family history) an individual could be potentially at the same level, or higher level, of probabilistic risk of cardiovascular related death. As we know, not everyone with all heart disease indicators will have a heart attack while some people with only one or two of those indicators will actually have a heart attack and die as a consequence. This same principle applies to terrorist threat. It is not necessarily the number of indicators, but rather the value of those indicators found to be present within the context of the case that matters. Because of the SPJ method’s flexibility, and its design to allow the evaluator to interpret and appreciate information, it has been argued that the SPJ approach is the more appropriate and the most fruitful form of assessment when completing evaluations under conditions where the information available is limited and often is also of poor quality.[18] This is often the case during active investigations, when time-pressured CT professionals do not have enough data on-hand that would meet a ‘clinical standard.’

While most familiar with SPJ maintain that this flexibility is a strength of the method, others have criticized it as a weakness. It has been suggested that the interpretive nature of the methodology can lead to decision-making bias, and even that the SPJ approach is ill-suited for law enforcement or other security agency use. However, research conducted by Storey and colleagues found that, following proper training, SPJ assessments could be accurately used by police and other criminal justice professionals.[19] Moreover, many scholars argue through training and acquiring a background knowledge on indicators to violence and the population type being assessed, issues of bias can be minimized or even off-set. When it comes to CT, anyone applying or using any type of threat model should be highly knowledgeable about terrorism in general and the terrorist group or individual they are assessing.

There Is Still the Problem of Questionable Validity

Of the few SPJ proprietary CT threat assessments this author had the privilege to observe, many did not provide strong evidence – or any evidence - related to appropriate construct and validation testing. This takes us back to the same issue - it is unclear how these metrics were developed; how indicators were defined, the degree of efficacy the assessment has; or if the metrics used are based on robust empirical or theory-driven evidence. Even though SPJ assessments do not apply algorithmic or statistical computations in determining threat attribution – they still must be developed and tested with strong scientific rigor. These models still need to demonstrate reliability and validity; indicators still must demonstrate evidence of a relationship-based outcome with the latent construct; and the indicators must still demonstrate evidence of generalizability to the terrorist population of interest. Oversights in appropriate testing could lead to false positive or false negative assessments of threats, which could be significantly detrimental to public safety. In short, reliability and validity testing must be conducted, and should be reported.

Conclusion

In this Policy Note, a number of shortcomings found in many proprietary threat assessments that have been developed by law enforcement CT organizations were presented. In the author’s opinion, many of these arose from a poor understanding of model development and evaluation testing. These issues are amplified when
untrained or unskilled model developers attempt to create functional actuarial threat metrics. Because terrorism is an elastic and amorphous concept, the author argues that - even at best - CT actuarial threat assessments are problematic, and he concludes that the adoption of a Structured Professional Judgment methodology would likely be more efficacious. Therefore, it is recommended, that the Structured Professional Judgment method should be adopted as basis of future proprietary or in-house terrorist threat assessments. Now more than ever, forecasting the threat terrorists, or potential terrorist actors, pose is of utmost importance; we cannot afford to get it wrong given the high number of potential perpetrators. A 2020 report by the UK government found that British intelligence agencies are aware of more than 43,000 individuals who pose a potential terrorist threat to the UK.[20] Of that number, 3,000 are considered ‘subjects of interest’ and are under active investigation. If CT agencies are going to develop their own threat assessment metrics and models, they need to have all the knowledge to get it right. To paraphrase Victoroff – a lack of good understanding on terrorism has left many CT policy makers to design counterterrorism strategies without the full benefit of facts – or – worse - be guided by theoretical presumptions assumed to be factual.[21]

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Policy Note are the author's and the author's alone. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the author's professional or academic affiliations. The counterterrorist threat assessments discussed in this Policy Note have been personally examined by the author. The names of the agencies which develop and own the assessment instruments discussed here, the number of assessments examined, as well as the nature and contents of these assessment tools, can, unfortunately, not be disclosed here for security reasons.

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Notes
[4] See the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Indicators of Mobilization to Violence (IMV), as an example of a counterterrorism actuarial model which employs a check list system of fixed numerically weighted indicators. Please note, neither this Policy Note, nor the author are stating, implying or otherwise suggesting any factors discussed in this paper are in any way related or relevant to the IMV. The IMV is simply cited as an example of a counterterrorism actuarial model used in law enforcement. The IMV was leaked to the public in 2017: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3460923-Imv-Score-Final.html#document/p1

[8] Of note, neither this Policy Note, nor the author are stating, implying or otherwise suggesting that any counterterrorism organization collects data in an improper or inaccurate way, or in a manner that is discriminatory or racialized. The comparison to the way the UK Metropolitan Police collected data is simply for reference purposes, to provide the reader with an open source example of how police organizations may have erred in data collection.


[10] Ibid.


[15] Ibid.


Bibliography: Children, Youth, and Terrorism

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2020-5]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the nexus between children, youth, and terrorism. It covers minors’ exploitation by terrorist groups within organizations (e.g., as child soldiers or executioners) as well as other forms of direct or indirect victimization (e.g., terrorist attacks against minors, their enslavement by militant organizations, or the impact of terrorist acts on their psychological well-being). The bibliography focuses on recent publications (up to May 2020) and should not be considered as exhaustive. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, children, youth, minors, adolescents, juveniles, terrorism, victimization, exploitation, abuse, recruitment, child soldiers

NB: All websites were last visited on 20.05.2020. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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About the Compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., is a Professional Information Specialist. Since 2011, she works for the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). In addition, she serves as Information Resources Editor to ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. In her editorial role, she regularly compiles bibliographies and other resources for Terrorism Research (for an inventory visit https://archive.org/details/terrorism-research-bibliographies). She wrote her doctoral thesis on Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents (focus: media-oriented hostage takings). E-mail: j.tinnes@gmx.de
Bibliography: Internet-Driven Right-Wing Terrorism

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2020-6]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, news articles, blogposts, multimedia items, bibliographies, and other resources on internet-driven right-wing terrorism. It focuses on recent publications (up to May 2020) and should not be considered as exhaustive. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, right-wing terrorism, attacks, mass shootings, Pittsburgh, Christchurch, Poway, El Paso, Bærum, Halle, Hanau, social media, 4chan, 8chan, Discord, Gab, Telegram, memes, memetic warfare, manifestos, “Alt-Right”, accelerationism

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Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 17 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

So many books are published on terrorism- and counterterrorism-related subjects that it is difficult to catch up on a large backlog of monographs and edited volumes received for review. In order to deal with this backlog, this column of capsule reviews consists of short single paragraph overviews and Tables of Contents of 17 books, including also several books published less recently but still meriting attention. Some of the new books will be reviewed in future issues of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’ as stand-alone reviews. The books are listed topically.

**General**


The contributors to this important edited anthology present an updated multidisciplinary approach to analyzing what they term a third generation street gang (3Gen Gang) theory, which was first introduced in a series of papers by co-editor John P. Sullivan in 1997. Today, the contributors argue, the threats have evolved to encompass sophisticated gangs with transnational reach, which are also accompanied by political dimensions, particularly in countries such as Mexico, that affect the communities and nations where they operate, resulting in a threat to global security, as well. Dr. Sullivan served as a Lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and is a Senior Fellow with “Small Wars Journal-El Centro.” Dr. Bunker is an Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and is a Senior Fellow with “Small Wars Journal-El Centro.”

*Table of Contents:* Prologue On 3GEN Gangs; Foreword: Narco-Insurgent-Gang-Terror (NIGT) Phenomenon; Introduction: Third Generation Gangs from Theory to Reality; Part I: Third Generation Gangs; Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence; Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America; Part II: Third Generation Gangs Strategic Notes [23 Notes]; Part III: Military Trained Gang Members; Background; Third Generation (3Gen) Gangs and Military Trained Gang Members (MTGMs); The Threat of Street Gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and Domestic Terrorist/Extremist Groups with Military-Trained Members [4 Notes]; Part IV: Conclusions; Conclusion: The Past, Present and Potential Future of Third Generation Gang Studies; Postscript: Gangs and Conflict: Armed Conflicts are on the Rebound and They are Harder than Ever to Stop; Afterword: Mexico’s Forever War; Appendices: Appendix 1: Gangs & Drug Trafficking in Central America Conference; Appendix 2: Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13): A Law Enforcement Primer; Appendix 3: Iraq and the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects; Appendix 4: Gangs in Baghdad; Appendix 5: Gangs, Criminal Empires and Military Intervention in Cape Town’s Crime Wars; Selected Readings.

**Counterterrorism**


This is an important examination of the dilemmas faced by perpetrators, whether governments or insurgents, in their use of indiscriminate violence targeting civilians in their wars. By examining these issues, the author presents proposals on how to prevent such atrocities. The author is the head of the Project on Small Arms and
Light Weapons Control at the Bonn International Center for Conversion.

Table of Contents: Targeting Civilians in Civil Wars; What Do We Know About Indiscriminate Violence?; State Use of Indiscriminate Violence; Nonstate Use of Indiscriminate Violence; Conceptual Building Blocks; A Theory of Group-Selective Violence; How Does Indiscriminate Violence Work in Practice?; Assessing the Effects of Indiscriminate Violence; Group-Selective Violence Across History; Violence Against Civilians in Ethnic Wars; Conclusion: Does Group-Selective Violence Work?


The contributors to this volume offer diverse perspectives on mitigating and resolving major conflicts through what they term a “constructive conflict approach,” which they apply to examining how this worked in lessening the destructive impact of those conflicts in cases such as Israel and the Palestinians, Britain in Northern Ireland, and dealing with aggressive countries such as North Korea. Co-editor Dayton is Associate Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation and director of the CONTACT Peacebuilding Program at the SIT Graduate Institute, School for International Training, and co-editor Kriesberg is Associate Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation and director of the the same program as Bruce Dayton.


This textbook presents a comprehensive framework for analyzing how a spectrum of social conflicts can be resolved through a “constructive conflict approach.” As a textbook, it discusses key principles and core ideas about conflicts and how they can be resolved, as well as the roles of social movements and non-governmental organizations, including conflict actors, and the use of various persuasive means to de-escalate conflicts, which are applied to a series of case studies. Post-conflict activities that are likely to result in long term peace are also discussed.

Table of Contents: List of Figures and Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; Acronyms; Analyzing Social Conflicts; Underlying Conditions for Social Conflicts; The Emergence of Conflicts; Alternative Conflict Strategies; Adopting Conflict Strategies; Escalation of Conflicts; De-escalation of Conflicts; Mediation in Conflicts; Settling Conflicts; Conflict Outcomes and Consequences; Synthesis, Specifications, and Challenges; Appendix A: Selected Organizations in the Field of Constructive Conflicts; Appendix B: Selected Websites Relating to Social Conflicts.

This monograph examines the components of strategic- and operational-level decision-making, including the elements of risk and legality, involved in providing unconventional warfare support to a resistance force as a foreign policy option. These are applied to supporting insurgent resistance in unsuccessful cases such as the Bay of Pigs event against the Castro regime in Cuba in April 1961, and successful cases such as supporting local Afghani forces in removing the Taliban in late 2001. The author is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with experience as a defense analyst, researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.

Table of Contents: From the Director; Foreword; About the Author; Introduction; Influencing the Decision-Making Process; Prospect: Opportunity and Timing; Peril: Risks and Consequences; Premise: Assumptions and Feasibility; Propriety: Sovereignty and Intervention; Conclusion; Acronyms.


In this conceptually important monograph, the authors examine how the evolution of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) command and control mechanisms can operate effectively in countering terrorist groups at the village level in countries with weak sociopolitical systems, such as Afghanistan. Dr. Knarr is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) in Tampa Florida. Former U.S. Army Major Nutsch is a consultant to the Special Operations Forces community.

Table of Contents: Foreword; About the Authors; Introduction; A War of Necessity; Searching for Context and Solutions from the Past; VSO/alp Programs; Adapting Village Stability Operations Concepts to Reality; Top-Down Interagency (Supporting Governance and Development) Meets Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency; Activating the Special Operations Joint Task Force: Synchronizing Missions and Managing Resources; International and Multinational Contributions; Special Operations Forces/Conventional Forces Integration; Discussion/ Summary: Successes, Failures, and Implications; Acronyms.


A fascinating and detailed account of the covert operations of Keenie Meenie Services, a British private mercenary company, which was involved in providing “shadowy” paramilitary services to clients in conflict regions such as Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and Nicaragua. The account is based on the author's investigative reporting, including access to newly declassified evidence about the British government's tacit support for the company's operations. The author, a veteran British journalist and producer, is a staff reporter for Declassified UK, an investigations unit focusing on British foreign policy.

Table of Contents: Prologue: Piramanthanaru Massacre; Introduction: Return of the Privateers; White Sultan of Oman; Bodyguards and Business Building; Teenage Rebellions; The Upside Down Jeep; Oliver North's British Mercenary; The Exploding Hospital; Mercenaries and Mujahideen; The English Pilot; Grenades in Wine Glasses; Bugger off my Land!; Epilogue.
Religion and Terrorism


This is a well-written, insightful and authoritative examination of the connection between extremist religious faiths and violence around the world. All the major religiously-based violent extremist groups are covered, such as Christian Identity, Hindu extremists, Jewish fundamentalist groups, and Islamist groups such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Significant questions are discussed such as how “religious” is this type of terrorist violence and the factors that motivate extremist adherents to conduct terrorist attacks on behalf of their beliefs. The author is professor of sociology at County College of Morris, New Jersey.

Table of Contents: Introduction: The Study of Religion and Violence; Fighting for God: Scriptural Obligations and Holy Wars; Psychological Perspectives; Apocalyptic Violence; Civilizational Clashes, Culture Wars, and Religious Violence; Religious Suffering, Martyrdom, and Sexual Violence; Conclusion: Toward a Holistic Approach to Religious Violence.

Jihad


This is the author’s well-informed personal account, based on his extensive research visits to the country, of the evolution of the conflict between the radical Muslim Tajiks against the Soviet Tajiks, which ended in the establishment of an independent Tajik state in 1997. The author, a prominent scholar in the fields of Central Asian and Iranian studies is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota.

Table of Contents: The War Year; The Emirate of Bukhara; The Sovietization of Tajikistan; End of an Era; The Government of National Reconciliation; Reinventing the Wheel; The Path to Recovery; Appendix; Glossary; List of Abbreviations.


This is an assessment of the Arab Spring, which the author argues represented the first time in recent Middle Eastern history that many of the region’s people undertook collective action to achieve political and social reforms in their societies. To examine these issues, uprisings and their consequences include the Egyptian revolution, the Syrian civil war, the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria and the Tunisian struggle toward what the author terms a struggle toward Islamic constitutionalism are presented. The author is Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.

Table of Contents: Preface; The People Want; Tahrir and the Problem of Agency; Syria and the Question of Fault; The Islamic State as Utopia; Tunisia and Political Responsibility; Afterword: Catharsis?


This account utilizes René Girard’s mimetic theory of religiously sanctioned violence, to explain the historical
trajectory of militant jihadism as a violent response against the impact of modernity on their societies. The author is a Senior Lecturer in Systematic Theology at Australian Catholic University.


This is a dramatic insider’s account of the behind-the-scenes battle by the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) against ISIS, which had held a Royal Jordanian Royal Air Force’s pilot hostage after his F-16 fighter aircraft crashed over ISIS territory in Syria on January 3, 2015. The pilot, First Lieutenant Moaz al-Kasasbeh, was ultimately executed in a highly publicized and brutal execution. The author’s account of Jordan’s GID’s revenge against the pilot’s ISIS captors draws on his extensive contacts with the Jordanian government, which provided him the inside material to produce this fascinating book. The author is a New York City-based author of numerous books on terrorism and counterterrorism.

Table of Contents: Glossary; October 26, 2019; Author’s Note: Prologue: Slider One-One; Book One: A New Storm Over the Horizon; What Could Go Wrong?; The Fall of Mosul; The Line in the Sand; Send in the Vipers; Book Two: The Human Bazaar; Held Captive; The Point of No Return; Barbaric; The Extortionists; Shock and Horror; Kill the Monsters; Book Three: Guillotine; Amman Station; The Kill List; Tradecraft; The Third World War; Say, Die in Your Rage; Book Four: Payback; Desert One; Just Rewards; Find, Fix and Finish; Dirty Battles, A Dirty War; Dawn before Daylight; Postscript: Caution and Vigilance.


This is a comprehensive, detailed and authoritative account of the origins and current activities of Boko Haram, including its relationship with the Islamic State. To examine these issues, the author draws on his extensive interviews and access to primary sources in Arabic and Hausa. The author is Senior Fellow on African Affairs at The Jamestown Foundation and Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.

Table of Contents: Boko Haram and Global Jihad; Nigerian Jihadists in Sudan and the Sahel.; Al-Qaeda in Nigeria; Ideological Preparation for Jihad; Broken Alliances with Salafis; Mobilizing for Battle; The Role of al-Qaeda Affiliates; Factional Feuds and Territorial; Conquests; Allegiance to the Islamic State; The Islamic State in West Africa Province; The Future of Global Jihad in Nigeria; Appendixes.

United States


This is an interesting account of the origins of modern homeland security in the United States, which began with the establishment by President Franklin Roosevelt of the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in the early 1930s.
During World War II, the OCD managed the recruitment and activities of more than 10 million volunteers for civilian defense. Also examined are issues such as civil liberties and the militarization of civilian life – issues that are still relevant in the activities of today’s Department of Homeland Security. The author is Professor of Political Management at George Washington University.

Table of Contents: Introduction: Guns and Butter; Ultimate Armageddon; No Pact, Treaty, Symbol, or Person; Two Fronts; The Problem of Home Defense; An American Plan; London Burning; A Sweeping Conflagration of Insanity; Heart and Soul; We Can't All Run to Central Pk; A Man Must Be Protected; Fair Game; The Liberal Approach; All These Rights Spell Security; Conclusion: National Security Liberalism.


This is the first volume of the author's comprehensive and extensively detailed four volume overview of the origins and evolution of the United States' Government's approach to counterterrorism from the Dwight Eisenhower through the Donald Trump administrations. This first volume covers the years from the Eisenhower to the Carter presidencies - what the author terms the first phase of the international terrorist threat facing the United States. The second volume, covering the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, is scheduled to be published in a few months. The author is a retired U.S. Government terrorism analyst in the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security Threat Analysis Group/Division, giving this volume a unique insider's perspective.


This is a critical account of the effectiveness of the components of targeting, prosecution, detention as well as interrogation of suspected terrorists in the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts against mostly Islamist terrorists, including a discussion on adherence to customary international law and treaty law, during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The author is Professor of International Relations at the University of Leeds, England.

Table of Contents: Introduction; The use of force after 9/11; Prosecuting terrorist suspects after 9/11; Detaining terrorist suspects after 9/11; Interrogating terrorist suspects after 9/11; The State of the American Exception.

This is a dramatic journalistic account of the increasing use of weaponized drones by the American government, particularly under President Barack Obama, to target the leaders of Islamist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda. The pursuit, targeting and assassination by a weaponized drone of Anwar al-Awlaki (and his associates) in their hideout in Yemen in May 2011 forms the book's central narrative. The author is a Washington, DC-based national security reporter for The New York Times.

*Table of Contents:* Prologue; Part I: 2009-2010; Merry Christmas; You Are Still Unsafe; Part II: 1990-2002; He Had a Beautiful Tongue; An Exquisite Weapon; We Are the Bridge; Totally Planning to Stay; Stealthy, Agile, and Lethal; Part III: 2002-2009; What Was the Transformation; WWW Jihad; I Face the World as It Is; Part IV: 2010-2014; The Guy Everyone Wanted to Find; The Time for Reaping; A Bigger Brand; Afterword.

*About the Reviewer:* Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
‘Militant Islam’ vs. ‘Islamic Militancy’ focuses on overlooked and understudied questions of radical Islamic movements and the distinctive factors of such groups by considering theoretical and practical frameworks. Throughout this edited volume, the authors focus their analyses on discourses on radical Islam, political Islam, Islamic extremism, and religious violence. They do so by asking questions about what people are discussing when they refer to Salafism, Jihadism, and Islamic terrorism in order to try to overcome discrepancies in these terminologies.

This book consists of eight contributions, based on an international workshop organized by the Department of Religious Studies and Intercultural Theology, in cooperation with a Research Group on ‘Power of Interpretation: Religion and Belief Systems in Conflicts of Interpretational Power,’ held at the University of Rostock on November 16-17, 2017.

Hans G. Kippenberg, in his chapter “The end of Jihadi Movements in the Light of Comparative Studies in the Decline of Terrorism,” analyzed the endings of terrorist groups on religious and nonreligious levels. He also provided a synopsis of terrorism and jihadism by examining the motives for renouncing violence.

Alex P. Schmid, under the title of “Religion and Violent Extremism – with a Focus on Islamist Jihadism,” studied the definitions and relationships between religion and violence through the lens of the three Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Schmid analyzed how Salafi Jihadist ideologies interpret the Islamic sacred texts to justify their violence and killing, believing they are being done in the name of God. He also reviews the relationship between jihad and terrorism. Consequently, this chapter concludes that jihadism will continue to be a challenge in the 21st century, similar to how the ideologies of Fascism and Communism were during the 20th century.

In his “Beyond Religion – Beyond Islam: The Challenge of Ultra-Islamist Violence” contribution, Reinhard Schulze highlighted the political stereotyping of “Islamic terrorism” by considering de-radicalization programs. The author criticizes reducing the meaning of Islam to militant jihad, which led to the equation of Islam and vicious terrorist attacks in some quarters. In the end, the author suggests reconsidering the notions of Islam, religion, and violence to overcome the possibility of social stigmas being attached.

“The Problem of Salafism, the Problem with ‘Salafism’: An Essay on the Usability of an Academic Category to Understand a Political Challenge” by Florian Zemmin discusses the politicization and misuse of the term Salafism. In this chapter, the author explains how the meaning of Salafism changed over the years by almost demonizing the religion of Islam through the violent activities of terrorists. In his conclusion, the author suggests that the use of the term “Islamic extremism” is more appropriate than “Militant Islam” because the use of Islamic extremism identifies extremism as the main problem, instead of the religion.

Andrew Hammond, in the chapter “Contesting Legitimacy: Zahid Kevseri’s Semantic War with Emerging Salafism,” argues that Kevseri, the last Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam Mustafa Sabri’s deputy in Istanbul, became a “lightning rod for the Salafi movement” after his death. Kevseri was a prominent scholar in the tradition of Hanafi-Maturidism, and he held a critical position towards Ibn Taymiyya, by countering Salafi and Wahhabi practices, such as the frequent use of takfīr (declaring Muslims non-believers).

Nina Käsehage argues in her chapter, “Empowerment through Violence – European Women in Jihadi Movements,” that the role of women in Jihadi movements has been underrated based on her own interviews and observations. In her research on “Female Salafistic Jihadi,” she examined the various motives of European female Jihadi members for joining terrorist groups. Dr. Käsehage concluded that one of the main reasons why
Salafi Jihadist groups were able to recruit female members was because of “empowerment through a specific form of violence.” Finally, the author, in her conclusion, suggests the development of alternative forms of empowerment for (Muslim) females participation in Europe to counter radicalization and recruitment.

In “Islamism and Women in the Sahel: Roots and Evolutions,” Olga Torres discusses the development of Islam in the Sahel, as well as how it impacted Muslim women through the progress which occurred between the eighth and sixteenth centuries. Diaz concludes that it is only possible to counter the threat of female extremism and radicalization in the Sahel by addressing the deep historical roots, including social, educational, and economic factors that have affected the female population adversely compared to their male counterparts.

Claudia Carvalho and Johannes Saal, in their analysis “The Hidden Women of the Caliphate – a Glimpse into the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network on Facebook,” reviews the role of Muslim women and their online activities, particularly on Facebook. According to the authors, female jihadists’ activities within Spanish-Moroccan online networks contribute to “bridging social capital and the brokerage function,” and the most effective female jihadists are the ones who perform online.

In sum, this volume provides productive and multidimensional approaches and discussions to a variety of issues, including the definitional and perceptional challenges in describing or labeling Islamic extremism or militancy, the perception of the religion of Islam and Salafism through the eyes of the extremists, other Muslims, and outsiders, the relationship of faith and violence, and the role of females in a variety of jihadist settings and groups.

Klaus Hock is Head of the Department of Religious Studies and Intercultural Theology at the University of Rostock. His research focus is on Christian-Muslim relations and transculturation. Nina Käsehage is a Research Fellow at the University of Rostock with a focus on Islamic radicalization. Currently, she is working on the religious socialization of children in the former Islamic State (IS).

About the Reviewer: Ahmet S. Yayla is an Assistant Professor and the Director of the Center for Homeland Security at DeSales University.
If you ask security policy makers or analysts what the dominant trend in terrorism is today, the chances are high that they will tell you that it is the threat of lone wolf terrorism, especially that originating from Islamic and far right environments. The last few years have witnessed a spike in the number of studies of this phenomenon. *Lone Wolves*, by the German political scientist Florian Hartleb, specifically probes the threat from solo right-wing actors and provides a far-ranging perspective on such perpetrators and their backgrounds, motivations, trajectories of violent radicalization, and murderous deeds.

Hartleb makes a good case throughout this book of the benefits of taking an in-depth look at the *particular* – at each episode of lone actor terrorism - in order to establish tendencies and commonalities and to capture the *universal*, or a broader view of the phenomenon. Three arguments specifically stand out. The author criticizes – rightly in my view – the way that authorities are often too quick to attribute attacks to mental imbalance or personal issues (the ‘running amok’ view) even when the choice of victims appears targeted, the perpetrator expressed clear grievances of a political or religious nature, or both. Such “depoliticisation” and “pathologisation” (p. 174-175) impede a full understanding of the act. The reasons for such a predisposition are, however, insufficiently explained here.

Hartleb, through various case studies, makes clear that lone wolves adhere to an ideology of validation that legitimizes the act. At the same time, he gives credence to the view that mental disorder is indeed a risk factor for lone-wolf terrorists even if it is not the *cause* of lone wolf terrorism. Finally, lone wolves are not really “lone,” in the sense that they are usually part of community subcultures and networks that are often virtual. Hence, “[t]his finding becomes even more significant, as it contradicts the assumption that lone wolf terrorists do not communicate with other people” (p. 166). The author makes a powerful case that David Sonboly, the German-Iranian teen who went on a killing spree in Munich in 2016, was indeed a lone wolf terrorist while the German authorities played down (even negated) the political motivations for his attack. The 18-year-old fit all criteria, including hatred for ethnic minorities, especially Turks, although he himself was of minority origin; the immersion in an online subculture where extremist and violent views were the norm (in the gaming platform 'Steam'); and a mental disorder. As a counter-strategy and prevention measure, the author forcefully makes the case that the online communities of the video game industry constitute a sort of blind spot in the monitoring of extremism on the Internet.

*Lone Wolves: The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors* would have benefited from better editing; the language is often convoluted, and some sentences are confusing to read. There are minor factual mistakes too: Hartleb confuses Richard Spencer, a major Alt Right leader, with Robert Spencer, the Counter Jihadi ideologue (p. 145), while shortly before that, he states that the “Bible” of the Identitarian movement is a book by Renaud Camus on the “Great Replacement” (p. 141). However, if the movement has a “Bible,” it is Guillaume Faye’s *Why We Fight*). Finally, I think the volume lacks sufficient dialogue with social psychology literature, particularly in terms of psychological factors that may serve as a catalyst for lone wolves. For example, the hypothesis that some individuals may be pushed to action owing not to lack of empathy but rather to an excess of empathy to the grievances of his group (or the group he sees himself part of). Yet all in all, these are minor shortcomings. This is a book well worth reading as it opens new research directions not only regarding the question of “what makes a lone wolf terrorist” but also how the milieus that propagate them may be countered. If, as many believe, we are going through the initial stages of a renaissance of lone wolf terrorism, these issues assume utmost importance, and Hartleb is to be commended for addressing them.
About the Reviewer: José Pedro Zúquete, Ph.D. is a political sociologist. His research focuses on comparative radical politics, social movements, and the impact of globalization. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences- University of Lisbon, Portugal.
Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

by Berto Jongman

Most of the clickable items included became available online between April and June 2020. They are categorized under thirteen headings (as well as sub-headings, not listed below):

1. Non-Religious Terrorism
2. Religious Terrorism
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
5. Extremism, Radicalization
6. Counterterrorism Strategies, Tactics and Operations
7. Specific Operations and/or Specific Policy Measures
8. Prevention, Preparedness and Resilience Studies
9. State Repression, Civil War and Clandestine Warfare
10. Intelligence Operations
11. Cyber Operations
12. Risk and Threat Assessments, Forecasts and Analytical Studies
13. Also Worth the Time to Read/Listen/Watch

N.B. Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects is a regular feature in 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. For past listings, search under 'Archive' at www.universiteitleiden.nl/PoT

1. Non-Religious Terrorism


2. Religious Terrorism

2.1. Al-Qaeda and Affiliates


Taliban Sources Project (TSP) Department of Culture Studies and Oriental languages, UiO, May 2020. URL: https://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/taliban-sources-repository/about-the-repository/index.html


2.2. Islamic State (Daesh) and Affiliates


ist-groups


Hassan Hassan. Islamic State is back and this time the West is ill-prepared to take it on. *The Guardian*, May 24, 2020. URL: [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/24/islamic-state-is-back-and-this-time-the-west-is-ill-prepared-to-take-it-on?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/24/islamic-state-is-back-and-this-time-the-west-is-ill-prepared-to-take-it-on?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other)


2.3. Other Muslim Groups/Organizations


N. Jahanbani. Reviewing Iran’s proxies by region: a look toward the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. *CTC Sentinel*, 13(5), 2020. URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/may-2020/


The Nujaba movement, an Iraqi Shiite militia handled by Iran, also operates in the Gaza Strip. *The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center*, May 25, 2020. URL: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/nuja-ba-movement-iraqi-shiite-militia-handled-iran-also-operates-gaza-strip/?fbclid=IwAR0IivBIO8ycnIIW88ayIQpo4UgQHNg5bcFxFqjeGsupsXO5f1DoiuurOLlk


3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics


P. Salahin Refsdal. Dugma: the button. 2020. (on Suicide Terrorism in Syria) URL: https://www.journeyman.tv/film/6585?fbclid=IwAR18E8ETeORac3NNihBcaVN_TWwLHsANChZKAcFIOHQ1mtGTL4tX_xBKnVpU
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism

4.1. Criminal Groups


4.2. Political Violence, Hate Crimes, Anti-Semitism


5. Extremism, Radicalization

5.1. General


5.2. Right-wing Extremism


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E. Sahinkaya, D. Galperovich. Radical Russian Imperial Movement expanding global outreach. VOA, May 9, 2020. URL: https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/radical-russian-imperial-movement-expanding-global-outreach?fbclid=IwAR2ny0GhAY8pcCYIkiMGDeUz1-K3mGakXx7CURLykyrqPORw_4N-bzPTa8U


L. Stenzler-Koblenz. The far-right leverages COVID-19 pandemic to gain influence and encourage violence. ICT, April 30, 2020. URL: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2541/The_Far_Right_Leverages_COVID_19?fbclid=IwAR2OM5rDwRCKFcLx67gecs1XfWKA0ZzXCVD84kd2i8-r-gqe-xUhKp2U7mg - gsc.tab=0


A.M. Bluc, J. Betts, M. Vergani, M. Iqbal, K. Dunn. The growing power of online communities of the extreme-right: deriving strength, meaning, and direction from significant socio-political events ‘in real life.’ The Hague: ICCT, April 28, 2020. URL: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/drone-killings-don’t-work-accord- ing-book-148836?fbclid=IwAR0O-KSe0XMRhoECGry1zAtym3lgKs56Rj-WmiX8iUDkPjPAFeY3gzTJiK8


5.3. Leftwing Extremism

N. Munro. Authors: Antifa rioters are the tech economy’s college discards. Breitbart, June 6, 2020. URL: https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/06/06/authors-antifa-rioters-are-the-tech-economys-college-discards/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social


T. Lavin. How to be an antifascist from your couch. You don’t have to punch Nazis to fight fascism. The Nation, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/antifa-online/


A. Speckhard, M. Ellenberg. Perspective: why branding Antifa a terror group is a diversion. Homeland Security Today, June 2, 2020. URL: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/perspective-why-branding-antifa-a-terror-group-is-a-diversion/?fbclid=IwAR1ER45d75r8eidawQEGmZF-NeFslOAX-ciaBGsepio9PVzNBmiV3lx4eyLY

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J. Hodge. After five bloody years in Syria, Russia is turning against Iran – and Assad. *The Daily Beast*, May
7. Specific Operations and/or Specific Policy Measures

7.1. Foreign Fighters and their Families


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8. Prevention, Preparedness and Resilience Studies


**9. State Repression, Civil War and Clandestine Warfare**

**9.1. Arbitrary Arrest/Detention/Prison System**


**9.2. Extra-judicial Killings, Executions**


9.3. Torture


10. Intelligence Operations

5 Eyes, 9 Eyes, & 13 Eyes countries –what you need to know. *VPN Monitor*, May 27, 2020. URL: [https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/understanding-five-eyes-concept/](https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/understanding-five-eyes-concept/)


A. Anthony. Barton Gellman: “The Assange precedent is dangerous’. *The Guardian*, May 23, 2020. URL: [https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/may/23/barton-gellman-the-assange-precedent-is-dangerous?CMP=twt_books_b-gdnbooks&fbclid=IwAR1DTay4_bNtlzuQs-5ddNc0h4AzQx/PLjon2ZA6WPTyr8UfYjr9yNKvaXFs](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2020/may/23/barton-gellman-the-assange-precedent-is-dangerous?CMP=twt_books_b-gdnbooks&fbclid=IwAR1DTay4_bNtlzuQs-5ddNc0h4AzQx/PLjon2ZA6WPTyr8UfYjr9yNKvaXFs)


11. Cyber Operations


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Z. Doffman. Chinese military cyber spies just caught crossing a ‘very dangerous’ new line. Forbes, May 7, 2020. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/05/07/chinese-military-cyber-spies-just-caught-crossing-a-very-dangerous-new-line/?fbclid=IwAR0KUXe9OEmk2gPNpAUZFw9j6Tso6DGgCaBr-gEkVDhPM-ea8kj70m8tGkF - 7b5ee4cd2ab3

11.1. Internet Regulation, Censorship


12. Risk and Threat Assessments, Forecasts and Analytical Studies


How are terrorists and violent extremists using gamification? *The Tech against Terrorism podcast*, May 13,


Where to publish academic research on online extremism and terrorism?: what we can learn from journal article entries in Vox-POL’s online library. Vox Pol, May 7, 2020. URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/where-to-publish-academic-research-on-online-extremism-and-terrorism-what-we-can-learn-from-journal-article-entries-in-vox-pols-online-library/


B. Ganor (ICT) on current terrorist threats and commonalities between Covid19 and terrorism. ITSSVerona, YouTube, May 15, 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SHc5lePPM2c&feature=youtu.be


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E. Karmon. The CBRNe threat in the COVID-19 era. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), YouTube, May 6, 2020. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7waB7vKgMI


13. Also Worth the Time to Read/Listen/Watch


A. Gescinska. Herwaardering van de waarheid begint met twijfel. *NRC Handelsblad*, June 5, 2020. URL: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/06/05/herwaardering-van-de-waarheid-begint-met-twijfel-a4001903 - /handelsblad/2020/06/06/


*About the Compiler: Berto Jongman* is Associate Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He is a former senior Military Intelligence Analyst and currently serves as International Consultant on CBRN issues. A sociologist by training, he also worked for Swedish and Dutch civilian research institutes. Drs. Jongman was the recipient of the Golden Candle Award for his World Conflict & Human Rights Maps, published by PIOOM. He is editor of the volume ‘Contemporary Genocides’ (1996) and has also contributed to various editions of ‘Political Terrorism’, the award-winning handbook of terrorism research, edited by Alex P. Schmid.
Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events

Compiled by Reinier Bergema

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming academic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events – both on- and offline – that are directly or indirectly relevant to the readers of Perspectives on Terrorism. The calendar includes academic and (inter-) governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, civil society events and educational programs. The listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.

We encourage readers to contact the journal’s Associate Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema, and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. Reinier Bergema can be reached at <r.bergema@icct.nl> or via Twitter: @reinierbergema.

June 2020

COVID-19 and Social Media – Meeting Challenges Using Lessons Learned from Countering Terrorism
Henry Jackson Society
3 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @HJS_org

Gender and Violent Extremism Today
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)
4 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague

Strategies for Addressing Global White Supremacists
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
4 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @fdd

Book Talk: Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
8 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_UMD

Incitement: Anwar al-Awlaki’s Western Jihad
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR)
9 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICSR_Centre

Can an ISIS Terrorist be Rehabilitated and Reintegrated into Society?
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism
10 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @icsve
Weaponising COVID-19: Far-Right Antisemitism in the UK and US
Henry Jackson Society
11 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @HJS_org

Border Management and Human Rights: Collection and Sharing of Information and New Technologies in the Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Movement Context
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
15-25 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @osce

A Decade of Review: The UN’s Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee
Asser Institute
15 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @TMCAsser

Violent Non-State Actors and the Pandemic: Extremist Narratives, Adaptations, and Governance
Valens Global
15 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @Valens_Global

CARR Far Right De-Radicalisation Webinars: Nigel Bromage (EXIT UK)
Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR)
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @C4ARR

Chad’s Pivotal Role in the Sahel
International Institute for Strategic Studies
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @IISS_org

Webinar: Finding Solutions to Insecurity in Cabo Delgado
Chatham House
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ChathamHouse

COVID–19 and Terrorism: Assessing the Short- and Long-Term Impacts
Pool Re Solutions
16 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Ethics for Mental Health Workers in the Prevention of Radicalisation
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Mental Health
16-17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

START Webinar: Information Warfare
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd
Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism
Asser Institute
17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @TMCAsser

The Impact of the Islamic State on Terrorism Research
George Washington University's Program on Extremism
17 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @gwupoe

Webinar: The Impact of COVID-19 on Peace Operations in Africa
Egmont Institute
18 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @Egmontinstitute

Weapons of the Weak State: Contracts and Consent in Post-Conflict Statebuilding
Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
18 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @FSIStanford

RADPol2020 Conference “Towards Evidence-Based Practice and Policy: What Research Projects Offer to Practitioners in the Field of Preventing Radicalisation”
Polish Platform for Homeland Security
18 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @PolishPlatform

U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East
Center for Strategic & International Studies
22 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @csis

Repatriation of FTFs and Their Families: Why Not?
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)
23 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague

Webinar: EU Options for Dealing with the Syrian Conflict
Clingendael Institute
23 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @clingendaelorg

Families ‘Left Behind’ by FTFs
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Families, Communities and Social Care
23-24 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RANEurope

Refugees and COVID-19: The Case of the Syrian and Rohingya Crises
Wilson Center
24 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @thewilsoncenter
After the Attack: Crisis Communication Strategy and the Role of the Media
*International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)*
25 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague

RADPol2020 Conference “Sharing the Insights on Central and Eastern Europe Approaches in Radicalisation and Violent Extremism”
*Polish Platform for Homeland Security*
25 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @PolishPlatform

Terrorist Financing Present and Future
*National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*
29 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd

Natural Resources, Sustainable Development, and Peace in Africa
*Wilson Center*
30 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @thewilsoncenter

Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab Spring
*Wilson Center*
30 June, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @thewilsoncenter

**July 2020**

RADPol2020 Conference Doing it Better “Improving Policy and Practice Tackling Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe”
*Polish Platform for Homeland Security*
2 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @PolishPlatform

Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad
*Monash University*
3 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @MonashUni

Global Terrorism Database (GTD)™ 2020 Update
*National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*
9 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd

The Executive Certificate Program in Counter-Terrorism Studies
*International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*
12-31 July, Herzliya, Israel
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICT_org
Progressive Terrorism Studies Webinar Series – The Persistent Online Presence: The Shift in Platform Exploitation Over Time
Royal United Services Institute
14 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

CARR Far Right De-Radicalisation Webinars: Ryan Scrivens (Michigan State University)
Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR)
16 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @C4ARR

Trump’s Deployment of Terrorist Designations: A Look at the IRGC and Russian Imperial Movement
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
21 July, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @START_umd

August 2020

Understanding Incel Violence
Monash University
14 August, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @MonashUni

Advanced Summer Programme: Preventing, Detecting, and Responding to Violent Extremism
Leiden University Centre for Professional Learning & International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague
17-21 August, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeidenCPL; @ICCT_TheHague

Advanced Summer Program: Terrorism, Countering Terrorism, and the Rule of Law
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague & Asser Institute
24-28 August, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @ICCT_TheHague; @TMCAsser

September 2020

From Potential to Prosperity: Africa’s Long-Term Future
Institute for Security Studies Africa
2-3 September, Johannesburg, South Africa
Website: visit | Twitter: @issafrica

The World Counter Terror Congress 2020
Counter Terror Expo
8-10 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @CTX_Event

Women, Terrorism, and Counter-Terrorism
Monash University
9 September, online
Whitehall Briefing - The Future of UK–EU Intelligence Sharing in a Post-Brexit World
Royal United Services Institute
9 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

Trading Emerging Technologies: Security and Human Rights Perspectives
Asser Institute
15 September, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @TMCAsser

IVth ‘Silent Leges Inter Arma?’ Conference
International Society for Military Law and the Law of War
15-18 September, Bruges, Belgium
Website: visit | Twitter: @ISMLLW

Extreme Threats to the UK
Royal United Services Institute
17 September, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

Counter Terrorism / Attack the Network [Course]
NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)
21-25 September, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Countering CBRN at Home and Beyond
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
23 September, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Asser Institute
28 September-2 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @TMCAsser

German Prevention Congress
Deutscher Praeventionstag
28-29 September, Kassel, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: @praeventionstag

Women in Terrorism and Counterterrorism
NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)
September, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

14th Annual International Conference: Unanswered Questions and Under-Researched Topics in Terrorism Research
Society for Terrorism Research
September, London, United Kingdom
October 2020 & Beyond

Misogynistic Terrorism and the Far-Right
*Monash University*
6 October, online
Website: visit | Twitter: @MonashUni

GLOBSEC 2020 Bratislava Forum
*GLOBSEC*
7-8 October, Bratislava, Slovakia
Website: visit | Twitter: @GLOBSEC

Migration Deals and Their Damaging Effects
*Asser Institute*
9 October, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @TMCAsser

Annual CT Discipline Conference
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
12 October, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Terrorism Experts Conference (TEC)
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
13-14 October, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

COE-DAT CT Lessons Learned (Critical Infrastructure Protection)
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
15-16 October, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Terrorism and Media [Course]
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
19-23 October, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

Modern Deterrence Spring 2020 Conference
*Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)*
21 October, London, United Kingdom
Website: visit | Twitter: @RUSI_org

1980-1920: The Forgotten History of Right-Wing Terrorism
*FORENA/University of Applied Science Düsseldorf & NS-Dokumentation Centre of the City of Cologne, and Nachwuchsforschungsgruppe der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung*
29 October, Cologne, Germany
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

**CBRNe Convergence Boston**
CBRNe Convergence
2-4 November, Boston (MA), United States
Website: visit | Twitter: @cbrneworld

**Defence Against Terrorism Seminar**
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
3-4 November, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

**Border Security, Refugees, and CT**
*NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*
16-20 November, Ankara Turkey
Website: visit | Twitter: n/a

**2020 Stockholm Security Conference**
*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*
18 November, Stockholm, Sweden
Website: visit | Twitter: @sipriorg

**Security, Democracy & Cities Conference**
*European Forum for Urban Security*
25-27 November 2020, Nice, France
Website: visit | Twitter: @Efusnews

**Advanced Winter Programme: Preventing, Detecting and Responding to Violent Extremism**
*Leiden University Centre for Professional Learning & International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*
25-29 January 2021, The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: visit | Twitter: @UniLeidenCPL; @ICCT_TheHague

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**About the Compiler:** Reinier Bergema is a Research Fellow and Project Manager at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) and an Associate Editor at Perspectives on Terrorism. His research interests include, inter alia, Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters and terrorist threat levels across the EU.
About Perspectives on Terrorism

Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at the following URL: https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism.

PoT has over 9,000 subscribers and seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses on terrorism;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘non-traditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our online journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards. The journal’s Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Team, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals.

While aiming to be policy-relevant, PoT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

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