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'Oil-Qaeda': Jihadist Threats to the Energy Sector

by Tim Pippard

Abstract

The West's and the Saudi's dependence on oil has made the energy sector a target for Al-Qaeda. The article discusses past and current threats to the energy sector and the motives, capabilities and limitations of Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and beyond.

On March 24, 2010, the Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia announced that it had arrested 113 Al-Qaeda operatives during the previous five months, all suspected of involvement in the planning of attacks on oil installations in the kingdom.[1] Just a week earlier on March 17, the Yemeni Interior Ministry announced that security measures had been bolstered around critical oil and gas installations and transportation routes to counter the threat of terrorist attacks under preparation by Al-Qaeda. [2]

Both incidents serve as clear reminders that the launching of attacks on energy infrastructure – be it fixed installations (such as pipelines, refineries or storage tanks), the energy supply chain (ships and ports) or even electronic infrastructure (including cyber attacks likely to be directed at process control networks) – remains an attractive option for jihadist terrorists seeking to achieve maximum economic impact through either the disruption or cessation of production, or increases in international oil prices, transportation and insurance costs.

That being said, some uncertainty continues to surround Al-Qaeda's capacity and desire to target the energy industry in a coordinated fashion. This article will seek to resolve some of this ambiguity by examining three core issues: first, the underlying ideological and strategic basis for targeting the energy sector; second, the apparent gap between this strategic grounding and Al-Qaeda's tactical and operational capabilities; and third, the more fundamental limiting factors that might currently preclude Al-Qaeda from launching a sustained and coherent campaign against energy targets, or even pursuing its broader pan-Islamic agenda and objectives.

'Bleed to Bankruptcy' – Ideological and Strategic Drivers

Al-Qaeda initially cautioned against attacking oil targets on the basis that the Islamic Caliphate it hopes to establish would later depend upon these same resources. Over time however, the group has altered its strategic and ideological stance, particularly after the 2004 publication by Saudi ideologue Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasir al-Rashid titled the 'Laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests and a Review of the Laws Pertaining to the Economic Jihad'. [3]

Rashid's work revealed a new doctrine for economic terrorism, and outlined Al-Qaeda's rules of engagement when targeting oil infrastructure. In the document, Rashid argued that the targeting of oil-related interests is a legitimate means of economic jihad, with the potential to precipitate rising oil prices, increase infrastructure protection costs, and damage the economic reputation of the U.S.

Rashid outlined four broad types of oil related interests – oil wells, oil pipelines, oil facilities, and petroleum industry personnel – and aimed to institute a series of considerations or rules in relation to the targeting of each. Rashid insisted that the targeting of oil wells, for instance, is not permitted as long as a realistic alternative exists, because the negative consequences of such an operation outweigh the benefits. Similarly, Rashid argued that while attacks on oil facilities (refineries and plants) can render a devastating blow to the enemy, such operations must not target facilities owned by Muslims.

At its core then, Rashid's doctrine is one rooted in proportionality, seeking to prioritize targets that would not damage long-term oil production capability, but would instead cause oil prices to rise. This logic of proportionality is especially clear in Rashid's assessment of targeting oil pipelines: "Pipelines are easier and less costly to attack… As for the costs of attacks against pipelines, they are less detrimental to the environment… In addition, pipelines are easy to target from an operational perspective. This is because guarding the pipelines is virtually impossible due to the vast distances that they sprawl across…Thus, attacking oil pipelines offers great benefits, and deals a great blow to the enemies that cannot be dealt by other means."[4]

Al-Qaeda's senior leadership further developed this strategy in late 2004. In a videotape from late October (the transcript of which was released by Al-Jazeera in early November), Osama bin Laden called for attacks on the oil industry as part of an economic jihad against the U.S. In this statement, Bin Laden noted that the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1990s "bled Russia for 10 years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw… We are continuing the same policy to make the U.S. bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy."[5]

This 'bleed to bankruptcy' strategy has since remained Al-Qaeda's guiding philosophy in relation to the energy sector, and in September 2005 Al-Qaeda's deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri reiterated Bin Laden's arguments in a video statement released to coincide with the fourth anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S. Zawahiri stated: "I call upon the mujahideen to focus their attacks on the stolen oil of the Muslims. Most of its revenue goes to the enemies of Islam, and most of what they leave is plundered by the thieves who rule our countries. This is the greatest theft in the history of humanity. We must stop this theft in any way we can, in order to save this resource for the sake of the Muslim nation."[6]

While little of compelling strategic value has since been published by Al-Qaeda or its supporters, attacks on oil interests remains a common feature of jihadist documentation and online activity. In the February 2007 issue of Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad), Abeed al-Bassam authored a piece titled *Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon*, in which he discussed theories of economic jihad and future U.S. dependence on foreign oil.[7] In the piece, Bassam emphasized the value of detailed pre-attack reconnaissance to ensure successful tactical execution, and encouraged attacks on physical assets rather than personnel (who are vital in maintaining and operating energy facilities and infrastructure). Bassam also made a number of revealing points about target selection. For example, he considered the attacks on the French-flagged oil tanker *MV Limburg* on 6 October 2002 and the Abqaiq oil processing facility on 24 February 2006 to be the only concrete examples of Al-Qaeda operations directed at the oil industry.

After a sizeable flurry of activity on online jihadist sites regarding Al-Qaeda's energy war in the 2005-2006 period – predominantly focused on the Iraqi theater – such activity has since subsided considerably. Since mid-2006, IHS Jane's has been monitoring and examining some 400 English, Arabic, Pushto and other foreign language websites, blogs and forums with the aim of understanding the radical nature of online extremist content and activity, and assessing strategic and tactical trends and themes that emerge across the range of sites, including documenting any evidence of shifts in the nature and focus of Al-Qaeda's targeting of energy infrastructure, assets and personnel. [8]

For the most part, online statements directed at the energy sector have become sporadic, with one of the most recent examples occurring as far back as August 29, 2009, when members of the Al-Fallujah Forum were told in an online discussion: "We notice in the recent periods a lack of interest by the mujahideen to attack oil pipelines and refineries. Therefore, we call upon the Islamic State of Iraq and other mujahideen to attack those pipelines, which supply the occupation. They are the source of their survival so far in Iraq."[9]

Cutting the Economic Umbilical Cord

Given this strategic grounding, how does Al-Qaeda's stated desire and intent to attack energy targets stack up against its operational past performance in successfully executing attacks targeting the energy sector?

Arguably, there is a clear disconnect between Al-Qaeda's intent and capabilities. Certainly at the height of the Iraqi insurgency between 2004 and late 2006, oil interests – especially pipelines and refineries in northern Iraq around Bayji, Dahuk, Kirkuk and Mosul [10]– were frequently disrupted by insurgent attacks, many of which (but by no means all) were carried out by militants linked to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However outside of the Iraq theater, to date Al-Qaeda's

campaign against energy targets has been remarkably limited to a handful high-profile incidents in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

In fact, three specific examples of attacks or attempted attacks on high profile energy targets effectively constitute the sum of Al-Qaeda's activity in this arena: the attack on the *MV Limburg* on 6 October 2002; the attack on the Abqaiq oil processing facility on 24 February 2006; and the coordinated attacks on two oil terminals in Yemen on 15 September 2006. Each of these attacks highlights the varying levels of tactical and strategic success Al-Qaeda has enjoyed when targeting oil interests.

MV Limburg – 6 October 2002

The attack on the French-flagged oil tanker *MV Limburg* off the Yemeni coast on 6 October 2002 remains possibly the only operation targeting oil interests in which Al-Qaeda has achieved *both* its tactical and strategic objectives, and at that time served as a stark wake-up call to the vulnerability of vital shipping lanes and port facilities to terrorist attack.

Tactically, the attack involved an explosive-laden dinghy ramming into the side of the vessel and detonating. The explosion blew a hole in the side of the vessel, setting it on fire, and spilling 90,000 barrels of oil (just under a quarter of the 397,000 barrels of oil being transported) into the Gulf of Aden. One crew member was killed in the attack and 12 others were injured. [11]

In addition to an immediate rise in oil by prices by 1.3 % (30 cents), Yemen's economy suffered dramatic longer-term effects in the wake of the attack as a result of a collapse in international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and a tripling in insurance premiums on ships operating in Yemeni waterways. According to a fact sheet released by the U.S. State Department's Office of Counterterrorism on 8 November 2002, the average cost for a vessel to dock at a Yemeni port increased by $150,000, causing a 50 % reduction in port activity and a loss to the Yemeni economy through reduced port revenues of around $3.8 million per month. [12] For an economy in which more than 75 % of government revenue is generated from oil exports, the loss of trading activity was a significant economic blow, one that took several years to remedy. Indeed, in an interview in mid-January 2007, M.M.J. Subramaniam, the Chief Executive Officer of Aden Container Terminal's (ACT) operator Overseas Port Management, told *IHS Fairplay* that ACT had recorded a 26 % increase in throughput at the end of December 2006 to 350,000teu, still below the 388,000teu being achieved prior to the *Limburg* attack. [13]

Abqaiq Oil Processing Facility – 24 February 24 2006

The attack on Abqaiq oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia on February 24, 2006 was of even greater significance than that targeting the *Limburg* owing to the strategic importance of the

target. Abqaiq is located beside an oil field with some 17 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. In 2006, the field was producing around 4 % of Saudi Arabia's total oil production, equivalent to some 430,000 barrels per day.[14] Moreover, two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's crude oil production passes through the facility's pumping stations, gas-oil separators and pipelines prior to export from terminals at Ras Tanura, Ras al-Juaymah and other Gulf export terminals. At the time of the attack in February 2006, this amounted to around 5 million barrels per day – or one-sixth of total global oil production. These statistics render the facilities at Abqaiq pivotal to Saudi (and indeed global) energy production and export capacity.

The operation itself involved a five-man team consisting of a three-vehicle convoy: a lead vehicle (a Toyota Landcruiser, a 4x4 vehicle) with three terrorists onboard, and two other vehicles, both vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and driven by single suicide bombers. Michael Knights, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and specialist on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has previously offered one of the most succinct reconstructions of the attack:

"Led by the lead 'shooter' team, the convoy approached the gate. The breaching team dismounted from the Landcruiser and began shooting and throwing hand grenades at the guards. The attack on the guards was successful, and both were mortally wounded. The first VBIED then rammed the gate barrier and exploded shortly afterwards. The explosion opened a path for the second vehicle to slowly drive through the burning chassis and gate debris… While the second VBIED cleared the gate, it was stopped by gunfire from security forces after it had driven approximately 40 m closer to the Abqaiq facility. This vehicle exploded between 300 m and 400 m from the plant's key areas."[15]

Tactically then, the operation failed before reaching Abqaiq's critical infrastructure. With only one of the three attack vehicles able to operate off-road, the attack cell certainly limited its chances of success, forced to approach and target Abqaiq's main outer security perimeter rather than the more easily penetrable wire fencing around other sections of the facility. Consequently, damage from the two explosions was contained around pumping and processing stations outside the main facility.[16] While the quick response of Saudi security forces to engage the two approaching vehicles cannot be discounted, this fundamental flaw in operational execution – the use of vehicles with limited capacity to fulfill mission objectives – demonstrates both a degree of insufficient pre-attack reconnaissance, as well as an air of misplaced tactical optimism. Strategically, the Abqaiq operation was more successful. News of the attack resulted in an increase in crude oil prices of around $2. More significantly, the attack clearly reflected the greater focus on energy targets displayed by militants in Saudi Arabia during the previous twelve months. During this period, Saudi security forces killed prominent AQAP leadership figure Saleh Mohammed al-Awfi on 18 August 2005, in the process uncovering charts and maps indicating

several potential oil infrastructure targets across Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.[17]

Yemen Oil Terminals – 15 September 2006.

On 15 September 2006, jihadist terrorists launched two near-simultaneous attacks on oil facilities in Yemen. These operations must ultimately be characterized as over-ambitious attacks that were poorly conceived and executed worse, suffering from a combination of inadequate target selection, shortcomings in operational implementation, and an absence of sophisticated strategic guidance.

The most surprising element of the attack was the choice of targets, with neither being critical to Yemen's oil industry nor as heavily guarded as other oil facilities (such as the Sanaa oil processing facility). Consequently, even had the attacks enjoyed tactical success, the economic impact would have been marginal (and indeed, oil prices were unaffected by the failed incidents).

Tactically, the operations shared many of the characteristics associated with the Abqaiq attack earlier in 2006. However, the absence of a lead vehicle designed to clear a path for suicide vehicle-borne explosive devices (SVBIEDs) to breach the outer perimeters ultimately confounded the operations to failure.

The first attack targeted the Ash Shihr oil terminal in Mukalla, Yemen's main export terminal in the Gulf of Aden. The attack involved two VBIEDs; the first exploded at the external perimeter wall of the facility, while the second exploded just inside the perimeter after security forces shot and wounded the driver. The second attack, some 45 minutes after the first attack, targeted Block 18 site in Marib province, 150 km east of Sanaa – a 10,000 barrels per day (bpd) oil gathering and gas/oil separation plant. As with the first attack, two VBIEDs were involved in the Block 18 operation. The first vehicle rammed the gate and exploded. Before reaching the destroyed section of the gate, the second VBIED changed course and struck an undamaged section of chain-link fence before exploding. Physical damage in both attacks was extremely limited. [18]

Strategically also, the attacks must be considered a failure. While no doubt affirming Yemen's rapidly deteriorating security environment, little compelling evidence exists of any discernible involvement or direction from Al-Qaeda. [19] Rather, the operations were carried out by a small, inexperienced home-grown group of Yemeni Islamists attempting to imitate the tactics of their jihadist counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and South Asia.

Al-Qaeda's Operational Limitations

Why then, despite the strategic discourse on the legitimacy of targeting and sabotaging oil infrastructure, is Al-Qaeda yet to make a significant impact on the energy sector?

There are some important limiting factors that help explain Al-Qaeda's operational shortcomings, not the least of which is the fact that strategic energy targets – especially large refineries – are among the most heavily guarded and secured.

For instance at the time of the Abqaiq attack in February 2006, the Saudi government was spending $1.5 billion on energy security, and providing around-the-clock surveillance from military helicopters and F15 patrols. In addition, an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 troops were protecting Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure, and each terminal has its own dedicated security unit, comprised of Saudi Aramco security personnel, and specialized units of the National Guard and Ministry of Interior. [20] In addition, Saudi Aramco announced the creation of the Abqaiq Area Emergency Control Center in November 2002, housing advanced command, control and communication systems to manage emergency and supply disruptions to pipelines and processing hubs.[21]

In Iraq, as a reaction to the deliberate targeting of the country's pipeline infrastructure during the past few years, the government, with U.S. financial support, has established a series of pipeline exclusion zones (PEZs), consisting of layers of berm, fences, razor-wire, walls and trenches, as well as armed guards and patrols placed at strategic locations or at locations from which rockets and other types of attacks can be launched. [22] In the 12 months following completion of the Kirkuk to Baiji PEZ in northern Iraq from July 2007 to July 2008, exports through the pipeline increased ten-fold and no serious disruptions were reported.

The relatively high level of security at strategic energy infrastructure is clearly then an important hindrance to successful jihadist attacks on oil interests. Nevertheless, a more complete and fundamental explanation for the disconnect between Al-Qaeda's strategic objectives and its operational capabilities relates to a number of critical dynamics shaping Al-Qaeda's broad aims and objectives, as well as determining the group's underlying capacity to realize its agenda.

Al-Qaeda's Strategic and Ideological Evolution

Al-Qaeda's strategic and ideological center of gravity has shifted substantially since the attacks in New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001. This is essentially the result of two inter-connected factors.

First, Al-Qaeda has failed to gain traction across much of the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia, which has led many within the jihadist movement to question Bin Laden's ideological supremacy and label his strategic direction misguided. Al-Qaeda's single most

important objective since its inception has been the establishment an Islamic Emirate. However, its failure to do so has instead led to a loss of credibility across the Islamic world. This is particularly clear in Iraq, where the Sunni awakening process (in which U.S. forces began to form alliances with local Sunni tribes in western Anbar) from late 2005 was one that completely rejected rather than embraced Al-Qaeda's vision of a pan-Islamic state. [23]

These internal fissures over Al-Qaeda's general strategic approach are one of the central dynamics shaping the movement, and will likely remain so in the coming years. Without a state or centralized ideological authority, some within the movement argue that a completely different and alternate vision of jihad must be adopted. As Eric Brown has argued, in a new landscape characterized by a rapid proliferation of new actors in the pan-Islamic movement, Al-Qaeda's continuing authority will depend on its ability to manage these internal divisions and prevail in the debate over the correct strategic and ideological direction. [24]

Second, Al-Qaeda has fundamentally reassessed its approach to jihad in the past nine years. Under sustained pressure from U.S. and coalition forces in the Afghan-Pakistan border region since 2001, Al-Qaeda has morphed into a highly decentralized network of associated groups and individuals. This, critically, has shifted ideological – and operational – authority away from the group's senior leaders and has necessitated a shift in focus and posture to avoid questions of relevancy. Put simply, Al-Qaeda has quite deliberately attempted to transform itself into a strategic and doctrinal agenda-setter, and as terrorism specialist Jarret Brachman has noted, this has led Al-Qaeda to evolve "from a terrorist group that dabbles in media, to a media organization that dabbles in terrorism". [25]

No better example of this shift can be found than in a recent Bin Laden statement released in late January 2010 focused almost exclusively on climate change, in which the Al-Qaeda leader stated: "The effects of global warming have touched every continent. Drought and deserts are spreading, while … floods and hurricanes unseen before the previous decades have now become frequent. The world is held hostage by major corporations, which are pushing it to the brink. World politics are not governed by reason, but by the force and greed of oil thieves and warmongers and the cruel beasts of capitalism in Washington, New York and Texas." [26] While the style of this statement is immediately divergent from more typical Al-Qaeda statements that make specific threats against oil interests, it is equally clear that by debating a topic such as climate change, Bin Laden is actively seeking to expand the Al-Qaeda message beyond non-traditional support bases and hardcore jihadist sympathizers, to those who may simply feel disenfranchised by Western regimes. [27]

Internal Power Dynamics

A second important operational limitation to consider arises from the on-going internal power struggle afflicting Al-Qaeda's upper leadership echelons, particularly between the group's Egyptian and non-Egyptian jihadists. These internal power dynamics not only have the potential to undermine Al-Qaeda's long-term strategic success, they could also feasibly serve as a distraction that reduces the operational and tactical capacity of the group.

Al-Qaeda has always been heavily dependent on its capable and experienced Egyptian contingent to pursue its objectives and project power. However, as Guido Steinberg has noted, Egyptian over-representation in Al-Qaeda's senior leadership structures has been a common cause of friction among the group's non-Egyptian jihadists, who are largely unable to reconcile the discrepancy between the ideal of a supranational community or believers and the reality of Egyptian dominance of Al-Qaeda's leadership circles. [28]

Internal power dynamics have been further complicated since 2007 by U.S. drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, which have resulted in the killing of many of Al-Qaeda's senior Egyptian leaders. The highest profile killing to date has been that of Al-Qaeda's third in command, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid. [29] Al-Qaeda released a statement on 1 June 2010 confirming Yazid's death, although U.S. officials suspect he was killed in a drone strike some weeks earlier. Yazid, also known as Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, was a founding member of Al-Qaeda and a pivotal figure in the senior leadership, acting as the prime conduit to Bin Laden, as well as assuming a high degree of responsibility for Al-Qaeda's financial operations. He also coordinated and bolstered relationships between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan, and as such his death will likely lead to a period of uncertainty in relations between the different groups operating across the AfPak border region.

Most importantly, Yazid was widely tipped as the natural successor to Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. As an Egyptian, his position and influence within Al-Qaeda thus tended to perpetuate tensions with non-Egyptian individuals rising in the ranks of the terrorist network. Certainly, his removal from the leadership hierarchy could inspire the decline of Al-Qaeda's Egyptian element relative to a second tier of leadership dominated by influential Libyan jihadists. [30]

Related to these power shifts is the emergence of a younger generation of jihadists within the ranks of Al-Qaeda, many of them Saudi and Kuwaiti nationals. All of these individuals demonstrate a religious zeal and are more than prepared to die as martyrs, but seek high profile targets to justify their death and achieve notoriety. Put simply, operations targeting easily repaired oil pipelines may simply lack the glamour required to satisfy the urge of younger Al-Qaeda martyrs.

Recruitment Challenges

The third and final challenge that potentially undercuts Al-Qaeda's capacity to pursue its campaign relates to recruitment. In the past two years, detailed accounts have emerged (largely via court transcripts) from individuals who have trained in jihadist camps in AfPak which present somewhat mixed experiences.

There are examples of individuals who genuinely appear to have enjoyed their experience. For instance, at least one of the four members of the so-called 'Sauerland Cell' – arrested on 4 September 2007 and convicted in March 2010 for a plot to target U.S. military installations in Germany in 2007 - spoke positively in court about his time in AfPak, describing in his testimony how he "savored every moment" fighting in Afghanistan in 2006 and would have liked to stay longer. [31]

Of more concern to Al-Qaeda must be the accounts of several veterans of jihadist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan who have complained of poor treatment by their Al-Qaeda hosts. Here, a telling case is that of a number of Belgian and French nationals who returned to Europe from AQ training camps in late 2008 and were arrested by Belgian authorities in December that year. According to their interrogation documents, instead of being sent to a training facility upon their arrival in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), each had to pay around €900 for equipment and training, were dispatched to primitive shacks in the mountains and engaged in no meaningful operational activities.

The experience of the Belgian and French group is revealing on two fronts. Negative accounts, if they are well publicized, have the potential to easily cause a reduction in the flow of western militants to training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would ultimately undermine the ability of the group to pursue attacks against any target sector – including oil targets. Second and as importantly, the notion of recruits paying for equipment and training seems to confirm a now long-held suspicion that the group is struggling financially. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership – and in particular Mustafa Abu al-Yazid prior to his death earlier this year – have made frequent appeals in video statements for financial and logistical support from sympathizers. Such appeals indicate that Al-Qaeda might currently lack the support structures and logistical backbone to effectively prosecute its campaign.

Conclusion

The future of Al-Qaeda's oil war remains highly uncertain. While the group retains the desire to organize and execute attacks directed at all types of oil interests (be it pipelines, refineries or personnel), Al-Qaeda nevertheless is grappling with a range of challenges that continue to impact its ability to sustain its campaign, including pressure from outside actors (U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan), ideological divisions, internal power struggles, and recruitment difficulties. Its future force projection capabilities – including those directed at energy targets –

will to a large extent depend on its ability to overcome these challenges, and in an environment of new ideologies and new actors, on its ability to solidify its role as a strategic visionary in the broader pan-Islamic jihadist movement.

It is by no means certain that Al-Qaeda will emerge from this period of redefinition on a stronger footing. Should it succeed in managing these internal and external pressures, oil companies can expect the group to continue to focus its operations on any strategically important pipelines, particularly those that are located in highly volatile regions with a history of attacks on pipeline infrastructure, such as in northern Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The overwhelming fear for oil companies, however, must be that Al-Qaeda will begin to target critical energy facilities and chokepoints in a more sustained and coordinated fashion. Although the level of redundancy in the oil market renders success in any large scale operation difficult to accomplish, if Al-Qaeda launches attacks against the energy sector in a manner consistent with its traditional modus operandi – large-scale, multiple simultaneous explosive attacks – the economic impacts could be severe.

About the Author: *Tim Pippard is a Senior Consultant in the Security and Military Intelligence Practice of IHS Jane's. He is assistant editor of Perspectives on Terrorism, and former managing editor of Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center (JTIC).*

Notes

[1] Saudi Arabia Arrests 113 Al-Qaida Suspects, *ABC News,* 24 March 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=10189021. Retrieved 16 June, 2010.

[2] "Yemen ups oil security for fear of Qaeda attack", *Al Arabiya News Channel,* 17 March 2010, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/03/17/103309.html

[3] See Kohlmann, Evan, "Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia – excerpts from The Laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests", 01 March 2006, http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0306/oiljihad0306.pdf. Retrieved on 16 June 2010.

[4] Kohlmann, Evan, *op. cit.*

[5] "Al-Qaida is bleeding the US to bankruptcy, Bin Laden claims", *The Guardian,* 3 November 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/03/usa.alqaida, retrieved on 8 July 2010.

[6] Excerpts from Ayman al-Zawahiri's video statement were aired by Al-Jazeera in September 2005; however, the full transcript of the interview only appeared online in early December 2005. See "Newly-Released Video of Al-Qaeda's Deputy Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri's Interview with Al-Sahab TV", *The Middle East Media Research Institute,* 8 December 2005, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1550.htm#_edn1; retrieved on 8 July 2010.

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[12] U.S. Department of State, "Yemen's Economy Suffering Due to October Terrorist Attack", November 8, 2002, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/November/20021108162129skaufman@pd.state.gov0.4453089.html, Retrieved on 8 July 2010.

[13] IHS Fairplay, "Aden recovers from *Limburg* attack", 18 January 2007, http://www.fairplay.co.uk/secure/displayMagArticles.aspx?articlename+fpnw20070118023nw&phrase; retrieved on 17 June 2010 (password required)

[14] Production at Abqaiq has since declined (partly due to natural depletion). According to IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates (IHS CERA), production at Abqaiq in 2009 stood at 375,000 barrels per day. See IHS CERA, "World's Largest Oil Fields and Top Oil Producing Nations", 18 August 2009, https://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/public1/news/articles/newsArticleDetails.aspx?CID=10534, retrieved on 8 July 2010. See also Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Briefs – Saudi Arabia", November 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Saudi_Arabia/Full.html, retrieved on 7 July 2010.

[15] Knights, Michael, "Attack on Abqaiq highlights growing focus on oil targets", *Jane's Intelligence Review,* 1 May 2006, http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2006/jir01473.htm@current&pageSelected=janesNews&keyword=Abqaiq&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/search&Prod_Name=&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC ; retrieved on 8 July 2010 (password required)

[16] For further discussion of the Abqaiq attack, its impacts, and security force responses to the attack, see Al-Rohan, Khalid R., "The Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security", *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* 27 February 2006, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060227_abqaiqattack.pdf, retrieved on 8 July 2010.

[17] Knights, Michael, *op. cit.* Knights also makes reference to a Saudi Ministry of Interior statement of 26 February 2005 that suggested a number of planned attacks (some focused on oil interests) had been disrupted by security forces in the Dammam and al-Kharju areas – further evidence of Al-Qaeda's increasing strategic focus on energy targets.

[18] Descriptions of the Yemen oil terminal attacks derived from Knights, Michael, "Yemen oil attacks display intent but little capability", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 6 October 2006.

[19] For a broader discussion of Yemen's security situation – including the Islamist threat, ongoing conflict in Saada, and the southern separatist movement – see Boucek, Christopher, "Collision course – Yemen's converging crises", *Jane's Intelligence Review,* 17 September 2009.

[20] See Cordesman, Anthony H, and Obaid, Nawaf, "Saudi Petroleum Security: challenges and Responses", *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* 30 November 2004, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/saudi_petroleumsecurity041129.pdf; rretrieved on 6 July 2010

[21] Cordesman and Obaid, *op cit.*

[22] For further discussion of PEZs and additional security measures around Iraqi critical oil infrastructure, see Blanchard, Christopher M., "Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy", *Congressional Research Service,* 3 November 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34064.pdf, retrieved on 8 July 2010; Lando, Ben, "Iraqi forces step up oil protection", *Iraqi Oil Report,* 24 September 2009, http://www.iraqoilreport.com/security/iraqi-forces-step-up-oil-protection-2248/, retrieved on 4 July 2010 (password required); Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Briefs – Iraq", June 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/pdf.pdf, retrieved on 8 July 2010; and "Safer pipeline lets Iraq oil exports flow: report", *Reuters*, 26 July 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2641627720080726, retrieved on 4 July 2010.

[23] See Pippard, Tim, "Ál-Qaeda's Afghan Strategy", *IHS Jane's Intelligence Center Seminar,* 7 December 2009, http://www2.janes.com/docs/onlineSeminars/Al-Qaedas-Afghan-Strategy.html, retrieved on 6 July 2010 (password required). For a broader discussion of Al-Qaeda's perceived strategic failures, see Burke, Jason, "Perceptions of leaders: Examining extremist views of Al-Qaeda", in *Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership – A Jane's Strategic Advisory Services Supplement,* IHS Jane's, November 2009, pp. 2-6.

[24] Brown, Eric, "Al-Qaeda after Bin Laden", in *Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership – A Jane's Strategic Advisory Services Supplement,* IHS Jane's, November 2009, pp. 36-40.

[25] Brachmann, Jarret, "Retaining Relevance – Assessing Al-Qaeda's Generational Evolution", in *Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership – A Jane's Strategic Advisory Services Supplement,* IHS Jane's, November 2009, pp. 26-30.

[26] "Bin Laden Blasts U.S. for Climate Change", *ABC News,* 29 January 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=9695828&page=1, retrieved on 9 July 2010.

[27] Pippard, Tim, "Ideologies and Actors: Jihadist threats to the energy sector", *CERAWeek 2010,* Houston, TX, 8 March 2010, http://www2.cera.com/ceraweek2010/cwonline/; rretrieved on 6 July 2010 (password required).

[28] For a detailed discussion of internal power struggles between Al-Qaeda's Egyptian and non-Egyptian contingents, see Steinberg, Guido, "Towards Collective Leadership – The Role of Egyptians in Al-Qaeda", in *Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership – A Jane's Strategic Advisory Services Supplement,* IHS Jane's, November 2009, pp. 7-11.

[29] U.S. Welcomes Death of Al-Qaida Leader in Pakistan", *Voice of America,* 1 June 2010, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Pakistani-Based-High-Ranking-al-Qaida-Leader-Killed-95292139.html, retrieved on 8 July 2010.

[30] The Libyan Abu Yahya al-Libi has emerged as one of Al-Qaeda's most senior ideologues and religious authorities since his escape from Bagram airbase in 2005, frequently appearing in video and audio statements. See Steinberg, Guido, *op. cit.*

[31] For a detailed analysis of the Sauerland cell, the plot and jihadist threats in Germany more broadly, see Steinberg, Guido, "Trial and Error – How a failed plot revealed a movement", *Jane's Intelligence Review,* 16 April 2010, http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2010/jir10875.htm@current&pageSelected=janesNews&keyword=Sauerland&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC/search&Prod_Name=&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JTIC, retrieved on 8 July 2010 (password required). On Al-Qaeda's general recruitment challenges and their impacts upon the operational capacity of the movement, see Cruickshank, Paul, "Enlisting Terror: Al-Qaeda's recruitment challenges", in *Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership – A Jane's Strategic Advisory Services Supplement,* IHS Jane's, November 2009, pp. 12-15.

Using the Qur'an to Justify Terrorist Violence: Analysing Selective Application of the Qur'an in English-Language Militant Islamist Discourse

by Donald Holbrook

Abstract

Selective Qur'anic referencing comprises a core element of radical Islamist discourse endorsing militancy. These are often embedded in wider religious deliberations which also cite numerous Hadith *and other religious sources to support a given argument. This article seeks to analyse and document the way in which specific verses of the Qur'an are used to legitimise justifications put forward for violence and targeting in a selected corpus of English- language extremist Islamist material. The article concludes that application of the teachings of the Qur'an is altered and tailored in major militant Islamist treatises to match their political narrative, thus violating strict Salafistic demands for literal application of the Qur'an's message.*

Introduction

Modern militant Islamism, sometimes termed 'jihadi-Salafism' [1] departs from large swathes of non-activist and non-political Salafism in that it seeks to confront a self-proclaimed political 'reality'. Nonetheless, militant Islamists retain the emphasis on broadly defined Salafist positions, at least rhetorically. This includes the pivotal importance of the fundamentals of Islam, as contained in the Qur'an and Hadith - the collection of sayings attributed to the Prophet - and the literal implementation, as well as interpretation, of the religious tenets. As self-appointed vanguards of the religion, militant Islamists demand that Muslims live by their interpretation of these tenets and - in the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri - 'renounce popular sovereignty and every other sovereignty besides that of the Qur'an and Sunnah'.[2]

This basic, puritanical doctrine has been embraced and utilised by the religio-political agendas of radical fringe movements operating chiefly in the Middle East. Reuven Paz identifies three major strands of influence in this regard:
(1) the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (most famously through Sayyid Qutb's ideas of *jahiliyyah*—pre-Islamic ignorance, and *hakimiyyah*—sovereignty of God),
(2) Neo-Wahabis of the Arabian Peninsula, and
(3) the works of prominent Palestinian-Jordanian Islamist activists (primarily Abdullah Azzam, Abu Qatada and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).[3]

Although these militant elements have, as Paz notes, 'lost all connection with the original reformist Salafism of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth

century as well as the current purist Salafism' [4], at least in terms of vision and methodology, they still rely on legitimisations based on religious purity to justify their strategy and actions. As a result, isolated quotes from the Qur'an remain central to the narrative of militant Islamism. It has been embraced and extensively utilised by the Al-Qaeda leadership as well.

Thus militant Islamist ideologues and propagandists seek to supplement their message with references to the Holy Book of Islam, framing the narrative in a religious setting and adding perceived religious purpose and legitimacy to the prescribed campaign of jihadist militancy.

In the following, I shall analyse this core of the jihadi-Salafist narrative through an empirical, evidence-based approach, focusing on a sample of prominent extremist articles popular among English-speaking sympathisers of the militant cause. In doing so, I shall not seek to review all Qur'anic referencing in the texts under investigation. Indeed, the Qur'an remains central to many of the arguments put forward by the proponents of militant Islamism (albeit frequently in a truncated and de-contextualised manner). Ayman Al-Zawahiri, for instance, regularly relies in his messages and interviews on the verse *Al-Mā'idah* (5): 51:

> O believers, do not hold Jews and Christians as your allies. They are allies of one another; and anyone who makes them his friends is surely one of them. [5]

For Al-Zawahiri, this is the foundational principle all Muslims should adhere to, in order to respect the division of *Al-Wala wa-l-Bara* (loyalty and disavowal – the concept of exclusion of enemies and cohesion of the righteous *Ummah*).

In this article, I will also not seek to analyze those verses specifically used to celebrate martyrdom, such as *Al-'Imrān* (3): 3:

> Never think that those who are killed in the way of God are dead. They are alive, getting succour from their Lord. [6].

This restriction is partly in order to make the dataset smaller and thus more manageable. Yet it is also due to the fact that radical preachers and other figures do not always use the verses related to martyrdom in the context of fighting (even though dying in battle is regarded as the surest way of entering *Jannah* (paradise).[7]

Here I shall focus only on Qur'anic verses explicitly endorsing violence or fighting, which militant Islamists have sought to use in their messaging to encourage consumers of this material to support violent jihad. This excludes the relatively common usage of Qur'anic verses to generally encourage resolve from the *Ummah* and maintain strength whilst facing temptations, challenges and adversaries. It should also be noted, moreover, that this review is not intended as a dissection of the Qur'an itself, but rather the way in which individual and isolated verses are

used by jihadist propagandists to glorify and encourage acts of violence. As will be demonstrated below, their application does not always do justice to the Qur'anic verses themselves and the context in which they were made.[8]

Thus, here I pursue two main goals:

- to identify the nature of Qur'anic referencing justifying violence and especially the verses most commonly used in this regard in English-language Islamist material;
- to identify elements of selective and de-contextualised referencing which might be used to exploit weaknesses in the militant Islamist narrative.

The analysis is based on thirty texts which were either authored in English or translated by militant Islamist sympathisers and figures in the hope to win support for the jihadist cause and justify acts of violence against identified enemies and targeted societies.

Emphasis in this analysis has been placed on prominent UK-based publishers and distributors, especially Maktabah al-Ansaar and Babar Ahmad's online distributing network Azzam Publications. Additionally, the study focused on individuals prominent within the British militant Islamist scene, such as Abdullah Faisal and Abu Hamza Al-Masri, as well as Al-Qaeda material translated by militant Islamist sympathisers and jihadist 'media outlets' for English-speaking audiences. Understanding the militant Islamist 'product' intended for the English-speaking sympathisers is important, given the fact that many lack the language skills and education to check and challenge the religious justifications put forward for terrorist violence.

Methodology

The review selected items that have been highlighted and distributed by major Islamist extremist outlets seeking to ensure that the core texts of the militant narrative are accessible to English-speaking sympathisers. The contextual period covered in these articles includes modern adaptations of medieval works from scholars and jurists such as Ibn Nuhaas and Ibn Tamiyyah, through to the introduction of contemporary interpretations of jihad and the professed individual obligation to fight in the writings of Abdullah Azzam and Mohammad Salam Faraj, the Balkan and Caucasus insurgencies and up to the post-9/11 era and the establishment of As-Sahab, Al-Qaeda's 'media' production network.

My focus was on versions and editions of texts and audio/visual files as presented by *ad hoc* distributing networks in order to analyse the narrative as presented to consumers of such material in the UK, US and other English-speaking communities which rarely access the texts in question in their original language. Any additions, interpretations and other ways through which the translated versions departed from the original work were thus part of the analysis. The

translations studied, therefore, were by the militant supporters themselves, not Western-based journalistic or academic organisations and think tanks. All the titles analyzed are listed in Appendix 1.

Prior to identifying the titles to be analysed, a coding protocol was established, designed to assess each item systematically in order to allow for direct comparison between all the files in the dataset. As well as the specific details of each item (title, publisher, author, year of publication and distribution, source) the coding sheet was designed to capture variables that related to the referencing of religious texts with the specific aim of endorsing violence, legitimising militant strategies and encouraging or demanding support for such methods.

Although various *Hadith* quotes are frequently used to legitimise violence, particularly specifics in terms of targeting and tactics that cannot be easily justified by applying the Qur'an (for instance targeting of children, women and the elderly), their application is less structured and systematic than the usage of Qur'anic verses, even though the combination of both Qur'anic and *Hadith* accounts is fundamental. When seeking to compare different items of militant Islamist material and assessing commonalities between them, therefore, the quoting of Qur'anic verses provides a far clearer and more manageable dataset. For this reason, the current study focused on usage of the Qur'an exclusively, in addition to paying attention to the narrative context in which the referral was applied.

While not all texts reviewed here included Qur'anic verses used to legitimise violence, many texts relied heavily on quotations from the Qur'an to justify the nature and level of violence prescribed in the text or in audio-visual messages, as will be elaborated further below.

Applying the Qur'an

Parts of the Qur'an were revealed during a period of intense inter-tribal conflict in the Arabian Peninsula and during an increasingly determined campaign lead by the Prophet Mohammad, especially after the migration (*hijra*) to Medina, where he established the religion of Islam. [9] Specific *surah* (chapters) of the Qur'an, therefore, allude to aspects of warfare and fighting. These have subsequently formed the backbone of, and been exploited by, the rhetoric of contemporary militant Islamist activists.[10]

Fragmented elements endorsing violence are not unique to the Qur'an of course. Sections of the Bible and the Old Testament in particular, for example, contain vivid descriptions of bloodshed celebrated for its divine purpose. For instance, the Old Testament displays scant tolerance for 'idolaters', e.g. in sections of Deuteronomy where believers are commanded to: 'pull down their altars, break their sacred pillars, hack down their sacred poles and destroy their idols by fire' (7:5-6). Similar condemnation of idolatry in the Qur'an forms the foundation of one of the

more popular verses used to justify violence: *At-Taubah* (9): 5 ('the verse of the sword', see below). Numerous other commands and accounts of the Old Testament similarly glorify and legitimise violence.[11] 'Islamic activism is not', as Quintan Wiktorowicz reminds us, '*sui generis*.'[12]

The late Abdullah Azzam, a guiding figure of contemporary jihadists and inspiration to Osama bin Laden, sought to capture the chronological development of the concept of jihad and fighting in the Qur'an in his book *Defence of Muslim Lands*. Here he identified the major stages through which 'the order to fight was revealed.' First, was the demand of staying true to the faith and moving away from polytheism (explained in *Al-Hijr* (15): 94). Second, was the need to invite nonbelievers to Islam (*An-Nahl* (16): 125). If this was refused they could be fought, according to Azzam's interpretation of *Al-Hajj* (22): 39. Fighting defensive war was legitimised according to *Al-Baqarah* (2): 191, aggressively after the sacred month had passed, according to *At-Taubah* (9): 5 and, finally, the right 'to fight all out in general' was encouraged, according to Azzam, in to *Al-Baqarah* (2): 190: 'And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits. Truly Allah likes not the transgressors.'[13]

Azzam's overview includes some of the most popular 'fighting verses' identified in the discourse analysed. These 'verses of the sword' are framed and used so as to maximise the emphasis on violence in the Qur'an in order to reinforce the argument that Muslims are obliged to support the militant cause. In this way, the selective Qur'anic referencing frequently gives a skewed and false representation of the Holy Book.

Appendix 2 lists all the verses of the Qur'an that were instrumentalized in more than three of the articles under review to justify or encourage support for (terrorist) violence, as well as the full English translation for each verse (*ayah)* (according to Ahmed Ali's 1993 translation of the Qur'an).

In the analysis of thirty texts, one set of verses, *An-Nisā*: 74-75, was quoted more frequently than all the other *ayat* applied, featuring in nine texts analysed. The verses emphasise grievance-based violent responses, which correspond to the fundamental focus on grievances throughout the militant Islamist narrative. Overall, *Surah* 4 on 'The Women' (*An-Nisā)* (verse 84, in addition to 74-76), *At-Taubah* (9) (chiefly verses 5, 13-15, 38-39 and 111) and *Al-Baqarah* (2) (mainly *ayat* 190-191 and 216) were utilised most prominently to carry forward and frame the pro-violent message. In this regard, the study did not detect substantial differences in terms of year or period of publication. *An-Nisā*: 74-75, for instance featured in medieval texts, Soviet invasion-era books by Abdullah Azzam, as well as newer As-Sahab output of the articles under review.

Interestingly, the review only identified in two of the texts coded the verse *Al-Anfāl*: 60:

> Prepare against them whatever arms and cavalry you can muster, that you may strike terror in (the hearts of) the enemies of God and your own, and others besides them not known to you, but known to God. Whatever you spend in the way of God will be paid back to you in full, and no wrong will be done to you. [14]

This *ayah* is one of the more prominent verses of the 'Spoils of War' used to justify violent jihad, and forms, according to Gilles Kepel, the core of the pro-militant narrative in the works of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and others. For Suri, the verse denoted the distinction of 'praiseworthy terrorism', as the act of violence committed in the service of God, since it commanded believers to 'strike terror' against enemies of Islam. *Al-Anfāl*: 60, therefore, formed the cornerstone of his definition of *irhab mahmud*, 'terrorism by the righteous who have been unjustly treated.'[15]

Although Suri did not approve of the 11 September attacks since the price was the loss of the safe haven in Afghanistan [16], Osama bin Laden has used similar terminology and argumentation to justify Al-Qaeda's terrorist strategy and the 9/11 attacks. His audio message on 13 December 2001, for instance, explained how 'our terrorism against America is praiseworthy terrorism in order to repel the injustice of the oppressor.'[17]

Similar categorisation was applied in the *Supporters of Shariah* newsletter, coded for this article, which was published shortly after Al-Qaeda's bombings of two US embassies in East Africa in August 1998. The newsletter, edited by Abu Hamza al-Masri's group at Finsbury Park Mosque in North London, defined the act as 'Islamic (obligatory) terrorism', and therefore something that should be encouraged. In support of their argument, the authors quoted *Al-Anfāl*: 60.[18]

Some items reviewed did not rely on the Qur'an to encourage fighting and violence, utilizing instead either *Hadith* or anecdotal accounts glorifying the acts of 'martyrs' and highlighting grievances illustrating the urgent need for the *Ummah* to join and support the campaign in the name of Islam. Unsurprisingly, this related mostly to audio-visual material, with written texts based on more rigorous quoting of the Qur'an. In this regard, works by Abdullah Azzam, Ibn Tamiyyah and Ibn Nuhaas (through Anwar Awlaqi's translation and interpretation) were particularly prominent in seeking to base the pro-jihadist argument on the Qur'an.

Moreover, Moulana Mohammed Masood Azhar, the leader of *Jaish-e-Mohammed* in Pakistan, based much of his book - *The Virtues of Jihad* - on the importance of fighting as set forth in the Qur'an. 'There is consensus of opinion', Azhar argued, 'amongst researchers of the Quran, that no other particular action has been stated in such great detail as Jihad.'[19] According to his analysis, the term *jihad-fi-sabilillah* ('Jihad in the path of Allah') was referred to in the Qur'an 26 times, and *qital* (fighting) 79 times.

In light of this apparent importance of Qur'anic foundations for prescribing violent jihad, as well as the centrality of doctrinal purity for the Salafi-jihadist, the current study identified several cases of inaccurate referrals and misrepresentations of the Qur'an in the samples analysed.

De-contextualised and Truncated Use of Quotes from the Qur'an to Justify Violence

The declaration from the 'World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders', issued in February 1998, announced the ambition of the group that later became known as Al-Qaeda to 'kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military.' The declaration, which is now seen as one of the more important public messages from the Al-Qaeda leadership, began by quoting *Sura At-Taubah* (9): 5, urging Muslims to recognise their duty to 'slay the idolaters' wherever they were found.[20] However, the verse, as it was written by bin Laden and his co-signatories, quoted only half the *ayah*, commanding Muslims to besiege idolaters wherever they could be found as soon as the months wherein fighting was prohibited had passed. Left out was the second part of the *ayah*—'but if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and pay the *zakat*, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.'[21]

Bin Laden, as Bruce Lawrence noted, applied the same verse in a similarly truncated manner in his earlier Declaration of War in October 1996. [22] The section bin Laden omitted followed, according to Rosalind Gwynne's analysis, a 'permitted' pause.[23] However, the context and implied message has been altered from that conveyed through the full *ayah*, or the verses immediately preceding and following 9:5. [24]. This is demonstrative of, what Lawrence identifies as, bin Laden's selective application of the Qur'an to fit his specific ambitions:

> First, he selects only those Qur'anic verses that fit his message, and then cites them exclusively for his own purposes. He ignores both their original context and also the variety of historical differences among committed Muslims about how to apply their dicta. Second, he collapses the broad spectrum of Qur'anic teaching into a double requirement: first to believe and then to fight. [25]

The Qur'an in this case has been applied to match the specific topic and agenda of the group responsible, identifying 'idolaters' (worshippers of false gods) as legitimate targets. Ayman al-Zawahiri, founding member of the 'World Islamic Front', had argued in an earlier statement on behalf of *Al-Jihad* how the command to target idolaters was particularly relevant with respect to Western liberal democracies:

> Democracy is a new religion. In Islam, legislation comes from God; in a democracy, this capacity is given to the people. Therefore, this is a new religion, based on making the people into gods and giving them God's rights and attributes. This is tantamount to associating idols with God and falling into unbelief.[26]

Other statements from Zawahiri also illustrate how Al-Qaeda attached the label 'idolater'(worshiper of false gods) to Christians, thus legitimising their targeting in light of its interpretation of the Qur'an. In 2006, for instance, he claimed: 'Christianity cannot be accepted by a sound mind because it includes superstitions like the trinity, the crucifixion, redemption, the original sin, the infallibility of the pope, and the church's forgiveness of sins.'[27] Numerous Al-Qaeda communiqués, moreover, have sought to bring Arab political leaders under this category of 'idol kings', whose targeting is therefore sanctioned by the Qur'an.[28]

Thus, Al-Qaeda seeks to structure both the core of its own narrative, as well as the Qur'anic verses themselves to match the group's strategic ambitions and ideology, and base these arguments on perceived religious legitimisation.

A truncated version of *At-Taubah* (9): 5 also features in Abdullah Azzam's review of the development of the concept of jihad in the name of the Lord in his seminal work *Defence of the Muslim Lands*, already mentioned above. Quoting Ibn Abidin (d. 1842), a *Hanafi* jurist and scholar, Azzam explained how the order to fight was revealed to Muslims in stages, arguing more aggressive war against *Mushrikun* - Jews, Christians and pagans (in his interpretation) - would be permitted after the sacred months had passed:

> Then, they were ordered to fight with conditions, when the sacred months had passed: "Then when the sacred months (the 1st, 7th, 11th, and 12th months of the Islamic calendar) have past, then kill the *Mushrikun* wherever you find them...".[29]

The limitations on fighting as stipulated in *Sura* 9:5 were presumably deliberately excluded as was the different context in the Qur'an. The same goes for the book *Mashari al-Ashwaq ila Masari al-Ushaaq* by Ibn Nuhaas (Ahmad Ibrahim Muhammad al Dimashqi) [30], a mediaeval scholar (d.1411). The verse *At-Taubah* (9): 5 is used to introduce the first ('On The Command of Jihad Against the Non-Believers and its Mandate, and the Stern Warning Against Those who Do Not Practice Jihad ') and fourth ('The Virtues of *Ribaat* and the Virtues of the One who Dies in *Ribaat*') chapters of the Ibn Nuhaas' book, but is quoted without the second paragraph of the *ayat*, or those giving context, limiting the level of violence condoned in the first paragraph. Although the whole verse features unedited in Dhiren Barot's book *The Army of Madinah in Kashmir* (written under the pseudonym 'Esa al-Hindi'), the author erroneously relates it to *Al-Anfāl* (Surah 8) rather than *At-Taubah*.[31]

Barot, convicted of conspiracy to murder in London in 2006, also relied on the *Al-Anfāl*: 60 verse to encourage acts of terrorism, because: 'terror works and that is why the believers are commanded to enforce it', according to his interpretation of the *ayat* in question (since it referred to 'terrorising' the enemy). The author ignored, however, the subsequent verse which qualified and limited the nature and level of violence authorised in 8:60: 'But if they are inclined to peace, make peace with them, and have trust in God, for He hears all and knows every thing.'[32]

Al-Anfāl: 60 was also quoted in isolation in a particularly belligerent edition of the *Supporters of Shariah* newsletter (September/October 1998) which was coded as part of this study. The same applies to Suri's detailed dissection of the verse when arguing for his conceptualization of 'praiseworthy terrorism', as described above. [33]

Conclusions

From our brief analysis of thirty texts it emerges clearly that the Qur'an is taken as guidance very selectively to suit the jihadists' particular strategic and political agenda and to strengthen the accompanying narrative set forth by proponents of militant Islamism. Numerous verses and sections of the Qur'an that call for peaceful co-existence and mutual respect, counter-balancing many of the verses used to justify (terrorist) violence, are ignored and excluded from their one-sided narrative. This is typical of the tailored, politically motivated foundation upon which much of the militant jihadist discourse rests. Quoting from the Holy Book of Islam is shamelessly selective in order to serve their propaganda objectives.

The English-language output from militant Islamist figures relies heavily on the repeated use of a limited number of Qur'anic verses to justify political violence. Their arguments appear to rely on truncated rather than complete passages from the Qu'ran and are designed to fit their strategic narrative rather than being in conformity with the nuances of meanings of the Qur'an. The same 'doctored' use can be found in some of the abridged translations of medieval texts and more recent seminal works edited by jihadist publishing and distributing networks, which are also meant to serve contemporary jihadist propaganda.

When juxtaposed to the requirements set forth by Salafism for doctrinal purity and literal interpretation of the Qur'an (which includes the originally intended meaning) - values frequently invoked by the militant Islamists themselves - their peculiar selective utilization of the Qur'an appears paradoxical. Rather than being guided by the teachings of the Qur'an through the unadulterated application of its message, the narratives put forward by militant Islamists rely on a Qur'an *a la carte,* based on cherry-picked passages from specific verses to fit their pre-determined religio-political ideology and inform their messages to advance their group-specific ambitions.

Several authors in a previous issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* [34] exploring the concept of counter-narratives and the potential for counter-terrorism efforts, have advocated measures to challenge extremist narratives given their role in recruitment and radicalisation. Such efforts rely, in part, on identifying irregularities and flaws in the extremist argument. Our investigation illustrates how the narrative of militant Islamism seeks to frame its legitimisation for violence through tapping into the authority of the Qur'an. This scrutiny of a sample of major English-

language jihadist texts also indicates that propagandists of jihad violate the Salafists' own demands for doctrinal purity in terms of adherence to the Qu'ran. In other words - they tend to be dishonest and hypocritical.

About the Author: Donald Holbrook is a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews. He holds postgraduate degrees from Cambridge University and St. Andrews University. His current research focuses primarily on the language of extremism and, in particular, Al-Qaeda leadership communiqués.

Notes

[1] This paper uses the terms 'jihadist', 'jihadi-salafist' and militant Islamist interchangeably. Legitimate concerns regarding the applicability and accuracy of such terminology, particularly the jihad-related terms, are outside the scope of this paper.

[2] Zawahiri, Ayman Al- (2007). 'Annapolis - The Betrayal'. As-Sahab Media Foundation (14 December). See translation in: in *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1* (2008), Tempest Publishing, Alexandria VA. – Sunnah is the body of traditional customs and practices based on the Prophet's words or acts. Together with the Qu'ran it is accepted as authoritative by [Sunni] Muslims.

[3] Meijer, Roel (2009): 25, Reuven Paz (2009), 'Debates within the Family: Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, *Takfir*, Extremism, Suicide Bombings, and the sense of the Apocalypse', in Meijer (2009) (Ed.) *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, Hurst & Company, London: pp. 269-270.

[4] Paz, Reuven (2009): p. 270.

[5] Ali, Ahmed (1993): *Al-Qur'ān*, Princeton University Press, Princeton – New Jersey (1993). Other verses used within the same context include *Al-Baqarah* (2): 120 and *Al-'Imrān* (3): p. 118.

[6] Transl: Ali (1993). Other verses include *Al-'Imrān* (3): 157 and 169-170,; *Muhammad* (47): 4-6 and *Al-Baqarah* (2): 154.

[7] Feiz Mohammed, for instance, in his audio lecture titled 'The Grave' emphasised how dying in battle facing the enemy and standing guard for the Lord secured for believers life after death. Although 'martyrdom' in the battle was the most important form of death, according to Feiz, dying because of an abdominal disease, after reciting *surat al-Mulk* (67) or dying on a Friday, would also ensure an afterlife in heaven.

[8] For a review of 'Verses from the Quran that explicitly endorse armed fight', see National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (December 2009). *Ideology and Strategy of Jihadism*: Appendix 1 (pp. 76-83).

[9] Ibid: pp. 23-25.

[10] Although the matter is complicated by ongoing debates over whether certain verses abrogate those thought to have been revealed earlier. Rosalind Gwynne's study (2001), however, found that bin Laden, for instance, did not hold this view: 'Al-Qaʾida and al-Qur'an: The "Tafsir" of Usamah bin Laden' , <http://web.utk.edu/~warda/bin_Laden_and_quran.htm>

[11] The Book of Joshua, for instance, describes how, acting on the commands of Moses whose orders in turn were passed down from God, Joshua's conquest took prisoner the kings of the enemies and 'struck them down and put them to death' (20:18) since 'they should be annihilated without mercy and utterly destroyed, as the LORD had commanded Moses' (20:20). Consider also the ruthlessness of war as explained in God's laws delivered by Moses (in Deuteronomy), e.g.: When you advance on a city to attack it, make an offer of peace. If the city accepts the offer and opens its gates to you then all the people in it shall be put to forced labour and shall serve you. If it does not make peace with you but offers battle, you shall besiege it, and the LORD your God will deliver it into your hands. You shall put all its males to the sword, but you may take the women, the dependants, and the cattle for yourselves, and plunder everything else in the city' (20:10-14) and 'In the cities of these nations whose land the LORD your God is giving you as a patrimony, you shall not leave any creature alive' (20:20:16) (*The New English Bible: The Old Testament* Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press. 1970).

[12] Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2004), in Q. Wiktorowicz (Ed.) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Indiana University Press: p. 3.

[13] Azzam, Abdullah : *Defence of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman*. Maktabah al-Ansaar Publications.

[14] Translation by Ali (1993).

[15] Kepel, Gilles (2008). *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East*. Belknap Press-Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA; see Suri's *Global Islamic Resistance Call,* Chapter 8 in: Lia, Brynjar (2007). *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri*. London: Hurst, pp. 383-386.

[16] See e.g. Kepel (2008) *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: p. 114*

[17] Bin Laden, Usama (2001) 'The Facts of the Conflict between us and America';video message distributed by Al-Jazeera (12 December).

[18] Sarmid, Nadeem, Mikail and Abu Hamza al-Masri (1998). *Supporters of Shariah* (September/October 1998 - 1419H. Issue 5.

[19] Azhar, Moulana Masoud (1996). *The Virtues of Jihad*. Ahle Sunnah Wal Jama'at Publications, Islamabad: p. 10.

[20] The declaration appeared in *Al-Quds al-'Arabi* (23 Feb. 1998). See translation in *FBIS Report: Compilation of Usama bin Laden Statements 1994-January 2004*. FBIS 2004. Note the broader intended meaning of 'idolaters' from the original translation, to include non-Muslims (including Christians and Jews who, according to Al-Qaeda, had deviated from the true meaning of their scriptures).

[21] Translation by Ali (1993).

[22] Lawrence, Bruce (2006) *The Qur'an: A Biography*. London: Atlantic Books.

[23] Gwynne, Rosalind (2001) 'Al-Qaʿida and al-Qur'an: The 'Tafsir" of Usamah bin Laden' (18 September). See <http://web.utk.edu/~warda/bin_Laden_and_quran.htm> ; accessed 30 June, 2010.

[24] See also: Lawrence, Bruce (2006)

[25] Ibid, pp. 179-180.

[26] Zawahiri, Ayman Al- (1993). 'Advice to the Community to Reject the Fatwa of Sheikh Bin Baz Authorizing Parliamentary Representation: Published Under the Supervision of Ayman al-Zawahiri.' Translated in: Kepel, Gilles and Jean-Pierre Milelli (2000). *Al Qaeda in its Own Words*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. Zawahiri based this point partly on *Sura Yūsuf* (12):40: '(What) you worship besides Him are nothing but names that you and your fathers have assigned, for which no sanction has been sent down by God. Authority belongs to God alone. He commands that you worship none but Him. This is the right way; but most men are ignorant.' (Translation: Ali, 1993).

[27] Zawahiri, Ayman al- (2006). 'Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusaders'; video statement issued 29 September. See translation: *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri Vol. 1* (2008). Alexandria VA.: Tempest Publishing.

[28] See, for instance: Zawahiri (2006) 'Four Years Since the Battle of Tora Bora - From Tora Bora to Iraq' (statement issued 12 April); see *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri,* Vol. 1 (2008); Zawahiri (2006) 'Realities of the Conflict Between Islam and Unbelief' (statement issued 22 December); see *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri,* Vol. 1 (2008); Zawahiri (2006), 'Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhid' (statement issued 30 December); see *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri,* Vol. 1 (2008); bin Laden (2009) 'Practical steps to Liberate Palestine' (issued 14 March), As-Sahab; bin Laden (2009) 'Fight on, O' Champions of Somalia' (issued 19 March), As-Sahab.

[29] Azzam, Abdullah (exact year unknown). *Defence of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman*. Transl. and publ.: Maktabah Al-Ansaar, Birmingham.

[30] The item reviewed for the current study was the translation by Anwar Al-Awlaqi (distributed by Maktabah Al-Ansaar), whose audio lecture on the book reveals important insights into Awlaqi's support for suicide bombings and civilian targeting [distributed by Dar Ibn al-Mubarak (Beirut) (2003)]. The specifics regarding *At-Taubah* (9): 5, however, also feature in Noor Yamani's translation of the book.

[31] Hindi, Esa al- (1999). *The Army of Madinah in Kashmir*. Maktabah Al-Ansaar. Birmingham, p. 117.

[32] *Al-Anfāl*: 61 (transl. by Ali, 1993).

[33] Lia, Brynjar (2007). *Architect of Global Jihad*.

[34] Volume III, issue 2, August 2009.

APPENDIX 1: List of texts reviewed

AUTHOR(S)	TITLE	PUBLISHER/TRANSLATOR (of copy examined)
Omar Abdur-Rahman	'Confronting the Ruler'	Azzam Publications
Anwar Al-Awlaqi (and his interpretation of the book by Ibn Nuhaas)	'The Story of Ibn Al-Akwa / Mashari Al-Ashwaq'	Dar Ibn al-Mubarak (Beirut) (2003)
Moulana Mohammed Masood Azhar	*The Virtues of Jihad*	Ahle Sunnah Wal Jama'at Publications (1996)
Abdullah Azzam	*The Signs of Allah the Most Merciful Ar-Rahmaan in the Jihad of Afghanistan*	Maktabah Al-Ansaar
Abdullah Azzam	*The Lofty Mountain* (1st Edition)	Azzam Publications (2003)
Abdullah Azzam	*Join The Caravan* (2nd Edition)	Azzam Publications (2001)
Abdullah Azzam	*Defence of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman*	Maktabah Al-Ansaar (N/A)
Abdullah Azzam	*Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations*	Unknown publisher
Azzam Recordings/ Publications, London	'In the Hearts of Green Birds: The Martyrs of Bosnia'	Azzam Publications (1996)
Azzam Recordings/ Publications, London	'Under the Shades of Swords'	Azzam Publications (1997)
Abdullah Faisal	'Cancers in the Body of the Ummah'	Unknown publisher
Abdullah Faisal	'Rejecting the Taghoot'	Various
Abdullah Faisal	'Shirk in Perspective'	Various
Abdullah Faisal	'Let the Scholars Beware'	Various
Abdullah Faisal	'Peak of the Matter'	Various
Abdullah Faisal	'Treachery from Within'	Various

Muhammad 'Abdus Salam Faraj	*Jihad - The Absent Obligation: And Expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula*	Maktabah Al Ansaar (2000)
Esa al-Hindi (Dhiren Barot)	*The Army of Medinah in Kashmir*	Maktabah Al-Ansaar (1999)
Hizb ut-Tahrir	*Khilafah Magazine* (November 2000)	H u-T 2000/Khilafah
Usama bin Laden, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed al-Haznawi, Adam Gadahn and others	'The Wills of the Martyrs of the New York and Washington Battles' a.k.a. 19 Martyrs (Parts 1 & 2)	As-Sahab (2002)
Usama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Tah, Mir Hamzah, Fazlul Rahman	'World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders – Fatwa'	World Islamic Front's Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Through Al-Quds Al-Arabi. 23 February 1998.
Usama bin Laden	'Letter to the American People'	Islamist websites. 26 October 2002
Abu Hamza al-Masri, edited by Ibn Umar	*The Khawaarij and Jihad*	Maktabah Al-Ansaar (2000)
The Media Centre of the Voice of the Caucasus	'Russian Hell' parts 1, 2 and 3	qoqaz.com. Also mucadele.com and others
Sarmid, Nadeem, Mikail and Abu Hamza al-Masri	*Supporters of Shariah Magazine*: September/October 1998 - 1419H. Issue 5	Supporters of Shariah
Ahmad Ibn Tamiyyah	'The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad' (from the book *Governance According to Allah's Law in Reforming the Ruler and his Flock*)	Maktabah Al-Ansaar (2001)
'Waislamah News Network'	'Contemporary Heroes of Islam Series 1: Khattab'; a.k.a. Biography of Khattab	Waislamah.net (2004) and distributed by Maktabah Al-Ansaar
Ayman al-Zawahiri	'The True Facts of Jihad and the Lies of Hypocrisy'	As-Sahab's sixth interview with Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Translated by Global Islamic Media Front. 4 August 2009.
Ayman Al-Zawahiri	'Gaza Massacre and the Traitors Siege in the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful'	As-Sahab. Translated by 'Jihad Media Battalion.' 15 January 2009.
Ayman al-Zawahiri	"The Sacrifices of Gaza… and Conspiracies"	As-Sahab. Translated by Global Islamic Media Front. 13 February 2009

APPENDIX 2: Qur'anic verses most frequently used to justify and encourage acts of violence

- Used in <u>nine</u> of the texts under review:

An-Nisā (4): 74-76 *Those who barter the life of this world for the next should fight in the way of God. And we shall bestow on him who fights in the way of God, whether he is killed or is victorious, a glorious reward.*
What has come upon you that you fight not in the cause of God and for the oppressed, men, women and children, who pray: "Get us out of this city, O Lord, whose people are oppressors; so send us a friend by Your will, and send us a helper."
Those who believe fight in the way of God; and those who do not, only fight for the powers of evil; so you should fight the allies of Satan. Surely the stratagem of Satan is ineffective.

- Used in <u>six</u> of the articles under review:

An-Nisā (4): 84 *So fight on in the way of God (irrespective of others). You cannot compel any one except your own self; but urge the believers to fight. It may well be that God will keep back the might of the infidels, for God's might is greater, and severe His punishment.*

- Used in <u>five</u> of the articles under review:

At-Taubah (9): 5 *But when these months, prohibited (for fighting), are over, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, and take them captive or besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every likely place. But if they repent and fulfil their devotional obligations and pay the* zakat*, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving and kind.*
At-Taubah (9): 38-39 *What happened to you, O believers, that when you are asked to set out in the cause of God your feet begin to drag? Do you find the life of the world so pleasing that you forget the life to come? Yet the profit of the life of this world is but meagre as compared to the life to come.*
Unless you go out (to strive), God will inflict grievous punishment on you, and bring other people in your place, and you will not be able to harm Him in the least, for God has the power over all things.

At-Taubah (9): 111 *God has verily bought the souls and possessions of the faithful in exchange for a promise of Paradise. They fight in the cause of God, and kill and are killed. This is a promise incumbent on Him, as in the Torah, so the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is more true to his promise than God? So rejoice at the bargain you have made with Him;for this will be triumph supreme.*
At-Taubah (9): 13-15 *Will you not fight those who broke the pledge and plotted to banish the Apostle, and who were the first to attack you? Are you afraid of them? If you are believers you should fear God more.*
Fight them so that God may punish them at your hands, and put them to shame, and help you against them, and heal the wounds of the hearts of believers,
And remove the anger from their breast; for God turns to whosoever desires.

- Used in <u>four</u> of the articles under review:

Al-Baqarah (2): 190-191 *Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God does not like aggressors.*
And fight those (who fight you) wheresoever you find them, and expel them from the place they had turned you out from. Oppression is worse than killing. Do not fight them by the Holy Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do, then slay them: Such is the requital for unbelievers.
Al-Baqarah (2): 216 *Enjoined on you is fighting, and this you abhor. You may dislike a thing yet it may be good for you; or a thing may haply please you but may be bad for you. Only God has knowledge, and you do not know.*

Al-Hajj (22): 39-40 *Permission is granted those (to take up arms) who fight because they were oppressed. God is certainly able to give help to those who were driven away from their homes for no other reason than they said: "Our Lord is God." And if God had not restrained some men through some others, monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques, where the name of God is honoured most, would have been razed. God will surely help those who help Him, - Verily God is all-powerful and all-mighty,*

- Used in <u>three</u> of the articles under review:

Al-Anfāl (8): 39 *So, fight them till all opposition ends, and obedience is wholly God's. If they desist then verily God sees all they do.*

Qur'anic translations by Ahmed Ali [*Al-Qur'ān*, Princeton: University Press (1993)]

Hizballah's Bekka Organization
by Carl Anthony Wege

Abstract

 Hizballah views Iran's theocratic doctrine of clerical rule (velayat-e-faqih) as their marja ('source of emulation'). This theocratic marja undergirds Hizballah's malevolent Islamicism which is rooted in Lebanon's Bekka valley. The valley is both anchor and heart of Hizballah and precipitates the regions drift toward Iran.

Lebanon's Matawila

In the early twentieth century France sought the creation of a Christian-Arab state[1] in the environs of Mt. Lebanon[2] to further its political objectives in the French Mandate territories. In the 1920s France midwifed a new Lebanese state with a confessional system dominated by the mercantile interests of a Maronite-Sunni axis to the disadvantage of the mountain-based clan leaders. The Matawila (as Lebanon's Twelver Shi'a community is often called) was, according to Yusri Hazran, dominated, between 1920 and the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, by a handful of families, including the al-Asad, al-Khalil, al-Zayn, Hamadah, Usayran, Baydoun, Al-Fadl, and the Haydar's.[3] Lebanon, like other states grafted into Near East societies by the colonial powers, was a 'weak state', which characteristically lacking intermediating social-political institutions linking the state and society. Although Lebanon had a civil bureaucracy and nascent political parties, they failed as intermediating social-political entities [4] in the absence of an organic Lebanese civil society.[5] Clan, tribe, and confessional associations were more important than intermediating political institutions.

The Lebanese Shi'a worldview reflected the personalism, clientism, and paternalism characterizing these clans, tribes, and confessional associations. That worldview evolved as political mobilization among Lebanon's Shi'a began in the 1960s in the context of both Lebanese modernization and an influx of Shi'a religious scholars arriving in Lebanon from Najaf (Iraq) after Iraq's 1968 Ba'athist coup.[6] Najaf's 'Circles of Learning' (Hawzat al-Ilmiyyah) included many students who were later to become the theological cadre in Hizballah.[7] The dynamics of emergent Shi'a student-teacher networks in the context of Lebanon's family-clan relations changed the worldview of Lebanon's Shi'a community and the worldview of what became Hizballah. The Shi'a in Lebanon's south were dominated by local landlords (Zi'am) and notables acting as nodes, controlling vast client and patronage networks. The Zi'am system did, however, not characterize the Shi'a community in the Bekka which was more rooted in clan and tribal relationships. The more than hundred clans of the Bekka Valley were defined by a social framework anchored in blood relationships, cousin- and other arranged marriage, and long running vendettas frequently involving disputes over land or women.[8]

The 1982 Israeli-Lebanon war precipitated the creation of Islamic Amal (Amal Al-Islamiyah), by Hussein Musawi[9] when he and approximately 500 followers from Musa Sadr's original AMAL [10] movement trekked east to Nabisheet (Hussein Musawi's home town) in Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekka valley.[11] They joined with Sepahe al-Quds (Jerusalem) elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guard[12] (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC or Pasdaran) deployed in eastern Lebanon's Bekka valley in July of 1982. Sheikh Subhi Tufayli and his cadre from Lebanon's al-Dawah (the Islamic Call)[13] movement had already arrived in the Bekka, creating an environment conducive to the Islamist enterprise. A coalition developed between the Musawi organization, the followers of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli,[14] the Association of Muslim Students, [15] and the Association of Muslim Ulema in Lebanon.[16] The Pasdaran (Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami in coordination with the Iranian Embassy's in Beirut and Damascus)[17] drew from this - and the heart of Hizballah[18] began to beat in Baalbek.[19] In 1982 the Pasdaran's Sepahe al-Quds (under Mohsen Rafiq-Dust initially involving cadre trained by the PLO in Lebanese camps during the reign of the Shah[20]) were configured in the Bekka valley in camps near Zebdani, Baalbek,[21] Brital, and Nabisheet. The Sepahe al-Quds Pasdaran in the Bekka were particularly skillful in mobilizing revolutionary zealotry and systematizing mechanisms to nurture Hizballah. Iran's presence in the Bekka integrated Khomeini's foreign policy goals of exporting the revolution and creating an Islamic Republic in Lebanon through Hizballah. Many PLO-trained Pasdaran were familiar with Lebanon, concomitantly facilitating Palestinian relations with various Islamist factions within the Shi'a community.[22] The Pasdaran offered the Shi'a of the Bekka - and later the larger Shi'a community - an articulation of resistance that conformed to Shi'a religious tradition while creating a vision of something greater than a mere confessional militia.

In the Bekka, Hizballah supported the more impoverished part of the Shi'a against elements of the larger Shi'a clans including the Jafar's - even though the Jafar's, of Baalbek and Hermel,[23] were associates of what became core Hizballah clans like the Hamadis.[24] Bekka Shi'a clans include the Hamiya, Musawi, Aqeel, Shahadehs, and Ezzedeens. This, in return, facilitated the Guards integration into Lebanon's Shi'a Islamist movement.[25] In 1983 and 1984, Hizballah's developed regional organizations first in the Bekka (particularly in Brital, Hermel, and Baalbek), then in Beirut, and only lastly in the south[26] with features similar to those found in clan-based criminal organizations.[27] In the absence of state institutions, these organizations both rendered a form of justice and were a source of social services. The geographic regions themselves became sub-divided into sectors, creating a compartmentalized operational environment with the Bekka region. It was characterized by a focus on Hizballah logistics and training. As Hizballah's military component matured, small training camps like Yanta and Shaara near Nabisheet were closed and its Bekka-based facilities consolidated into six main venues described as including Ain Bourday and Homs Road near Baalbek, Nabisheet, Wadi Firsan and Nabeh El Assi near Hermel, and Wadi al-Yammouneh adjacent to the Jbeil mountains.[28]

The Bekka's Dar al-Islam

The Bekka valley runs about seventy-five miles on a north-south axis between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon (Jabal al-Sharqi or Eastern) mountains, with a girth that averages about ten miles. There are two main rivers of note that transit the Bekka. The headwaters of the Litani originate west of Baalbek; it supplies southern Lebanon while it is also coveted by Israel.[29] The north-south axis of the valley characterized by geographic compactness masks its spatial complexity. Although multiple remote sensing modalities used by multiple foreign powers have probed every available physical aspect of the valley it has still retained some of its secrets. The Bekka has been an agricultural breadbasket going back to Roman times when it was the granary of Roman Syria [30]. The Bekka was also Lebanon's breadbasket but the civil war that began in 1975 saw commercial narcotic cultivation, which had always existed on the margins, become an integral element of the Bekka's agricultural profile. This commercial illicit narcotic cultivation was a mainstay of the valley's economy through the civil war, with essentially every community and militia playing a role in the enterprise. It was overlooked by the United States and other western countries as Lebanese factions supported by the United States were as compromised to the illicit growth and trade of narcotics as everyone else. Narcotic networks with assets operating in the Bekka were characterized by an exchange of cash and arms to Lebanese stakeholders in return for Bekka cannabis and heroin. Syrian occupation forces in the Bekka managed what amounted to a tax on farming operations involving narcotics cultivation and distribution networks. Manara and Hermel (in the Western Bekka) were a hub of cannabis cultivation. Heroin processing occurred in Baalbek, Hermel, Hellanyeh, Niha, Abbasyeh, Barqa, Laat, Zarazeer, and Kuddam. [31]

In addition, Iran began counterfeiting the famous $100 "Super Notes" using the intaglio printing machines initially supplied by the United States to Iran under the regime of the Shah. The Bekka's Zebdani barracks at the Beirut-Damascus border crossing with Syria was the initial distribution node for the phony currency which first surfaced in Hong Kong in 1989. The actual counterfeiting operation was later moved to the Bekka with the fake currency distributed via the narcotics networks - with both Syria and Iran netting approximately a billion dollars from the exercise.[32] The Bekka itself was characterized by a mixed demography with Shi'a communities concentrated in the Baalbek-Hermel area balancing Greek Catholic domination by the Skaff clan of the Bekka administrative capital of Zahle near the Syrian border and southeast of mount Sanin[33] whose heights dominate part of the Bekka. Zahle and its 150,000 people sit astride the Barouni River and the town was used extensively by the Syrians during their 1976 – 2005 occupation of Lebanon. The Palestinian political presence in the Bekka is still anchored at the Wavel camp near Baalbek[34] where many Palestinian factions have offices. The Taalabaya region of the central Bekka, directly on the Syrian border, has offices and facilities for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP & PFLP respectively). The PFLP General Command (an offshoot of the original

organization) is located in nearby Koussaya and opposite this area deployed in the Western Bekka near Kamed al-Lawz [35] Although now essentially defunct, the Abu Nidal Organization had maintained facilities at Yanta in the Rachaya district of the Bekka. A generation ago, the Bekka hosted a virtual alphabet soup of secular guerrilla organizations the bulk of which were defined by Marxist of pseudo-Marxist ideologies. Today one is more likely to find Islamist organizations and the concomitant splinter groups dotted across the valley. Iran has made common cause with the Sunni Hamas and the less significant Palestinian Islamic Jihad to gain entry into the Israeli conflict theater. Iran promotes some level of training for these groups under Hizballah auspices in the Bekka.[36]

Syria's dominance in the Bekka was rooted first in geography and, more recently, in its 1976 intervention in Lebanon's civil war. The Syrian-Lebanese border has always been somewhat ambiguous due to the reluctance of Damascus to recognize Lebanese sovereignty.[37] The major recognized crossing points in the Bekka are Jusia, connecting Baalbek and Homs in Syria and the Masnaa crossing on the Beirut to Damascus highway. However, there are an additional seventy odd crossing points that facilitate smuggling but are often little more than mule trails.[38] Bath'ist Syrian foreign policy had effectively adopted part of the pan-Syrian ideology expressed decades earlier by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)[39], arguing that geographic Syria should include present day Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan. The organizational strength of the SSNP has always been greatest in Lebanon where it acted as a deniable Syrian intelligence asset. Syrian interests in Lebanon during its occupation were overseen by Ghazi Kan'an; he was responsible for Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon between 1982 and 2001. He later became the Syrian Interior Minister and in the end was reportedly assisted in committing suicide in 2005 - following the assassination of Lebanese President Hariri. Kan'an's replacement as head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, General Rustom Ghazaleh, maintained the headquarters staff of about 100 Syrian military intelligence personnel in the small eastern Bekka village of Anjar[40] until Syria's formal withdrawal of troops in 2005. In addition to the Syrian presence, Anjar (also called Haoush Mousa) was home to approximately 2.000 Armenians settled there by the French from the Musa Dagh area of Turkey, following the Armenian genocide. It became home for both the Armenian terrorist group ASALA and the Justice Commandos.[41] Anjar was also alleged as a logistical hub for Sunni jihadists entering Syria in order to infiltrate Iraq and join the Sunni insurgency there.[42]

Syria's Hafez al-Assad also facilitated Pasdaran [43] operations in the Bekka to immunize his troops in Lebanon against Shi'a agitation that could destabilize his presence in Lebanon and precipitate further troubles in Syria with the Sunni Muslim Brothers. This was important with Assad supporting both AMAL and the Hizballah even given the greater Alawite affinity for the secularists of AMAL.[44] The Hizballah clans came to dominate the Bekka labyrinth, particularly the Baalbek-Hermel axis, in part due to a level of ideological commitment far in excess of that enjoyed by AMAL and various Christian and Sunni militias. Officers

administering the Syrian occupation were primarily committed to personal enrichment and only secondarily to upholding Syrian interests in Lebanon and preparing for the confrontation with Israel. The Bekka Hizballah clans and their allies in the Pasdaran could thereby navigate both the Syrian occupation authorities and rival militias to secure Shia interests.

Thermidor to the Harb Tammus

The fratricide of Lebanon's civil war became intra-communal with the so-called green terror within the Muslim community in the latter 1980s. This green terror ended, along with the Lebanese civil war, in the thermidor of the T'iaf Accords in 1989 which also marking Hizballah's evolution from a confessional militia into a larger political movement. By the early 1990's, Hizballah split into a relatively moderate, politically-oriented faction[45]and an Islamist faction. The Islamist faction itself divided, as Sheikh Tufayli attempted to create a 'Movement of the Hungry' in the Brital region of the Bekka, with aspirations corresponding to Hizballah's original program for an Islamic Republic of Lebanon. It was stillborn by 1998. The Islamic Resistance (al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) thereupon became the 'mainstream' Hizballah Islamist faction looking no longer to create an Islamic Republic but rather to force the Israelis out of south Lebanon. In this they succeeded as Israel's Defence Force (IDF) withdrew in May of 2000.

Although Hizballah's status ascended immeasurably as it fought the IDF to a standstill in the summer of 2006, it nonetheless emerged from the war badly mauled. The progression of that conflict is discussed elsewhere yet it was a significant transformative event on multiple levels. In the summer war the Party of God became integral to the defense of whole of the Lebanese state against Israel. Hizballah demonstrated an emerging sophistication as a military force due, in part, to its close integration with elements of the Pasdaran. The reconstitution of Hizballah as it incorporated the lessons of the summer war into its organization has resulted in further evolution of the party. Syria facilitated the replenishment of Hizballah arms following the summer war to the degree of establishing what amounts to a Hizballah military base near Adra in an area northeast of Damascus to manage the transfer of arms into the Hizballah security pockets of the Bekka.[46] In the summer of 2008 Hizballah entered Mount Sannine in the Matar region (roughly a couple of dozen miles due east of Beirut) apparently to deploy remote sensing equipment, counter Israeli *in situ* devices from the summer war, and use the heights to command the entire central region of the Bekka valley.[47]

Conclusion: the Shi'a Tribal Flag

Charles Glass, a British journalist, observed that Near Eastern societies were better described as 'tribes with flags' than states. The phrase aptly describes Lebanon's Shi'a. The matrix of

criminal, militia, and Islamist networks create a system of variable sovereignties in the Bekka. The dominance of a given sovereignty at a given node at a particular point in time is a function of both internal and external conditions. Internal conditions are rooted in the concept of Ba'raka (charisma) and the leadership of the scholar-jurists (e. g. Fadlallah) with militants adhering to them on the basis of their personal charisma. Different personalities thereby rise and decline as their followings coalesce and disintegrate. The result is a set of fluid relationships around the followers of various Ulema. External conditions are configured by the rulers of Beirut and Damascus and, to a lesser extent, Tehran, Amman, and Tel Aviv. The Hizballah sovereignties in the Bekka are characterized by an intellectual frame of reference formed in the Hawzat's of Najaf and Qom. Understanding the Bekka's Hizballah sovereignties absent that frame of reference is akin to discerning the nuance and subtlety of a Jesuit worldview devoid of inculcation in the Loyolan tradition.

About the Author: **Carl Anthony Wege** *is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia in Brunswick, Georgia. He has taught political science for twenty year and has published a number of articles on Lebanon's Hizballah and related topics.*

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Notes

[1] This 'greater Lebanon' (Etat du Grand Liban) created by France , encompassed areas historically ruled by Fakhr al-Din (Fakhreddine II 1572–1635) and Bashir II (1788-1840). See Hanf, Theodor. Coexistence In Wartime Lebanon. Oxford: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993, p. 64.

[2] Mt. Lebanon was created as a separate administrative region within the Ottoman empire at the behest of the European powers, following massacres of Christians during civil strife in 1860.

[3] Hazran, Yusri. 'The Shiite Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendancy,' *Middle East Brief*, No. 37. Brandeis University: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, June 2009.

[4] See Nazih Ayubi, 'Arab Bureaucracies: Expanding Size, Changing Roles'; in: Giacomo Luciani (Ed.). *The Arab State*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.

[5] Civil society here is understood in Lockean terms, i.e. wherein government is created by a social contract among individuals protecting life, liberty, and property.

[6] Shapira, Shimon.'The Origins of Hizballah', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 46 (Spring 1988), p. 116. - The secular Ba'athist parties in Iraq and Syria were opposed to the Islamists who later created Lebanon's al-Dawah (the Islamic Call) movement.

[7] These Hawzat were under the direction of Bakr al-Sadr and the students included Shams al-Din, Hussein Fadlallah (who studied under Baqr al-Sadr and Ayatollah Abol Qasim Musavi-Khoi), Subhi Tufayli, Ibrahim al-Amin, Hasan Nasrallah (who saw Ayatollah Khomeini when the latter was in Najaf), and Abbas Musawi among others. They were instrumental in the founding of Hizballah. See Hamzeh, Nizar and Hrair Dekmejian, 'The Islamic Spectrum of Lebanese Politics,' *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. XVI, No. 3 (Spring 1993), p. 36.

[8] See 'Bekaa Valley clans sign peace pact', *France24,* 28 October 2009.

[9] The Musawi clan members in the AMAL movement were more sympathetic to Iran's 1979 revolution than other Shi'a clans associated with AMAL.

[10] These were primarily al-Dawah members who had infiltrated AMAL earlier, intending to maneuver the organization in an Islamist direction.

[11] Hussein and his followers left the AMAL center in Beirut and seized AMAL offices and ordinance depots in the Bekka valley town of Baalbek.

[12] Hussein Musawi initiated the split within AMAL during the Fourth Congress in Tyre in March 1982. See Sankari, Jamal. *Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader*. London: Saqi Books, 2005, p. 196.

[13] Originally an Iraqi Shi'a Islamist organization created by Baqr al-Sadr (a cousin of Musa Sadr) in 1958, Lebanon's al-Dawah (the Islamic Call) was formed in the late 1960s. Al-Dawah officially dissolved itself in 1980 in response to Khomeini's admonitions concerning Western style party organization. In practice, this had little impact as al-Dawah's members were integrated into the larger Hizballah movement. Those retaining less formal adherence to Dawah ideology tended to follow Hussein Fadlallah. They were heavily penetrated by Syrian intelligence by the late 1990s although they continued training at Hizballah camps until they created their own facilities in 1996. See *Intelligence Online*, 19 February 1998.

[14] Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli commanded the operational headquarters of Hizballah in Baalbek in close coordination with the Pasdaran. See Ranstorp, Magnus. 'Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions' *Terrorism and Political Violence* , Vol.6, no. 3, 1998, p. 305. Tufayli was later Secretary-General of Hizballah but was ultimately expelled over his opposition to Hizballah's more moderate course. He then created a 'Revolution of the Hungry' (Thawrat al-Jiya') from his bastion in the Brital region of the Bekka in 1999 but the movement failed and Tufalyi was marginalized as the century closed. See Shahanon, *The Shi'a of Lebanon,* op. cit., p. 123.

[15] The organization was originally created by Lebanese Shi'a clerics in the early 1970s to assist Shi'a university students in avoiding worldly temptation.

[16] Shapira, 'The Origins of Hizballah', op. cit., p. 124.

[17] See Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Rudolph Atallah. 'Hizballah: A Discussion of Its Early Formation.' Infantry, 94 (3) May / June 2005 pg, 24. See also Al-Muharar, Lebanon 28 July 1989. Iranian Ambassador to Damascus Mohammed Hassan Skhtari was instrumental in building Hizballah on the ground in the Bekka.

[18] Iran decided to foster an Islamist organization using the Pasdaran rather than working with the more secularly oriented AMAL.

[19] 'Islamic Jihad Seen As Pro-Iran', *New York Times,* 19 April 1983, p.12. The first Iranian volunteers were apparently sheltered at the Imam al-Mahdi school in Baalbek with an Iranian communications center in Ballbeks al-Khayyam hotel before the Guard acquired their better known bases in the valley. See Miller, Judith. *God Has Ninety Nine Names*. New York: Touchstone Books, 1996, p. 282.

[20] Robin Wright . *In The Name Of God.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 109. Abbas al-Musawi was apparently in the first group of about 180 men given ideological and military training by the Pasdaran in Baalbek. By all accounts, he was quite inspired by the entire experience. See Sankari Fadlallah, op. cit., p. 194.

[21]. See Taheri, Amir. *Holy Terror.* Bethesda, Maryland: Adler and Adler, 1987, pp. 122 - 123. The Pasdaran held the Sheikh Abdallah Barracks and al-Daek garrison in Baalbek. The Sheikh Abdallah Barracks would not return to nominal Lebanese army control until 1992. Several hundred Pasdaran were based in and around Baalbek and Nabisheet.

[22] It is perhaps worth noting that Fatah historically had good relations, and some association with, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. It is therefore not amazing that they would make some common cause with Islamists among the Shi'a opposition. Arafat had previously co-opted Musa Al-Sadr and convinced him to allow Fatah to train early AMAL cadre. This even though the 1980s would also see Palestinian-Shi'a conflicts during the so-called war of the camps.

[23] See Hamzeh, Nizar. 'Clan Conflicts, Hezbollah and the Lebanese State', |*Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies,* Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1994), p. 433. The Hermel clans can be divided into two basic groups: the first includes the A'shair Shamasiyyah, al-Shamas, al-Elawh,

al-Dandash, al-Alam, al-Awad, al-Nasreddine, and al-Ala'eddince clans; the second major Hermel clan group includes the A'shair Zouaiteriyyah, al-Zouaiter, al-Jafar, al-Noon, al-Amhaz, al-Mukdad, al-Hajj-Hasan, al-Shryif, and al-Rabah clans.

[24] Harris, William W. *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions.* Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1997, p. 304.

[25] Jaber, Hala. *Hezbollah: Born With A Vengeance*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 117.

[26] See Shanahan, *The Shi'a of Lebanon,* op. cit., p. 114.

[27] In this organizational sense, they shared some characteristics with mid-20th century Cosa Nostra families.

[28] 'Hezbollah digs in deep' *Asia Times,* 25 July 2006.

[29] The watershed of the Orontes (Asi) river likewise arises near the Labwah springs east of Baalbek and flows north into Syria.

[30] The flat plain of the Bekka valley was known at one point as coele Syria ('hollow Syria').

[31] *US Congressional Record* , 27 July 1990.

[32] See 'Terror Dollars: Counterfeiters, Cartels, and other Emerging Threats to America's Currency', *Washington Post*, 6 March 1994; see also Gary C. Gambill, 'Syria after Lebanon: Hooked on Lebanon', *Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2005: pp. 35-42.

[33] In mid 2008, Hizballah made significant areas of Mt. Sanin a closed military zone - apparently with the intent to establish command, control and remote sensing assets there.

[34] The camp is home to about 7.500 souls and dominated by the PFLP-GC and Syrian Palestinian Saiqa organization.

[35] Maroun, Pierre A. 'The Map of Terrorist Groups In Lebanon: The Syrian Moukhabarat Connection'; at http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/78/TheMapofTerroristGroupsin LebanonTheSyrianMoukhabaratsConnection.pdf accessed May 2010. The DFLP, PFLP, PFLP-GC are all beholden to Syria and operate under Syrian auspices.

[36] At the same time Iran has been much more circumspect in its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, in deference to Syria, and Al-Qaeda, limiting their access to the valley.

[37] Diplomatic relations between the two states were not formally established until 2008.

[38] 'Smuggling Across the Syrian-Lebanese border', *Asharq Alawat,* 27 April 2008.

[39]Patrick Seale. Asad: The Struggle For The Middle East. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988, p. 349. The SSNP, as a political organization, was founded by Antun Sa'ada in Beirut in 1932. It was characterized by a focus on secularism, a leadership principle (that was essentially proto-fascist), and a commitment to greater Syrian (as opposed to Arab) nationalism. The SSNP had splintered in the 1960s into right and left wing factions. When the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, the SSNP militia was still estimated to number about 3000.

Factions of the SSNP served in both the anti-government Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and in a collection of leftist parties the Syrians had organized in competition with the LNM - including a pro-Syrian faction of the SSNP under the leadership of Elias Knizah and Issam al-Muhayri. The pro-Syrian wing of the SSNP then allied with Syria in the prosecution of the Lebanese civil war after 1976. In return, the Syrians supported the SSNP with arms and money and ran a training camp for them in Didda, Lebanon. The SSNP militias have historically been well-organized; they fought to good effect during the early stages of the civil war and became one of Syria's major allies in the Lebanese conflict.

[40] The main Syrian intelligence facility was at the western entrance to the town which was also home to a Syrian detention facility under the command of Col. Yussaf Al-Abed in 2004.

[41] The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos (JC) were both Armenian terrorist organizations with grievances against Turkey for the Armenian genocide of 1915.

[42] Gambill, Gary. 'Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon.' *Mideast Monitor*, Vol. 3, No.1, January-March 2008.

[43] Syria supported Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq Gulf war. The Iranian dispatch of Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon implicitly supported the Syrians while Israel savaged Lebanon. This policy was continued by Bahir Assad, following the 2000 death of his father Hafez.

[44] It should be mentioned that relations between the Shi'a, Pasdaran, and Syrian security services were complex and changing. Syria actively assisted Hizballah operations prior to the Multinational Forces withdrawal in 1984. Thereafter the relationship was more problematic although Syria always collected a hefty share of the Bekka's drug trafficking operations. Ironically, the drug trade nonetheless gave both a steady source of income and provided a model of cooperation for all concerned. See Magnus Ranstorp. Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 71. Shi'a clans in the Bekka involved with both drug smuggling and Hizballah included Hamiya from Taraiya village west of Baalbek, Tles and Mazloum from Brital town, and al-Masri from Hawr Ta'ala. See Benjamin Feinberg, Sarah Marek, and Jan Snaidauf, unpublished paper *Hizbullah and its Worldwide Crime/ Terror Infrastructure*; SIS 596 – Transnational Crime & Terrorism, Professor Louise Shelley, December 20, 2005, p. 10.

[45] In just over a decade, this political faction developed to the point that a joint Hizballah-AMAL bloc received 35 Parliamentary seats in the spring 2005 elections. See Samii, Abbas William. 'Shiites in Lebanon: The Key To Democracy'. *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Summer 2006), p. 32.

[46] 'Syria accused of arming Hizballah from secret bases', *Times Online*, 28 May 2010.

[47] 'Lebanon: Hezbollah's New Mountain Hideaway', *Stratfor* ,15 July 2008 www.stratfor.com

Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution?   A Critique of Atran's and Axelrod's Bargaining Model as Applied to the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation

by Paul Kamolnick

Abstract

This article provides a critique of Atran's and Axelrod's conceptualization and application of bargaining theory to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Key notions such as ' the sacred,' and 'the symbolic' are either not defined at all or equivocally operationalized. The intrinsic relation between the symbolic and material levels of a phenomenon are misunderstood. Finally, the authors fail to modify their instrumental-rational bargaining paradigm to account for the uniquely existentialist challenges at the base of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

Introduction

Noted researchers Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod recently provided *Perspectives on Terrorism* readers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with a transcript of their extraordinary interview with Ramadan Shallah, Secretary-General, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).[1] Though not the interviewee sought, they state ,regarding their data collection "the objective was to gain insight from field interviews into how to further advance scientific understanding of cultural and political conflict in order to create new theoretical and practical frameworks for negotiation and cooperation".[2]

Readers interested in their conceptualization of key variables and broader theoretical argument are referred to a previous publication in the prestigious journal *Science*.[2] An analysis of this theoretical statement from 2007 reveals, however, significant conceptual confusion. As presently formulated, it is the opinion of this writer that this research project will neither advance our scientific understanding of conflict resolution in general nor resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in particular. In what follows, I identify conceptual difficulties with their current framework, and suggest in conclusion that productive insights derived from bargaining theory must fully account for the existentialist core of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

The Alleged Limits of the Rational Choice Paradigm

Traditional rational choice paradigms, the authors assert, have "dominated strategic thinking at all levels of government policy . . . and military planning," and have been "arguably useful in anticipating an array of challenges and in stabilizing world peace enough to prevent nuclear

war". [3] This type of instrumental rationality was manifest in the nation-state rivalry between the United States and former U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. Yet the present Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and by extension others allegedly involving sacred values is as the authors state, at least partially governed by motivations immune to the types of material incentives and trade-offs typically demanded to resolve tractable conflicts.

> [W]e are witnessing "devoted actors" such as suicide terrorists. . . .who are willing to make extreme sacrifices that are independent of, or all out of proportion to, likely prospects of success. Nowhere is this issue more pressing than in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. . . . The reality of extreme behaviors and intractability of extreme conflicts there and discord elsewhere—in the Balkans, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and beyond—warrant research into the nature and depth of commitment to sacred values.[4]

'The Sacred': Problems of Definition, Concept Formation and Operationalization

Despite its centrality, however, nowhere in this theoretical article do the authors actually define the concept of the 'sacred'. One could have been easily derived from Emile Durkheim, the classical sociologist of religion, to whom they earlier make reference.[5] Instead, definition is offered indirectly in several contrasts drawn between 'the sacred' and its various others soon to be examined. Yet these indirect approaches do not remove but further aggravate conceptual confusion. Let us examine this more closely.

Defining the Sacred

Durkheim, in his classic *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* offers a definition and characterization of 'the sacred' as an essential component of uniquely religious phenomena. "The division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all this profane," Durkheim states:

> is the distinctive trait of religious thought; the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with profane things. But by sacred things one must not understand simply those personal beings which are called gods or spirits; a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of wood, a house, in a word, anything can be sacred. A rite can have this character; in fact, the rite does not exist which does not have it to a certain degree. . . The circle of sacred objects cannot be determined, then, once for all. Its extent varies infinitely, according to the different religions . . . Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane things, those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the representations

which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects. [6]

Standard dictionary definitions [7], sociology of religion textbooks, [8] and scholarly handbooks [9] presume practically without exception that religion's *differentia specifica* is this essential bifurcation of the world into those radically distinct but essentially interdependent spheres one deemed sacred, and the other profane. The fuller implications of this for theoretically analyzing and formulating practical approaches to 'sacred barriers to conflict resolution' shall be developed later. For now let us explore the variety of indirect definitions offered and the extent to which they capture, depart from, or further confuse this standard definition of the sacred/profane distinction offered by classical and contemporary theorists in the sociology of religion.

The Nature of 'Sacred Values'

Devoid a definition of the sacred, the authors nevertheless offer several instructive if perplexing characterizations. Consider for example the following: "Sacred values differ from material or instrumental ones by incorporating moral beliefs that drive action in ways disassociated from prospects for success." [10]. But is it not the case that moral beliefs not specifically sacred or sacralized in the standard sense described above can also 'drive' (i.e. motivate) action? Is the sacred here a subset of morally-motivated action, or vice versa? Further, does "disassociated from prospects for success" or not require that one is a philosophical materialist? What the authors presume, it seems without warrant, is their own materialist, secularized conception of what actually counts as 'prospects for success'. In short, they presume as fact for any 'rational actor' that real success, genuine success, rational success, one that can actually count for a human being, must discount ends sought that by their own premises are impossible and not possible worlds for materialists to maintain.

It was another classical sociologist, Max Weber, however, who furnishes a conceptualization of values, their motivational basis, and their relation to social action that does *not* presume such a materialist bias, nor even a sacralized one, yet still captures the moral and ideal dimensions of value. Weber states, in a classical discussion of the four-fold bases of social action, that social action can be rooted in four distinct motivational bases. Instrumental-rational action privileges the value of efficiency of prospective means in relation to a materialistically-conceived end, i.e. it seeks and values most the least possible cost/expenditure for the greatest possible reward, and a clear relation between means and ends in a 'possible worlds' sense. This is the ultimate ideal-type underpinning of the 'rational choice' paradigm that the authors presume no longer captures the nature of 'sacred' conflict. It is basically what Atran, Axelrod, and Davis mean by "material or instrumental ones" and "prospects for success".

Yet as Weber asserts--despite the undoubted heuristic utility for causal explanation in the social sciences of a presumed instrumental-rational actor—that in fact social action has complex motivational foundations, i.e. instrumental-rational action does not exhaust the range of human valuing, willing and wanting. Indeed, three other types of social action each depart substantially from a narrowly-conceived, economistic cost/benefit maximization model. Affectively-motivated social action privileges payoffs in terms of the feeling states and emotions motivating certain choices; habitually-motivated action defies awareness and roots much social action in the unintended; a privileging of precedent, the routine, and the customary; and the 'taken for granted' backdrop of a world that mostly escapes human intention and knowledge. Finally, and most relevant to our discussion, is what Weber refers to as value-rational (*wertrational)* action, i.e. social action motivated by a belief in certain fundamental values, ideals, and imperatives conceived as non-negotiable categorically-binding ends - whether or not these are actually possible of realization in a purely biological-materialistic sense. Such 'ideals' encompass 'perfected states,' and 'ultimate values' as harmony, peace, love, justice, equality, liberty, but also the uniquely religious quest by Abrahamic-derived religionists for salvation and a sinless eternal life in Paradise.[11]

 In fact, though confounding all kinds of key distinctions, the authors do arrive at something resembling Weber's insight when they state: "Across the world, people believe that devotion to core values (such as the welfare of their family and country or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice) is, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Such values outweigh other values, particularly economic ones". [12] The experienced gravity of, and devotion to, 'core values' though, is not a commitment to 'sacred values' and the authors' conjoining of such fundamentally disparate 'ends' further obfuscates the precise limits they seek to discover that derive from specifically *sacred* limits to conflict resolution.

Compounding this confusion is a deeply confusing bundling of values that further undermines clarity regarding the precise meaning of the sacred. First, consider the relation between the sacred and the economic/material. Rather than understanding that virtually all magic and religion originate in the attempt to either coerce or propitiate those forces thought to control the conditions of worldly and other-worldly existence - yet another insight bequeathed by Weber in his sociology of religion [13] - the authors state:

> To say that sacred values are protected from trade-offs with economic values does not mean they are immune from all material considerations. Devotion to some core values, such as children's well-being . . . or the good of the community. . . or even to a sense of fairness. . . may represent universal responses to long-term evolutionary strategies that go beyond short-term individual calculations of self-interest, yet advance individual interests in the aggregate and long run." [14]

Again though, in the above account "sacred values" are conflated with, or at least not significantly differentiated from, "core values". They are seen as broadly functionalist to the attainment, within an evolutionary-adaptationist logic, of "economic values". Further, the distinction between "material considerations" and "economic values" is, by adaptationist logic, itself ambiguous since the 'relative fitness' of the organism—the core medium for evolutionary adaptation and competitive success—presumes reproductive and economic fitness maximization, each being a dimension of "the material" and ultimately also "economic" world. Granting to these authors the relative persuasiveness of recent evolutionary biological arguments warranting the extension of organism-centered classical Darwinian premises to those of inclusive fitness, kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, and long-run evolutionary stable strategies, they simply acknowledge an intrinsic connection between the material and immaterial, i.e. the securing of the material object (life and its extensions, economic and otherwise) sought through propitiation of the immaterial subject (spirit, and its historically variable concatenations). In short, they have 'discovered' a 'sacred' or 'core' connection to the 'economic' or the 'material' though in a bit more sophisticated Darwinian selectionist-adaptationist framework. That was not a connection lost to the progenitors of the classical sociology of religion, however.

Yet again, in a robust paragraph, there is a confusing jumble that further obfuscates, rather than clarifies, the exact dimensions of the sacred, and its potential constraint:

> Other such values are specific to particular societies and historical contingencies, such as the sacred status of cows in Hindu culture or the sacred status of Jerusalem in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Sometimes, as with cows. . . or forests. . .the sacred may represent accumulated material wisdom of generations in resisting individual urges to gain an immediate advantage of meat or firewood for the long-term benefits of renewable resources of energy and sustenance. Political leaders often appeal to sacred values as a way of reducing "transaction costs" . . . in mobilizing their constituents to action and as a least-cost method of enforcing their policy goals. [14]

Let us grant again, for the sake of argument, these further extensions of the sacred to various natural resources on adaptationist grounds, we are still left in the above with two unwarranted extensions. First, the appeal by political leaders to 'sacred values' is likely a reference to what they mean by other 'such values', i.e. 'core values,' or more likely as we will soon see 'symbolic values,' but not necessarily 'the sacred' as classically understood. Second, the 'sacred status of Jerusalem in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam' is tellingly *not* included in the authors' adaptationist narrative. In fact, it is simply dropped from discussion altogether since it seems, to this writer, to have identified a potential realm of the sacred that defies their generally indirect references. It is certainly one that is fundamental to the Israeli-Palestine confrontation.

The Nature of 'Symbolic Concessions'

A second major conceptual confusion concerns the manner in which these authors define, conceptualize, and characterize 'the symbolic'. First, like the concept 'the sacred', it is never actually defined. Had it been, several difficulties soon to be described could have been avoided. A symbol, as commonly defined, is an abstract signifier. A signifier, moreover, is a socially recognized, objectively binding referent to something beyond it, that to which it refers, i.e. 'the signified.' It is possible for a symbol to signify very different things to different people, particularly when the meaning of that symbol is mediated by fundamentally divergent interests, values, perceptions, aspirations, and, perhaps, survival imperatives. Examples of such multivalent symbols could be: the flag of the United States of America; the 'Stars and Bars' flag flown for various reasons of pride, honor, rebellious spirit, and sometimes race, by persons with various attachment to the Southern states and cause; the flag of Israel; the flag of Hamas, or of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; a Christian crucifix, Jewish Star of David, Muslim crescent and star; the flag of the Communist movement with hammer and sickle; or, the Nazi swastika. Symbolism and the symbolic also richly tap into realms of human existence, hope, despair; and mythic projection, and abstractions of all sorts. Combining the mythic-symbolic with its potentially mobile significations with those rare moments of charismatic fire that erupt in human history may account for some of the darkest and greatest chapters of the human spirit.

What is clear in all this, though, is that the symbolic is an abstract signifier connected in thought and often deed, with great potency for evoking the signified and mobilizing on its behalf. The question becomes then: Is this symbolic significance really so far detached from a materialistically-conceived, instrumentally-understood set of interests (signifieds), that it exits in the very sphere of rational conflict, and compromise? Or in contrast, must we simply describe rationality more broadly and expand its reach to grasp the depths of the symbolic though still remaining largely within a coherent materialist understanding of the basis of a given conflict and its potential resolution?

Atran, Axelrod, and Davis provide a really obscure venture into these issues: one that appears to this writer conceptually problematic. Their apparent thesis in this regard is the following: "Symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit may be key in helping to solve seemingly intractable conflicts." [16] But what evidence do they provide that these "concessions" are of "no apparent material benefit"? Two examples are provided from the immediate post-war phase of conflict: one from the Vietnam War, and one from World War II. First consider the concessions sought by both sides after the end of the Vietnam War. They claim:

> "Matters of principle or "sacred honor," when enforced to a degree out of proportion to any individual or immediate material payoff, are often seen as defining "who we are." After the end of the Vietnam War, successive U.S. administrations resisted Hanoi's efforts at reconciliation until Hanoi accounted for the fate of U.S. soldiers missing in action. . . .

Granted the issue was initially entwined with rational considerations of balance of power at the policy-making level: The United States did not want to get too close to Hanoi and so annoy Beijing (a more strategic ally against the Soviet Union). But popular support for the administration's position, especially among veterans, was a heartfelt concern for "our boys," regardless of numbers or economic consequences." [17]

To begin, two different notions, "matters of principle" and "sacred honor" are used equivocally and again undercut the fundamentally unique nature of the realm of the sacred. Second, the authors concede that on narrow rational choice grounds U.S. interest in mainland China strategically trumped a policy of immediate or escalated reconciliation with Hanoi. Third, when a nation goes to war, it is both blood and treasure, people and the wealth of the nation, that are ventured. The fact that actual human beings were indeed mauled, butchered, killed, and a considerable number were missing in action, was existential and materialist to its core. Even in strictly Darwinian-adaptationist terms the authors could, if they wanted, account for the fact that one's progeny, and a nation's progeny, had been sacrificed in an inconclusive war that many likely felt had been lost on the streets of America and in its universities, not on the battlefields of Vietnam, or the heartlands of the Midwest and South. In what sense must one really dig here beyond elemental rage, and sadness, and loss, and betrayal, and existential-emotional values, to understand that personal attachments had been contemptuously disregarded and were actually unaccounted for? Consider, for example, how enormous the symbolic significance of Hanoi immediately empathizing with those lost, disfigured, or unaccounted for loved ones - what the authors refer to as the "who we are" aspect - would have been. This is something virtually unimaginable of course, since this same war caused catastrophic losses to their own countrymen and countryside. Their application of an economistic calculus to "individual and immediate material payoff" and calculations of an individual's share in national-level gross domestic product at the very least radically circumscribes what one should imagine by "individual or immediate material payoff" in relation to the potentially permanent loss of one's loved ones. But it also restricts or distorts interpretation of more abstract signifiers, including symbolic gestures and overtures of various sorts that reassure one - whether Washington, D.C. or Hanoi - that there is a clear understanding of the value of the losses suffered and the anxiety experienced by those whose loved ones remain unaccounted for at the war's close.

The second example is offered by the authors when they state that "at the peaceful implementation of the occupation of Japan in 1945, the American government realized that preserving, and even signaling respect for, the emperor might lessen the likelihood that Japanese would fight to the death to save him." [18] Again, this has nothing to do with sacralization but with symbolism, and a symbolism that again, while not tied to a strict monetary accounting, indicates, through a "signaling respect for," a recognition of a human signified (i.e. the legitimacy and right of a people to honor their traditionally recognized authorities). Further, it imputes value to one's opponent; recognizes their moral standing; and is related deeply to the

phenomena of human trust, social security, temporal continuity, and a potential power imagined by a people now defeated in war. These are existentialist-psychological values and need not share any space with a transcendently conceived sacred.

Applying the Conceptual Framework to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

As might be anticipated, concrete application of this equivocal, ambiguous, and generally muddied conceptual universe does not significantly illuminate the material, sacred, nor symbolic dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On two occasions these researchers conducted on-site field research with various categories of interested agents: in the first, an unstated number of Israeli settlers, Palestinian refugees, and Hamas versus non-Hamas students; in the second, 14 interviewees in Syria, Palestine, and Israel, considered "leaders of the major parties to the Israel-Palestine dispute", were questioned. [19] The research team's core objective involved measuring "emotional outrage and propensity for violence in response to peace deals involving compromises over issues integral to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict". [20] Four core areas of fundamental conflict were then presented to the research subjects: "exchanging land for peace, sovereignty over Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former lands and homes inside Israel, and the recognition of the validity of the adversary's own sacred values". [21] In the first study among non-leaders, the authors report:

> [P]eople with sacred values had responded "No" to the proposed tradeoff; "no" accompanied by emotional outrage and increased support for violence to the trade-off coupled with a substantial and credible material incentive; and "Yes, perhaps" to trade-offs that also involve symbolic concessions (of no material benefit) from the other side. [22]

The results of the earlier study among non-leaders is then summarized:

> We found the use of material incentives to promote peaceful resolution of political and cultural conflicts may backfire when adversaries treat contested issues as sacred values. Symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit may be key in helping to solve seemingly intractable conflicts.[23]

The results of the second study conducted among leaders were "consistent to previous findings," the authors report, except that among leaders "the symbolic concession was not enough in itself, but only a necessary condition to opening serious negotiations involving material issues as well." [24] It is not the bare report of findings here that illuminates the genuine conceptual difficulties of their perspective, however, but rather the flesh they put on its bones when quoting verbatim from various experts and leaders. At issue here, again, is what this writer detects as a

major failure to either capture the uniqueness of the sacred, or properly conceptualize the intrinsic relation between the symbolic and material levels of a phenomenon. Is it really the case then that "[s]ymbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit may be key in helping to solve seemingly intractable conflicts"?

First, the authors assert that this is indeed corroborated by "experts". For example a senior member of the U.S. National Security Council stated:

> This seems right. On the settlers [who were to be removed from Gaza] [sic], Sharon realized too late that he shouldn't have berated them about wasting Israel's money and endangering soldiers' lives. Sharon told me that he realized now that he should have made a symbolic concession and called them Zionist heroes making yet another sacrifice. [25]

As a "further illustration that sacred values be at the heart of deep-seated political disputes," the authors report that Isaac Ben Israel, a former Israeli Air Force general who currently heads the nation's space agency stated:

> Israel recognizes that the [Hamas-led] [sic] Palestinian government is still completely focused on what it considers to be its essential principles. . . .For Hamas, a refusal to utter the simple words 'We recognize Israel's right to exist' is clearly an essential part of their core values. Why else would they suffer the international boycott. . . and let their own government workers go without pay, their people go hungry, and their leaders risk assassination?[26]

Three key former or current leaders also furnish what the authors consider evidence for their thesis regarding the sacred barriers to conflict: Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas leader and then-spokesman for the Palestinian government; Musa Abu Marzouk, aformer chairman and current deputy chairman, of Hamas and Binyamin Netanyahu who at the time was a former Israeli prime minister and later opposition leader in parliament. Each is quoted respectively.

> [Ghazi Hamad] In principle, we have no problem with a Palestinian state encompassing all of our lands within the 1967 borders. But let Israel apologize four our tragedy in 1948, and then we can talk about our right of return to historic Palestine.

Tellingly, the authors immediately assert at this point in their text: "In rational choice models of decision-making, something as intangible as an apology could not stand in the way of peace." [27] A point to which we shall later return.

> [Musa Abu Marzouk]. The authors state that Marzouk:

[S]aid "No" to a trade-off for peace without granting a right of return; a more emphatic "No, we do not sell ourselves for any amount," when given a trade-off with a substantial material incentive (credible offering of substantial U.S. aid for the rebuilding of Palestinian infrastructure); but "Yes, an apology is important, but only a beginning. It's not enough, because our houses and land were taken away from us and something has to be done about that." [28]

And Binyamin Netanyahu, in response to the researcher's question—"Would you seriously consider accepting a two-state solution following the 1967 borders if all major Palestinian factions, including Hamas, were to recognize the right for the Jewish people to an independent state in the region?":

[Binyamin Netanyahu] "Yes, but the Palestinians would have to show that they sincerely mean it, change their textbooks and anti-Semitic characterizations and then allow some border adjustments so that Ben Gurion [Airport] [sic] would be out of range of shoulder-fired missiles." [29]

Finally, consider three additional statements thought to further buttress their thesis. The authors state that despite Israel's dire economic circumstances, the World Jewish Congress refused reparations from Germany for murdered European Jews. Israel insisted at that time (1948) that "Germany must publicly declare contrition for the murder and suffering of Jews at German hands". [30]. An Iranian scholar's remarks at a World Federation of Scientists convention are cited for having said that "symbolic statements are important if sincere, [and] without reservation." [31] And Israel's former chief of hostage negotiations is cited as saying: "Trusting the adversary's intentions is critical to negotiations, which have no chance unless both sides believe the other's willingness to recognize its existential concerns." To which the authors state that "Indeed, recognition of some 'existential values' may change other values into material concerns, e.g." and now returning to Merari cite him as saying: "[S]ince the PLO's . . . recognition of Israel, most Israeli's no longer see rule over the West Bank as existential". [32]

Conclusion

The authors claim that the above evidence warrants their robust conclusion regarding the probable importance of the non-material, non-instrumental dimensions for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They state:

Our findings about sacred values suggest that there may be fewer differences than are publicly acknowledged in the material trade-offs that "moderate" and "radical" leaders in

Palestine, Israel, and elsewhere may be willing to make. Overcoming moral barriers to symbolic concessions and their emotional underpinnings may pose more of a challenge but also offer greater opportunities for breakthroughs to peace than hitherto realized. [33]

But do their findings support such a conclusion? Supposing one is even capable of conceptually relating such disparate and denotatively different terms—"sacred values," "material trade-offs," "moral barriers," "symbolic concessions and their emotional underpinnings"—what is actually discovered in the various statements by protagonists, antagonists, experts, and ancillary authorities, about the supposed 'sacred limits' to resolving this conflict? The overwhelming common denominator among these statements, it seems to this writer at least, is that the nature of this conflict is not captured by typical rational choice bargaining scenarios because unlike most bargaining games, this one is about *whether one exists at all* as a distinct people with a land, and a history, a present and a future. Virtually without exception, the "symbolism" the authors discover is existentialist; rooted in materialist premises; and involves the process of moral recognition or non-recognition by opponents to the very right of another to exist as a people with a state.

Several questions seem relevant at this point. What is the "rational" choice or 'instrumental-materialist' negotiated/bargaining solution for an individual, people, or state, whose choice is *to be* - or *not to be*? *To exist* - or *not to exist*? Is it really a mystery why symbolism is so potent in existentialist, irredentist conflicts? Isn't the difficulty of making a *symbolic* concession that it is also most definitely an *existential* concession, though not captured in a narrowly-conceived pay-off but a broader vision of a people's rights, legitimacy, and possibilities? Is it not the case that before one can bargain, let alone imagine a matrix of economic trade-offs modeled by bargaining scenarios, one must first exist - secure, with rights, and authority? Standard bargaining scenarios when applied to the U.S. - Soviet Cold War rivalry presumed the rational desire of actors convinced of the primacy of a materialist this-worldy value schema—whether liberal democratic, or Marxist-Leninist--to exist, and to be rightfully regarded as seeking self-preservation within certain territorial spheres of influence. Bargaining theories in economics, psychology, sociology, and biology are remarkably successful not at predicting existential trade-offs, but once presuming existence is a value guaranteed to each, modeling strategies most likely to rationally maximize outcomes for each in an interdependent iterative game.

The intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not result from some irrational, non-instrumental symbolic attachment that subverts a more rational sense of one's genuine best moves. It is instead composed of a type of brutal honesty that puts its cards on the table not out of spite, but as an alternative vision of the good. Consider for example the answer offered by PIJ General-Secretary Shallah to a core existential question put to him by his interviewers.

Question: Both Israelis and Americans, including their leaders, want to know if there is any possibility that you or Hamas could ever recognize Israel, not necessarily now but in the future, under whatever conditions? And if you could, what would you want for it?

Ramadan Shallah: I cannot speak for Hamas. But I will never, under any conditions, accept the existence of the state of Israel. I have no problem living with the Jewish people. We have lived together in peace for centuries. And if Netanyahu were to ask if we can live together in one state, I would say to him: "If we have exactly the same rights as Jews to come to all of Palestine. If Khaled Meshaal and Ramadan Shallah can come whenever they want, and visit Haifa, and buy a home in Herzliyah if they want, then we can have a new language, and dialogue is possible." But until then, I would say to Netanyahu: "I will never accept the existence of Israel. I will never accept the existence of a state of Israel. Never. Ever." (Smiling) I hope that is clear enough. After the Cold War, Americans began asking: "Is Israel a liability?" Under the Bush years, it was worse for us with America than even for Israel. Until the Americans see Israel as a liability, nothing is possible. We have had three Islamic-Israeli wars, including the one with Hizbollah, and we are headed to a religious war between Muslims and Jews—a clash of civilizations. [34]

Indeed, the ultimate nature of this confrontation has most likely been understood by its protagonists and interested observers for decades. In this writer's opinion its roots lie in what is truly an existential conflict between two peoples that, while involving symbolic and sacralized dimensions, is ultimately mundane and this-worldly. It is rooted in a core disagreement over the relative value attributed to each other's existence, at the expense of one's own maximalist vision for one's own people, power and prospects. Given this understanding, rooted in a deeply materialist-existential paradigm, concessions - symbolic or otherwise - that do not begin with this mundane first principle, are unlikely to shed light, or make progress. At root, the Israel-Palestinian confrontation is an irredentist-existentialist claim by two peoples for a specific land.

The relatively recent rise of fervent religious rejectionists on each side—radical Islamists and zealous Jewish supremacists—enormously complicate what decades ago was a fairly straightforward battle among secularists, including socialists of all stripes, for a territorial nation-state as final resting place for two displaced, diasporic peoples. The de-facto and finally official recognition of this two-state solution should it escape the bloody logic of religious maximalism, bodes well for some future settlement. Neither will receive all; both will receive some. Israel will exist. Palestine will exist.

It is not now the generation of 1968 though, that threatens a permanent future of heightened readiness for the next so-called suicide attack. It is the generation of 1979, of Islamist revolution, and the renewed power of a uniquely powerful tactical innovation with enormous strategic consequence, i.e. the targeted munition of choice or 'martyrdom operation'. It is not desperation that led PIJ Chairman Shallah to sabotage and undermine any prospect of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. It was in fact the opposite, i.e. the prospect of a non-rejectionist vision of future relations, that led the PIJ and Hamas to have to proclaim their relevance in violent deeds to an 'intifada' that largely escaped their leadership. It was the PIJ especially—vanguardist, secretive, bloody, and effective—that engaged in the process of terrorist bargaining and escalation in order to prove its militant bona fides against the then-emergent HAMAS upstart. The two waves of terrorist bombings that first undermined the Oslo, and then Madrid peace negotiations, of course would be blamed on the obnoxious Israeli's who later elected to construct a physical barrier; develop and deploy a more effective operational counterterrorist policy and also, quit Gaza.[35]

Should a profound Islamist immaterialism and desire to prove one's ultimate worth to Allah in the process of killing and being killed permanently replace the earlier vision; should the jihadist covenant proclaimed in Qur'an 9:111 [36] replace a this-worldly calculus that so long provided a reasonable expectation of eventual, if hard-fought and difficult, irredentist bargaining, then the 'sacred' will surely have created limits to conflict resolution. To earn favor with one's God through expiation of one's sins, and the highest form of expiation—becoming blameless before Allah through killing and being killed [37] —as the militant desire to eliminate all who do not exclusively worship Allah - is that not a path to permanent bloodshed? If that is the path then yes, there is a sacred limit to conflict resolution. The instrumental and practical nature of it should not be misunderstood owing to a secularist bias on the part of academic researchers, however. The obliteration of the infidel usurper of a land once conquered by Islam, and therefore always a *waqf*, [38] is instrumental in the extreme. Absolutely instrumental. In fact, it is the height of selfishness that would guarantee not only the greatest of privileges of a sensuously blissful paradise for the martyr, but the intercessory rights of the martyr to provide for seventy loved ones. [39]

In the estimation of this writer, Atran and Axelrod have not yet proved that non-instrumental values - sacred, symbolic, emotional, core, or otherwise - do, would, or could transform the prospects for conflict resolution. What they have provided, however unintentionally, is a case for revising the application of bargaining models to existential conflicts of a national-irredentist type. What is at issue is the very conception of "the game" itself. The right to play a rule-bound game is the unquestioned first premise of game theory. It is that very premise, though, by not being granted -existentially, symbolically, materially--that is at the heart of the political violence and terror, and the apparent intractability, of this now century-long conflict.

About the Author: Dr.Paul Kamolnick, *professor of sociology, teaches classical and contemporary sociological theory in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, East Tennessee State University. His current research interests include developing models for analyzing the intrinsic relationships between religion, secularization, fundamentalization, and terrorist violence committed in the name of religion; the processes and variables associated with so-called homegrown terrorist radicalization; and applications of sociological theory to counterinsurgency theory and practice.*

Notes

[1] Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, "Interview with Ramadan Shallah, Secretary General, Palestinian Islamic Jihad," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 4, No.2, May 2010, pp. 3-9.

[2] Ibid., p. 3.

[2] See ibid., p. 3, note 1, referring to: Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, and Richard Davis, "Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution." *Science*, Vol. 317, 24 August 2007, pp. 1039-1040.

[3] Ibid., p. 1039.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., endnote 8, p. 1040.

[6] Emile Durkheim. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Transl. J. Swain. Free Press: New York 1965 [1912], pp. 52, 56.

[7] See e.g.: *Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary*, 11th Ed., Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc., 2004, p. 1094.

[8] See, e.g.: Kevin J. Christiano, W. H. Swatos, Jr., and P. Kivisto. *Sociology* of *Religion*: *Contemporary Developments*, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, esp. chapter 1. R. L. Johnstone. *Religion in Society: A Sociology of Religion*, 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007, chapter 1; Lester R. Kurtz. *Gods in the Global Village: The World's Religions in Sociological Perspective*, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2007, chapter 1; James C. Livingston. *Anatomy of the Sacred: An Introduction to Religion*, 2nd ed.. New York: Macmillan, 1993, esp. chapters 1 and 3.

[9] See, e.g.: Richard K. Fenn. 'Editorial Commentary: Religion and the Secular; the Sacred and Profane: The Scope of the Argument', pp. 3-22 in R. K. Fenn, ed. 2003. *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

[10] Atran, Axelrod, and Davis, p. 1039.

[11] See: Max Weber. *Economy and Society*, Eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press1968 [1922], vol. 1, pp. 24-26.

[12] Atran, Axelrod, and Davis, p. 1039.

[13] M. Weber. *The Sociology of Religion*. Transl. E. Fischoff. Boston: Beacon. 1963 [1922], pp. 1-2.

[14] Atran, Axelrod, and Davis, p. 1039.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 1040.

[17] Ibid., p. 1039.

[18] Ibid.

[19] S. Atran, R. Axelrod, and R. Davis, p. 1039, p. 1040.

[20] Ibid., p. 1039.

[21] Ibid., p. 1040.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, "Interview with Ramadan Shallah, Secretary General, Palestinian Islamic Jihad," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 4, No.2, May 2010, p. 8.

[35] Meir Litvak,Ph.D., "The Radical Palestinian Islamic Movements and the P.A." Lecture, Tel Aviv University, 12 June 2008; Meir Litvak, "The Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Background Information". Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 26 February 2003. Available at: www.ict.org.il/apage/printv/5300.php. Accessed: 17 April 2008; See also HAMAS Covenant 1988, 18 August 1988, Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/hamas.asp. Accessed: 14 January 2009.

[36] Qur'an 9:111: "Allah hath purchased of the Believers their persons and their goods; For theirs (in return) is the Garden of Paradise: They fight in His Cause, and slay and are slain: A promise binding on Him in Truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the Qur'an: And who is more faithful To his Covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded: That is the achievement supreme." (Ali translation;

The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an. New Edition with Revised Translation and Commentary. Brentwood, MD: Amana Corporation, 1992, pp. 470-471.

[37]See e.g.: *The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari*, (Transl. Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan), Arabic-English, vol. 4, Book 56 "The Book of Jihad," nos. 2782 – 3088 (July 1997, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam). A few hadiths are worth quoting in full: Sahih Al Bukhari, **no. 2796**: "Narrated Anas: The Prophet said, 'A single endeavor (of fighting) in Allah's Cause in the afternoon or in the forenoon is better than all the world and whatever is in it. A place in Paradise as small as the bow or lash of one of you is better than all the world and whatever is in it. And if a woman (Hūr etc.) from Paradise appeared to the people of the earth, she would fill the space between heaven and the earth with light and pleasant scent; and her headcover is better than the world and whatever is in it'"; **no. 2817**: "Narrated Anas bin Malik: The Prophet said, 'Nobody who enters Paradise likes to return to the world even if he got everything on earth, except a martyr who wishes to return to the world so that he may be martyred ten times because of the honour and dignity he receives (from Allah.)'"; **no. 2818**: "Narrated 'Abdullah bin Abi Aufa: Allah's Messenger said, 'Know that Paradise is under the shades of swords (Jihad in Allah's Cause)'". See also: *Sahih Muslim*. (Transl. Abdul Hamid Siddiqi), Vol.3, Book 10, "Kitab al-Jihad". Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers.

[38] See e.g. HAMAS Covenant 1988, 18 August 1988, Article Eleven: "The Islamic Resistance Movement [HAMAS] believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem generations until Judgement Day. . . . This is the law governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia (law) and the same goes for any land the Moslems have conquered by force, because during the times of (Islamic) conquests, the Moslems consecrated these lands to Moslem generations till the Day of Judgment". Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/hamas.asp. Accessed: 14 January 2009.

[39] See esp. David Cook. *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005, pp. 22-31, for an excellent discussion of the instrumental nature of violent jihad and the various goods owed the martyr who kills and is killed on the field of jihad.

The Science of the Sacred: Response to Professor Kamolnick
by Scott Atran & Robert Axelrod

Professor Kamolnick argues that a *Science* article [1] of ours that we cited in our interview with Ramadan Shallah in the last issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism*,[2] which was meant to give an indication to the reader of the kinds of issues we are exploring, was conceptually confused. We allegedly failed to give adequate definitions of "the sacred" and "the symbolic," the distinctions we did provide were "equivocally operationalized," and we misunderstood the difference between what is symbolic and what is material.

Nowhere in Kamolnick's critique is there a discussion of actual empirical findings. There is only a polemic over the meaning of certain words and ideas and how they fail to cover or adequately take into account those of important 19th and early 20th century sociologists, like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, as Professor Kamolnick chooses to interpret them. Instead of operationalized and empirically tested distinctions, Kamolnick offers his considered opinions and speculations about the true sense of these words and ideas, especially as he thinks they apply to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

For example, Professor Kamolnick argues that by characterizing the sacred as "non-instrumental," we obfuscate the real nature of both. According to Kamolnick:

> obliteration of the infidel usurper of a land once conquered by Islam, and therefore always a waqf, is instrumental in the extreme. Absolutely instrumental. In fact, it is the height of selfishness that would guarantee not only the greatest of privileges of a sensuously blissful paradise for the martyr, but the intercessory rights of the martyr to provide for seventy loved ones.

Now, Kamolnick may define "instrumental" any way he likes; however, from our point of view (and that of the standard rational choice theories that underlie much of economics and political science, as well as any alternatives that seek to test and refute the standard theories), his notion of "absolutely instrumental" is an oxymoron. Indeed, we and others have argued that when people hold values to be non-fungible "absolutes" that is precisely what characterizes such values as sacred. This operational characterization of the sacred correlates highly with other operational characterizations (immunity to monetary tradeoffs, susceptibility to concessions of no evident material value as far as subjects are concerned, emotional salience, etc.), which yield quite reliable empirical results and predictions.[3]

As for the selfish and instrumental "intercessory rights of the martyr to provide seventy loved ones," this is mere speculation based on no study of actual or would-be martyrs (the reference that accompanies the claim concerns an interpretation of Muslim religious exegesis). No empirical study has ever shown that seeking loved ones in paradise is a significant motivator of martyrdom, instrumental or otherwise. Indeed, in fieldwork with jihadis across Eurasia and North Africa, never have we heard this cited by would-be martyrs, failed suicide bombers, supporters, trainers, and so forth. In fact, whenever we've brought up the issue, leaders of organizations that sponsor and support suicide attacks all told us more or less what the Hamas people told us, namely, that "they would slam the door in the face" of anyone who sought martyrdom to gain virgins in heaven.[4]

As a further example of our supposed confusion, Kamolnick notes that we make reference to possible evolutionary underpinnings of some sacred values (e.g., a cross-cultural unwillingness to trade off children or community for material gain) but not others (e.g., sacred cows in India or sacred forests and burial grounds). But all we are saying here is that some sacred values appear to be culturally universal, with a possible evolutionary grounding (e.g. tribal territory), whereas others appear to be culturally particular (e.g. importance of acquiring nuclear capability for some Iranians), with no direct support from any biological adaptation to ancestral environments. [5] Similar considerations apply for related symbolic aspects of sacred values, such as universal gestures of submission to higher authority in terms of bowing, prostration and throat baring, as opposed to the culturally particular implications of schoolgirls wearing headscarves for Muslim religious notions of modesty and submission to God versus secular French notions of equality and the universal citizen.

Kamolnick makes no reference to the actual empirical studies in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA* that operationalized the framework of sacred values used in the *Science* article. [6] That framework focuses on immunity to tradeoffs and privileged relationships to emotions (especially related to violence). These and other experiments and surveys with thousands of randomly sampled Palestinians and Israelis deal with hypothetical yet realistic trade-offs for peace. We consistently find that people's opposition to giving up things they consider sacred actually *increases* when material incentives to compromise are offered. Support for violence *decreases*, however, when an adversary makes symbolic gestures of no evident material consequence (from the subjects' perspective) that show recognition of the other's sides sacred values.

More recently, this finding has been replicated in India with respect to the Kashmir conflict, [7] in Indonesia with respect to the importance of Sharia among students in moderate and radical madrassahs, [8] and in Iran with respect to acquisition of nuclear capability [9] (with a much larger study about to come out that involves over two thousand respondents and 28 of 30 Iranian provinces, which clarifies some problematic issues in the original paper: for example, we now find significant differences among Iranians with respect to the perceived importance of acquiring nuclear energy capability, making it relatively immune to "carrots and sticks" incentives and

disincentives, which only harden attitudes, versus the insignificance of material incentives or disincentives in hardening attitudes to acquisition of weapons capability).

In these and other peer-reviewed scientific papers, we and our colleagues have also discussed relevant aspects of Durkheim's distinction between the sacred and the profane [10] as well as Weber's concept of value-rational.[11] And we have tried, where possible, to note the implications of their ideas for operationalizing differences in willingness towards tradeoffs that could be tested and then experimentally replicated or refuted.

Kamolnick's discussion of our use of "sacred values," and the entire philosophical critique behind it, makes no evaluation of these substantial empirical findings. In the end, they are pretty much irrelevant to what he surmises in the quote below to be the correct reading of the nature of seemingly intractable political conflict:

> The intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not result from some irrational, non-instrumental symbolic attachment that subverts a more rational sense of one's genuine best moves... In this writer's opinion its roots lie in what is truly an existential conflict between two peoples that while involving symbolic and sacralized dimensions, it is ultimately mundane and this-worldly.

In fact, we pretty much agree with this opinion. The scientific issue is to separate out what people themselves believe to be the difference between what is identifiably mundane (e.g. a structured collection of stones) and what is considered sacred (e.g. a holy temple). The fact that political leaders from vastly different cultural milieux (e.g., The US National Security Council, Hamas politburo, Israeli Knesset, etc.), and the many thousands of people in their supporting populations that we have tested, readily respond to our conceptual distinctions in clear yet surprising ways (i.e., not predicted from available standard theories) that are regularly replicated and independently assessed (e.g., in studies of correlated emotions), [12] suggests that attention to the operational distinctions we have made are relevant to understanding seemingly intractable conflicts.

Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conflict situations to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that negotiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotiations or should try to bypass them with sufficient material incentives. Our empirical findings and historical analysis suggest that conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide material benefits in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more difficult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of no obvious apparent material benefit (from the tested standpoint of the parties involved) might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conflicts. There are, of course, various material consequences to any sacred stand,

and various material means may be used to achieve sacred ends. But in sacred endeavors, only the ends count, whatever the means. In the case of PIJ's Ramadan Shallah – in possible opposition to Hamas's Khaled Meshaal [13] – the repossession of all of historical Palestine is a sacred duty that apparently admits of no compromise and must be fought out, with any available means, to the end.

In sum, while Kamolnick raises some interesting philosophical issues about the meanings of the words "sacred," "symbolic," "rational," "material," "instrumental" and so forth, he appears to have wholly ignored the quite substantial literature on sacred values that has come out of cognitive and social psychology over the last 15 years or so. [14] The intent of that work is not to adequately capture the entire philosophical range, connotation, or possible references of interesting words and ideas, but to precisely test whether, and under what conditions, certain operationally defined cognitive distinctions can predict significant differences in decisions and choice of behavior. True, this neither exhausts nor captures the full richness of the sacred in human life or political conflict, which is less a tractable topic and program for science than an intriguing problem for philosophy.

About the Authors: **Scott Atran** *is Research Director in Anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, Visiting Professor of Psychology and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, and Presidential Scholar in Sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City.* **Robert Axelrod** *is the Walgreen Professor for the Study of Human Understanding at the University of Michigan, with appointments in the Department of Science and the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.*

Notes

[1] S. Atran, R. **Axelrod**, R. Davis (2007) **Sacred** barriers to conflict resolution. *Science* 317: pp. 1039–1040
[2] S. Atran, R. Axelrod (2010). Interview with Ramadan Shallah, Secretary-General, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. IV, Issue 2, May.
[3] J. Ginges, S. Atran, D. Medin, K. Shikaki (2007) Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,* 104: pp. 7357-7360.
[4] S. Atran (2010) *Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un) Making of Terrorists*. New York: Ecco/HarperCollins.
[5] S. Atran, R. Axelrod (2008) Reframing Sacred Values. *Negotiation Journal*, 24: pp. 221-246.
[6] J. Ginges et al (2007), op. cit.
[7] S. Sachdeva, D. Medin (2009) Group Identity Salience in Sacred Value Based Cultural Conflict: An Examination of the Hindu-Muslim Identities in the Kashmir and Babri Mosque Issues. In: *Proceedings of the 31th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci)*, Washington, D.C.
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[9] M. Dehghani, R. Iliev, S. Sachdeva, S. Atran, J. Ginges, D. Medin (2009). 'Emerging sacred values: Iran's nuclear program', *Judgment and Decision Making,* 7: pp. 930-933.
[10] J. Ginges, S. Atran (2009). Non-instrumental reasoning over sacred values, op. cit.
[11] J. Ginges, S. Atran (2010). Moral bounds to decisions to support or oppose deadly intergroup violence. Under review.
[12] J. Ginges, S. Atran. 2008. 'Humiliation and the inertia effect: Implications for understanding violence and compromise in intractable intergroup conflicts'. *Journal of Cognition and Culture,* 8: pp. 281–294.
[13] S. Atran, R. Axelrod (2010). Why We Talk to Terrorists. *New York Times*, June 30.
[14] See, for example: J. Baron, M. Spranca (1997). Protected values. *Organizational Behavior and Decision Processes. 70*: pp.1–16; P. Tetlock (2003). Thinking the unthinkable: Sacred values and taboo cognitions. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences,* 7: pp. 320-324.

Dissertations and Theses on (Counter-)Terrorism and Political Violence (1980-2010)
Selected by Eric Price

Scores of theses on terrorism and political violence are written every year at our universities. While a number of them are subsequently published as books, many remain shelved and unread. However, today more and more are available online. Here is a sample of more than 130 titles; many of them can be directly accessed online through the Internet.

Ahrnens, Anette. Lund University, Sweden; 2007
A Quest for Legitimacy: Debating UN Security Council Rules on Terrorism and Non-proliferation.
Al-Ajmi, Thaqal Saad. Aberystwyth University, U.K.; 2003
Legal Responses to Terrorism with Special Reference to the Position of Kuwait.
Albuquerque, Nazare Alves de. University of Reading, UK; 1993
The contemporary European response to political crime : a study of the European Community, France and the United Kingdom.
Al-Harbi, Adnam Noori. University of Ulster, U.K.; 2005
A comparative study of Western and Middle Eastern newspaper responses to 9/11 and the 'War on terror'.
Alon, Hanan,The RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 1980
Countering Palestinian terrorism in Israel: toward a policy analysis of countermeasures.
Asthappan, Jibey. The American University, U.S.A.; 2009
Stealing their thunder: The effectiveness of military force in deterring terrorism.
Avihai, Hillel. Anglia Ruskin University, U.K.; 2006
Evolution and escalation of aviation terrorism : from bargaining chip fashion to total destruction orientation.
Baker, Anthony (Abdul Haqq). University of Exeter, U.K.; 2009
Countering Terrorism in the UK: A Convert Community Perspective.
Barnidge, Robert Perry. Queen's University Belfast, U.K.; 2008
Non-state actors and terrorism : applying the Law of State Responsibility and the due diligence principle. Bataillon, Gilles. Université de Lille III, France; 1996
Violence et politique en Amérique centrale [microform] : essai sur la mise en place de la guerre civile nicaraguayenne et des affrontements armés au Guatemala et au Salvador.
Bauhn, Per. Lunds Universitet, Sweden; 1989
Ethical aspects of political terrorism : the sacrificing of the innocent
Berger, Michael Andrew. St Andrews University, U.K.; 2010
How resisting democracies can defeat substate terrorism : formulating a theoretical framework for strategic coercion against nationalistic substate terrorist organizations.
Berrebi, Claude. Princeton University, U.S.A.; 2004
The causes and consequences of terrorism.
Biggio, Nancy Connors. The University of Alabama, U.S.A.; 2002
The rationality of the use of terrorism by secular and religious groups.
Binodah, Abdullah M. The University of Sheffield, U.K.; 2006
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Bush War on Terror : elite opinion and the failure of U.S. strategy.
Boukalas, Christos. Lancaster University, U.K.; 2007
Empire and Reich. War on Terrorism and the Political Metalaxis of the US.
Brannan, David. St. Andrews University, U.K.; 20007
Violence, terrorism and the role of theology : repentant and rebellious Christian identity.
Brown, David. University of Aberdeen, U.K.; 2001
Aspects of the area of freedom, security and justice : assessing the progress made, commitment expressed and legitimacy of the implementation processes of European police cooperation and counter terrorism.
Cale, Jesse L. Simon Fraser University, Canada; 2004
Issue terrorism: An analysis of trends in North America.

Capper, David. University of Surrey, U.K.; 2003
The effects of terrorism on the decision-making process of tourists.
Carlsson, Eric. Umeå University, Sweden; 2009
Medierad övervakning : En studie av övervakningens betydelser i svensk dagspress
Chadwick, Elizabeth. University of Nottingham, UK; 1994
The utilization of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the Geneva Convention Treaty Régime, to deter acts of international terrorism, with special reference to armed struggles by "Peoples" for their right to self-determination
Clarke, Colleen Margaret. University of Toronto, Canada; 2006
Police response to anti-terrorism policy.
Clutterbuck, Lindsay. University of Portsmouth, U.K.; 2002
An accident of history? : the evolution of counter terrorism methodology in the Metropolitan Police from 1829 to 1901, with particular reference to the influence of extreme Irish Nationalist activity.
Coaffee, Jon. Oxford Brookes University, U.K.; 2000
Risk, insurance and the making of the contemporary urban landscape : with specific reference to the threat of terrorism in the City of London 1992-1997.
Cockley, David. Texas A&M University, U.S.A: 2009
The media spectacle of terrorism and response-able literature.
Cunningham, William G. George Mason University, U.S.A.; 2006
Terrorism and conflict resolution: Theory and practice.
Daetwyler, George. Universität Zürich, Switzerland; 1981
Der Terrorismus und das internationale Strafrecht : unter Berücksichtigung des neuen Europäischen Übereinkommens zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus [ETÜ] von 1977
[Rltd Work European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977)]
Dahlin, Maria. Umeå University, Sweden; 2008
Tal om terror : säkerhetspolitisk retorik i Sverige och Ryssland hösten
Dalby, Andrew Keith. St Andrews University, U.K.; 2004
European integrationist influences on member states' counter-terrorist co-operation and co-ordination. Derin Gure, Pinar. Boston University, U.S.A.; 2009.
Essays in public economics and economics of terrorism.
Dulin, Adam. ISVG; West Haven ,CT, USA; May 2006
Development as Counterterrorism - An Examination of the Columbian Conflict
Egner, Michael. Pardee RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 2009
Between Slogans and Solutions: A Frame-Based Assessment Methodology for Public Diplomacy.
El-Ibiary, Rasha. University of Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K.; 2006
Televisual representation of the 'War on Terror' : comparative analysis of Al-Jazeera and CNN in covering the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Engene, Jan Oskar. University of Bergen, Norway; 1998
Patterns of terrorism in Western Europe, 1950-1995
Eser, Tarik. ISVG; West Haven ,CT, USA; December; 2007
The Impact of the Turkish Policies Toward the PKK Terrorist Organization
Flarey, Dominick L. Breyer State University - Kamiah Idaho, U.S.A.; 2003
Terrorist Groups Are Aligning To Conduct Global Terrorism.
Franks, Jason. University of St. Andrews, U.K.; 2005
Rethinking the roots of terrorism: through the doors of perception.
Fraund, Philipp. Universität Konstanz, Germany; 2009
"The picture survives" [Elektronische Ressource] : zur Geschichte der Kriegsberichterstattung ; Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan - globaler Krieg gegen den Terror
Gantt, Jonathan Wes. University of South Carolina, U.S.A.; 2005
Irish terrorism, British counter-terrorism and United States foreign policy, 1865—1922.
Gatliff, Jason R. Bowling Green State University, U.S.A.; 2006
Terrorism and Just War Tradition: Issues of compatibility.
Gerhardus, Antonius Johannes. Leiden University, The Netherlands; 2006
Transnational crime and the interface between legal and illegal actors : the case of the illicit art and antiquities trade Tijhuis

Germann, Jan-Peter. Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany; 2009
Terror und Anti-Terror [Elektronische Ressource] : politische Gewalt, Sicherheitspolitik und die strategische Kultur der Terrorismusbekämpfung in Deutschland
Gillespie, Rebecca J. University of Sussex, U.K.; 2006
Exploring the impact of reminders of mortality and terrorist events on intergroup relations – a terror management theory perspective.
Ginbar, Yuval. University of Essex, U.K.; 2006
Torture, terrorists and ticking bombs : moral, societal and legal aspects of the 'ticking bomb' justification for torture in the struggle against terrorism.
Goh, Hui Peng Constance. University of Nottingham, UK; 2008
The art of dissent from the rhetoric of silence: the terror and promise of Dao and Khora
Gok, Ozkan. University of Cincinnati, U.S.A.;2010
Structural disadvantage, terrorism, and non-terrorist violent crime in Turkey.
Green, Craig Anthony. University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa; 2009
The Khawaarij and the Creed of Takfeer; Declaring a Muslim to be an Apostate and its Effects upon Modern Day Islamic Movements.
Grevi, Giovanni. Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 2007
The Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy of the European Union: Ever-Closer Cooperation. Dynamics of Regime Deepening.
Hadjimatheou, Katerina. The University of Essex, U.K.; 2009
Ethnic profiling in counter-terrorism: Justice in practice.
Hale, William Chris. ISVG; West Haven ,CT, USA; May 2005
Twenty-first Century Terrorism, Twenty-first Century Answers - The Why and How of Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Open Source Intelligence
Hamilton-Tweedale, Brian. University of Sheffield, UK; 1987
The British press and Northern Ireland : a case study in the reporting of violent political conflict.
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The evolution of international aviation security : from politics to warfare.
Hawes-Bilger, Cordula. University of Zurich, Switzlerland; 2007
War zone language : linguistic aspects of the conflict in Northern Ireland
Haynes, Michael Wilfred. University of Glasgow, UK; 1998
German cultural responses to the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion)
von der Heiden, Gregor. Umeå University, Sweden; 2009
Gespräche in einer Krise : Analyse von Telefonaten mit einem RAF-Mitglied während der Okkupation der westdeutschen Botschaft in Stockholm 1975
[Conversations in a crisis : Analysis of telephone communication with a member of the Red Army Faction during the 1975 occupation of the West German embassy in Stockholm]
Hillebrand, Claudia. Aberystwyth University, U.K.; 2010
The Democratic Legitimacy of EU Counter-Terrorism Policing: Challenges for Parliamentary and Judicial Scrutiny.
Hjeds Löfmark, Monika. Växjö University, Sweden; 2008
Essays on transition
ΛΟΒΕΡΔΟΣ, ΑΝΔΡΕΑΣ. Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki, Greece; 1986
ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟ ΕΓΚΛΗΜΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ. ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗ ΣΤΗ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΥΟ ΕΝΝΟΙΩΝ ΑΠΟ ΠΛΕΥΡΑΣ ΠΟΙΝΙΚΟΥ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ
[On Terrorism and Political Crime]
Homewood, Christopher James. University of Leeds, U.K.; 2008
From Baader to Prada The Representation of Urban Terrorism in German-Language Film.
Houghton, Brian. Pardee RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 2004
Gearing Up and Getting There: Improving Local Response to Chemical Terrorism.
Howell, David R. Pardee RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 2009
Finding Needles in a Haystack: A Resource Allocation Methodology to Design Strategies to Detect Terrorist Weapon Development.
Hughes, Jennifer S. The University of Manchester, U.K.; 2009
Performance in a time of terror: Critical mimesis and the age of uncertainty.
Huseyin, Demir. University of Leeds, U.K.; 2000

The role and treatment of political parties in liberal democracies with reference to the United Kingdom, Turkey and the European Convention on Human Rights.
Jansen, Pia Therese. St. Andrews University, U.K.; 2008

The consequences of Israel's counter terrorism policy.
Jenkin, Clinton Michael. University of New Hampshire, U.S.A.; 2006

Responses to terrorism scenarios: Event features, individual characteristics, and subjective evaluations. Jones, Steven David. University of Sussex, U.K.; 2009

Selfhood as instance of Horror: Ontology, Ideology, and Narratives of Body-Terror.
Kalidheen, Rufus. University of South Africa, South Africa; 2008

Policing mechanisms to counter terrorist attacks in South Africa.
Kelly, Aaron James. Queen's University Belfast, U.K.; 2000

'Utterly resigned terror' : the thriller and Northern Ireland since 1969.
Kim, Joongho. University of Hawai'i at Manoa, U.S.A.; 2008

The sources of North Korean terrorism: Analyses at three levels.
Kiser, Steve. Pardee RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 2005

Financing Terror; An Analysis and Simulation to Affect Al Qaeda's Financial Infrastructures.
Kistner-Bahr, Hanna. University of Köln, Germany; 2010

Die Entwicklungstendenzen Europols im europäischen Integrationsprozess : mögliche Ausweitung der Befugnisse Europols vom Informationsaustausch zur Ermittlungskompetenz unter Berücksichtigung des Vertrages von Lissabon.
Koh, Jae-myong. University of Edinburgh, U.K.; 2006

The suppression of the financing of terrorism : the evolution and implementation of international standards.
Lambert, Joseph J. University of Cambridge, UK; 1988

The response of the international community of states to terrorism as exemplified in the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979.
Lee, Jennifer E. C. University of Ottawa, Canada; 2007

Terrorism risk perception and individual response in Canada: A social-cognitive perspective.
Leong, Angela Veng Mei. University of London, U.K.; 2006

Serious organised crime and terror : an analysis of legal and non-legal strategies in the context of criminal justice.
Le Sage, André. University of Cambridge, UK; 2004

Somalia and the war on terrorism: political Islamic movements & US counter-terrorism efforts
Levi, Michael Abraham. King's College (University of London), U.K.; 2006

Rethinking nuclear terrorism.
Lindquist, Torkel. Uppsala, Sweden; 2001

A war of words: from Lod to Twin Towers: defining terrorism in Arab and Israeli newspapers 1972-1996
Llobet Anglí, Mariona Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain; 2009

Terrorismo y "guerra" contra el terror: límites de su punición en un estado democrático
Loiler, Molly. University of Southern California, U.S.A.; 2006

The role of the school in responding to and educating about terrorism.
Loof, J.P. Leiden University, The Netherlands; 2005

Mensenrechten en staatsveiligheid: verenigbare grootheden? : Opschorting en beperking van mensenrechtenbescherming
Lugton, Alis Margaret. University of Leeds, U.K.; 2008

Citizen UK 2000 and the European Convention for the promotion and protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms.
Γεωργιάδης Νικόλαος 2008 Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Greece; 2008

Εξουσία, τεχνολογία και πολιτισμός: οντολογικές και κοινωνικο-πολιτικές προσεγγίσεις
[Power, technology and culture]
Mabrey, Daniel. ISVG; West Haven ,CT, USA; May 2006

Tactical Terrorist Analysis- A Comparison of Statistical Learning Techniques to Predict Culpability for Terrorist Bombings in Two Regional Low-Intensity Conflicts
Makarenko, Tamara. University of Wales, Aberystwyth, U.K.; 2005

The crime-terror continuum : modelling 21st century security dynamics.
Markovic, Vesna. ISVG; West Haven ,CT, USA; December 2008

Suicide Bombings and Lethality - A Statistical Analysis of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Mendel, Jonathan Michael. University of Durham, U.K.; 2007
Virtual wars: a comparative analysis of the 1991 Gulf War and the 'War on Terror'.
Moeckli, Daniel. University of Nottingham, U.K.; 2006
Whose liberty? : the 'war on terrorism', human rights and non-discrimination.
Morakabati, Y. Bournemouth University, U.K.; 2007
Tourism, travel risk and travel risk perceptions: a study of travel risk perceptions and the effects of incidents on tourism.
Mullin-Jackson, Angela. Middle Tennessee State University (Murfreesboro, Tennessee) U.S.A.; 2009
Racial and Cultural Otherness; The Lived Experience of Americans of Korean Descent.
Murphy, Martin N. The University of Reading, U.K.; 2007
Small boats, weak states and dirty money: Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism's threat to international security.
Muro Ruiz, Diego. London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), U.K.; 2004
Ethnicity and violence : the case of radical Basque nationalism.
Mylonaki, Emmanouela-Anastasia. University of Bristol, U.K.; 2007
The contemporary counter-terrorism model of inter-state co-operation.
O'Regan, Mary. University of Stirling, UK; 2006
Framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict : a case-study analysis of the Irish national 'opinion leader' press - July 2000 to July 2004.
Odora Hoppers, Catherine A. Stockholm University, Sweden;1998
Structural violence as a constraint to African policy formation in the 1990s : repositioning education in international relations.
Oehmichen, Anna 2009 Leiden University, The Netherlands; 2009
Terrorism and anti-terror legislation - the terrorised legislator? A comparison of counter-terrorism legislation and its implications on human rights in the legal systems of the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and France.
O Regan, Mary. The University of Stirling, U.K.; 2006
Framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict : a case-study analysis of the Irish national opinion leader press - July 2000 to July 2004.
Ozguler, Mustafa. Kent State University, U.S.A.; 2008
Comparing and assessing the preparedness of police organizations in counter-terrorism (Netherlands and United Kingdom).
Pineu, Daniel Filipe Dos Ramos. The University of Wales, Aberystwyth, U.K.; 2009
The Pedagogy of Security: Police Assistance and Liberal Governmentality.
Pitcher, Ben. University of East London, U.K.; 2007
Multicultural Nationalism New Labour and the Politics of Race and State.
Rae, Norman G. D. University of Glasgow, U.K.; 2007
Reinventing geopolitical codes in the post-Cold War world with special reference to international terrorism.
Reilly, Paul. University of Glasgow, U.K.; 2008
Framing online communications of civil and uncivil groups in post-conflict Northern Ireland.
Richards, Anthony. St. Andrews University, U.K.; 2003
Political fronts of terrorist groups a comparative study of Northern Ireland political fronts, their evolution, roles and potential for attaining political change.
Richardson, Alexia. University of Durham. U.K.; 2008
Traces of terror : photography and memory of political violence in Argentina and Peru.
Robison, Kristopher K. Ph.D., The Ohio State University, U.S.A.; 2007
The challenges of political terrorism: A cross-national analysis of the downward spiral of terrorist violence and socio-political crisis.
Saul, Ben. Oxford University, U.K.; 2005
Defining 'terrorism' in international law.
Schachter, Jonathan. Pardee RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 2002
The Eye of the Believer: Psychological Influences on Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making.
Shah, Mohamed Shah bin Hussin. University of Exeter, U.K.; 2006
Terrorism in Malaysia : an investigation into Jemaah Islamiah.
Singh, Ajaindra. Glasgow Caledonian University, U.K.; 2008
An Exploration of Perceived Effectiveness of the National Terrorism Insurance Scheme in the Post-9/11

Environment: The Case of the UK Pool Reinsurance Company: Volume 1.
Spencer, Alexander. Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München, Germany; 2010
The tabloid terrorist: the predicative construction of 'new terrorism' in the media.
Spiegel, Eric Baron. University of Maryland, College Park, U.S.A.; 2005
Internal and environmental buffers of terrorism-related anxiety.
Sproat, Peter Alan. University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK; 1997
An investigation of the concept of state terrorism.
Stampnitzky, Lisa Rachel. University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.; 2008
Disciplining an unruly field: Terrorism studies and the state, 1972-2001
Stanley, Wesley. Georgetown University, U.S.A.; 2010
Examining the link between regime type and terrorism: An evaluation of recent trends.
Teemu, Sinkkonen. University of Tampere, Finland; 2009
Political Responses to Terrorism: Case study on the Madrid terrorist attack on March 11, 2004, and its aftermath
Tellidis, Ioannis. St. Andrews University, U.K.; 2008
Preventing terrorism? : conflict resolution and nationalist violence in the Basque country.
Tinnes, Judith. Saarbrücken University, Germany; 2010
Internetnutzung islamistischer Terror- und Insurgentengruppen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von medialen Geiselnahmen im Irak, Afghanistan, Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien.
Toros, Harmonie. The University of Wales, Aberystwyth, U.K.; 2009
Terrorism, Talking and Transformation, Northern Ireland and Mindanao.
Turksen, Umut. University of West of England, Bristol, U.K.; 2008
Protection seekers, states and the new security agenda.
Valiyev, Anar. University of Louisville, U.S.A;2007
Urban terrorism: Do terrorists target cities and why.
Van de Voorde, Cecile Valerie. University of South Florida, U.S.A.; 2006
Freedom fighters, freedom haters, martyrs, and evildoers: The social construction of suicide terrorism. Vanhala, Helena. University of Oregon, U.S.A.; 2005
Hollywood portrayal of modern international terrorism in blockbuster action-adventure films: From the Iran hostage crisis to September 11, 2001.
Vasconcelos, Maria Luisa Silva de. University of Aberdeen, U.K.; 2003
Terrorism and the use of violence in Portugal : from the establishment of the Estado Novo to democratic stability.
Wittig, Timothy Simon. St. Andrews University, U.K.; 2009
Power, value, and the individual exchange : towards an improved conceptualization of terrorist finance. Wong, Yuna Huh. Pardee. RAND Graduate School, U.S.A.; 2006
Ignoring the Innocent: Non-combatants in Urban Operations and in Military Models and Simulations.
Yayla, Ahmet. University of North Texas, U.S.A.; 2005
Terrorism as a social information entity: A model for early intervention.

Conference Calendar

by Benjamin J.E. Freedman, Editorial Assistant of 'Perspectices on Terrorism'

CONFERENCE	LOCATION	DATE	ORGANIZER	WEBSITE
2010 International Terrorism and Organized Crime Conference	Disneyland Hotel, Anaheim, California	2-6 August 2010	Asian Gang Investigators' Association of California, Inc.	http:// www.agiac.co m/ conference_2 010.htm
Police-Trexpo East	Dulles Expo & Conference Center, Chantilly, VA	17-19 August 2010	Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine	http:// east.trexpo.co m
International Cyber Resilience Conference	The Duxton Hotel Perth, Perth, Western Australia	23-24 August 2010	secau - Security Research Centre, Edith Cowan University	http:// conferences.s ecau.org/ cyberresilienc e/
Terrorism and New Media: Building a Research Network	Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland	8-9 September 2010	Centre for International Studies, Dublin City University	http:// www.dcu.ie/ ~cis/TNM/ index.html
Screens of Terror: Representations of War and Terrorism Since 9/11 in Film, TV Drama & Documentary	Abbey Conference Centre, London Road Building, London South Bank University	9-11 September 2010	Center for Media and Culture Research, London South Bank University	http:// screensofterro r.blogspot.co m/

CONFERENCE	LOCATION	DATE	ORGANIZER	WEBSITE
The IISS Global Strategic Review	Geneva, Switzerland	10-12 September 2010	International Institute for Strategic Studies	http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-review/
World Summit on Counter Terrorism: ICT's 10th International Conference	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel	12-15 September 2010	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism	http://www.ict.org.il/AnnualConference/Conference2010/AbouttheConference/tabid/86/Default.aspx
Global Media and the 'War on Terror'	University of Westminster, London	13-14 September 2010	Communication and Media Rsearch Institute (CAMRI) of the University of Westminster, London, in collaboration with the Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London	www.westminster.ac.uk/schools/media/camri/events/camri-events-calendar/2010/global-media-and-the-war-on-terror-an-international-conference

CONFERENCE	LOCATION	DATE	ORGANIZER	WEBSITE
SPIE Security + Defense 2010	Centre de Congrès Pierre Baudis, Toulouse, France	20-23 September 2010	SPIE	http://spie.org/x6201.xml
International Port Security: Communication, Cooperation & Coordination	Hilton Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain	29-30 September 2010	SMi Group Ltd.	www.smi-online.co.uk/events/overview.asp?is=16&ref=3520
Asia-Oceania Resilience Conference	Parkroyal Hotel, Singapore	5-6 October 2010	International Association of Emergency Managers	http://www.iaem.com.sg/Asia-Oceania-Resilience-2010.htm
Counter Terrorism and the 2012 Olympics Conference and Exhibition	The Oxford Belfry Hotel, Oxfordshire, UK	12 October 2010	The Investigator	http://www.the-investigator.co.uk/files/Counter_Terror_Conference_Web.pdf
Liberty and Security in the Age of Terrorism	Lexington, Kentucky	22-24 October 2010	Commonwealth Security Studies Laboratory, Morehead State University	http://csslab.org/?page_id=10
5th Annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference and Exposition	Palace Station Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada	25-29 October 2010	The Counter Terrorist Magazine	http://www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference/

CONFERENCE	LOCATION	DATE	ORGANIZER	WEBSITE
International Conference on Conflict Terrorism, and Society, "Putting People First: Terrorism and Human Security"	Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey	2-4 November 2010	Kadir Has University	http://sites.google.com/site/societiesundersiege/Home
20th Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law Conference	Downtown, Washington, DC	4-5 November 2010	American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Law and National Security	http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/
Counter Terrorism	Hilton London Kensington, London	10-11 November 2010	SMi Group Ltd.	www.counterterrorism-conf.com
2010 Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology Conference	Orlando, Florida	15-19 November 2010	The Defense Threat Reduction Agency	http://cbdstconf2010.sainc.com/general_information/default.aspx
CICA/STR 4th Annual International Conference on Aggression, Political Violence and Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach for a Peaceful Society	International Convention Center Julio Cesar Turbay, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, South America	18-20 November 2010	Society for Terrorism Research (STR) and Coloquios Internacionales sobre Cerebro y Agresión (CICA)	http://www.4thconferenceinternational.com/the-conference

CONFERENCE	LOCATION	DATE	ORGANIZER	WEBSITE
2010 secau Security Congress [includes: 8th Digital Forensics Conference; 8th Information Security Management Conference; 11th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference; 3rd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference; 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference]	The Duxton Hotel Perth, Perth, Western Australia	30 November-2 December 2010	secau - Security Research Centre, Edith Cowan University	http://conferences.secau.org/
The Seventh IISS Regional Security Summit: the Manama Dialogue	Manama, Bahrain	3-5 December 2010	The International Institute for Strategic Studies	http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-iiss-regional-security-summit/

Book Reviews
by Alex P. Schmid

Jeffrey F. Addicott. Terrorism Law. Materials, Cases, Comments. 5th edition. Tucson, Arizona: Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, Inc., 2009. 622 pp. ISBN-13: 978-1-933264-64-6 (hc).

Terrorism is a form of violence without legal restraints. "The law", on the other hand, tries to restrain terrorist crimes. Many who advocate a more muscular approach to terrorism prefer a military campaign to a law enforcement approach for dealing with terrorism. Yet the military too is subject to restraints when dealing with terrorism; bound by the laws of war, it cannot fight "fire with fire" without loosing the moral high ground. The law punishes those who transgress it but terrorism is often not only an act of provocation but also a form of punishment, motivated by revenge. The relationship between terrorism and law is a complex one. One of the great merits of Prof. Addicott's work is to make this complexity visible. The 5th (2009) edition of this seminal textbook maintains the same chapter structure as the 4th (2007) edition but is 65 pages longer, updating the broad ground covered already in previous editions. Dr. Addicott is Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas. Until 2000, Jeffrey Addicott was an active duty Army officer and senior legal advisor to the United States Army's Special Forces. He is a strong advocate of preventing violations of humanitarian law in the War on Terror and his textbook devotes entire chapters to controversial issues like "Interrogation Techniques" (ch. 6) and "Contractors on the Battlefield" (ch. 7). In chapter 4 he also looks at the role of human rights law addressing. In chapter 9 he calls for "A New Paradigm for War and Terrorism Avoidance". He pleads that "the world's most precious commodities – the promotion of democratic values and human rights – must not become casualties in the War on Terror" (p. xviii).

Addicott's volume is written primarily for students of law who will find this one of the best introductions into "terrorism law" in its evolving national (US) and international complexity. With such an audience in mind he discusses extensively case law (e.g. Hamadan v. Rumfeld, Boumediene v. Bush and Padilla v. Hanft). The book contains more than a dozen appendices reproducing key US and UN texts. Given the author's background, the textbook provides us with insights into the legal thinking of both the Pentagon and the Supreme Court in matters of terrorism. Its outstanding features are its clarity and well-argued judgments. Where this reviewer finds it hard to follow the author, however, is in his assessment of perceptions of the Green Berets in the sub-chapter "The Role of Special Forces" (ch. 9.12). He claims that the US "Army Special Forces soldiers are universally recognized and respected as efficient, professional and humanitarian" (p.392). My reservations also extend to his discussion of the humiliation and torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib (ch. 6.8) where he settles too easily for the few "bad apples"

theory (p. 278). However, this does little to detract from the overall value of the textbook.

Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (Eds.) . Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. London, New York: Routledge, 2009 (2007 hc). 406 pp. ISBN-13: 978-0-415-48319-3 (pbk).

With twenty-five chapters by 32 (co-) authors, this handbook offers a fairly comprehensive overview of the state of the art in conflict- and peace research, addressing such issues as mediation, conflict (mis-)management, reconciliation, peace education and international law. One of the editors, Johan Galtung, is one of the founders of the field of peace and conflict studies. Yet his own introduction on "peace by peaceful conflict transformation – the TRANSCEND approach" is strangely idiosyncratic. But his brief concluding chapter (co-authored by Charles Webel) on the past and future of peace and conflict studies in which he pleads for "Bridging the gap between peace movement moralism and foreign policy pragmatism" (p. 399) is more accessible. Those interested primarily in terrorism will find the volume unsatisfactory. While much is to be said for studying terrorism within a framework of other forms of violence and non-violent political actions, and address all of these within a wider framework of conflict-waging at various levels, the volume has little to offer in this regard. "Terrorism" and "terrorists" receive only 8 and 10 brief mentions in the index (plus 2 for "terror" and 2 for "Al Qaeda"). While a sub-title on Charles Webel's introduction is "Peace and its antithesis: terror and terrorism" (p.8), this idea is not worked out. In fact, counter-terrorism rather than terrorism is seen as the main problem in much of the volume. The chapter by Kinhide Mushakoji, Director of a Peace Research Institute in Tokyo and former Vice President of the International Political Science Association, is one of the most ideological ones of the entire volume. According to Mushakoji, the "War on Terror, is a new form of colonialism", "a global form of fascism" (p.91).

In a chapter on "Nuclear disarmament", David Krieger, founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, argues that "With nuclear weapons, an extremist group such as al Qaeda might conceivably bring even the most powerful country to its knees. And it could do so without fear of retaliation, since such a group could not be located" (p. 113). While deterrence is indeed difficult and perhaps impossible when the location of the opponent is not immediately known, that does not mean that a non-state group in possession of one or even several crude nuclear weapons could bring a superpower to its knees. More likely, a nuclear attack might trigger an over-reaction from that "most powerful country" and lead to the formation of an unprecedented forceful international coalition against those who are associated with the terrorist cause. The ability to escalate conflict rapidly to unprecedented levels is so much larger on the side of the most powerful country that any rational terrorist non-state actor would most likely be dissuaded and any irrational terrorist actor would hopefully be replaced by saner elements in the terrorist entourage. At this moment in time, the fear of non-state, going nuclear is generally exaggerated

in the political discussion and while the desire to lay their hands on the "ultimate weapon" exists among a handful of terrorist groups, their capabilities to do so are still largely absent. As a whole, the Handbook is of uneven quality; there are many sound ideas about peace-making but there is also a great deal of leftish ideology where one would have wished for more evidence-based, empirical social science research findings.

Thomas Riegler. Terrorismus. Akteure, Strukturen, Entwicklungslinien. Innsbruck, Wien: Studien Verlag, 2009. 635 pp. ISBN 978-3-7065-4604-1.
[Terrorism. Actors, Structures, Trends].

The book is a slightly revised text of a doctoral dissertation by an Austrian academic and journalist who studied history and politics at the universities of Vienna and Edinburgh. It has been said that historians tend to do a great deal of research to publish about a very small subject area and that political scientists work the other way round. Riegler masterpiece has 2395 footnotes and a literature list of more than 50 pages, combining historical depth with the broader sweep of political scientists - but written with the flair of a journalist. Like few others, Riegler's book succeeds in placing the events of 11 September 2011 in context, unpacking the complexities behind the often one-dimensional portrayal of the phenomenon in media, politics and, unfortunately, also parts of academia.
Part I of the volume provides a skillful synthesis of established knowledge on the conceptual, historical and sociological background of terrorism whereby special emphasis is placed on the evolution of the idea of terrorism as "propaganda by the deed". By consistently taking into account state reactions to terrorism since the days of the anarchists, Thomas Riegler manages, in Part III, to show convincingly that some typical state reactions to insurgent terrorism tend to be clearly counter-productive. Where Riegler really enters new and largely unchartered territory is in Part II where he deals with the "Interpretation, Construction and Visualization of Terrorism" . He elaborates in detail the mechanisms of what Brian Jenkins called the "terrorism as theatre", demonstrating how terrorists try to score in a bloody "war of images" that is meant to shock the public and put pressure on governments. He also manages to make plausible what inspiration even fictional media products (e.g. from Italo-Western) could provide for some young people who became members of the Baader-Meinhof group (p.p.248-255).

While many other writers point to socio-economic crises as enabling the emergence of terrorism, Riegler's interpretation, while not disregarding the trigger role of crises, focuses more on the great importance of elements from the ideological suprastructure - the role of powerful ideas, the construction of meaning that bundles fantasies, longings and projections in those individuals who seek revolutionary self-realization through spectacular deeds. He identifies for both left-wing and jihadist terrorists the mechanism of "acting out" as a source of power motivating many non-state terrorists. Or, in the words of one Italian terrorist he quotes: "The main thing was the feeling to be able to influence the world around you, rather than experience it passively" (p. 569). Terrorism is a combination of violence and communication and Riegler's study offers strong support for the view that the battle of ideas is more important in the fights against terrorism than disproportional kinetic action that often creates more new recruits than counter-terrorists manage to neutralize by force. All in all, this volume convinces by its comprehensiveness and the balanced fairness of its evaluations. Had it been published in English, it would, I am sure, already have been recognized as a truly outstanding addition to Terrorism Studies.

About Perspectives on Terrorism

PT seeks to provide a unique platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the field of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. It invites them to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research an analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) could be characterized as 'nontraditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-based subscription journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles - but without compromising professional scholarly standards. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles we expect contributors to adhere to.

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community and seeks to empower it by creating synergies that can extend the impact of each participant's research endeavours.

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